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ABSTRACT
Freedom of religious and belief is a recognized right in international law. In order to 
understand, interpret, develop and implement this right, it is important to go back and 
analyse the fundamental reasoning behind this right. Freedom of religion and belief is 
a contradictory right: a freedom for self-constraint. It is a double-sided right, a right of 
expression and a right of identity, two aspects related to individual and group 
perceptions of this right. Therefore, this right must be understood through a conflict 
between competing conceptions of individual and group rights. International law 
should protect the religious freedoms of individuals, and should protect groups only 
as derivative from the rights of individuals, and never in contravention of them, and 
generally does so. Current tendencies towards recognising group rights raise concerns, 
highlighting the importance of this determination. The conceptual analysis of the right 
serves as a critical tool for discussion of specific conflicts of rights regarding religious 
freedom, in different area of legal regulation.
Different state constitutional structures concerning religion have important 
implications for analysis of the group/individual conflict. A categorization of 
constitutional arrangements shows that each presents problems for guaranteeing 
religious freedom. The constitutional analysis shows religions have public 
characteristics, and so must abide by human rights norms. The recognition of group 
rights compromises state neutrality, central to liberal theory. Whatever their 
constitutional arrangement, states must allow participation in religious communities 
while protecting individual rights.
Particular conflicts are analysed: A conflict between group and individual rights exists 
between community religious autonomy and women’s rights. While international law 
has been decisive in mandating supremacy of individual rights in this conflict, it has 
not addressed some of the root causes undermining women’s individual rights. 
Children’s religious freedom, in conflict between state, religious group, family, and 
child, has not always been amply protected in international law, due to absence of 
differentiation between group and individual interests. Lastly, use of speech by 
individuals directed against, or in conflict with, religious groups, such as blasphemy, 
proselytism or hate speech, is addressed.
Discussion of these conflicts examines difficulties created, and shows that although 
some states, based on their respective histories, religions, and cultures, protect the 
group over the individual, ultimately only an individualistic approach of international 
law is a coherent way of protecting religious freedom as a human right.
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INTRODUCTION
‘What is the area within which the subject... is or should be left to do or be 
what he is able to do or be without interference from other persons? ’... ’What 
or who is the source o f control or interference that can determine someone to 
do, or be, this rather than that? ’ The two questions are clearly different even 
though the answers to them may overlap.
Isaiah Berlin [1969] p. 118
Freedom of religion is a seeming contradiction in terms. Freedom is the absence of 
constraint, religion is a self-imposed constraint on freedom. Freedom of religion is 
thus a unique human right. Religion is an all-encompassing normative system, 
providing a complete value system for all aspects of life. Therefore, it poses an 
authority alternative to that of the state. In this, religious freedom is different from 
other human rights. Other human rights, such as free speech or privacy, are not 
associated with an alternative normative system. There is simply no such thing as a 
normative system of speech or of privacy. The construction of the right of freedom of 
religion must therefore deal with elements of constraint as well as freedom, and so the 
interpretation and protection of religious freedom as a human right is more 
complicated than that of other rights.
Because of this nature of religions as systems of rules, religions might claim group or 
institutional determinations to supersede individual autonomy. In fact, a vital 
constitutive part of many religions might be the ability of the group or its institutions 
to make binding determinations for its members. As will be seen, the group can stand 
in conflict not only with non-members but also with its members and its own 
dissenting sub-groups.
Religions as communal normative systems, alternative to legal authorities, operate on 
different levels, from the smallest community - the family - to transnational 
communities. Religion can form an important part of state identity, particularly in the 
process of state building, as did, for instance, the rise of autocephalous Churches in 
the states of the former Soviet Union (manifested in the legal regulation of
9registration of religions1). Religion can be a force behind regime change (Iran), or 
aligned with it (Franco’s Spain). Legitimation of religion can be associated both with 
democratization (post-Soviet Russia) and with a change to totalitarianism. Religion is 
often entwined with other aspects of the state. Indeed, the relationship between state 
and religion is not static. Religious changes can cause constitutional changes, and 
changes of regime can use religion to power the political and constitutional change. 
With the arrival of new religious groups, through immigration or mass conversion, 
states which before had only to determine their legal relationship with a predominant 
religion, now have to do so with several religions, which may serve for their members 
as competing sources of authority with the state.
Any determination in international law as to how states must accord the right to 
religious freedom restricts the state’s ability to manifest its own ideology and restricts 
its sovereignty. This is true regarding all international protection of human rights, but 
especially so with religious freedom, as the religious, or alternatively secular, outlook 
is often an important part of the state’s self-definition. Nevertheless, perhaps even 
more so because of this, it is a restriction which must be made in order truly to accord 
religious freedom.
This study argues that central to the interpretation of religious freedom is the 
understanding of the clash between individual claims and group claims. It argues that 
religious freedom is foremost an individual right; a right of groups can only be a right 
derivative of individual rights, and thus can never supersede them. Conceptually, 
group rights of religious freedom do not exist except as aggregates of individual right. 
Therefore, such rights should not be recognized (except as derivative rights). States 
do, in practice, recognize group rights. For this reason, I will refer to group rights, 
where such have been recognized, even though their existence and legitimacy is 
disputed in this work. (I refer to group rights and community rights interchangeably, 
as there is no meaningful difference between the terms for the purposes of this work).
The argument in this study is both that the supremacy of individual rights to group 
rights ought to be the interpretation of international law, and that largely it is so.
1 See Chapter Three.
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Those instances in which states or international law have not followed this approach 
are shown precisely as illustrations of the problems such deviation creates.
The methodology employed is first a theoretical examination of what is meant by a 
group right and by an individual right, and by group and individual justifications for 
rights. I draw conclusions about the interpretation that should be preferred. I use this 
conclusion on different legal examples, looking at how they were decided, and how 
the analysis suggested here might lead to a different coherent analysis. The purpose of 
these examples is twofold: They both implement the thesis in specific cases, and by 
doing so, showing that indeed this is the best conclusion in each case, they strengthen 
the original thesis.
I use cases from different jurisdictions, both international and domestic, as examples 
of such conflicts of rights. International case-law is scarce, consisting of few decisions 
of the UN Human Rights Committee. General Comments and Concluding 
Observations on State Reports by the various committees under the UN human rights 
conventions were also helpful in analysing existing law and its required changes. 
More abundant is the regional case-law of the bodies of the European human rights 
system. I also utilize the few cases in this area of the African and American regional 
mechanisms.
A conscious attempt was made to use examples from a variety of Western and non- 
Westem jurisdictions, referring, if possible, to states with differing religious 
composition. The only criterion of choice was which cases best exemplified the 
problem discussed. Of particular importance to my work was the use of as wide as 
possible a spectrum of national and international jurisdictions. There is a 
predominance of cases from democratic states, as these are the most interesting for 
my discussion. While it is not surprising that states that are not democratic and do not 
respect human rights infringe religious freedom, it is more interesting to understand 
why states that are generally committed to human rights principles infringe this right. 
It is because the conflicts inherent within this right, exposed in this study, make it an 
impossible right to implement without following a conscious and coherent 
interpretation, which this work will try to suggest.
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Domestic law can be evidence of state practice, and therefore of the existence of 
customary international law2. In order to prove that state practice exists, uniform and 
extensive state practice must be shown to exist, accompanied by a belief of states that 
they are acting according to international law. As will be seen, there is mostly no 
uniform state practice which can be said to apply in the situations raised in this work, 
much less indications of opinio juris. Indeed, this work is not intended as a survey of 
the practice of states regarding religious freedom. Such surveys have been carried out 
elsewhere . The recourse to analysis of domestic law in this work serves another 
purpose: By seeing how states have dealt with problems involving the implementation 
of religious freedom, particularly those involving a conflict between individual and 
group rights, an insight into substantive arguments for group-rights approaches and 
for individual-rights approaches can be gleaned. The discussion of the conflicts in this 
work looks to reasonings of domestic courts, legislators and writers, which can further 
conclusions on desirable solutions in international law.
It may be noted, that there is an inherent problem in ascertaining general international 
law from the practice of states in the field of international human rights law, including 
religious freedom. Ascertaining the uniform practice of states would, in many cases, 
lead to the lowest common denominator of protection of rights, encouraging a ‘race to 
the bottom’, rather than setting a legal standard which reflects norms to which should 
aspire, and with which they must comply.
International law serves as the starting point of the discussion and as its end point. 
The aim of this work is to uncover the principles that should lead the implementation 
of this right in international law. It aims, through theoretical discussion and 
examination of practical examples, at showing the points of conflict of rights which 
international law has so far not addressed well, or at all. This discussion will lead to a 
conclusion about how it should address them in the future.
Chapter One, a short introductory chapter, provides a point of reference for the 
substantive legal discussion to follow. It introduces the main legal documents of
2 M. Shaw, International law. (5th ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) p.72-77.
3 See: Boyle and Sheen [1997].
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existing international legal protection of this right, showing the elements of individual 
and communal protection in the text of the documents themselves.
Chapter Two sets out the thesis of this work: that a key to understanding the right of 
religious freedom lies in the conflict between its interpretation as an individual right 
or as a group right. These interpretations will be learned from analysis of the classical 
liberal formulations of this right and their criticisms. The preferred interpretation is 
that of an individual right. A group (or community) right of religious freedom is only 
a derivative of individual rights and can never supersede them. This is correlated with, 
though not identical to, two perceptions of religious freedom: as a right of expression 
and as a right of identity.
The following chapters will show how the analysis introduced in Chapter Two can 
further our understanding of human rights conflicts involving religious freedom and 
what problems it encounters. The subjects of these chapters reflect a choice of 
different types of conflicts between group and individual in realization of the right to 
religious freedom. Each different type of conflict illuminates the thesis from a 
different aspect.
Chapter Three looks at the legal structures of religions within the state and how they 
impact upon freedom of religion. Particularly, I look at how the constitutional 
structure of the legal regulation relates to the interpretation of this right. To an extent, 
the following chapters of the thesis extrapolate the theme of this chapter to specific 
areas in which the legal regulation of the state impacts on religious freedom.
Chapter Four looks at the conflict between the individual rights of women and a group 
right of religious freedom. This is probably the most ubiquitous example of the clash 
of claims regarding religious freedom, and continues to be a major stumbling block to 
universal realization of human rights. It is also a clash rooted in principle, as the 
assignation of gender and family roles is a central tenet to the doctrine of many 
religions.
Chapter Five looks at religious freedom of children. The case of children raises a 
conflict between the individual and a different type of group from those previously
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discussed: the family. Additionally, there are conflicts involving the wider religious 
community. The chapter centers on the process of formation of religious identity, 
primarily through education. Thus, I examine in this chapter not just the religious 
freedom of students, but also of teachers, within the education system.
Chapter Six revisits the distinction between religious freedom as a right of identity 
and religious freedom as a right of expression, introduced in Chapter Two, and asks 
how analysis that calls attention to these two perceptions can help in deciding what 
will be offences of religious speech acceptable in a democratic society that respects 
human rights.
Some issues run throughout this study. Such is the issue of discrimination in the 
workplace, addressed in Chapters Three, Four and Five. The position of the worker in 
institutions of religious character emanates from the legal status accorded to religious 
organizations within the state. This status has particular implications for women 
workers and for workers in educational institutions. The problem of religious 
discrimination in the workplace thus intertwined with the issues of education of 
children and of the rights of women within the public and private sphere4.
An important issue which runs throughout this work is the public/private distinction. 
The classifications of bodies or activities as ‘private’ traditionally do not come under 
the ambit of law. This dichotomy will be questioned in the context of this work. 
Religion is private but it is also public. That is why it must be protected, but 
individuals must also be protected from it.
Another of the classical liberal conceptions challenged is that of voluntary choice and 
its implications. The often implicit presumption, that individuals willingly enter 
groups and thus accept all their rules, will be seen in different instances to be a 
fallacious basis for various legal determinations regarding individuals within the 
religious group, whether as employees in institutions, students in schools or men and 
women within a family. Throughout this work, it will be seen that legal
4 However, some issues relating to religious discrimination in the workplace are beyond the scope o f  
this work and will not be discussed. Such is, for example, the proposed US Workplace Religious 
Freedom Act, S. 893 108th Congress, currently under debate in the US senate.
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determinations have been made, based on assumptions of free will, which are at odds 
with the constraints imposed by the interacting forces of family, religion and 
community. The interpretation of religious freedom should take these into account.
Some issues have not been separately addressed, such as the claims of religious 
minorities themselves against the state (such as access to places of worship, right to 
communicate with co-religionists abroad). This is because this work does not examine 
the claims of groups towards the state, but the conflict between individual and group 
claims of religious freedom. The issues of legal requirements to address religious 
needs of religious communities, particularly minority communities, have been 
comprehensively discussed elsewhere5.
The right included in most national and international documents is that of freedom of 
religion, conscience and belief or a right to freedom of religion and belief. I will not 
deal with the right to freedom of conscience, but only with freedom of religion and 
religious belief. Neither will I deal with freedom of belief that lies outside the ambit 
of religious belief. This study is thus restricted, as the conflict of individual and group 
rights is a key to the understanding of the right of freedom of religion and religious 
belief, because of the nature of religion as a social institution. Freedom of conscience 
has been studied elsewhere6.
This study examines the issue of religious freedom from a completely different angle 
from that of previous works in the field. It does not aim at a comprehensive survey of 
one body of law, but rather enquires as to the nature of this right. It shows that 
recognition of group rights is not only opposed to the idea of human rights, but also 
results in inconsistent and unjustified determinations. However, I also show the 
problems entailed by the approach I advocate.
5 Thornberry [1990].
6 See for example: Hammer, [  2001], who examines solely the rights to freedom o f  conscience, offering 
discussion o f  issues deliberately not covered in this work such as conscientious objection to military 
service and to the payment o f  taxes.
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• . • HMajor studies of the legal right to religious freedom include that of Tahzib , who 
examines the existing international legal instruments protecting religious freedom, 
and examines the possibility and desirability of a completion of a binding convention 
safeguarding this right.
An important collection of essays edited by Witte and Van der Vyver8 comprises two 
volumes: one of religious perspectives on religious freedom, and one of legal 
perspectives. These include both articles from specific legal systems and articles 
relating to international law, covering a wide spectrum of counties and disciplines.
Carolyn Evans examines the principles which shape the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (and of the European Commission for Human 
Rights)9, while Malcolm Evans10 examines international law on religious liberty in 
Europe in the context of the historical development of the right to religious freedom. 
The collection of essays edited by Janis11 deals with a separate but connected topic of 
the way in which religions influenced the development of international law. Boyle 
and Sheen provide an extensive survey of the compliance with international law of 
countries across the world.
Of course, earlier work exists in the field, including studies commissioned by UN 
bodies engaged in the development of protection of religious freedom (as will be 
discussed), notably that of Krishnaswami13, and that found in the bibliography.
The recognised right under international law, including in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All
7 Tahzib, [1996].
8 Witte and Van der Vyver, £1996] vols. 1 and 2.
9 Evans, [ 2001].
10 Evans, £1997].
" Janis, [ 1991].
12 Boyle and Sheen, [1997].
13 Krishnaswami, [I960].
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Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief is a right to 
freedom of religion or belief. Since the term ‘belief is broader than ‘religion’, this 
work does not need to rely on a definition of religion. The definition of religion has 
been subject of much debate14. Substantive definitions are centred around concepts of 
theism, or belief in a supernatural being15. Functional definitions encompass any 
belief system16. All would be included, in any case, in the broader term ‘belief, as 
would atheism and agnosticism. Indeed, ‘belief includes ideological or philosophical 
beliefs that do not take a stand on religious issues. This delineation does not concern 
this work, and has been studied elsewhere17. The beliefs, practice and institutions of 
religions are protected under the right to freedom of religion in international law, to 
different extent. The extent of protection of religious institutions, especially, will be 
influenced by the approach taken to this right, whether as an individual or a group 
right.
The analysis presented in this work of the conflict between individual and group 
interpretations of religious freedom will shed light on the problematic nature of this 
right. Moreover, it will provide insight on the relationship between the constitutional 
structure of the state and the right of religious freedom. This analysis o f the 
relationship between constitutional structure and implementation of a human right 
may also be applicable to the interpretation of other human rights.
14 For some discussions o f  the definition see: Smart, [1979] p. 4 -  34; Greenawalt, [1984].
15 Associated with German phenomenology and the work o f  Weber, Otto, Wach, and Berger. See: 
Hunter, [1990] p. 58.
16 Associated with structuralism and the work o f  Durkheim, Malinowski and Talbot Parsons and with 
German sociological materialism and Marx, Engels, and Harrington. See, Hunter, [1990] ibid.
17 Evans, [2000] .
CHAPTER ONE: EXISTING PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before turning, in the next chapter, to the thesis of this work, and to an analysis of the right to 
freedom of religion and belief, this introductory chapter briefly examines the existing 
protection of religious freedom in international law.
International law is a starting point and an end point for this study. However, this study is 
concerned not with the existing international law regarding religious freedom, but with how it 
should be developed. It seeks to uncover the problems regarding this right that are largely 
disregarded by existing international law. It will do so by drawing on a theoretical proposal 
and discussion of legal examples.
The right to freedom of religion is recognized in international law and in all major human 
rights systems, but it is often reiterated without much thought given to the problems it creates. 
Often, the most pervasive infringements of rights emanating from the state’s actions towards 
religion are not viewed as issues of religious freedom. Only an analysis of the principles 
behind this right will allow a conclusion as to how it should be implemented in international 
law. However, to see how this analysis might fit into the existing legal framework and build 
upon it, we must first examine, in brief, the relevant international legal documents. The 
analysis will bring us back, throughout this study and its conclusion, to an understanding of 
how this right should be perceived and developed in international law.
The historical development of the right to freedom of religion and its incorporation in 
international legal documents reflects a move from protection of groups to recognition of the 
rights of the individual. A start of a counter-move is currently seen towards the incorporation 
of the protection of the rights of the group. While the current protection of religious freedom 
under international law is based on individual rights, a growing trend will be seen, reflected 
in proposed international documents and some regional documents towards a recognition of 
group rights. However, this would be a problematic development for the protection of the 
right to religious freedom, as will be discussed in this chapter.
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1. Historical underpinnings
A principle of tolerance of other religions was already recognized by several religions in 
antiquity1 . But the emergence of a legal principle of religious freedom parallels the 
emergence of international law itself. Initially, this freedom was recognized only as a 
freedom of the ruler to choose the religion of his territory, cuius regio eius religio. The Peace 
of Augsburg (1555) gave Lutheran princes the same status as Catholic princes and let the lay 
princes decide which of the two religions to adopt within their territories (with limited 
concession to those people already Lutheran to continue observing their faith) and gave the 
Lutheran Church self-governance. The Peace of Westphalia Treaties in 1648 concluded the 
Thirty Years War by setting up a regime of states with different Protestant faiths, obliging 
them to respect the diverging religious beliefs of individuals subject to their jurisdiction2. The 
state borders no longer paralleled the religious border, and religious freedom in a true sense 
was recognized. The authority of the sovereign under this regime was no longer seen to 
emanate from divinity but from the will of people. Thus, legal positivism in international law 
was bom. The Treaty of Westphalia guaranteed freedom of religion for three religions 
(Calvinist, Lutheran and Catholic Christian faiths). The Union of Utrecht (1579), which later 
became the Constitution of the Netherlands, had already guaranteed general freedom of 
religion. So, international law developed a right of religious freedom, but religious freedom, 
in turn, was pivotal to the development of international law.
Protection of religious minorities through bi-lateral treaties continued after the Peace of 
Westphalia, which modified the previous mle of cuius regio eius religio, the freedom of the 
ruler to choose the religion of his territory. Bi-lateral treaties since the 17th century 
incorporated religious protection clauses, usually on a basis of reciprocity between the
r * 3signatories . Religious rights were, in some cases, a condition for territorial arrangement or
1 See Chapter Two section 4, and discussion o f  the relation between religion and the sources o f  the law o f  
nations in antiquity in: Bederman, [2001] 48-85.
2 Evans M., [1997] chapter 2. But religion did not cease to influence statecraft after Westphalia ( McDougall, 
[1998]).
3 Such as the Treaty o f  Vienna (1616) and the Treaty o f  Carlovitz (1699) between Austria and Turkey (22 CTS 
219). See: Simpson, [2001] 110-111.
18
recognition of states4. This development in international law was the practical manifestation 
of the contemporary liberal philosophy, which wished to distinguish religion from state, in 
order to avoid conflict5. Since the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim powers too accepted these 
principles of European international law including full recognition of non-Muslim states, 
abandoning the shari’a principles of non-recognition of non-Muslim states and of a 
permanent state of war with such states6.
The era of modern protection of freedom of religion started after the First World War, with 
the League of Nations and the Minority Treaties. The Covenant of the League of Nations did 
not include a proposed article (Draft Article 20) prohibiting the parties from interfering with 
religious exercise. A set of minority treaties was entered into . Typical among these was the
o
1919 Minorities Treaty between the Principled Allied and Associated Forces and Poland , 
which committed Poland to non-discrimination of (among others) religious minorities, equal 
funding for educational, religious and charitable causes of minorities, and specifically Jewish 
education (an arrangement which failed in practice9), as well as an undertaking not to 
disadvantage Jews because of Sabbath observance. The treaty was monitored by the Council 
of the League of Nations. The structure of the treaty was triangular: Poland’s obligations 
towards the minorities were explicitly deemed international obligations between the 
signatories. The members of the Council of the League of Nations, and not the minorities 
themselves, were accorded the right to bring infractions to the attention of the Council or, 
ultimately, to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
4 Lerner, [1996] 94.
5 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.
6 An-Naim, [1990] Chapter 6.
7 Seventeen states were involved in fourteen treaties. Capotorti, [1979] 18. See list in Lauterpacht, [1948] 713 
fn. 1.
8Treaty Series, No. 8 (1919). Reprinted in Robinson, [1943] appendix I.
9 Robinson, [1943] 73.
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2. The right to freedom of religion in the major UN documents
Following the Second World War, it became clear that the League of Nations method of 
upholding religious freedom through group protection had collapsed. This was due to its 
failure of enforcement, and, ultimately, to its use by Hitler as a pretext for the invasion of 
Poland, and start of the Second World War10. The approach to the protection of human rights 
in the international arena changed from a minorities protection approach to a conception of 
universal individual rights as manifested in the early documents of the United Nations.
The United Nations Charter, drafted in 1945, states in article 1, among the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations :
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;
The phrase ‘without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’, copied also in 
subsequent human rights documents, was formulated in the San Francisco negotiations. The 
importance of this wording is the conceptual choice it reflects. A norm of anti-discrimination 
was chosed instead of any mention of minority protection, a preference furthered mostly by 
immigrant-absorbing countries such as the United States which feared the implications of 
minority-based wording11.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]12 adopted on December 10 1948,
states, in Article 18, that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
10 Morsink, [1999] p.27. See details o f  the developments in Polish -German relations in 1930-1931 leading up to 
this, Walters, [1952] 446-468. Today, as will be seen in this chapter and the following chapters, different 
enforcement mechanisms o f  different international and regional instruments protecting religious freedom have 
varying degrees o f  effectiveness.
11 Thornberry, [1990] 122-3.
12 UNGA Res. 217 A(III) (1948).
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The main point of contention in drafting this article was the right to change one’s religion. 
The inclusion of this right, together with Article 16 (which mandates equality in marriage) 
caused Saudi Arabia’s abstention on the vote on the Declaration13 as irreconcilable with the 
teachings of Islam.
Article 2 of the Declaration, the non-discrimination article, includes religion as an 
impermissible ground of discrimination in Declaration rights.
The Universal Declaration refers throughout to individual rights, except article 2614, which 
does not establish a right but refers to a duty to promote tolerance between religious groups. 
This conception of rights as individual rights is due, in part, to the position of Eleanor 
Roosevelt, as head of the first Commission on Human Rights, who was opposed to the idea of 
minority rights, and saw the solution to the problems of minorities in respect for human 
rights15. This position was supported by immigrant-absorbing states such as Chile16, and by 
those, like the Belgian delegate, apprehensive of provisions relating to minorities, because of 
the use of the presence of German minorities in other countries by Hitler as a pretext for 
German intervention17. The historical failure of the Minority Treaties in group protection thus 
played an important role in the shift towards protection of individual rights.
3. The International Human Rights Covenants
The same individual approach is evident in the UN Human Rights Covenants adopted in 
1966. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights18 [ICCPR] states, in article 18, 
a clear individual rights provision, that:
13 Nielsen, [2002] 356.
14 Article 26(2) “Education shall ... promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial 
or religious groups. . . . ”
15 Evans, [1997] 182.
16 Morsink, [1999] 251, (see also UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.15/p.6 discussed, ibid, 271).
17 E/CN.4/SR.73/ p.6 quoted in Morsink, [1999] 274. (The Belgian delegation later reversed its stand on this 
issue).
18 Adopted 16 D ecem berl966, 999 UNTS 171.
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1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freed.om to have 
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.
All rights in the Convention are guaranteed without discrimination on enumerated grounds, 
which include religion19. (Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights20 [ICESCR] mandates that all the rights which are included in that Covenant
•  • • • •  21must be exercised without discrimination on certain grounds, including religion ).
These provisions are complemented by article 27 of the ICCPR, which accords specific rights 
to members of religious (and other) minorities22. It should be noticed that Article 27 is 
carefully worded, so that individuals are still the bearers of the rights it accords. The Sub­
commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities discussed drafts of 
Article 2723 submitted to it24. The Sub-Commission changed the wording of the article from a 
collective wording “Ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
19 Article 2.
20 Adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 3.
21 Article 2 para.2.
22 Article 27: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members o f  their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”.
23 Report o f  Sub-Commission UN Doc E/CN.4/358, paras. 39-48.
24 Pursuant to UNGA Res. 217c(III) adopted 10 December 1948.
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language” to the individual subject “persons belonging to minorities shall not be denied the 
right...”. This was done because minorities were not seen as subjects of law. The Sub- 
Commission did acknowledge a communal character of the right by inserting the words ”in 
community with the other members of their group”25. The addition of the qualifying phrase 
“[i]n those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist” opened the door for 
states to argue that there are no minorities residing in their boundaries, thus allowing states an 
interpretation that the Article does not apply to them26.
Collective (or group) rights in UN human rights conventions appear regarding self- 
determination, in common article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICSECR, which states the right of 
“all peoples” to self-determination and to free use of their natural resources. (Collective rights 
also appear in article 1 of the Declaration on the Rights to Development27, which declares 
that the right to development is a right of “every human and all peoples”). Some 
commentators have noted, that the right to development is meaningless except as a right to be 
exercised by groups28, although others have claimed that the right to development is not and 
cannot be a collective human right .
Article 27 of the ICCPR, stating the right of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities, to enjoy their culture, process and practice their religion and use their 
language, is clearly different. Although couched in terms of individual rights, it has been 
described as ‘inherently collective’ . The Human Rights Committee stated that this is an 
individual right, but may give rise to a duty of a State towards a minority to protect its 
identity. This is clearly different from a group right of religious freedom.
25 Thornberry [1990] 149.
25 The Human Rights Committee has not yet examined a claim from a member o f  a religious minority under 
Article 27. De Zayas, [1992] points to HRC Comm. No. 208/1986 Singh Bhinder v. Canada  UN Doc. A /45/40  
Vol. II p. 50, in which the issue could have been raised but was not.
27 UNGA Res. 41/128 (1986).
28 Bedjaoui, [1991] 1182.
29 Donnelly, [1985]. Higgins, [1993], claims that the term ‘rights o f  peoples’ implies rights o f  the citizenry o f  
the state as a whole, as distinct from minority groups within it (as in Article 27 o f  the ICCPR) and so it is 
misleading to refer to these rights as group rights.
30 Steiner and Alston, [2000] 993.
31 General Comment 23 (CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add, 5) para. 6.2.
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If there were to be recognized a group right of religious freedom, it would raise a set of 
problems not encountered with the recognition of group rights to self-determination and 
development, relating to potential conflict between the rights of the group, as they are 
exercised, and the rights and choices of individuals within it. Group decisions, which exercise 
exisitng collective rights (such as the right to self-determination and use of natural resources 
in common Article 1), may conflict with choices of individuals within the group. (Someone 
may object, for instance, to the way natural resources are used). But the conflict between the 
exercise of religious rights of the religious group and freedom of belief of its members is 
inherent. This is because religions, by their very essence, seek to regulate every aspect of the 
lives of their members - public and private, moral and spiritual. In this respect, recognition of 
group rights of a religious group would be more problematic than recognition of group rights 
of linguistic or cultural groups. Language and culture typically encompass only some, mostly 
external, aspects of their members’ lives. The potential for conflict between group and 
individual determinations is therefore greater in respect of religion.
4. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (1981)
A subtle shift towards protection of group aspects of religious freedom can be seen in the 
newer, more particularized documents on religious rights. Following the report 
commissioned by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities from Special Rapporteur Arcot Krishnaswami32, efforts to achieve a binding 
convention on freedom of religion or belief have been made. These have not been, so far, 
successful, culminating in the aborted 1967 Draft Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Religious Intolerance33. What was achieved is the 1981 UN Declaration on the
32 Krishnaswami, [I960].
33 UN Doc A/8330 App. Ill (1971). See Tahzib, [1996] 145-155 (a narration o f  the events leading to the Draft 
Convention), and ibid, p. 423-483 (appraisal o f  the current prospects for such a convention).
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Elimination of All forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion and Belief34,
* * • 35which is the most detailed international instrument on religious rights and freedoms to date .
The Declaration is stated in terms of individual rights, but elaborates, in Article 6, on 
recognition of rights which are individual but exercised communally, such as the rights to 
worship or assemble in connection with religion, to teach religion or belief, to train and
36appoint leaders and to communicate with other communities in matters of religion . The 
Article is phrased in terms of individual rights, as it is merely an explication of what the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief includes. These are individual rights 
exercised communally rather than group rights. Thus, they do not raise the problems, which 
will be examined in this study, inherent in recognition of group rights.
The idea of the group as a unit of protection of religious freedom is, however, reflected in 
Article 5. The group protected is the most intimate one, the family -  a building block of the 
larger religious community. The parents are given the rights to organize life within the family 
in accordance with their religion and belief. This right is given in the context of the status of 
the child, but the right to organize the religious life of the family introduces a broader idea, of 
the family as an autonomous unit, a subject of rights, within the state. The implications and 
criticism of this approach will be seen in the discussion of the formation of religious identity 
and affiliation of children in Chapter Five.
34 UNGA Res. 36/55 adopted 25 November 1981.
35 While UN General Assem bly resolutions and declarations, such as the 1981 declaration, are not formal 
sources o f  law within the categories o f  Article 38 (1) o f the Statue o f  the International Court o f  Justice, the 
resolutions are very influential in the development o f  customary international law. See: Schachter [1991] 85.
36 Article 6: “In accordance with Article 1 o f  the present Declaration, and subject to the provisions o f  article 1, 
paragraph 3, the right to freedom o f  thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following 
freedoms:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these 
purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or
customs o f  a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or b elief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and 
standards o f  any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days o f  rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts o f  one's 
religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters o f  religion and belief 
at the national and international levels.”
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The right to change one’s religion or belief was omitted in the Declaration. This omission 
might be thought to detract from the individual aspect of religious freedom, as the right to 
change religion is important precisely to the dissenter, to the individual who wishes to 
distance himself from the group to which he was bom. However, this omission is more a 
concession to expediency than principle, as, in practical terms, the right was preserved. The 
right to change belief was included in the UDHR. While the 1981 Declaration does not 
expressly mention the right, it declares in Article 8, that nothing in the Declaration shall be 
construed as restricting or derogating from any rights defined in the UDHR or the
• • 37international human rights covenants. So, the shift is only illusory .
• • 38Finally, discrimination on the basis of religion might also be prohibited by customary law . 
However, it appears that only non-discrimination, which is an independent right as well as 
one aspect of religious freedom, is partially protected by customary law, while all other 
aspects of religious freedom are not.
S. International documents relating to national, religious and linguistic minorities and 
to indigenous peoples
The UN Declaration on Persons Belonging to National, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
199239 indicates a further step in the direction of according rights to minority groups. 
Although the rights in this Declaration are accorded individuals belonging to religious (and 
other) minorities40, it also declares that states must protect the religious identity (as well as 
other identities) of minorities41. The individual character of the rights is, however, retained
37 Elizabeth Odio Benito, the former Special Rapporteur Sub-commission on Prevention o f  Discrimination and 
Protection o f Minorities, believes this right is included in the 1981 Declaration even without reference to Article 
8 (Odio Benito, [1989] 50).
38 At least regarding systematic discrimination on grounds o f  religion. See: The Restatement [Third] o f  the 
Foreign Relations o f  the United States (1987) § 702 comment (j).
39 UNGA Res. 47/135 o f  18 December 1992.
40 See Article 2.
41 Article 1.
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and reinforced by the explicit right of minority members to choose to exercise their right 
either individually or in community with others42.
The Declaration provides that: “No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a 
minority as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights” in the 
Declaration43. However, it is not made clear if it is the state that may not cause such 
disadvantage to any person, or if also the minority group itself may not disadvantage the 
individual for his choice. (Indeed, if the state permits the group to cause such disadvantage, it 
is the state itself that is responsible for the infringement, as will be seen in Chapter Three).
One further step in recognition of group rights over individual rights is evident in an evolving 
category of international human rights documents regarding rights of indigenous peoples (a 
category which includes some, but not all, religious minorities). The Draft UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples44 differs markedly from existing UN instruments in that it is 
worded in the language of group rights45. The inherent problems of this approach are implicit 
in Article 33, which declares that, "indigenous peoples have a right to promote, develop and 
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive juridical customs, traditions, 
procedures and practices, in accordance with internationally recognised human rights 
standards”.
Thomberry suggests that, despite opposition from some representatives of indigenous peoples, 
both the collective right of Article 33, a right to indigenous juridical procedures, and its 
qualification, to adherence to human rights, should be retained. He suggests that a balance 
should be sought between individual and collective rights46. This is a problematic solution, as 
it is not clear who will decide on such balance of rights, and it gives no coherent reason as to 
why some individuals, but not others, must forsake their rights to the group.
42 Article 3(1).
43 Article 3(2).
44 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/Annex I.
45 Indeed, France viewed this as an attempt to provide new rights in international law (UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/102 para. 108), and the Netherlands expressed concerns about this (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102  
para. 109).
46 Thomberry, [2000] p. 381.
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Similarly, the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples47 48 
declares that indigenous law shall be recognized as a part of the states' legal system49, that 
indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and reinforce their indigenous legal systems 
and also to apply them to matters within their communities50, and that procedures concerning 
indigenous peoples shall include observance of indigenous law and custom51.
However, indigenous juridical customs, many of them religious, may stand in conflict with 
human rights norms. A right to a legal system is a group right, and hence it is in potential 
conflict with rights of individuals within the group. While Article 43 of the Draft UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples guarantees the rights recognized in the Draft 
Declaration equally to male and female indigenous individuals, it ignores the possibility that 
the rights enumerated in the Declaration itself, such as an indigenous juridical system, may 
operate in a manner discriminatory to members of the group. The Proposed American 
Declaration too ignores altogether the possibility of gender discrimination within indigenous 
law and custom.
6. Regional instruments
The right to freedom of religion is also recognized in major regional human rights 
instruments. Differences between formulations of the right in these documents indicate 
different perceptions of this right as a right of individuals or of groups and of its place in the 
state.
47 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples (Approved by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 26 February 1997) OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6.
48 Although the proposed American Declaration does not define indigenous people, it refers to groups with their 
own customs and traditions and distinguishing culture, but does not refer to religion (in Article 1). However 





The Americas -  The regional American approach to human rights is consistently one of 
individual, rather than group, protection52. It is also the approach of various Latin-American 
constitutions53. It stems from a view that as immigrant-absorbing countries, rights are granted 
to immigrants upon the premise of their assimilation into society as a whole and not as 
separate groups54. However, as mentioned above, in stark contrast to this approach, the 
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is one of the most group 
rights-oriented documents.
The American Convention on Human Rights protects religious freedom55 as a right of the 
individual, offering particularly broad protection to the right of the individual to dissent from 
the group. This is done both by specific mention of the right to disseminate one’s religion or 
belief56, and by adding to the right to change one’s religious belief the prohibition of any
C H
restrictions on this right . This would prohibit laws which place restrictions on proselytizing, 
which impair the right to change religion .
52 Thomberry, [1991] 20.
53 Such as those o f  Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico.
54 This approach was evident, as discussed above in the American delegates positions in the drafting o f  the 
UDHR. ( See Morsink [1999] p.251).
55 Article 12 o f  the American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1114 UNTS 123:
1. Everyone has a right to freedom o f  conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to 
maintain or to change one’s religions or beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one’s 
religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in public or in private.
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain or to 
change his religion or beliefs.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limitations 
prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
rights or freedoms o f  others.
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious and 
moral education o f  their children or wards that is in accord with their own convictions.
56 Article 12(1).
57 Article 12(2).
58 Such restrictions in Israel, Germany, Greece and France will be discussed in Chapter Six.
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Africa - The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights59 includes, in Article 8, 
the right to freedom of religion60. While other regional instruments allow the right to be 
qualified in certain conditions, the African Charter is the only such instrument to allow the 
right to be qualified under such a broad condition as “subject to law and order”. The reason 
for this qualification in the African Charter was the insistence of the Islamic signatory states, 
to which this qualification was important61. This gives considerable scope to the state to 
restrict religious freedom. However, it does not mean that Article 8 cannot be effectual. For 
instance, the African Human Rights Commission found Zaire in violation of article 8 in its 
harassment of Jehovah’s Witnesses without proof that the practice of their religion “threatens 
law and order”62.
Europe -  In Europe, two main regional legal frameworks exist which protect human rights, 
that of the Council of Europe, through the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms63, and that of the European Union, within its competence, 
in relation to member states of the EU and the EU itself. As well, there exist the non-legal 
instruments of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The European Convention guarantees a right of religious freedom in Article 964. A right to 
equality in protection of religious freedom is granted in Article 1465. It is not a general
59 Adopted 26 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5. 21 ILM 58.
60 Article 8: “Freedom o f  conscience, the profession and free practice o f  religion shall be guaranteed. N o one 
may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise o f  these freedoms”.
61 Johnson, [1992] 100.
62 Comm. 25/89, 47/90, 5 6 /9 1 , 100/93 Free Legal Assistance Group v. Zaire, 
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases
63 ETS 5.
64 Article 9 states:
(1)Everyone has the rights to freedom o f  thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching , practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests o f  public safety, for the protection o f  public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection o f  the rights and freedoms o f  others.
65 Article 14 states that: “[t]he enjoyment o f  rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any grounds such as ... religion...”.
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prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, but is limited to discrimination 
regarding Convention rights. A general prohibition on discrimination on any right in law is 
included only in Protocol 12, Article 1 to the Convention66.
Importantly, during the cold-war era67, the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe68, a non-legally binding instrument, provided that the participating 
states will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone 
or in community with others, religion or belief. The later 1989 Concluding Document of the 
Vienna Follow up Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe69, referred specifically to the rights of religious 
communities in Principle 16.
The later Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1990) guarantees an individually 
formulated right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief70. However, Part IV recognizes 
rights of national minorities, including the rights to religious identity, maintenance of
71religious institutions, and the right to profess and practice their religion . Here religious 
rights, even the right to profess and practice religion, are directly accorded to the group. 
Furthermore, the Participating States are required to create conditions for promotion of the 
religious (as well as ethnic, cultural and linguistic) identity72. The right to religious identity is 
accorded to the national minorities, while no separate mention is made of religious 
minorities. Religion is seen only as one of the defining characteristics of the national group. 
Identification as a member of the national minority is left to the individual’s choice73,
66 Protocol 12 will enter into force in April 2005. Eleven o f  the state parties have ratified it, so far. It states: “(1) 
The enjoyment o f  any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race ... religion... . (2) No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as 
those mentioned in paragraph 1.”
67 See: Buergenthal [1977] 134 -140 .
68 Final Act o f  the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (adopted 1 August 1975) 14 ILM 1292.






However, no mention is made of the rights of an individual who chooses to be part of the 
group, but would like to opt out of some of the group’s actions. (The importance of such a 
possibility will become apparent in the substantive discussions which follow, for instance, of 
women within religious communities in Chapter Four).
The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities74,
• » 75similarly recognizes religion only as a component of national minority identity , and not as a 
group identity on its own. It too protects the choice of the individual, whether or not to be
7 6 • •part of the minority, without suffering disadvantage as a result of this choice . This, again, is 
an “all or nothing” choice. No protection is given for an individual’s choice to be considered 
part of a minority for some purposes, but not for others.
The European Union does not currently have a comprehensive human rights convention. The
• 77Treaty Establishing the European Union, as amended by the Nice Treaty includes a 
provision concerning discrimination, whereby within its competence, the European Union 
may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on religion or belief (among
78other grounds) .
7Q
The negotiations on the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe exposed deep 
divisions regarding the inclusion of a mention of Christianity, mostly between Catholic states 
such as Poland which demanded it, and secular states such as France which opposed it. In the 
end no mention was made of Christianity, the Preamble referring only to the “spiritual and 
moral heritage” of the European Union.
74 1 February 1995, 34 ILM, (1995) 351. See generally: Oberleitner, [1999].
75 Along with language, traditions and cultural heritage, in articles 5 and 17. Articles 7 and 8 guarantee every 
person belonging to a national minority (among other rights) freedom o f  religion, conscience and belief, and the 
right to manifest religion and belief, and establish religious institutions, organizations and associations.
76 Article 3.
77 OJ C80, March 2001.
78 Article 13, The Consolidated Version o f  the Treaty Establishing the European Union.
79 O JC169, 18 July 2003.
32
Planned as a comprehensive human rights convention for the Union, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is currently a second chapter of the Draft
• R OConstitution. It includes the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion , a general 
non-discrimination provision on grounds which include religion81 (currently missing from the 
European Convention), and a provision that ’’the Union shall respect cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity”82.
A right related to religion, the right to marry and found a family83, is made subordinate to 
national legislation. Although subordination to national legislation is not exclusive to rights 
concerning religion84, it is notable that such deference to national law is present regarding 
family life, seen as a deeply cultural choice, which religion underlies. Thus, even this new 
international document shows deference to member states, precisely in those areas that 
religion underlies. An investigation of the rights of religious freedom of the individual vis-a- 
vis the group is thus as important as ever.
Having shown that the protection of religious freedom in international law has shifted from 
group protection to individual right, and now shows signs of shifting to incorporation of 
aspects of a group right, this study will show next why the conception of religious freedom 
should remain one of an individual right.
80 Article 11-10:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom o f thought, conscience and religion. This right includes 
freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance.
(2) The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws 
governing the exercise o f  this right.
81 Art 11-21(1): “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership o f  a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”
82 In Article 11-22.
83 Article II- 9.
84 See for example article 11-27 (workers’ right to information and consultation).
CHAPTER TWO: WHY IS THERE A RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION?
1. Introduction
In this work, I try to explain how international law should interpret the right to freedom of 
religion or belief, and how it should protect this right. I argue that it should be understood and 
protected, first and foremost, as an individual right and only in furtherance of individual 
rights should it be protected as a group right. In this chapter I base this argument on a 
theoretical analysis of the right. In the following chapters I argue for a coherent interpretation 
of international law based on the principles introduced in this chapter.
Other themes emerge throughout the discussion: The meaning of religion and its role in 
society and in individual life is culture-specific. More than subjects of other human rights, 
such as ‘torture’ (Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], Article 5) or ‘slavery’ 
(UDHR, Article 4), ‘religion’ is a concept defined by the culture to which it belongs. This 
concept loses much of its meaning outside its cultural context. Therefore, more than other 
human rights, freedom of religion can be interpreted differently by different cultures. The 
differences over the meaning of this right were even evident during the drafting of the article 
guaranteeing its protection in the Universal Declaration1.
According legitimacy to disparate policies regarding freedom of religion, as well as other 
rights, is at the centre of the debate between a cultural approach to human rights, and a 
universalist approach to human rights. However, relativistic interpretations are intrinsically
1 See: Glendon, [2000], who highlights the fact that the main controversy surrounding the drafting o f  the 
UDHR related to Article 18, specifically to the inclusion in it o f  the right to change religion. While all delegates 
agreed as to the important o f  the inclusion o f  the right to freedom o f  religion in the Declaration, Saudi Arabia’s 
delegation objected to the inclusion in it o f  a right to change one’s religion based on the tenets o f  Islamic faith. 
The Pakistani delegate was influential in bringing about the final inclusion o f  this right, based on the 
interpretation he gave to relevant passages o f  the Koran. This incident supports a wider claim, that in fact much 
more representative inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogue had taken place in the drafting o f  the Declaration than 
many commentators assume and that the final consensus was reached as much by non-W estem as by Western 
contributions.
2 For the debate on universalism vs. cultural relativism o f  the UDHR see Mickelson, [1998]. For cultural -  
relativist criticism o f  the UDHR see: Pollis and Schwab, [1980], who claim that human rights is a Western 
concept which cannot be transplanted outside its cultural context, that it philosophically stems from Western 
enlightenment-era philosophy o f  the autonomy o f  the individual and that the UDHR was historically adopted 
when Western states were dominant in the international community, and so cannot be said to reflect universal 
values. For the view that the UDHR, although based on a human rights concept o f  Western origin, has universal 
applicability in the modern word, see: Howard and Donnelly, [1989].
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problematic regarding freedom of religion3, as claims to such interpretation of this right often 
clash with the rights of individuals, including women, children and dissenters, as will be 
illustrated in the next chapters.
The law on freedom of religion must be interpreted in light of the unique role religion plays 
as an independent and competing source of authority with the state authority. Historically, of 
course, the process was the opposite one. It was the secular state that was set up as a rival 
source of power to religion, by separation of state from church. Because of this, religion 
occupies a place in law distinct from other civic organizations, and guaranteeing its freedom 
is a more complex legal matter than ensuring other freedoms.
The state might deal with religion as a competing source of authority, in one of two ways: It 
may either view it as a threat to the state, which has to be curtailed, or it may co-opt religion 
for its own needs. History provides numerous examples of both these processes4. Religion 
may serve an important part in formation of national identity and cohesiveness, and, indeed, 
may underwrite nationalism. This continuing struggle and engagement of religion and state is 
reflected, in different ways, in almost all modem constitutions5.
This chapter explores the justifications of religious freedom. Understanding the reasons for 
the recognition of freedom of religion as a human right is necessary for the resolution of legal 
conflicts surrounding the application of this right. First, I explain the difference between a 
group right and an individual right (section 2). I argue that the dual nature of the right to 
religious freedom creates a tension between its aspects of liberty and equality, a tension
The wider debate on universality o f  human rights: For a philosophical basis for a claim o f  universality o f  human 
rights see: Panikkar, [1982]. For a perspective that challenges the dichotomy o f  both pervasive views and 
argues that universalism /relativism is not an east/west distinction see Ghai, [2000] 1137. For further articles 
dealing with cultural inplications o f  human rights see: An-Na’im [1992]. For a relativist criticism waged against 
the UDHR in a statement by the American Anthropological Association see: Rentelin, [1990] 83.
3 For the Universal/Cultural debate on the UDHR as applicable to religious freedom, see: Glendon, [2000]; An- 
Naim, [1990]; Mayer, [1994].
4
The first occurred, for example when Turkey limited by law the power o f  Islam (Evans C., [2001] 19), and the 
second occurred when pre-revolution Mozambique used Catholicism to enhance its legitimacy in the eyes o f  its 
citizens (Nsereko, [1986] 285).
5 See: Maclear, [1995] for a collection o f  documents chronicling the development o f  constitutional relations 
between Church and state in Western states from the 17th c. onwards; For discussions o f  some constitutions by 
State see: An-Na’im, [1990] (Muslim states); Boyle and Sheen, [1997] (world survey).
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which is manifested in the legal protection accorded to this right (section 3). I then examine 
the reasonings given in liberal theory for protecting religious freedom to find which 
interpretation of this right they support. I examine the concept of liberal religious neutrality 
and the claim that it is not neutral between religious and non-religious doctrines, and might 
conflict with how some religions view their own role and that of the state (section 4). I review 
the different reasons offered for promotion of religious freedom, by approaches which center 
on the individual’s relationship to community and culture (section 5). I contrast these with 
views of religious freedom espoused by religions themselves (section 6). In view of these 
tensions I consider the problem of applying liberal theory to legal protection of religious 
freedom regarding two issues: the treatment of anti-democratic religious parties, and the 
legitimacy of the use of religious reasons for legislation (section 7). This chapter concludes 
that religious freedom can only be an individual right, but exposes the difficulties that must 
be overcome in such an approach because of the group aspects of this right.
The structure of most international and regional human rights instruments (such as the 
ICCPR and the ECHR) is such, that a right can be claimed against the state, and states are 
allowed to restrict these rights to protect certain state interests (including the rights of others). 
Because of this structure, conflicts between individual and group rights (as well as between 
conflicting individual rights) in litigation, often appear as conflicts between state and 
claimant, the claimant standing on one side and the state on the other. This is because under 
most human rights instruments an individual can only bring proceedings against the state. So, 
cases in which there is a conflict between individual and group will appear procedurally as 
cases where the state acted to uphold a group right and an individual claimant is challenging 
the decision of the state.
2. Can freedom of religion be a group right?
This chapter argues that a group right to religious freedom can only be recognised as a right 
derivative of individual rights, and, so, never paramount to them. It does so through two 
arguments: The first, maximalistic argument, is that rights should not be attributed to groups. 
This argument is supported by pointing to the problems of determination of group 
membership and group decision-making.
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The second, minimalistic argument, which is responsive to arguments raised in existing 
literature that some justified claims can only be protected through group rights, is that group 
rights can be recognised (as derivative rights) as long as they do not override individual 
rights. This argument, as will be shown, is compatible with arguments which justify certain 
group rights in order to protect group interests that cannot be reduced to individual interests. 
For the thesis expounded in this work, it is enough that either one of these arguments is 
accepted, as each leads to a necessary consequence that in a conflict between claims to 
religious freedom as a group right and religious freedom as an individual right, religious 
freedom must be recognised and accorded as an individual right.
This section first argues that religious freedom can only be an individual right, because rights, 
as such, cannot be attributed to groups. Rights are limits on a collective goal. Group power 
over individuals, like state power over individuals, may be justified, in certain cases, by other 
reasons, but not by assertion of rights. Use of rights depends on recognizable decisions by 
autonomous individuals. There is no one obvious way to recognize group members and 
identify legitimate processes of decision-making. Saying that what will be recognised is 
whatever the group decides concerning its membership and procedures is not helpful, as it is 
circular reasoning. Rights cannot be said to belong to groups, because there is no undisputed 
way in which the bearer of the right (the group) may use the right.
It is argued alternatively, and shown in the following chapters, that even if rights, including 
religious freedom, can be attributed to groups, rights of groups to religious freedom should 
not be allowed to override individual rights.
2.1 What would be a group right?
To understand what a group right would be, we should first clarify what it is not. It is not an 
aggregate of individual rights, even individual rights which are exercised communally. 
Religion is a case in point. It is a social institution, and its practice implies the existence of 
more than one participant. A single person may hold a belief, but not a religion. Therefore, 
one may think that the right to freedom of religion is a group right (even if the right of 
freedom of belief is an individual right).
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However, this conclusion is based on a faulty understanding of the distinction between an 
individual right and a group right. The mere fact that more than one person is needed for the 
exercise of a given right is not a sufficient condition for making it a group right. Thus, 
freedom of association is an individual right, although it cannot be practiced alone. Freedom 
of expression is an individual right, although it too cannot be meaningfully practiced alone. 
The speaker needs an audience, the worshipper needs his co-religionists, but the respective 
rights to express and to worship are theirs as individuals.
The concept of a group right must mean something more, it must mean a right of the group as 
such. A group right would supervene on the rights of individuals but would not be reducible 
to an aggregate of individual rights. (Just as water is wet, but molecules of which it is 
comprised are not). An obvious case of a group right is a right of the group that, by its nature, 
must override the rights of the individual members. For instance, a group could have a right 
to a legal system with jurisdiction over internal legal disputes6. A legal system, in order to 
operate, must override the freedoms of its litigants in that they must accept its verdict. The 
right to a legal system is properly a right of the group, not reducible to rights of individuals 
within it. So it is these types of rights, rights which belong to the group as a whole and whose 
exercise may impact upon individuals within the group, that must be justified by those 
arguing for recognition of group rights.
However, while such putative rights might be accorded to groups by states or international 
law, there is no justification for considering them to be rights. As Waldron points out, “[i]f 
the whole point of rights for individuals is to place limits on the pursuit of some communal 
goal, it will hardly do to characterize that goal as a community right which may then conflict 
with, and possibly override, the rights of individuals”7. Rights are promoted as a way to
o
counter the defects of utilitarianism , but giving the group the power to exercise rights, 
necessarily overriding individual choices, is itself utilitarian. It would be absurd to set up
6 See e.g. the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples, Article 33 (Adopted by the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention o f  Discrimination and Protection o f  Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/L.54), which 
will guarantee the right to an internal legal system to an indigenous group.
7 Waldron, [1993] 364.
8 See: Dworkin, [1994, 1977], especially 94-105.
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rights as a response to a communal goal, and then define the communal goal as a right. 
Indeed, Sieghart warned that rights given to ‘a people’, are given to an abstraction. Rights 
given to abstractions (like ‘the State’, ‘the true faith’) encompass a danger that they will be 
used as a pretext for violation of human rights, and voiced concern that individual rights 
would never become subservient to the rights of people9.
The tenn ‘group rights’ should not be describe the countervailing interests of the population 
of the state, such as national security. These may be legitimate interests for the state to 
protect, in some cases even at the expense of individual rights, but it would be misleading to 
describe these as group rights. The term ‘group rights’ is more appropriately applied to 
groups with a shared characteristic, or with a shared affiliation which is not identical to 
belonging to a state. In international law the state is the basic subject. The state has 
sovereignty over the population in its territory and corresponding rights and duties in 
international law. Individuals must have their human rights recognised and protected against 
the state, but the state itself does not need the protection of such rights. It has the recognised 
freedom to decide how to govern its territory by virtue of its sovereignty, subject to the 
applicable restrictions of international law.
2.2 How to identify a group
The concept of group rights also creates a problem of recognition. In order to recognise a 
group right we must have a rule for identifying group membership, and a rule for identifying 
the legitimate decision-making process for exercising this right.
2.2.1 Self-identification -  A seemingly straightforward solution is to make self-identification 
the criterion for membership of the group. So, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination10 stated that identification of individuals as being members of 
racial or ethnic groups shall be based on self-identification. This might seem to be an equally 
applicable criterion for defining membership of religious groups. However, there is a crucial 
difference between race and religion. Religious groups often claim as part of their doctrine
9 P. Sieghart, The international law o f  human rights (1983) p. 368
10 General Comment 8, UN Doc. A/45/18.
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the defining criteria of membership11. Indeed, religious doctrine creates the group in the first 
place. Thus, this is a controversial solution to the question of defining membership of a 
religious group12.
If a legal criterion of self-identification is accepted, then acceptance of religious freedom as 
an individual right over group rights is necessarily implied.
2.2.2 Identification bv the group -  A different possible principle is that of definition of the 
group by the group itself. Such an approach was taken by the US Supreme Court in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez13 (relating to a tribal, rather than religious group). The Supreme 
Court decided that a Federal Court had no authority to intervene in the decision of the Pueblo, 
pursuant to its Membership Ordinance, which discriminated against women, granting 
membership to children of a Santa Claran father and a non-tribe mother, but not to children of 
a Santa-Claran mother and a non-tribe father. While the case was decided according to the 
applicable US law, the principled argument behind it, as given by the first instance District 
Court, saw the membership rules as “no more or less than a mechanism of social... self- 
defmition... basic to the tribe’s survival as a cultural and economic entity” 14. The Court 
asserted that “the equal protection guarantee ... should not be construed in a manner which 
would require or authorise this Court to determine which traditional values will promote 
cultural survival ... such a determination should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not 
only because they can best decide what values are important, ...[but because] to abrogate 
tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of membership... is to destroy cultural 
identity under the guise of saving it”15.
The Court, and eventually the Supreme Court, which affirmed its decision, upheld the 
discriminatory tribal decision. A comparable decision of state or federal authorities would
11 For example, Jewish law considers Jews only those who are born to a Jewish mother or convert to Judaism 
under supervision o f  a Rabbinical Court. (Israeli Supreme Court: HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. M inister o f  the Interior, 
16 PD 2428).
12 This will be seen in the discussion in Chapter Three o f  schismatic groups and state recognition o f  leadership 
o f religious communities and in the discussion in Chapter Six o f  religious dissenters.
13 436 US 49 (1978).
14 402 F. Supp 5, 15 (1975).
15 Ibid, 18.
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have been viewed as discriminatory and would not have been upheld. Thus, a principle 
recognizing an unrestricted group right to definition of its membership has unacceptable 
consequences: by means of its self-definition the group can infringe recognized human rights 
of members. In this case a recognized right to equality between the sexes is infringed.
2.2.3 Objective identification -  A third approach to the definition of group membership is 
one of external definition by means of objective criteria. This approach was used by the UN 
Human Rights Committee [HRC] in its Lovelace16 decision. Sandra Lovelace was bom and 
registered as "Maliseet Indian" but had lost her rights and status as an Indian in accordance 
with section 12 (1) (b) of Canada’s Indian Act, after having married a non-Indian. She 
claimed her rights to membership of an ethnic and linguistic minority under Article 27 of the 
ICCPR were infringed.
The Committee decided that “[pjersons who are bom and brought up on a reserves who have 
kept ties with their community and wish to maintain these ties must normally be considered 
as belonging to that minority within the meaning of the Covenant. Since Sandra Lovelace is 
ethnically a Maliseet Indian and has only been absent from her home reserve for a few years 
during the existence of her marriage, she is, in the opinion of the Committee, entitled to be 
regarded as "belonging" to this minority and to claim the benefits of Article 27 of the 
Covenant”17.
Thus, the HRC chose to define membership of a group, for the purposes of Article 27, not 
according to the group’s definition and not according to self-definition but according to what 
the Committee saw as objective criteria. Of course, such ‘objective’ criteria could also be 
subject to controversy. Such criteria are particularly controversial regarding the definition of 
a religious group. A religion, by its nature, is always defined from within. Any imposition of 
external criteria can itself be perceived as an infringement of religious freedom.
16 Comm. No. 24/1977 Lovelace v. Canada CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977.
17 Ibid.
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So, even the preliminary step of deciding who belongs to a group is highly controversial and 
open to manipulation, an unsure platform upon which rights can be distributed.
How to recognize legitimate decisions of the group for exercising its right is also problematic. 
McDonald suggests18 a rule on decision-making according to which group rights can only be 
exercised through group decision-making.
This suggestion is unhelpful. It is not clear how to define the members who may or may not 
consider themselves part of the group against the group’s rules, or who disagree with its 
process of decision-making19. If there is no recognized legitimate way for a group to exercise 
its rights, this casts doubt on the possibility of recognising group rights at all.
But if we do not recognise group rights, including religious group rights, are we not being 
inconsistent? Can one deny the acceptability of group rights without rejecting the legitimacy 
of states20? The state itself, according to this argument, acts in an exercise of collective rights, 
which may sometimes override individual liberties (such as through the powers of the 
criminal justice system).
However, this argument for group rights must be rejected. Historically, rights were defined as 
rights of the citizens against the state. The liberal concept of rights was developed primarily 
as a defence of the individual against the exercise of state power21. State sovereignty and the 
justification of the state’s legitimacy in wielding power against its citizens are not rights- 
based22. While the concept of rights has been broadened (for instance, to rights against 
private actors), using it to mean the exact opposite of its original meaning renders it void of 
any meaning at all.
18 McDonald, [19921 134-135.
19 The practical problems in defining membership o f  the group can be seen when advancing the concept o f  a 
group right one step further, to include a collective right for compensation for past grievances to the group. See: 
Edwards, [1999].
20 Wellman, [1999].
21 The idea influentially developed by Locke, [ed. Goldie, 1993], The Second Treatise. See also: Miller, [1991] 
222 .
22 But relies on other reasonings, such as social contract and collective benefit.
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2.3 Can group rights ever be recognized?
In view of such objections to the possibility of recognition of group rights, can group rights 
ever be recognised?
It has been suggested by some writers, that some concerns of groups are not addressed by the
• • 23classic formulations of human rights and would merit recognition of group rights. Nettheim 
identifies land ownership, cultural identity and socio-economic disadvantage as concerns of 
groups, meriting group rights protection, with which international law has started to engage24. 
These could have relevance to religious freedom.
A number of bases advocated for advancing group rights merit a closer examination. As will 
be seen, these arguments, in general, are not necessarily inconsistent with the argument 
advanced in this study, that a group right to religious freedom should not be recognised, 
except as a right derivative of individual rights and never paramount to them. Crucially, these 
arguments and the examples given to support them, support recognition of external group 
rights, directed against the state. At the core of the demands for religious group rights, 
however, are internal group rights, directed against individuals within the group. In such 
cases, I argue and show, these arguments cannot justify recognition of group rights.
Historical considerations -  Rectification of historical wrongs is one consideration for how 
rights, for instance equality as well as religious freedom, should be interpreted and accorded. 
In cases based on historical justifications, it can be argued, the right can only be accorded to 
the wronged group. An important manifestation of a group right is a communal right to land. 
This could be a right to ownership, but could also be a right to spiritual use, particularly 
relevant to the discussion of religious freedom. Kingsbury25 criticises the US Supreme Court
23 See further: G. Nettheim, “’Peoples’ and ‘populations’ -  Indigenous peoples and the rights o f  peoples”, in J. 
Crawford (ed.), The rights o f  peonies (Clarendon, Oxford, 1988) p. 107.
24 See the ILO Convention No. 107 o f  1957 Concerning the Protection and Integration o f  Indigenous and Other 
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries and other instruments discussed in Chapter One.
25 B. Kingsbury, “Competing structures o f  indigenous people’s claims”, in P. Alston (e d .) , People’s rights. 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) p. 69, 73-74.
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26  * • •decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association , in which a claim by 
Native-Americans, that a road build on public land would breach their religious freedom to 
meditate in this traditional religious area, was rejected. Their religious freedom, just like the 
religious freedom of anyone else, was deemed by the Court not to extend to control of public 
lands. Kingsbury argues, that the historical loss of control of Indian lands should have been 
seen as a relevant factor, leading to recognition of their right.
Such a right based on historical considerations can only be attributed to a community, not an 
individual. But this is an argument of a community right against a state, which presents no 
conflict with rights of individuals within the community. Therefore, it can be accepted even 
alongside the thesis advanced in this work.
Community survival -  A further justification for recognition of group rights, in certain cases, 
is that otherwise the community will assimilate and cease to exist. Indeed, this reason was 
mentioned by the US court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez21, discussed in section 2.2
above, for preferring the rights accorded by law to the group over gender equality.
* 2 8Kingsbury argues that domestic courts should allow group rights that cause discrimination 
on the basis of gender of members when dealing with a small indigenous group departing 
from the universal arrangement (as Navajo in the US), but not allow it for one of a number of 
major groups in a state based on a plurality of customary law systems (Tanzania). This 
distinction I find incoherent. Individuals’ (in this case - women’s) rights within the group 
should not be more or less important depending on the position of the group within the state. 
Women (or indeed other individuals whose rights need legal protection) should not have to 
pay the price for cultural survival of the group. The justification of commmiity survival is 
relevant also to religious freedom. Religious law and religious legal systems are often 
claimed to be essential to survival of the religions. Indeed, they are an inherent component of 
religions. The counter-argument that this justification should not override individual rights 
would also apply to religious groups. Religious legal systems, as will be seen throughout this 
study, especially in Chapters Four and Six (regarding, respectively, rights of women and
26 485 US 439 (1988).
27 436 US 49 (1978).
28 Kingsbury [2001] 83.
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dissenting speech), are often lacking in adherence to international accepted human rights 
norms.
Cultural interpretation of rights - Another deficiency of recognised rights in human rights 
instruments, it has been argued, is that they exclude different, especially non-Western, 
cultural interpretations of concepts used. A suggested solution has been to interpret existing 
rights within a cultural context, thus effectively recognising group rights. In Hopu and
9QBessert v. France the Human Rights Committee accepted that the rights to family and 
privacy of Tahitians were violated when the French government allowed the building of a 
hotel over an ancient Polynesian grave. This was so, even though the authors of the 
communication were not direct relatives of those buried. Thus, in effect, a communal right 
over the use of the land as part of family life was recognised.
This reading of Covenant rights as according communal rights creates a right against the state, 
not against individuals within it. This type of recognition of group rights is not, in any way, 
incompatible with the thesis of this work, namely that there are no group rights to religious 
freedom which can trump individual rights. However, in other cases in which a cultural- 
context interpretation would cause group rights to become paramount to individual rights, the 
criticism would be the same as that raised previously. Such a definition of rights would 
merely transfer power over individuals from the state to other groups, whose use of power is 
not even checked by the human rights obligations to which states are obligated. There is a 
danger that rights to family and to privacy, for example, would be interpreted as allowing the 
family group to exclude state intervention which protects the rights of weaker members of the 
family group. Under the thesis advanced in this work, such an interpretation would be 
avoided.
Protection of rights of individual members of minorities is not sufficient for the special 
protection needed for minorities -  Leuprecht30 argues that particular rights beyond the rights 
of individuals, including administrative autonomy and special forms of participation in public 
decision-making, are needed to protect minorities. These, indeed, would be paradigmatic 
group rights. Applied to religious groups, such rights would give the religious group, as such,
29 UN Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993
30 P. Leuprecht, “Minority rights revisited”, in P. Alston (ed.), People’s Rights (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2001) p. I l l ,  123.
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an enhanced position in the law-making sphere, either over its own members, or in the 
formation of law over all citizens. As far as such rights are accorded to religious groups, 
however, it will be shown in this study, conflicts with individual rights are unavoidable. 
Administrative autonomy (such as over marriage and divorce) will be seen in this study 
(Chapters Three and Four) to affect adversely individual rights, particularly the rights of 
dissenting groups within the religions recognised by the State, and in the case of some major 
religions, will affect adversely the rights of women. According special forms of participation 
in public decision-making to religions, other then through the general democratic process, 
will also be seen to be problematic, potentially breaching human rights of individuals (see the 
discussion of abortion legislation in Chapter Four).
Waldron suggests a solution according to which group rights may be asserted externally 
(against claims from outside the group) but not internally (when there is a direct conflict 
between group and individual)31.
This solution must be faulted for pragmatic reasons. While it may have use regarding other 
rights, it is especially unsatisfactory in the context of religious freedom, in which a strong 
element of the group demand is directed internally. Religions, by definition, mostly address 
themselves and their precepts to their members. Telling religious groups that their religious 
group rights are recognized, except when directed internally, takes out a large part of what 
having a group right means for religious groups. This is substantially different regarding 
religions than regarding other groups, such as racial or ethnic groups. Precepts directing how 
members must behave are not an inherent part of what makes a racial or ethnic group, but are 
inherent to the being of religious groups. Therefore, even if a compromise which recognises 
externally directed group rights may be a useful solution for recognising rights of other 
groups, it is certainly not so for religious groups.
The uneasy basis for group rights, in general, and for religious group rights in particular is 
evident also in international law, as will become apparent in this study. Although some 
mention of collective rights appears in international legal documents, this has been done with 
no satisfactory theoretical debate as to the existence and meaning of the concept of collective 
rights prior to their inclusion.
31 Waldron, [1993] 366.
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Summing up, the concept of a group right is difficult to justify. This is because the concept of 
a group right is antithetical to the idea of rights as a limit to collective power. The means of 
recognising the group and its legitimate decisions are controversial. Even if such a concept 
has been recognised in international law, its application regarding religious freedom is 
controversial and raises unique problems and conflicts which must be addressed, and will be 
addressed in this work. The suggestion of limiting recognition of group rights to external 
rights would solve some of the problems associated with group rights. As regards most 
religious demands for groups rights, however, they would not be fulfilled by such a 
suggestion. As will be seen in this study, cases in which religious group rights were at issue, 
brought into sharp conflict individual and group rights, a conflict which must be coherently 
resolved by giving paramouncy to individual rights.
3. Freedom of religion: Between liberty and equality
Religious freedom is a unique right, a double-sided right based on two aspects of religion: 
One conception of religion for the purposes of this right stresses the aspect of religion as an 
expressive activity of belief, criticism and inquiry. This derives from an individualist 
perception of religion, which relates to the liberal view, and entails freedom  of religion. The 
second conception of religion, related to a communitarian view, stresses the aspect of religion 
as identity. This entails equality between religions. This view relates religion to groups, 
although it does not necessarily mean that equality is a group right . The conception, and 
protection, of religion as an attribute which marks membership of a group is becoming ever 
more prevalent in international human rights law and discourse.
Religion is both similar to, and different from, other characteristics that define groups. The 
similarities between religion and other group-defining characteristics, such as race, are
•  33highlighted by those who wish to accord them similar protection , whether in national or 
international law. One difference between race and religion is obvious. While race is 
immutable, religion is not. In fact, one of the justifications given for upholding a right to
32 See Section 3.2
33 For example Yang, [1997] argues that race and religion in US law should be treated alike as a constitutional 
matter.
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religion freedom is to enable everyone who wishes to do so to change their religion. The right 
to do this is legally protected in international law34. But the mutability of religion does not 
mean religious affiliation is less deserving of legal protection than immutable characteristics. 
A person’s right to change religion is protected, but so is his right to keep his religion. 
Religion is as much a part of identity, of personhood, as race or nationality.
Freedom of religion is unique. There is no correlative right regarding race or nationality. It is 
not possible to choose race, and there generally is no right to choose nationality, but there is a 
right to choose religion or belief. Religion is both a subject of liberty (like freedom of 
speech), and a subject of equality, a characteristic of the individual which merits the 
protection of the law (like gender, race or nationality). One can be of a certain race and be 
entitled to protection from discrimination based on race, just as one can be of a certain 
religion and be entitled to protection from discrimination based upon it. But it is meaningless 
to speak of ‘freedom of race’, while it is meaningful to protect freedom of religion. This is 
because religion is not only an identity. It is also an activity of thought, criticism and speech, 
an activity that merits protection in its robust and open manifestations.
Because religious freedom has two equally important aspects, religion as key to critical 
thought, and religion as identity, both liberal and communitarian theories may offer important 
insights in their perceptions of religion. Upon this duality the right to religious freedom 
should be constructed. This dual perception has important implications in current legal 
debate. These can be seen clearly in two examples of importance in international law: the 
prohibition of incitement to religious hatred and the prohibition of discrimination.
3.1 Liberty or equality: Prohibition of incitement
A unique treatment accorded to religion, stemming from the tension between religious 
equality and religious liberty, can be seen in the framing of international law provisions 
prohibiting hatred and incitement.
34 Article 18 UDHR but not explicitly in Article 18 ICCPR or in the 1981 UN Declaration. See further: Chapter 
One and Chapter Six.
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The argument in support of prohibition of incitement to religious hatred highlights the group- 
identity aspect of religion and frames the right in terms of equality of religions. A member of 
a religion cannot effectively exercise his right to be treated as a citizen equal to members of 
other religions in the public place, if his religion is constantly denigrated and vilified. The 
only way to guarantee such equality is by prohibition, at least of the most injurious religious 
hate speech.
The argument against such prohibition highlights the individual-inquisitive-expressive aspect 
of religion: Since freedom of religion is about questioning and defending beliefs, doctrines 
and ideas, a robust exchange of ideas, even one which some people may find insulting or 
injurious, is important for society. The right to call non-believers infidels who will bum in 
hell is as integral to religious freedom as any other part of this right. Curtailing such religious 
debate would arguably infringe the right to free religious expression, an important component 
of religious freedom.
International law (like domestic legal systems) exemplifies both perceptions: that which 
treats religion like all other group characteristics on which incitement can be based, and that 
which sees religion as different from them. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights makes no distinction in its provision on incitement between religious hatred and racial 
hatred. Article 20 (2) mandates that: “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. 
Likewise, the Proposal for a European Union Framework Decision on Combating Racism 
and Xenophobia35 does not deal differently with race and religion. It defines “racism and 
xenophobia”, which its provisions prohibit, as “the belief in race, colour, descent, religion or 
belief, national or ethnic origin as a factor in determining aversion to individuals or groups”36.
However, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination [CERD]37, which deals with discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin, but not religion, has a much broader provision
35 OJ 2002 C75E/269.
36 Article 3.
37 (Adopted 1966) 660 UNTS 195.
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mandating that states prohibit acts and organizations promoting incitement and theories of 
superiority (Article 4)38.
While a ban on organizations advocating theories of racial superiority is deemed acceptable 
under CERD, such a ban on religious organizations and theories is not. Indeed, a ban on 
religious theories which claim superiority over other religions or beliefs may contravene 
religious freedoms. Many religions claim to be the one true religion, claiming superiority 
over other religions which are false (as indeed atheism claims that all religions are false). 
Such claims may be of core doctrinal importance to their believers. Why is there such a 
distinction between religion and race? This seems to relate again to the analysis of religion as 
idea rather than identity. Religion is seen as a collection of ideas while a race is seen as a 
collection of people. It is acceptable to vilify ideas, not to vilify people, as vilifying people 
infringes upon their right to equality. But of course religions are both collections of ideas and 
of people. There is nothing wrong with claiming superiority of one doctrine over another, but 
much wrong with holding people who belong to one religious group to be better than others. 
International law might attempt to separate those two aspects, but, in practice, the difference 
between the two will not be so clear.
This is not only a problem of international law, but of domestic law as well, especially as 
state parties to the conventions mentioned above have duties to implement their provisions. 
The debate over the dual character of religion was reflected in the controversy in the United 
Kingdom regarding a legal amendment proposed by the government to broaden the existing 
prohibition on incitement to racial hatred to cover religious hatred as well. The amendment 
was not approved, and the law passed by Parliament, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, did not include this proposed controversial measure . The government has re­
introduced the measure in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, Section 119. 
However, the lack of such law arguably contravenes, as a matter of international law, article 
20 of the ICCPR, to which the UK is a party40. Thus, it is the duality of the right, although it
38 Lerner, [2000] 53 assumes Article 4 implicitly applies to religion as well, but I believe the wording clearly 
omits religion from the ambit o f  this Article.
39 See also the House o f  Lords Select Committee Report on Religious Offences in England and Wales ((10 April 
2003) Volume I (HL Paper 9 5 -1 )).
40 See further discussion in Chapter Six.
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has not been so perceived, which causes difficulty in addressing religious incitement. The 
issue of incitement will be revisited in Chapter Six, where an approach to this offence will be 
suggested, based on this analysis.
3.2 Group or individual: Implementation of religious equality
A dual perception of religion, as giving rise to a group right or to an individual right, can be 
seen in another example, in the way international human rights law interprets the right to non­
discrimination on the basis of religion.
The right to equality, or non-discrimination, on the grounds of religion is complementary to 
the right to freedom of religion. Without it, the right to freedom of religion is worth little. 
Currently non-discrimination on grounds of religion is becoming the focus of religious rights 
in international law41. Rights to non-discrimination based on religion in international law are 
drafted similarly to those based on race, nationality or gender42. Religion is seen as a subject 
of the universal prescription of equal treatment, like other characteristics whose bearers merit 
the same protection. The right not to be discriminated against on religious grounds is 
generally framed as an individual right in international law43. Each and every person has a
41 This is even indicated in the name o f  the 1981 UN Declaration , which mentions ‘intolerance and 
discrimination’ but not ‘religious freedom’. See further international legal documents indicating this trend in 
Chapter One.
42ICCPR Article 2(1): “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure ... the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction o f  any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion...”;
ICESCR, Article 2(2): “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure ... the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction o f  any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion...”;
The UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Article 1: “Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ...the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction o f  
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion...”;
ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. I l l )  concerning Discrimination in respect 
o f Employment and Occupation, Article 1: “For the purpose o f  this Convention the term "discrimination" 
includes: (a) Any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis o f  race, colour, sex, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect o f  nullifying or impairing equality o f  
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation” ;
There are also, at least in “soft law” instruments derivative duties o f  States to prevent behaviour which infringes 
these rights: UN Declaration on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Intolerance and Discrimination based on 
Religion or B elief (1981) Articles 4 , 7. See also the draft Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  
Religious Intolerance (1965) Articles VI -  VIII.
43 See provisions in previous note. Also: Declaration on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Intolerance and o f  
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 2: “(1) No one shall be subject to discrimination by any 
State, institution, group o f  persons, or person on the grounds o f  religion or other belief. (2) For the purposes o f
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right to be treated equally to others regardless of their religion. The claim of each individual 
to equality is to be assessed independently of claims of other individuals who belong to the 
same or other groups. This is the approach that arises from the liberal interpretation of this 
right.
From a point of view which examines the effect of equality on society, especially a society in 
religious conflict, other considerations might be raised. A unique provision44 in the Council 
of Europe’s directive on equal treatment, pertaining to Northern Ireland (the only state- 
specific provision of these directives), allows differential treatment in recruitment to police 
and teaching positions to redress religious imbalance, as specified by national legislation45. In 
this case the parties agreed to sacrifice equality of religion as an individual right in order to 
achieve equality between religious groups (Catholics and Protestants). Under this provision a 
qualified individual may be treated unjustly and less favourably based solely on his religion. 
This is obviously intended to achieve a worthwhile cause -  an end to historic conflict and a 
just peace between religious communities, in which policing and education are key issues. In 
one sense this furthers equality. Both religious communities must feel equal to each other, 
and feel that they are treated equally, especially in their ability to influence the co-religious 
society, through education and access to implementation of government policy (in this case 
through policing). In its individual sense, equality is sacrificed, in order to achieve group 
equality.
Such an exception in a human rights document raises complicated questions. Conflict 
between religious groups is not unique to Northern Ireland. When, if at all, is it legitimate for 
international law to substitute a group-equality approach for an individual-equality one? It 
was precisely prevention of such religious conflict that set the movement to recognition of a 
principle of religious freedom of Enlightenment liberalism in motion46. But a return to such 
group-based equality can jeopardize our protection of each individual’s rights.
the present Declaration, the expression "intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief' means any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its 
effect nullification or impairment o f  the recognition, enjoyment or exercise o f  human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on an equal basis”.
44 Article 15 o f  directive 2000/78/EC.
45 See: Section 46 o f  the UK Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000.
46 See section 4.2.
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The important theoretical debate over the dual perception of religious freedom has, therefore, 
very practical legal applications. The tensions between individual and group demands in the 
application of this right must be addressed by any legal system which accords this right. This 
is true for domestic legal systems and for international law.
As exemplified in this section, the right to religious freedom, more than other recognized 
human rights is one that sees individual and group at odds. Theories which have tried to 
define and justify this right were confronted with the need to address two competing aspects 
of this right. How they have done is discussed next.
4. Religious freedom in liberal political theory
An understanding of how the right to freedom of religion should be interpreted can be gained 
from analysing the different reasons that formed the basis for the claim to freedom of religion 
in the political theories which were influential in developing our current understanding of this 
right, and the individual and group interests which they saw influenced by recognition of this 
right.
A principle of religious tolerance was not unrecognised in ancient cultures47. It is neither a 
modem nor a Western phenomenon. Thus, it has been suggested, that Ashoka’s Rock Edicts, 
dating from the 3rd century B.C., aim at resolving the conflict between Brahmanism and 
Buddhism, were the first to recognise the principle of religious toleration. They embody the 
Buddhist spirit of toleration, which has its origins in Hinduism, a religion in which no one 
view is held as the one true view The Jewish tradition, too, has accorded an important role 
to tolerance of others. In the Bible, the Noachide Covenant sets basic moral rules for non- 
Jews49, thus accepting the morality of those who are not Jewish, as long as they adhere to a 
basic moral code, not related to a particular belief.




4.1 Justifications for religious freedom in liberal thought
While other and earlier philosophies had a principle of religious toleration, the idea of 
religious freedom as a right is most developed in liberal thought. It is first articulated under 
liberal philosophy as part of a set of rights. It is therefore especially relevant to understand 
the justifications for a right of religious freedom in liberal theory, and hence how this right 
should be coherently interpreted in law.
The idea of freedom of religion was an important force in the formation of liberal theory 
itself50. From the liberal literature of the Enlightenment and of the present-day debate, several 
important reasons for upholding freedom of religion emerge. While the basis for the right is 
individualistic it is also related to a demand for co-existence of religious groups. Out of 
liberal writings, at least three different individualistic justifications for religious freedom are 
discernible as well as justifications that are based not on the rights of the individual but rather 
on the relations between religious groups. Each of these justifications has different 
implications for the legal right that religious freedom should protect. Each of these also has 
severe shortcomings in the protection of religious freedom, as will be discussed.
4.1.1 Individual religious freedom as critical capacity -  The first reason for according a right 
to religious freedom is embedded in one of the central ideas of Enlightenment-era liberalism. 
Freedom of religious belief is a key to the existence of men as rational free-thinking 
individual citizens in the state. It emanates directly from a normative premise of equality, the 
demand that every doctrine should be open to scrutiny, and a belief that no dogma can be 
held with certainty51. Thus, religious toleration is one of the hallmarks of the liberal state.
This highly individualistic reason for religious freedom emphasises religious belief, personal 
decision and individual choice, rather than other aspects of religion (such as worship, ritual or 
institutions). If this is the reason for upholding religious freedom, then the legal right to 
religious freedom must be interpreted accordingly. If religious freedom is protected because
50 Raz, [1988] 252. For a general introduction to early liberal theory see: Rawls and Herman [2000];
Gray, [1995].
51 Barry, [1990] 23. See, for instance, the reasoning o f Anthony Collins, the 18th century outspoken critic o f  
religion in A Discourse o f  Free Thinking, reprinted in: Kramnick, [1995] 101, who argues that arriving at the 
truth can only be achieved through free-thinking.
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no religious dogma can be held with certainty, then those who challenge the existing dogma 
should be encouraged and not punished. It follows that activities like blasphemy and 
proselytism, which do exactly that, must not be criminalized. Critique, discussion and a 
robust exchange of ideas are best promoted when individuals are free to convince others to 
convert to their belief, and to speak for and against religions, even in ways which may be 
deemed by some inappropriate, free from fear of prosecution. The implications of the 
argument of religious freedom as freedom of thought for the legal regulation of conversion, 
proselytism and blasphemy are expanded in Chapter Six.
It may further follow, that if the ability to question dogma is the utmost reason for religious 
freedom, then it should not be possible even for the right-holder himself to waive, or to 
compromise, his capacity to continue to be able to think and make religious choices as an 
individual. A legal approach which attempts to preserve this critical ability can be seen in the 
implementation of religious freedom in France, in the concept of laicite active. An example 
of this is the justification given to the recently enacted French anti-cult law . The 
justification that the French government offered for it was the promotion of freedom of belief 
over freedom of religion53. It explained, that the purpose of the law is to limit religious liberty 
of the ‘cult’, in order to protect each individual’s freedom to formulate belief free from 
constraint, imposed by ‘cults’ 54. This reasoning shows a preference of the critical- 
individualistic aspect of religious liberty -  a person must retain his ability to formulate and 
criticise any belief -  over the aspect of religious liberty, which promises freedom to identify 
with any religious persuasion and belong to a religious group. Even someone who wishes to 
exercise his religious freedom by relying on the decisions of the ‘cult’ is not permitted to 
waive away his continuing individual capacity.
Such a strictly individualist conception of religious freedom leads to a regime that advances 
freedom of certain religions and beliefs but hinders the freedom of others. As seen in the last 
example, religions which are deemed by the authorities to be ‘brainwashing’ or toreduce the
52 Law n° 2001-504 o f  June 12, 2001.
53 Intervention o f  the French delegation to the OSCE Supplementary Meeting on Freedom o f  Religion, Vienna 
1999, quoted in: Introvigne, [2001], ftnt. 7.
541 will disregard, for the purposes o f  this discussion, the veracity o f  the claim that certain religions, which were 
classified as cults, constrain individual thought more than others, as my interest is only in analysis o f  the 
justification offered.
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critical capacity of individuals, usually new and unknown religions, will be adversely 
affected. But such a limited view of religious freedom, which effectively excludes certain 
religions, has its base in early liberal thinking.
The conception of freedom of religion and belief as an individualist charter of freedom of 
thought and challenging of dogma carried with it a severe limitation on religious freedom. 
Locke, the major proponent of this approach, who addressed the subject in his Letter on 
Toleration and other works, did not extend the right to atheists and Catholics55. Atheists 
could not be trusted because they would not take an oath on the Bible, Catholics could not be 
trusted because they had a double loyalty, a political theology at odd with liberal principles56
This reasoning reveals the very individualistic approach of Locke’s liberal theory. This 
approach is actively opposed to a group approach to religious liberty57 by excluding from the 
ambit of this right a religion whose doctrine contains a collective political element. A 
competing power to state authority is not to be recognised . The same exception, which 
Locke uses against extending religious freedom to Catholics, could be used, according to the 
same reasoning, against extending religious freedom to Jews or Muslims. Judaism, although 
highly de-centralised at Locke’s time, and certainly not as institutionalised politically as 
Catholicism, is also not merely a religion but a social regime for its members. Liberalism is 
very much a political approach best suited to one religion, Protestantism, and, indeed, 
historically entwined with it.
But from Locke’s view of religious freedom, individualistic to the extent of exclusion of any 
group components, it does not necessarily follow that freedom of religion is left as an empty 
shell59. Of course, an extreme possible conclusion from such a view, is that all religions based
55 He refers to Catholics indirectly: “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is
constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves 
up to the protection and service o f  another prince.” Locke, [1968] 133.
56 Elshtain, [2000]; Cranston, [1987] 101, 106.
57 Although see opposite view o f  Richard Ashcraft, quoted by Martin, [2000] 938, that under the guise o f  appeal 
to individual reason, Locke was in fact attempting to rely on community prejudices (against Catholics) to further 
his cause.
58 O f course it is also blind to religions which are not Bible adherents, but that is another matter.
59 Elshtain, [2000] citing McConnell. See also: McConnell, [1990] 1430-1436. McConnell shows that Locke’s 
writing was the intellectual basis for the constitutional framing o f  religious freedom in the U .S., but the
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on institutions and not merely on individual belief should be excluded from the scope of 
protection. This indeed is Locke’s conclusion. But such a conclusion is discriminatory and 
unacceptable.
However, there can be more moderate possible conclusions from such an exclusively 
individualistic view of religious freedom. For instance, that protection of a right of freedom 
of religion will be granted to adherents of all beliefs, but not to religious institutions. But this 
conclusion is also unsatisfactory. Protection of only individual aspects of all religions is not 
equal protection of all religions. Institutional aspects of religion are central to some religions, 
peripheral to others, and non-existent still in others. For practical reasons as well, such a rule 
will be hard to implement, as the dividing line between the individual and institutional 
aspects of religion is not always clear-cut.
The highly individual view of religion freedom grounded in the importance of guaranteeing 
the capacity for criticism would thus entail extensive cogent non-waivable legal protection of 
individual aspects of religious freedom, particularly those maintaining the ability to change 
religion and to influence others to do so. However, such a view may not only lead to lack of 
protection of collective and institutional aspects of religion, but may prove highly 
discriminatory towards some religions.
4.1.2 Individual religious freedom as equal liberty -  Other rationales for an individualistic 
interpretation of religious freedom can be discerned from the work of liberal theorists with 
different implications for the legal interpretation of this right. The second individualistic 
justification for religious freedom is premised not on the importance of the individual faculty 
for criticism, but rather on a principle of equality. This justification emanates from the 
egalitarian strand of liberalism, which followed from the work of Rousseau60, who among the 
early liberals emphasized the need for equal political liberties. It is currently exemplified 
primarily in the work of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin61. They emphasise the danger to
Americans importantly departed from his views. Locke did not object to religious patronage, while the 
Americans finally prohibited establishment o f  religion, and Locke gave the magistrate (the secular power) the 
supremacy in conflict with individual religious conscience, making the limits o f  religious freedom subject to 
government’s perception, while the American jurisprudence adopted constitutional judicial review over 
legislation, thereby denying government the last word over permissible limitation o f  this freedom.
60 Rousseau [1968], Book II, Chapter XI; Rousseau, [1984].
61 For a Kantian analysis o f  equal political liberties compare: Habermas, [1996] 120-122.
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liberty from a society that is unequal and unjust and the need for positive action for 
realisation of social freedom62. Dworkin63 defines liberalism through a principle of ‘rough 
equality’: resources and opportunities should be distributed in roughly equal shares to 
accommodate different personal preferences. This is so not just for material goods, but also 
for political decisions. Political decisions must reflect some accommodation of the differing 
personal preferences everyone has for themselves, but may not reflect preferences people 
have about what others shall do or have. John Rawls formulated liberal political theory so as 
to incorporate a principle of equality into liberal theory. The first principle of his theory of 
justice is that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible 
with similar liberty for others64.
What are the implications of these approaches for religious freedom? Dworkin’s approach, 
by virtue of its egalitarian principles, clearly entails an individualistic interpretation of all 
basic rights, including religious freedom. Because it disallows preferences people have about 
what others shall do or have, it will disallow exercises of group rights which override 
individual preferences.
Rawls includes liberty of conscience in the basic liberties comprised in the first principle. By 
mentioning freedom of conscience rather than freedom of religion, it seems that Rawls 
emphasizes the internal, individual right over the institutional right. In his later writing on 
‘political liberalism’, though, he refers to liberty of conscience as a liberty that both protects 
individual against Church and protects Church (= any religious association) against state65. 
As we shall see, these two types of liberty will often be antagonistic to each other. If the 
Church demands that the state respect its liberty even when its actions may override 
individual rights, which liberty prevails?
Although Rawls leaves this question unanswered, his first principle is compatible with only 
one option. The demand that persons enjoy an equal right to religious liberty is important in
62 See discussion in: Hampton, £1997] 153-159.
63 Dworkin, [1978] 128-141.
64 Rawls, [1999] 53.
65 Rawls, [1993] 221 fn. 8.
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solving this conflict of liberties. This is because it will be impossible to claim a right to 
religious liberty which is incompatible with equal liberties for each person. This principle 
therefore places limitations on group rights when they are incompatible with equal individual 
rights, and places religious liberty on strong footing as an individual right.
Following the principle of liberty as equality should have implications on the legal 
interpretation of the right to religious liberty. If equality of opportunity or equality of 
treatment are seen as a key to religious liberty, then international law should impose 
minimum standards ensuring equality of enjoyment of basic human rights, including religious 
freedom to everyone, especially to members of groups that are underprivileged in society 
such as women, children, homosexuals and religious dissenters, even where this entails 
intervention in group or state policy. Differently from the reasoning of rights ownership, 
which will be discussed in the next section, the political-equality reasoning would mandate at 
least a basic level of protection of individual religious freedom even when the rights are 
waived by the person him/herself who chooses to become or remain a member of a religious 
group. Equality of opportunity can only be achieved in a society in which everyone has a 
basic level of fundamental political freedoms, which cannot be relinquished to the group.
Rawls further individualises religion by introducing to his political theory a principle of 
neutrality, which demands that states should be neutral between ideas of the good. It makes 
religion an individual, rather than group, concern, by displacing it from the legitimate realm 
of public affairs, and maintaining it in the realm of personal affairs. One important legal 
implication of this demand regards the use of religious reasons for legislation, and will be 
discussed in section 7.1.
The principle of neutrality was introduced not in order to deal particularly with religions, but 
rather as a principle relating to all doctrines of the good. But it has particular importance in 
regard to religion. This is because religions, more than other civic institutions, prescribe a 
complete moral and ethical program of the good in all areas of personal and public life, which 
often conflicts with liberal assumptions about the same issues.
But the principle of neutrality has been attacked from within liberal debate. Crucially, Barry 
shows that the principle of neutrality may not be a good basis for guaranteeing religious
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freedom. He argues, that in order to accept the principle of neutrality, one must have accepted 
already many tenets of liberalism. Neutrality is not a position that can easily be reconciled 
with a religious position. Many religions will view the principle that every view of the good 
must be treated equally in the public sphere as morally reprehensible. Doctrines which call on 
the state to take a position on the public good66 are central to their tenets. The Catholic 
Church, for instance, does not see its teachings as something for individual belief only, not to 
be used in the public sphere67. So, in fact, many non-liberals will not be able to accept the 
principle of neutrality.
An attempt to respond to his critics, is Rawls’ introduction of the distinction between
/■o # t t
comprehensive liberalism and political liberalism . Comprehensive liberalism includes, 
besides a political component, a prescription for the culture of civil society. Political 
liberalism is more minimalistic, and assumes that society may contain a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines, religious as well as non-religious. This 
further attempt to reconcile liberalism with the plurality of non-liberal opinion has been 
countered with the criticism that a political theory that has no claim to any view of the good, 
is an impossibility69.
A more fundamental criticism of the idea of liberal neutrality has been waged inside the 
liberal camp by perfectionists, such as Haksar, who claims70 that liberal political theory must 
take a stand as to whether humans fare better under liberal institutions or under non-liberal 
ones. He argues that liberalism cannot and must not treat all value choices as equal, because
71some value choices are intrinsically better than others .
66 An ‘external preference’ in Dworkin’s terms. Dworkin, [1978] 133-134, limits legitimate political decisions to 
those that reflect some accommodation o f  the personal preferences o f  everyone for themselves, but not what he 
terms ‘external preferences’ -  preferences people have about what others shall do or have.
67 Barry, [1990] 34.
68 Rawls, [1993] especially 195-200.
69 Gray, £2000] chapter 1.
70 Haksar, [1979] 7.
71 For anti-perfectionist analysis see also Raz, [1986] 107 -  165.
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72Political liberalism may be not just unworkable but also undesirable. Elshtain rejects Rawls’ 
political liberalism, which demands that religious reasons not be brought into the public 
policy debate. She wants to acknowledge religious plurality and opposes the monist liberal 
stand. She rejects the view that this is neutrality. In her view, the separation of Church from 
state does not require the separation of Church from politics. The neutrality which disallows 
religious reasoning from the public political debate silences free religious expression rather 
than enhances it.
The place of religion in the public sphere and its uneasy relationship with individual liberty 
have remained a contentious point of the liberal program. Many liberal states have refrained 
from adopting a principle of neutrality. As discussion of U. S. Supreme Court cases will show, 
in Chapter Three, it is not clear if, and to what extent, such a principle can be implemented. 
Unsurprisingly, the discussion of neutrality by Rawls, Dworkin and Ackerman is concurrent 
with important developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence74 concerning non-
n c
establishment of religion .
As seen, basing religious freedom on a principle which demands equality of religious liberties 
will entail legal protection of equality of opportunity in utilisation of this right for everyone. 
This will mean rights of individuals should be protected even within groups, such as those of 
religious community members, employees or students of religious organizations. Equal 
liberties in society can be maintained only if individuals are never deemed to have waived 
fundamental liberties, even by joining an organization voluntarily. The introduction of a 
principle of neutrality, which is intended to further a society of equal liberties, will be seen by 
some as, in fact, curtailing liberties of freedom and belief in a discriminatory manner. 
Introducing a demand for neutrality in the state will limit lawmakers, public officials, judges 
and even citizens, in legal decisions which they make, if they rely on religious grounds. This 
is a limitation whose implications and difficulties will be discussed in a later section of this 
chapter.
72 Elshtain, [2000].
73 Ackerman, [1980] 12-15.
74 Such as: Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971) and its progeny; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972); 
Lynch v. Donnely, 465 US 668 (1984).
75 Barry, [1990] 29.
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4.1.3 Individual right as property of the right-holder — A third individualistic justification for 
religious freedom in liberal theory is offered by libertarian-liberal theory. It is based neither 
on the importance of individual critical capacity nor on a principle of equal religious liberties, 
but rather is rooted in the principle of minimal intervention by the state, as the perceived 
danger to liberty emanates from the state76. This strand of liberal thinking is notably 
expressed by Nozick77, in his development of Lockean liberalism.
Although Nozick’s78 theory is based on individualistic principles which put individual choice 
above all other aspects of religious freedom, it ends up protecting the group over the 
individual. In his view, although the framework of the state is libertarian and laissez-faire, 
individual communities within it need not be. Many communities may choose internal 
restrictions which the libertarian would condemn if they were enforced by a central state 
apparatus. In a free society people may contract into various restrictions that the government 
may not legitimately impose upon them.
This emanates from a perception of rights ownership79, which implies that rights can be 
waived at will. Locke (whose ideas form the foundation Nozick’s theory) saw rights as non- 
alienable, so that no one can contract away his rights. Nozick’s reading of Locke as an ultra­
libertarian may be wrong on the issue of ownership and waivablility of rights. Nozick 
believes personal religious freedom is owned by the individual, and can be used by him any 
way he wishes, including giving this right away. But from our previous reading of Locke, it 
can be seen that according to his view personal religious freedom is not absolutely waivable. 
At least, it appears that under a Lockean analysis, an individual cannot waive unto the group 
his right to make his own choices in matters of religion, especially not to a group whose 
governing principles compete with the liberal state, such as the Catholic Church. Rights 
cannot be sold or bargained away like property, as an individual cannot sell his freedom away 
to become a slave. Even in a proprietary model of rights, a different relation between the
76 For the other major exponent o f  libertarian theory and critic o f  welfare liberalism see: Hayek, [I960].
77 Nozick, [1974] 320.
78 Nozick, [1974] 320.
79 Gray, [2000] chapter 1.
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right-holder and the right is possible. For example, Waldron80 supports the understanding, 
based on Locke and Thomas Jefferson, that rights are not owned but held in trust by the right- 
bearer.
Nozick argues that if you contract into the community you buy the whole “package”. But the 
reality, especially in the case of religious communities, is more complex. Individuals’ 
affiliation with a religious community may be a product of circumstances, of deep-rooted 
belief or of choice. In some cases they may not effectively be able to leave -  their homes, 
family, and social connections belong to the religious community. In other cases they may 
not want to leave. It is precisely because of the importance of religion to the person that one 
should not be made to choose, on an all or nothing basis, between belonging to a religion and 
enjoying basic rights.
Nozick’s approach results in harming individual freedoms. This radical liberal approach, 
which is generally perceived as ultra-individualistic, achieves a similar outcome to the 
communitarian approach, in contrast to other liberal approaches. Allowing people to contract 
away their freedoms unrestrained, gives more power to the underlying forces operating in the 
community at the expense of individual liberties. Even the contractual argument, that 
members choose voluntarily to belong to a community and so have waived their right is 
misleading. Often people are bom into a community and face costly (not just in the economic 
sense) barriers of exit from it. This analysis of Nozick’s argument shows that ultra-liberalism 
in fact diminishes the aggregate freedom of individuals rather than enhancing it.
If freedom of action and freedom of contract are the fundamental principles underlying 
religious freedom, and the state should not intervene in the exercise of this right, as the 
libertartian approach claims, then people are to be respected in their choice of living in 
communities that do not uphold principles of religious freedom. If we accept that it is 
illegitimate for the state to intervene in the functioning of religious communities, then we 
must also accept that it will also be illegitimate for international law to intervene. But, as I 
have argued, these assertions based on a fiction of contractual freedom must be criticized. 
This approach will have practical legal implications regarding restrictions imposed by
80 Waldron, [1999].
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religious communities on their members, among them particularly restrictions upon women’s 
rights, analysed in Chapter Four.
Thus, liberal thought set important justifications for religious freedom: that of rational 
criticism, that of equality in according liberties and that based on a principle of non­
intervention of the state. This last basis will be criticized in subsequent chapters.
4.2 Justifications based on relations between religious groups
An important reason given by Enlightenment liberalism for religious freedom was an 
individualistic reason, the encouragement of critical debate. No less important in the 
development of the liberal project was the Enlightenment liberals’ group-ba£ed reasoning for 
religious freedom: prevention of conflict between religious groups and the advancement of 
toleration. These are utilitarian justifications, but they are not to be separated from the rights 
debate. Not only were these arguments historically entwined, but also, to this day, the 
separation of Church from state which follows from this reasoning, both complements the 
principle of religious freedom in liberal ideology and sits uneasily with it.
The group-based justification that emerges from Enlightenment liberalism for religious 
freedom is, that disentangling the people’s choice of faith from the coercive power of the
ft 1State will prevent violent conflict . Rousseau saw this as a key to solving the conflicts which
plagued the ancient world in which
“[s]ince each religion was thus attached exclusively to the laws of the state which 
prescribed it, and since there was no means of converting people except by subduing 
them, the only missionaries were conquerors; and since the obligation to change faith 
was part of the law of conquest, it was necessary to conquer before preaching 
conversion”82.
81 O f course, often the individual reason and the social reason were both argued, as by 17th c. writer Pierre 
Bayle, in his Philosophical commentary on the Words o f  Jesus Christ. “Compel them to com e in”, reprinted in 
Kramnick [1995] 75 ,79 .
82 Rousseau, £1968] (book IV chapter 8) 178.
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The important aspect of religious freedom, under this reasoning, is separation of religion 
from state, as a required constitutional principle. This demand was not accepted by many 
liberal states nor by current international law, as discussed in Chapter Three.
The controversial proposal of separation of Church from state as prerequisite to religious 
freedom is a direct consequence of the particular nature of religion as a competitor to state 
authority. Such a structural constitutional imposition which forms an essential aspect of a 
human right is unique to the right of religious freedom. There is no correlative demand 
regarding any other right. For instance, freedom of speech does not imply, under any political 
theory, that groups which engage in organised expressive activity will take no part in the 
governing of the State.
If religion as a source of law is incompatible with religious freedom, there are even more far-
reaching implications than separation of religion from state. Not only is the attachment of
religion to the state problematic, but so is the attachment of religion to political debate. This
demand was linked to the reasoning that resolution of conflict could only rely on accessible
rational means, and not on external divine authority. As Stout explains:
“Any point of view in which religious considerations or conceptions of the good 
remained dominant was, in the early modem context, incapable of providing a basis 
for the reasonable and peaceful resolution of social conflict. Incompatible appeals to 
authority seemed equally reasonable, and therefore equally suspect, as well as 
thoroughly useless as vehicles of rational persuasion.”83
This controversy over the involvement of religious argumentation in politics remains as 
pertinent today, as will be discussed in a later section of this chapter on religious reasoning in 
politics.
The justification for religious freedom which is based on the attempt to prevent conflict and 
the futility of coercion, is closely related to the idea of toleration. The concept of religious 
toleration in Enlightenment liberalism had two distinct meanings: toleration as the best way 
to discover the one true course (Locke’s meaning) and toleration as a way to accept different 
ways as valid and to co-exist with them (Hobbes’ approach)84. These two approaches may
83 Stout, 11981] 235.
84 Gray, [2000] 2-3.
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well be precursors of two different goals for the current liberal project, in Rawls’ terminology 
-  comprehensive liberalism and political liberalism. They re-appear in a new guise in the 
debate over liberalism’s claim to neutrality.
But the problem in defining religious freedom in terms of toleration is that toleration is
Off
extended to something which is to some degree undesirable, but there is a reason to tolerate . 
Toleration is considered a virtue precisely because the tolerant person refrains from curtailing
o/:
some thing he believes is unworthy . In the case of religious toleration, the reason is the 
collective good: harmonious relations between religious groups and the prevention of social 
strife.
This is an instrumental, pragmatic reason for recognizing religious freedom and therefore is 
problematic. States will respect it as long as it fulfils their social goals, but will infringe this 
freedom when they find it socially expedient to do so, for instance when the religious
on
dissenters are a small and socially insignificant minority . The weakness of the toleration 
argument is that it does not establish an independent value of a human right to freedom of 
religion. In the words of Thomas Paine: “Toleration is not the opposite of intolerance, but it is 
the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding 
liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it”88. A social justification for religious 
freedom in lieu of an individual-rights justification cannot be a basis for effective protection 
of religious freedom.
But the justification of religious freedom as a way to prevent conflict and harmonize relations 
between groups has important legal implications. As we have seen, this view justifies 
interpreting equality on the basis of religion as equality between groups, rather than equality 
between individuals. If the object is to promote harmonious relations between groups, then
85 Evans C., [2001] 22. King, [1976] 13 ff., suggested a distinction between tolerance and toleration. Tolerance is 
practiced when one objects to something but voluntarily endures it, while toleration is defined as the negation o f  
intolerance, which can include both mere endurance and positive support. While other writers have used these 
terms interchangeably, it is useful to note the two separate meanings o f  this term or terms.
86 Raz, [1986] 401-407.
87 Evans C., [2001] 23.
88 Paine, [2000] 102.
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each group must be treated equally, even if individuals are treated less favourably than they 
would without regard to their religion. Conversely, if utilitarian reasons are unacceptable as a 
basis for human rights, group equality must be rejected in favour of a universal standard of 
individual equality.
5. Community and identity
5.1 Communitarian approaches
The liberal view of religious freedom has come under attack from writers, broadly classed as 
communitarians, who challenge liberalism’s view of man as autonomous, and view the role 
of religion in social context. All the approaches under this heading explore the concept of
• » O Qreligion as identity and emanate from communitarian criticism of liberal theory . While 
communitarian analysis may be thought to lead to an interpretation of religious freedom 
founded on the group rather than the individual, I argue that analysis of communitarian 
writers leads to a more complex conclusion.
While we have seen that group justifications were present in liberal conceptions of religious 
freedom, these were utilitarian justifications, which justified religious freedom based on 
advancement of the general public good, rather than based on rights. Communitarians, 
however, can offer a more direct rights basis for religious freedom that is derived from group 
affiliation. But in the discussion that follows, I draw a distinction between a communitarian 
approach of self-identity, which I claim bases individual, rather than group rights, and a 
different communitarian approach of group-identity, which properly bases group rights.
One explanation of the shift from viewing religion as choice to viewing religion as social 
affiliation is an historic one. The liberal theorists in 17th century England saw religion as the 
product of individual decision. Glaser90 claims that such as approach was applicable for a 
community which was homogeneous except for differences of religion. He questions why, 
however, this approach should still guide contemporary liberals as Rawls, since nowadays
89 For a communitarian theory overview see: Gutmann, [1985].
90 Glaser, [1995] 126.
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religion is determined more by the community in which a person is bom than by individual 
decision. Protecting the communal rather than the individual, aspects of religion, is therefore 
today more conducive to safeguarding religious liberty.
Religion also plays another important role, according to the communitarian account, as a 
social bond which gives a goal to society. Taylor91 views civic freedom, complementary to 
the ‘liberal’ freedom of lack of government intervention in private life, as the freedom of the 
society to govern itself, free from despotism. He argues that for such a civic freedom to exist, 
a sense of cohesion or shared morality is needed, a sense that can be given by religion. 
Liberal freedom in itself is a ‘hollow’ freedom. The conception of a positive freedom, 
meaning more than just lack of government interference in life, shares something with the 
postliberal critique of liberalism, which also demands a substantive, positive freedom. But 
here these two critiques of liberalism diverge. While feminists, other post-liberals, and even 
egalitarian liberals demand a positive freedom that provides opportunity for se/^realization of 
the individual, Taylor’s approach demands a substantive freedom that is exercised by the 
society as a group.
However, while having common goals may be of worth to society, the individuals and the 
groups that make up society often do not have a common goal, as Taylor himself concedes. 
The whole point of freedom is that we are allowed to pursue our own goals. Furthermore, it is 
not clear, both historically and conceptually, that religion leads to the sort of civic freedom 
that fosters a society capable of staving off despotism. Quite the contrary, shared goals (such 
as religion or nationalism) are just as capable of promoting tyrannies in society. Taylor’s 
emphasis is on finding a common goal in society, besides the complementary freedom from 
government imposition of religion, which is part of the ‘liberal’ freedom. Such a position 
neither promotes the religious freedom of individuals nor of groups within society.
Religion may also be seen as an issue of identity in a different meaning, not of communal 
identity, but of personal identity. Although it has been offered as part of a communitarian 
philosophy, I wish to distinguish this reasoning from the reasoning which views religion as 
forming communal identity and constituting a person’s identity through membership in the
91 Taylor, [1990] 93.
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community. The role religion plays in constituting personal identity is an individualistic 
justification for respecting freedom of religion. In protecting freedom of religion we are 
protecting and assisting people in holding on to their spiritual identity and cultivating it.
Such a view of religion can be learned from Sandel’s criticism of the liberal approach. 
Religion (and sometimes the lack of it) is part of who a person is. Demanding neutrality 
concerning religion on any level is denying innermost convictions. This relates to Sandel’s 
general criticism of liberalism as a deontological view of the person, whose purpose, ties and 
morals are deemed a product of choice. According to his view, the problem with liberalism is 
that it claims we must view ourselves as independent in the sense that our identity is never 
tied to our aims and attachments, but living by these aims and attachments is inseparable 
from understanding who we are as persons92. Applied to the issue of religious freedom this 
might mean that religion should be accorded some kind of ‘trump’ value when it is in conflict 
with other considerations, because it is not just a rational or deliberative choice of a person, 
like political affiliation, but part of the person’s constitution.
The idea of religion as self-identity rather than community-identity which defines the 
individual, is inherent to Sandel’s strand of communitarianism. Although the community 
(family, religion, school) shapes and even constitutes the person, there is a personal 
conception of subjectivity, which includes contemplation of self-identity and commitments, 
and of society. Under this view, the person is not identical with his communal or social
93connections .
This version of communitarianism can be distinguished from a ‘stronger’ conception of 
communitarianism (such as that of MacIntyre, who views individuals as inheriting a specified 
social space94) in which the self is almost entirely a product of circumstances (including 
religion)95
92 Sandel, £1998] especially 7-14, 62,133-135.
93 For the development o f  the concept o f  identity see: Taylor, £1989]; for development o f  the politics o f  identity 
see: Taylor, £1994].
94 MacIntyre, £1984] 33-35.
95 Frazer and Lacey, £1993] 158.
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Sandel claims96, that belief is not a product of choice, like lifestyle, but it is constitutive, a 
deeply rooted component of the individual. That is why freedom of conscience is unalienable. 
But he refers to the source of belief as conscience, not social position but individual 
conscience, something that is influenced by, but also distinct from social context. This view 
does not stand in contradiction to the claim that religious freedom is an individual right, 
although it may have ramifications on how that right is to be implemented.
So, there may be two views of religion as identity in communitarian writing, that of religion 
as group identity or that of religion as individual identity. It appears, that some 
communitarian writing obscures the difference between religion as community-identity and 
religion as self-identity.
The relationship between a person and his community is crucial precisely because he forges 
his self-identity through confrontation with his surrounding community and attempts to 
differentiate himself from it. As object relations theory of psychoanalysis suggests, individual 
identity is based upon the separation of self from others. Although initially this concept refers
07to separation from the mother (real or symbolic) , it is, more importantly for our purpose, a 
separation from family and community98.
The interpretation of religion as constitutive of individual identity will be important in the 
discussion of legal issues in later chapters, such as that of children’s religious freedom and 
the right of the parents over the religious choice and education of their children and in the 
discussion of proselytism.
5.2 Freedom of religion as protection of minorities in a multicultural society
One important reason to accord freedom of religion protection as a human right, is the 
protection of minority religions in the society. By guaranteeing all aspects of freedom of
96 Sandel, [1990] 74.
97 See: Grotstein and Rinsley, [1994],
98
Gomez, [1997] and see: Frazer and Lacey, [1993] 174-5. Psychologists note that in non-Westem cultures the 
self is viewed not as self-sufficient and autonomous. Roland, £1988] refers to ‘w e -s e lf , a concept o f  personal 
identity which includes the encircling group.
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religion, we guarantee the preservations of these religious cultures and communities, and 
prevent their disappearance by assimilation into the mainstream society. Two separate 
reasons can justify this approach: One is that preserving a variety of cultures, social systems 
and religions, and maintaining the social dialogue between them, will reap benefit to society 
as a whole (a public good argument). The other is based on the intrinsic right of each cultural 
(or religious) group to exist with equal respect. This last reason can also be couched in terms 
of individual rights. If minority cultures would no longer exist, minority members’ choices of 
culture would become restricted, and their freedoms would be curtailed".
While these reasons apply to both minority and majority religions, the emphasis is on 
minority religions, as they are the ones likely to be eroded without this protection. 
Furthermore, historically, adherents of minority religions and practitioners of such religions 
bore the burden of persecution and discrimination. So, it is justified that the measures of 
protection of the rights of adherents of minority religions may be different from those of the 
majority religion. (In the international context, of course, “minority” is a relative term. A 
majority religion in one state may be a minority religion in another). The different treatment 
may not only be a function of majority/minority status, but of the inherent differences 
between the religions themselves. If we accept these arguments, we must tailor the 
interpretation of religious freedom to fit disparate religions residing together. Parekh100 
argues that “[e] quality between cultures is logically different from and cannot be understood 
along the lines of equality between individuals.... It is not enough to appeal to the general 
right to equality. One also needs to show that there is equality in the relevant feature of the 
context and that it entails identical treatment.” 101
What equality between cultures entails can be illustrated102 by the case of Ahmed v. UKm . A 
Muslim employee of a UK school asked to be given time off a regular workday to attend
99
Kymlicka, [1989], chapters 8, 9, p. 162 ff.
100 I use Parekh as a representative o f  multicultural thinkers. For other writers on multiculturalism, see: 
Gutmann, [1994]; Willet, [1998].
101 Parekh, [1997] 142-143.
102 See: Parekh, [1997] 123.
103 UK Court o f  Appeals decision: Ahm ed  v ILEA [1978] QB 36, 1 All ER 574, CA; European Court decision: 
Ahmed  v. UK  [1981]. See case analysis also in: Clapham, [1993] 14-15,316.
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religious services and was denied. Following his failed domestic litigation, his application to 
the European Court of Human Rights, arguing breach of Article 9 of the Convention 
(religious freedom) was also denied104. Under an analysis which ignores cultural context, 
Ahmed indeed is seen as asking not for equal treatment, but for preferential treatment. He is 
asking to work four and a half days a week, while his colleagues work five days. However, 
assessing equality between cultures, we see that the context in which this case took place 
creates inequality between cultures. The days of rest, Saturday and Sunday, conform to a 
Judeo-Christian tradition. To redress this inequality, an exception to the rule must be made 
for those whose religions require other rest days and the right under the Convention should be 
interpreted accordingly.
Parekh believes religious equality is an individually exercised collective right105. I disagree. 
Although a correct analysis of equality should assesses equality in the relevant cultural 
context, it is an individual right to equality of religious freedom that is protected by this 
assessment. Ahmed’s right and his choice to exercise it, and incur the risks associated with 
doing so, are his own. The fact that other devout employees of the same faith did not make 
the same demands, or even did not think this exemption was warranted by their faith, does 
not detract from the legitimacy of his claim. Religious freedom and religious equality should 
be understood and assessed in their cultural context, but this does not make them rights of the 
group rather than the individual.
My first disagreement is conceptual. Parekh argues collective rights do and should exist, and 
may sometimes trump individual rights. These include rights, such as the right of the Catholic 
Church, recognized by states, to grant or refuse divorce to its members. This would properly 
be a group right (in his terms - a collectively exercised collective right), because it overrides 
the rights of individuals. But it is problematic precisely for this reason, even if these 
individuals submit freely to its power over them. Parekh dismisses the argument that groups 
should not be granted rights because they will threaten individual rights. He counters that 
individuals can misuse their rights against others as well, and yet we recognize individual 
rights, so why should we not recognise group rights?
104 For a similar case regarding a Sabbatarian Christian employee, see the European Comm ission’s decision in 
Stedm anv. UK  [1997].
105 Parekh, [2000] 216.
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This seems to miss the point. Of course individual rights can be misused, but granting rights 
to groups essentially entails allowing the group power over individuals106. States have power 
over individuals; indeed states are defined as having a monopoly of such power. A State may 
have legitimate reasons to divest power to other institutions, but it is not clear why transfer of 
such power over individuals from state to group, including religious groups, constitutes a 
right of the group.
My second disagreement is policy-based. Parekh relies on a justification for community 
rights, particularly pertinent to religious group rights, which is the shared doctrine the group 
wishes to maintain. This, he maintains, is why most States respect the Catholic Church’s right 
to excommunicate its members or deny them divorce, and grant it exemption from sexual 
discrimination laws, even though this severely restricts individual liberties.
These examples show, if anything, the problems created by recognition of religious group 
rights. These powers of the Catholic Church, which are recognised in liberal states, raise the 
question, how can such erosion of individual rights be justified within a liberal framework. 
One answer is that in any state that recognises the right to freedom of religion, every member 
is free to leave the Church. But this is not a good justification. It is precisely because men and 
women are part of the society in which they live, that a Church should not be able to override 
indiscriminately members’ rights, even if the membership of the individual in the Church is 
voluntary. Voluntariness is a question of degree. Because someone lives in a Catholic 
community, it does not mean that they agree that a refusal to grant divorce should be outside 
the realm of the law. While refusing to grant divorce may or may not contravene the Church 
member’s rights, the fact that membership is voluntary should not automatically exempt the 
Church from scrutiny of the law.
Religious institutions, although they are private institutions, operate in the public realm. For 
instance, by allowing religious institutions the power to create legally recognized marriage 
and divorce, the state is transferring to them regulatory power in a crucial area of public
* 107 • •life . The distinction between organs of the state belonging to the public realm and religious
106 In the previous examples the Church is even given powers in the Hohfeldian sense (a right conferred by law 
to alter legal relations o f  others. See: Fitzgerald, [1966] 228-229).
107 See, further, Chapters Three and Four.
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institutions belonging to the private realm does not represent reality. When a church hires or 
fires employees or even excommunicates members, it is not just a private institution which is 
enforcing its doctrine. It is a public organization implementing a system of morality that must 
stand up to generally accepted principles of human rights.
While accepting the premise of the communitarian approach, that the individual is part of a 
social context, my conclusion is not that religious communities should be left alone to 
formulate their own rules, but rather that basic human rights provisions should apply to them, 
adapted to their dual character.
5.3 Groups which violate the human rights of their own members
A lingering question with no satisfactory answer for any approach that advocates acceptance 
of a plurality of cultural doctrines, while espousing basic principles of human rights, is that of 
a group that discriminates against some of its own members or against non-members who are 
reliant upon the group. The latter case concerns, for instance, employees who do not belong 
to the religious group, but work in its schools, hospitals or other institutions.
The issue of groups which violate human rights of their own members (especially socially- 
weak members and dissenters) is nowhere more evident than regarding religious communities 
and religious ethical codes. Kymlicka, who tries to reconcile liberal theory with 
communitarian challenges deals directly with the dilemma of how liberalism should treat 
groups that violate liberal principles. He argues that the fact that some group systems are 
deficient from a liberal point of view does not mean that liberals can impose their principles 
on them108. This is obvious to him in the transnational context: Liberal states will not 
intervene in how an illiberal state is run. Kymlicka argues that national minorities (we may 
add - religious minorities) deserve to be treated similarly to foreign states, that liberal 
principles should not be imposed upon them.
However, this reasoning can be argued the other way around. If some principles are justified 
as human rights minimums within the state, which the state may impose on private groups 
and institutions within it, then it is also justified that there should be human rights principles
108 Kymlicka, [1995] 165.
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which the international community is justified in demanding that states observe. This is not a 
new view. Teson109 traces the concept of human rights in international law to Kant, and 
explains that under a Kantian theory, respect for human rights is a fundamental prerequisite 
of the state. However, this remains a controversial question in international law. How it 
directly impacts on religious freedom will be revisited in Chapter Three.
5.4 Group rights: The utilitarian argument
An argument that promotes group rights above individual rights for a completely different 
reason than the communitarians, can be termed the group-rights-utilitarian argument. This 
argues that individual rights can be protected only by giving power to the group. While the 
ultimate goal is to protect the individuals’ rights, this must, paradoxically, sometimes be 
achieved by favouring the group over the individual. Gedicks claims110 that religious groups 
protect individual liberty precisely because they challenge the power of the state. Religious 
groups protect individuals by challenging the power of the State, which individuals are 
incapable of doing alone in the modem world. To allow groups the freedom they require to 
fulfil this role, they should be allowed to trump individual liberty in case of conflict.
This may be likened to the powers accorded by some laws to labour unions over workers. 
Organised labour is seen as the only power strong enough to challenge employers and 
authorities, and to protect individual workers’ rights, something the individual worker would 
not be able to do. To ensure the unions have these powers, for instance to utilise strikes, the 
decisions of individual workers must give way to union decision. Similarly, rights of 
individuals against the state can only be protected if power is given to popular social 
institutions, like religions, to override individual preferences.
The group-utilitarian justification provides no answer for those individuals whose rights are 
infringed by religions. By transferring authority from state to religions, authority which may 
be paramount to individual right, we are merely transferring the power to infringe individual 
rights, not protecting them.
109 Tes6n, [1992] 62-66.
110 Gedicks, [1998].
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6. Religious views and liberal prescription of religious freedom
Religions that view themselves as an all-encompassing social prescription for the community 
of their adherents stand completely at odds with the liberal view of the role of religion. A key 
idea of liberalism is the autonomous individual -  an individual who is not ruled by others and 
rules himself11 \  a view which is inherently incompatible with many religious world views.
As part of the liberal ideology, religious toleration is perceived to be compatible with 
Protestantism, the religion historically associated with the rise of liberal thought. However, 
even this is not entirely the case, and has not historically necessarily been so. Liberalism has 
been an important tradition in Protestantism, owing to Protestant emphasis on private 
judgment112. But Protestant Christianity developed an affinity not just with the individualistic 
aspect of liberalism, but also with the other characteristic of the liberal movement, the rise of 
the nation-state113. The Protestant Reformation, although ultimately conducive to religious 
freedom, has also a history of religious intolerance. While Protestantism empowered the 
individual in exercising personal religious freedom, it utilised the power of the state to 
establish religion, aligning the state-religion with the newly emerging nation-state. While 
some tendencies in the Reformation worked for religious liberty and separation of Church 
from state (especially among minority groups such as Baptists and Anabaptists which were 
not aligned with the state), the main Reformers such as Luther and Calvin actually helped 
reinforce the principle of one religion in one state, and put the power of religion directly 
behind the secular authority114. While today there is no such relation between Church and 
state in those states which are traditionally linked with Protestantism, as will be seen in the 
Chapter Three, their history shows a complex relationship to the liberal principle of freedom 
of religion.
111 Gray, [1995] 59.
112 Newman, [1991] 153.
1,3 Sanders, [1964] 12.
114 Newman, [1991] 107 ff.
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The conflict may be even more pronounced with religions which are not aligned with the 
philosophical tradition of liberalism. The Muslim political theorist Memissi argues that lack 
of public-private demarcation is inherent to the Islamic state. She claims115 that being Muslim 
is not a matter of personal choice, but of belonging to a theocratic state. Being a Marxist or an 
atheist does not contradict obeying national law, but being a Muslim is inherently a matter 
that is not disjointed from the public code. This would be impossible to reconcile with a 
liberal state’s conception of freedom of religion. This conception has direct implications in 
the international sphere. A view of the right to religious freedom in international law 
exclusively as a right of the sovereign state was expressed by the Saudi Arabian 
government116. It argued that this right comprises the freedom of any country to adhere to, 
preserve and protect its religion, and show respect and tolerance towards religious minorities 
of the country’s citizens, as long as they respect the constitutional tenets of their country.
Non-monotheistic religions and the political traditions which they inform have other views on 
the respective roles of the individual, the state and religion. Asian ideas of State foundations, 
in those states in which Buddhism and Hinduism are predominant, tend to espouse non­
separation of state and religion, integration of the individual and the public, and a grant of 
formal power to state without clear theories of accountability117. These are at odds with 
Western ideas of constitutionalism and individual freedom, as well as with the possibility of 
separation of state from religion. In Japan, for instance, it has been asserted that the post-war
1947 constitution, which was drafted by US occupation forces, instituted foreign Christian
118values . Separation of religion from state in that constitution, imposed by the allied forces, 
certainly introduced foreign American ideals, as will be discussed in Chapter Three.
However, other aspects of the liberal concept of religious toleration may be particularly 
suited to non-monotheistic religions: Monotheistic religion, suggests the Buddhist 
philosopher Abe, is apt to be intolerant, due to its emphasis on one absolute god. Religions 
based on exclusive faith generate intolerance. In contrast, Buddhism has no order to “have no
1.5 Memissi, [1991] 20.
1.6 Report o f  the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/1993/62, p.85. See: Shelton and 
Kiss, [1996],
1.7 Beer, [1992] 17-18.
118 Forfar, [1996],
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other god”. It has no dogma, as Buddha’s teachings are just one of many ways to 
enlightenment119. Hinduism encompasses two aspects: the ever present moral order of the
1 90universe (dharma) but also the individualistic (bhakti'), based on personal devotion . The 
second, more individualistic and less authoritarian aspect, is more easily reconciled with the 
liberal concept of religious freedom, but Hinduism is, is fact, a mixture of both.
As we can see even from this small sample, religious views and religiously informed State 
views, on different aspects of religious freedom, have varied enormously. If such are the 
divergences in the political philosophies of the states and the religious philosophies that 
inform them, both historically and contemporaneously, it is obvious that grave obstacles 
stand in the way of achieving a consensus on an international right to freedom of religion. 
This difficulty will be explored in later chapters.
7. Religious political participation
There are problems inherent in the concept of religious freedom that make it impossible to 
realise within the state. If religious freedom includes the freedom to use religion to oppose 
the state and its political underpinnings (in a liberal state -  democracy, human rights, and 
possibly, neutrality), the state cannot maintain both itself and complete, unabridged religious 
freedom. The state will necessarily provide an incomplete protection of religious freedom, 
especially under the view that claims religious freedom is a group right. While even an 
individual may wish to use religion against principles of the state, organized political activity 
is much more central to the exercise of religious freedom by a group. So, any limitation on 
religious participation in the political sphere is injurious to the exercise of group religious 
freedom. Conversely, any justification of limitations of religious political activity may 
contribute a political argument in favour of recognising religious freedom as an individual, 
rather than group, right. Examples of such limitations will be discussed in this and in the next 
sections.
119 Abe, [1995] 143.
120 Van derBurg, [1995] 110.
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The competition between the authority of religion and the authority of the state makes the 
conflict between group and individual rights much sharper regarding religious freedom 
compared to other human rights. It raises some profound problems in all states, and 
particularly in liberal democracies. These problems, both in quality and in quantity, are 
distinct from any that arise with other civil institutions. This is because religions are coherent, 
all-encompassing, externally derived, alternative normative systems to the state. Both 
problems analysed below show that religious freedom might be harder to define and more 
difficult to achieve than other human rights.
The first problem discussed in section 7.1 is that of the legitimacy of using religious reasons 
for legislation. Law in a democracy is made by majority vote, regardless of the subjective 
motivations people have for casting such vote. Each vote is equal. But there are limitations on 
the power of majority vote. Respect for human rights, including religious freedoms, is one of 
these limitations. But is prohibition of legislation according to religious doctrine one of these 
limitations? If democracy is based on collective decisionmaking by rational autonomous 
agents, when these agents are deciding according to predetermined external doctrine, they are 
bypassing substantive, if not procedural, democracy. These two opposing arguments mean 
that democracy and liberalism stand in irreconcilable tension regarding the status of religion 
in the state.
The second problem, discussed in section 7.2, is that of the right of religious political parties 
that are opposed to democracy to participate in the democratic process. If religious freedom is 
recognised as a collective right, one of its important manifestations is the ability to participate 
in democratic elections. This presents a conflict between democracy as a free and equal 
election process, and the limitations upon it necessary to make democracy both meaningful 
and sustainable. This conflict is fundamentally unsolvable.
7.1 Are religious reasons for legislation a breach of religious freedom?
One of the difficult problems regarding the permissible bounds of religion in the state, in 
states which are liberal democracies, is that of religious motivation for legislation. This 
question, of the legitimacy of use of religious reasons in the democratic political process, is 
pivotal both to theory and practice of the liberal state. The resolution of this question is
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necessary to resolving the fundamental question: whether a liberal state and religion can co­
exist in the same society. This has direct bearing on the interpretation of freedom of religion 
as a group or individual right, and is ultimately at the core of the understanding of religious 
freedom. This problem will be re-visited, with some its practical manifestations regarding 
women and religion, in Chapter Four.
On the one hand, if the legislative process is the culmination of the free marketplace of ideas, 
then religious ideas must be as eligible to compete in it as any others. On the other hand, if 
the resulting law is equivalent to the religious norm, and the reason for its adoption is 
religious dictate upon which the legislators acted, is it not tantamount to imposition of 
religious norms in contravention of religious freedom of all citizens?
In this discussion, it is clearer to focus on primary religious reasons, i.e. religious reasons 
which are given as the direct justification for the decision. There are many cases of hidden or 
secondary religious reasons, i.e. reasons that are based on social or cultural norms, which are 
ultimately derived from religious teachings, even if religion is no longer seen as their 
justification.
When asking whether religious reasons are legitimate, different answers must be given for 
different actors in the political system. I will analyze them in order, from the actor for which 
it is most permissible to use religious reason to the one for which it is least permissible.
Individual citizens -  Principles of individual freedoms and individual choice mean that 
individual citizens may generally make decisions as they please, for any reasons they feel are 
apt, or for no reason at all. But is this true also when they act as voters? Of course there is no 
possibility of placing legal restrictions on citizens’ reasons for voting as they do, but should 
there be any such moral constraints? I think not, as citizens should enjoy absolute personal 
freedom in forming their decision. Others see a social reason for this as well. Not only are 
religious reasons perfectly legitimate reasons for voting, but their inclusion may even serve a 
social function, argues Weithman121. He argues that to achieve liberal democratic citizenship, 
as many citizens as possible must participate in political life. This entails, he claims, allowing 
moral and religious argument from citizens and even some moralizing by government. Many
121 Weithman, [2001] 511.
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people become involved in public life through participation in churches, and their 
participation in political life would be curtailed if this could not be the platform for their own 
political agenda.
However, it may be argued that, when exercising their right to vote, individual citizens 
cannot legitimately act as they please. Rawls argues that not only are legislators and officials 
legitimately limited to public reason in political decisions, but citizens are likewise limited 
when they are acting politically, as voters, rather then in their personal lives. Their limitation 
to reliance on public reason means that they should be able to explain their actions in terms 
others could accept as consistent with their freedom and equality .
Some attempt has been made to reconcile these opposing views. Liberal democracy and 
religious public reasoning are not contradictory. Greenawalt argued, that it does not follow 
from a secular and separationist form of a liberal democracy that people should eschew their
• • • • •  19 1religious convictions in making political choices . At least in choosing between several 
reasonable possibilities given by public choice, he suggests that one may use a non-public (or 
religious) reason124.
Individuals holding institutional religious positions and the organisations they represent - 
These may of course use religious reasons in conducting the affairs of their religions, but the 
question is whether they may rely on their religious authority in the political discussion, use 
the power of religious institutions to advance political goals, and involve them in the political 
process. Among opponents of the legitimacy of such involvement, Audi125 demands that 
those bearing institutional religious positions refrain from pressing for specific public policies.
1 OfGreenawalt likewise argues that religious leaders should stay out of political endorsement 
of parties, because they will make religion political and alienate those with opposing religious 
views. However, he fails to explain why making religion political is a bad thing. It could be
122 Rawls [1993] chapter VI, changing his stand in Rawls [2nd ed, 1999].
123 Greenawalt, [1988].
124 But see also: Greenawalt, £1995].
125 Audi, [1989] 259.
126 Greenawalt, [2001] 401.
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argued that becoming political means being part of robust discussion in society, and therefore 
is a good result.
Weithman127 argues that religious institutions may legitimately be involved in politics, and 
backs this stand by citing two examples: the first, is of U.S. Catholic Bishops writing a letter 
in support of economic justice, the second is Church support for the US civil rights 
movement in the 1960s.
However, the content of the involvement, the fact that religious institutions supported 
worthwhile causes128 (from a liberal viewpoint), proves little about the principled political 
legitimacy of such institutional involvement. If such involvement is legitimate when it 
furthers causes compatible with liberalism, it must also be legitimate when it furthers causes 
which liberals would oppose129. An argument for institutional religious involvement in 
political life based on the content of this involvement in particular cases, is lacking in 
principle.
A middle way, between prohibition of institutional religious involvement in politics and grant 
of equal participation in the political process, is taken by US law. The limitation on the 
involvement of religion in politics is indirect. In the US Churches are prohibited from
130endorsing or opposing political candidates, if they wish to enjoy tax-exempt status 
Although enforcement was not rigorous, and perhaps because of this very fact, claims were 
made that the prohibition was discriminately applied. Discrimination in application is one of 
the dangers of rules that allow religion into politics, but it is one of the dangers of legislation 
that excludes religion from politics as well. The other danger of any regulation that decides 
how much religious speech may legitimately be included in the political process, is that the 
state becomes a ‘speech police’.
127 Weithman, [1991] 52.
128 Examples certainly abound, such as a recent call by bishops o f  the Church o f  England on the UK government 
for stricter regulation o f  arms export to the third world. See: Baldwin, [2002].
129 Such as the successful campaign by the Catholic Church in Portugal against liberalization o f  the law 
criminalizing abortion, in a 1998 referendum (Tremlett, [2000]).
130 The Internal Revenue Code 1986, Section 501(c )(3).
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Legislators -  A legislator does not enjoy the unencumbered freedom of the voter. Legislators 
are elected to act in promotion of the public good, not their idiosyncratic preferences. But 
legislators could claim that they were elected to promote a platform chosen by those who 
voted for them. If this platform relies on religious reasons it is not only their right but their 
duty to use them to enact conforming legislation.
131Some attempt has been made to reconcile these demands on the legislator. Greenawalt 
argues that legislators may use religious reasons for themselves, but should publicly develop 
non-religious arguments. Similarly, Perry argued that it is constitutionally permissible for 
legislators to make a political choice based on religious argument, but only where a plausible
199secular argument supports the same conclusion . He argues that only citizens may articulate 
religious grounds for their political decisions and use them in public argument.
The legitimacy of reliance by legislators on a religious source should be differentiated 
according to the type of religious source used: legislation based on the idea that there is a 
God-created order fundamental to moral truth; legislation based on the idea of a God-inspired 
text; and legislation based on the directives of a God-anointed figure, like the Pope, believed 
to teach moral truth133.
I believe that the political legitimacy of these as a basis for legislation is not equal. The 
difference between them is in the degree to which the legislator divests him/herself of the 
exercise of personal judgment. Reliance on a general belief in God-ordered universe may be 
permissible, disallowing it even transgresses upon the individual realm of freedom of belief. 
But deference of the legislator to a non-state religious figure (such as the Pope) may well be 
considered an illegitimate use of institutional religion in the state.
131 Greenawalt, [2001].
132 Perry, £1997] 3.
133 Perry, [2001] p. 664 fn. 2.
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Any limitations on lawmakers relying on any aspect of religion, whether confessional or 
institutional, as a basis for their legislation, conflicts with one aspect of religious expression 
of the group that some religions see as vital to their message -  a religious political party134.
Unelected public officials -  Public officials must exercise their judgments in making 
decisions of public policy, on which they may hold a religious opinion. Unlike legislators, 
unelected public officials cannot claim to have been elected to their position by their voters to 
promote a particular religious viewpoint. They have an equal duty towards all citizens. Even 
if it may be legitimate for legislators to use religious reasons, public officials must use only 
public reasons.
Judges - Even if it is legitimate for citizens and legislators to draw on their religious 
affiliation in choosing how to exercise their public decision-making, it is different for 
decisions made by judges. Judges who bear religious allegiance may face a conflict between 
their belief and what is laid down by the law that they must interpret. In a liberal democracy, 
the case seems clear -  rule of law must prevail, and the judge must lay his or her personal 
beliefs aside. Judges must rule according to law, and not according to religious dictate. 
Anything else would be a breach of the rule of law principle, as well as an illegal imposition 
of the judge’s religious beliefs on the litigants. But, from the judge’s point of view the case 
may not be so simple. A religious judge may feel that it is not so easy to separate the personal 
from the professional. He or she may feel that their religious freedom is breached when they 
are not allowed to bring their religious beliefs into consideration. In many legal cases, moral 
determinations must necessarily be made. Indeed, according to natural law theories a judge is 
bound to do so in every case. Ethical considerations can serve as a protection against 
automatic application of unjust laws by judges. So, why should only religious considerations 
be excluded?
This dilemma is not a theoretical one. Recently, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
(himself a Catholic) opined in a public lecture, that any Catholic judges who follow the
134 Such as Soka Gahkai in Japan. (Arvin, [1971]).
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Church’s teaching (promoted by Pope John Paul II) that capital punishment is wrong, should 
resign135. But would Judges who follow such religious teaching be doing something wrong?
One factor to consider is that religions constitute a comprehensive normative system, and in 
that they are different from other moral beliefs. As in the case of legislation, we should 
differentiate between institutionalized and personal religious reasoning. A judge’s reliance on 
institutional religious dictates (such as a direct command from a religious leader) in 
adjudication is very obviously wrong. It may be somewhat easier to argue in justification of 
a judge who relies on personal religious belief and not on religious dictates. However, in the 
case of judges the arguments against using religious reasons are the strongest of all cases of 
use of religious reasons by political actors. These arguments must outweigh the injury to the 
religious beliefs of a judge and mandate against use of religious arguments by a judge.
How should international law treat domestic religiously-motivated legislation (or other legal 
decision-making), of the different types analyzed above?
The different ways in which religion motivated legislation is evident in legislation in various 
states. For instance, the debate regarding legislation on abortion, in many states, such as 
Ireland136, had seen the use of religious reasons in the political forum, whether by resort of
IT*! p t
discussants to religious moral codes, or by direct involvement of the clergy . Likewise, 
religious reasons were present in different states in the debates on the legal rights of 
homosexuals (regarding criminalization of homosexual acts, same-sex marriage, and 
adoption by a couple of same-sex parents). Another recent use of religious reasons was the 
mobilization by the Greek-Orthodox church against the elimination of registration of religion
J T O
on identity cards in Greece .
135 “Scalia questions Catholic anti-death penalty stance”, http://www.cnn.com 5 February 5 2002.
136 This will be discussed in Chapter Four. See also: Whyte, [1998]; For a historical summary o f  events leading 
to Ireland’s constitutional change allowing the Divorce Bill see: Barnes, [1998].
137 Indeed, in the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens argued that religiously based premises about the value o f  
life are illegitimate basis for such legislation. {Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 492 US 490 (1989).
138 Stavrakis, [2002].
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Viewing religion as a group attribute makes for a stronger claim that it cannot be dissociated 
from political life than if it is merely an individual concern. The group is emasculated if it is 
not allowed to operate in the prime public sphere of the state. But it is precisely the group 
characteristics of religion -  its ordered hierarchy, lack of individual moral reasoning and 
acceptance of pre-written decisions -  which make the use of religious public reasons 
anathema to proponents of liberal democracy.
Of course, if the positions advocated lead to contravention of the state’s international human 
rights obligations, the objection to them is clear, but human rights discourse has not yet 
analysed whether intervention by clergy or by those relying on religious arguments is 
legitimate in cases that do not involve a breach of specific human rights obligations of the 
state139. Equal freedom of belief for all is breached, especially of those who do not share the 
religious belief, when religious reasons are used for decisions of the state, regardless of the 
resulting decision. However, if the legislators’ reasoning is taken into account on deciding 
upon its legality, then the same law could be deemed legal in one state (in which its 
enactment was motivated by religion) but not in another (in which it had a different basis)140. 
International law must assess here very different legal and moral cultures and cannot provide 
one satisfactory answer.
7.2 Democratic participation of non-democratic religious parties
Democratic participation and the continued observance of human rights may not always go 
hand in hand, as many commentators assume, but may become conflicting demands on a state. 
This occurs in democracies which face the rise of intolerant political parties through the 
democratic system.
Numerous examples of this phenomenon exist in recent years: In 1996 Mahatir bin Mohamad, 
the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaysia threatened to suspend the government of the 
state of Kelantan, thus pressuring the state government to abandon Islamic penal legislation 
which contravenes personal freedoms141. In 1991 in Algeria the second round election was
139 The tacit assumptions concerning such religious involvement are rarely questioned in international law  
literature. Exceptionally see: Coons, [2001].
140 Compare Perry, [2001] 672.
141 See discussion: Franck [1997] 606.
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cancelled142. The state justified the cancellation by claiming the Islamic FIS party a threat to 
the secular Algerian state.
When a political party opposes democratic elections or threatens the continuing respect of
basic human rights, it has been claimed by Fox and Nolte, the state may be justified, under
international law, in curtailing this institution’s participation in the democratic process143.
The dilemma is contained within the ICCPR. While article 25 of the ICCPR mandates that:
“Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity ... without unreasonable 
restrictions...to vote and to be elected... guaranteeing the free expression and will of 
the electors”,
article 5(1) of the ICCPR declares that:
’’Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized therein or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided in the present Covenant”.
Fox and Nolte argue that article 5(1) manifests the principles of substantive, rather than 
formal democracy. They point to its application by the HRC to removing an Italian Fascist 
party from protection of the Covenant144, and to similar jurisprudence by the European 
Commission of Human Rights, permitting such restrictions to apply to “persons who threaten 
the democratic system”145. Fox and Nolte suggest that international law views democratic 
procedure not as an end but as a means of creating a society in which citizens enjoy certain 
basic rights146. If so, democratic elections might be curtailed or restricted in order to protect 
the continuing enjoyment of such rights.
However, when the restriction on the activities of a party is triggered by its religious ideology, 
it is freedom of religion, as well as rights of association and political participation, that is
142 Fox and Nolte [2000] 393.
143 Fox and Nolte, [2000] Chapter 12, p. 389-435, especially p. 396.
144 Comm. No. 117/1981, M.A. v. Italy, CCPR/C/OP/31,33 /1984.
145 Concerning the similar Article 17 o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, D e Becker v. Belgium  
[1979-80]. See also Lawless v. Ireland  [1979-80] . See discussion in Fox and Nolte [1995].
,46 Fox and Nolte, [1995].
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being curtailed. If the religious group defines itself through its participation in public life, it is 
meaningless to talk of a group right of religious freedom and bar its participation in elections. 
It is in this sense that the concept of freedom of religion as a group right is inimical to liberal 
democracy.
Religious group rights are not contradictory to a democratic regime that respects human 
rights, insofar as what is included in the religious group right is defined from a liberal 
perspective. For those religious groups that view their political aspect as part and parcel of 
their religious self-identity, such a definition of what the group may or may not do or say will 
not be acceptable.
Dombrowski147 argues, that where a particular religion has a comprehensive conception of 
good such that will survive only if it controls the machinery of the state and practices 
intolerance, it would effectively cease to exist in a politically liberal society. If this is a 
descriptive claim, it is simply not true. It is precisely in cases in which a religion with a 
comprehensive conception challenges the authority of the existing state that the politically 
liberal society is strained to its limits.
Rawls, while presenting a rather optimistic picture of the way intolerant religious sects will
be whittled down naturally in a politically liberal society, ultimately concedes that he has no
solution for the problem of intolerant religions in the liberal state:
“Even if an intolerant sect should arise, provided that it is not so strong initially that it 
can impose its will straight away, ... it will tend to lose its intolerance and accept liberty 
of conscience...Of course, the intolerant sect may be so strong initially or growing so 
fast that the forces making for stability cannot convert it to liberty. This situation 
presents a practical dilemma which philosophy alone cannot resolve.”148
8. Conclusion
Religious freedom is unique, a double-sided right: a freedom to criticize and change ideas, 
and a right to preserve identity; a freedom of doing and of being. The term “religious 
freedom” holds an internal contradiction. While freedom of religion, like all rights, is 
intended to ensure liberty, religion itself is also defined by the constraints it imposes.
147 Dombrowski, [2001] 103.
148 Rawls [1999] 219
Freedom of religion protects both self-imposed and group-imposed constraints. For this 
reason, it is a liberty that sees the individual often at odds with the demands of the group. As 
we have seen, various theories which have tried to define and justify this right confronted the 
need to address two competing aspects of this right: liberty or equality, individual or group. 
This important theoretical debate has, crucially, very practical legal applications. These 
tensions between individual and group demands on the application of this right will be 
weighed by any legal system that accords this right. This chapter has argued and 
demonstrated, that it is an individual right, but has also highlighted the difficult problems 
associated with denial of group-related aspects of this right. These concerns exist for 
domestic legal systems and for international law. This will be exemplified and analysed in the 
various legal issues discussed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER THREE : THE LEGAL STATUS OF RELIGION IN THE STATE
This chapter examines the implications of the legal status of religions in the state for 
the determination of how religious freedom should be interpreted. I first distinguish 
between different legal arrangements of the status of religion in the state, and then 
argue that, regardless of the position adopted, religious freedom must be accorded as 
an individual right. This analysis should guide the interpretation of this right in 
international law.
The status of religion in the state, the degree of state involvement with religion and 
regulation of religion, are relevant not only to the degree of religious freedom, but 
also to its interpretation, whether as a group right or an individual right. Whatever 
legal status the state accords to religion, including according it no formal legal status 
(which is also a type of legal status), it must make choices between according this 
right to individuals, to groups or to subgroups. The state cannot escape from being 
entangled in deciding whether religious freedom is an individual right or a group 
right, whether religious groups themselves must respect religious freedoms and how 
groups, their members and leadership are defined for state legal purposes. Thus, while 
freedom of religion is generally defined as a negative right -  the state must not inhibit 
free religious belief and practice -  we will see that what this right entails for the state 
is far more complex. In many cases positive involvement of the state is required to 
provide rights that are an integral part of religious freedom. While it can do so in 
different ways, the only principled way to do so is by interpreting them as individual 
rights.
Part A. The legal status of religion in the state
There is an important relation between the stance of the state towards religion and the 
degree of religious freedom in the state. However, this is not a simple relation. States 
that are most closely identified with one religion may inhibit religious freedom, as 
may states that, at the other extreme, are hostile to religion1.
1 Durham, [1996].
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At the one extreme, that of identification between state and religion, are states with an 
established religion2 . Even these differ considerably. States in which religious
• 3 * •doctrine, as such, is the law of the state, because it is religious doctrine , or in which 
the law is subject to religious confirmation, such as Iran4, breach religious freedom of 
their citizens that do not believe in this religion or do not accept its doctrine.
Other states with a state religion, but with secular system of law, breach human rights 
obligations when religious dictates permeate the state legislation. For instance, in 
Nepal, where Hinduism is the established religion5, the law discriminates against 
women by utilizing Hindu concepts about women’s property rights in marriage6. It is 
not the establishment of religion as such, but the influence of the established religion 
on positive law that is in breach of international human rights obligations,
n
specifically, in this case, that of non-discrimination on the grounds of sex .
o %
Establishment of religion exists in many liberal democracies, such as the UK , which, 
while following the premise of religious freedom, have not accepted the correlative
2 1 use the terms ‘established church’ and ‘established religion’ interchangeably. As most o f  the debate 
on the position o f  religion in the state has focused on Christian states, I continue to use the phrase 
"State-Church", but the legal positions discussed refer equally to other state-established religions.
3 Such as in Yemen (Article 3 o f  the 1994 Constitution), in some states in Nigeria (Articles 275-279 o f  
the 1979 Federal Constitution).
4 Iran has a republican constitutional structure with a legislative authority (majlis), but all enactments 
o f  the majlis are submitted to the Council o f  Guardians for inspection o f  their conformity to the tenets 
o f  Islam before they can become law (Article 94 o f  the 1979 Constitution). The executive branch is 
headed by a president, whose candidacy must likewise be approved by the majlis (Mallat [1993]).
5 The Constitution, Article 27, states that the King must be “an adherent o f  Aryan Culture and the 
Hindu Religion”.
6 Gilbert, [1992].
7 Possible conflict is with Convention on the Elimination o f  all forms o f  Discrimination against Women 
(adopted 18 December 1979) 1249 UNTS 13, Articles 2(b),(d), and (f).
8 Similar liberal states with a State-Church are Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland.
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premise of Enlightenment liberalism of separation of church and state 9 . 
Unquestionably, the historical position of the Church of England as a State-Church 
has given an advantage to the Anglican faith over other creeds10. Strictly speaking, an 
advantage given to one faith, the State-Church, constitutes discrimination against 
other faiths. Undoubtedly, a state-race would not be permissible under international 
law. However, the religious and historical underpinnings of national identity11 may 
permit a certain divergence from institutional equality between religions, even though, 
inevitably, the national religion will not be that of all the state’s citizens.
The UN Human Rights Conventions and the 1981 Declaration are silent on the 
subject of what is a permissible status of religion in the state. The 1967 Draft
19Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance included in 
Article 1(d) the statement that “neither the establishment of a religion nor the 
recognition of a religion or belief by a state nor the separation of Church from State 
shall by itself be considered religious intolerance or discrimination”. The Convention 
was never adopted, and the 1981 Declaration does not refer to this matter. The UN 
Human Rights Committee (in its General Comment to Article 18 of the ICCPR13) has 
not seen establishment of religion of itself as an infringement of religious freedom14.
9 In the United Kingdom, the head o f  the state is the head o f  the Church (the monarch is the Supreme 
Governor o f  the Church o f  England), as first established by Supremacy o f  the Crown Act 1534 
(Repealed), and every monarch is required to join the Church o f  England, and marry a member o f  that 
religion (The Act o f  Settlement 1701). Other manifestations o f  the Establishment o f Church are the 
membership in the House o f  Lords o f  Church o f  England Archbishops and Bishops (See: Leeder,
[1997] p. 13), the appointment by the Monarch o f bishops and archbishops upon the advice o f  the 
Prime Minister, and the legislation o f  Measures o f the General Synod o f  the Church o f  England, 
enacted pursuant to the Church o f  England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, which is an Act o f  
Parliament, constituting primary state legislation in the UK.
10 Currently, calls for disestablishment o f  the Church o f  England are heard from the Church and even 
(informally) the General Synod itself. A recent poll showed 48% o f  the UK population favour ending 
the existing link between state and Church, and only 36% wish to maintain it (Travis, [2002]).
11 On the UK and Church o f  England, see: Mackintosh, [1972]. On the Orthodox Church see:
Runciman [1970].
12 UN Doc A /8330 App. Ill (1971).
13 GC 22, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.4 (1993) para. 9 states only that:
“[t]he fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or 
traditional or that its followers comprise the majority o f  the population, shall not result in any 
impairment o f  the enjoyment o f  any o f  the rights under the Covenant...”.
14 See also: CCPR/3 (1982) (consideration by HRC o f  initial report by Morocco).
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Likewise, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has not seen 
establishment of religion in itself as breach religious freedoms15. The European Court 
has also not seen a State-Church system in itself as breaching the state’s duty to 
observe religious freedom 16. Morsink 17, however, argues that the Universal 
Declaration does not allow for state-sponsored religion. He bases his assertion on the 
freedom of religion and non-discrimination provisions of the UDHR, together with 
the purposeful omission of any reference to God in the Declaration, at the insistence 
of the French delegate Rene Cassin. This last opinion seems, however, to be against 
what little legal opinion of UN bodies exists on this matter, and contrary to state 
practice.
However, a danger in the acceptance in international law of the State-Church status, is 
that the favoured status it confers upon one religion will be seen as the starting point 
of the examination of religious freedom, rather than as an arrangement whose 
implications must themselves be scrutinized as to their compatibility with the 
principles of religious freedom and non-discrimination. This danger can be seen in a 
decision of the Human Rights Committee [HRC] on a communication by a teacher of
♦ i oreligions and ethics at a public secondary school in Colombia . He was removed 
from teaching religion because he followed 'liberation theology', which advocates 
views different from those of the institutional Catholic Church. The Committee 
decided that the teacher's right to profess or to manifest his religion had not been 
violated, and that Colombia may, without violating Article 18 of the ICPPR, allow the 
Church authorities to decide who may teach religion and in what manner it may be 
taught. Neither did the Committee think this violated Article 19. It said that Article 19 
will usually cover the freedom of teachers to teach their subjects in accordance with 
their own views, without interference. But, in this case, it reasoned, because of the 
special relationship between Church and State in Colombia, exemplified by the
15 The former Special Rapporteur, Elizabeth Odio Benito did not reach a conclusion as to whether legal 
arrangements such as establishment p e r  se lead to intolerance, although she recognised that 
establishment does amount to certain discrimination. (Odio Benito, [1989] 20).
16 D arby v. Sweden [1991].
17 Morsink [1999] p. 263.
18 Comm. No. 195/1985 D elgado Paez v. Colombia CCPR/A/45,40/1990.
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applicable Concordat, the requirement by the Church that religion be taught in a 
certain way does not violate article 19.
This seems an ominous precedent for the legal appraisal of the relationship between 
individual religious freedom and the state's established Church. An established 
Church is always at tension with individual religious freedoms. If an established 
religion is to be legitimate, it can only be so as long as it does not infringe individual 
rights, including individual religious freedom. In this case, the implication of the 
establishment of church is that only one religion is taught in public secondary schools 
and only teachers subscribing to that religion, and to its official interpretation by the 
State-Church, may teach it. This breaches the religious freedom of both students and 
teachers. Had this been a private school of a religious community, there would be no 
difficulty with a policy requiring teachers of religion to conform to Church doctrine. 
However, the privileged position of one Church, giving it access to state secondary 
education, must not be used to infringe the rights of individual students and teachers.
The HRC itself revealed a different and preferable approach in its Concluding 
Observations on the Costa Rica state report19. It expressed concern that Costa Rican 
law (the Ley de Carrera Docente) confers on the National Episcopal Conference the 
power to impede the teaching of religions other than Catholicism in public schools 
and the power to bar non-Catholics from teaching religion in the public schools. It 
concluded that the selection of religious instructors subject to the authorization of the 
National Episcopal Conference was not in conformity with the Covenant.
One way in which states discriminate in favour of the established religion, is by 
supporting it, but not other religions, with state funding obtained through compulsory 
taxation. The conformity of this practice with individual religious freedom under the 
European Convention on Human Rights was challenged in Darby20, but was left 
undecided, as the Court found a breach of the Convention on other grounds. The 
existence of a privileged status of a State-Church in itself has not yet been challenged
19 UN Doc. A/49/40 vol. I (1994) 31 at paras. 158 and 162.
20 Darby v. Sweden [1991].
89
under the European Convention. However, the European Court has decided there was 
unlawful discrimination, where a religious association was not accorded legal 
personality in public law, which would enable it to pursue legal action in courts, 
whereas other religions had such status21. In this case, the discrimination of the 
applicant Catholic Church was in relation both to the state religion (Greek orthodox) 
and another religion (Judaism). There appears to be an incongruity between this 
determination and the implicit acceptance of the legitimacy of a state established 
religion by the European Court and Commission so far22. One religion may be given a 
privileged status, but more than one religion may not. It remains to be seen if the 
Court would entertain such a claim of discrimination, where the only privileged 
religion was the state-religion, or if it would decide that some degree of 
discrimination between religious organisations was justified in states that have a 
State-Church because of the historical significance of the Church to the state.
Between establishment and non-establishment of religion there is a continuum of 
legal arrangements23. A process of disestablishment of religion in the state, which 
nonetheless left an important constitutional role for the Catholic Church was instituted 
in formerly Catholic states by the Concordats24. Concordats between states and the 
Holy See defined the status of the Catholic Church in the state, without preserving it 
as state religion. It was often a pre-requisite for a transition to a civil constitution, 
disentangling the state from the church, fully or partially, as in Spain , Italy and
21 Canea Catholic Church  v. Greece [1999].
22 In cases such as: D arby  v. Sweden  [1991]; Williamson v. UK  [1995].
23 See Durham, [1996].
24
Agreements o f  states with the Catholic Church reported to the study commissioned by Sub­
commission on Prevention o f  Discrimination and Protection o f  Minorities in 1989 were those of:
Bolivia, Colombia, Italy, Argentina, Austria, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El-Salvador, France,
Federal Republic o f  Germany, Haiti, Hungary, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. (Odio Benito, 
[1989]).
25 In Spain the Concordat was concluded concurrently to the framing o f  the 1979 constitution. Article 
16(3) o f the Constitution states that: “No religion shall have a state character. The public powers shall 
take into account the religious beliefs o f  Spanish society and maintain the appropriate relations o f  
cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations”.
On the Spanish process o f  secularisation o f  the Constitution see: Santo Paz, [2001].
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South American states such as Peru27. Italy and Spain have also domestic agreements 
with other religious communities28. However, under this system, the legal status of all 
religions is not equal. In Spain, the Constitution was framed concomitantly with the 
conclusion of the Concordat, the Concordat will have great influence upon 
constitutional interpretation29, while the other agreements will not. Likewise the 
Lateran Pacts have a superior constitutional status to that of other agreements with 
religious communities in Italy30. The Concordats, as international agreements between 
two equal partners, puts the Catholic Church in a privileged extra-constitutional 
position. Indeed, the disparity in treatment between Catholicism and other religions
was upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court, because Catholicism is the religion of
1 1
nearly the entire Italian population .
26 The Lateran Pact o f  1929 between Italy and the Vatican preceded the 1948 Italian Constitution, 
Church and State were further separated by the 1985 Concordat replacing the Latern Pact.
The separation is enshrined in Article 7 o f  the Constitution (1947) which states: (1) The State and the 
Catholic Church shall be, each within its own order, independent and sovereign.
(2) Their relations shall be regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Such amendments to these Pacts as are 
accepted by both parties shall not require the procedure for Constitutional amendment.
27 In Peru, the 1980 Concordat approved by Decreed Law 23211 preceded the 1989 secular constitution, 
which “recognises the Catholic church as an important element in the history, culture and moral 
formation o f  Peru” rather than the earlier 1933 constitution which “protects” the Catholic faith and the 
earlier 1920 constitution which declared that “the nation shall profess the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
religion”.
28 Italy: See Article 8 o f  the Italian Constitution: (2) Religious denominations other than Catholic shall 
have the right to organize themselves according to their own by-laws provided that they are not in 
conflict with the Italian legal system. (3) Their relations with the State shall be regulated by law on the 
basis o f  agreements with their respective representatives.
Spain has agreements with the Evangelical, Islamic and Jewish communities establishing their legal 
status: Law 24/1992 Approving the Agreement o f  Cooperation between the State and the Federation o f  
Evangelical Religious Entities o f  Spain; Law 25/1992 Approving the Agreement o f  Cooperation 
between the State and the Federation o f  Israelite Communities o f  Spain; Law 26/1992 Approving the 
Agreement o f  Cooperation between the State and the Islamic Commission o f  Spain, all agreements 
concluded pursuant to Article 7 o f  the General Act on Religious Freedom.
29 Fernandez, [2002].
30 Their amendments do not require further constitutional implementation. Article 7(2) o f  the Italian 
Constitution.
31 Judgment no. 125/1957, See: Certoma, [1985] 121.
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Not only in these cases, but generally, states that grant religious rights by agreements 
with religious communities leave members of other, usually smaller, religions having
32no such agreements, in an unequal position .
Such processes of lessening of identification between church and state have occurred 
in other, non-Catholic states as well. The 1975 Greek Constitution33 recognizes the 
Orthodox church of Greece as the national religion of Greece, but the state structure 
has become more secular, recognising civil marriages in 1982 despite church 
opposition34.
At the other end of the spectrum of identification between state and religion from that 
of states with an established religion are states which espouse a principle of 
secularity35. Like establishment of religion, secularity translates into a variety of 
different stances of states towards religion, resulting in different degrees of respect for 
religious freedom. In its extreme, a principle of secularity seeks to privatize religion 
and remove it from the public sphere. As will be seen, by doing so it infringes 
religious freedom. This type of secularity in its extreme is a very individualistic 
conception of religious freedom, which delegitimises any involvement of religion in 
public life. As such, it is hard to reconcile with any comprehensive notion of religious 
freedom. Even an individualistic notion of religious freedom must accept some 
involvement of religion in public life. The right of religious freedom includes the
• 36possibility of using religious conviction to influence the policy of the state .
32 In Luxemburg, the Constitution, Article 22, states that: “The State's intervention in the appointment 
and installation o f  heads o f  religions, the mode of appointing and dismissing other ministers o f  religion, 
the right o f  any o f  them to correspond with their superiors and to publish their acts and decisions, as 
well as the Church's relations with the State shall be made the subject o f  conventions to be submitted to 
the Chamber o f  Deputies for the provisions governing its intervention”. The HRC, in its concluding 
observations on the Luxembourg state report, UN Doc. A/48/40 vol. I (1993) 30, para. 134, expressed 
concern over discrimination against religions which had not entered into a covenant with the State, and 
therefore were not supported by the State.
33 This followed the demise o f  the colonels’ rule.
34 See Mews, [1989] 88. This occurred at a time of growing integration into (liberal) Europe. On newer 
initiatives to further secularise the state, see: Stavrakis, [2002].
35 By 'secularity' I w ill refer to a variety o f constitutional arrangements o f  states which do not endorse 
religion. The term 'secularism' has been used by some states to define their specific constitutional 
principle, I will use this term when discussing them.
36 See Chapter Two.
92
Secularity means different things in different states spreading over a range of 
positions towards religion in the state, both formal and informal.
i. Hostility: A hostile legal stance towards religion was evident in state constitutions in 
regimes that were trying to emerge from Catholic political hold. This hostile attitude 
has been now eradicated from the constitution and laws in these states.
For instance, the 1931 Spanish Republican Constitution attempted to neutralize the 
competing power of religion, by dissolving religious orders (specifically, the Jesuits)
1 7
that require a “special vow of obedience to any power other than the state” . It 
attempted to privatise religion, guaranteeing freedom of conscience to profess and 
practice any religion38, but allowing only private worship, and limiting public worship 
to that authorised by the state. Any form of state aid to religious bodies was 
disallowed. The reinstation of Catholicism as state-religion by Franco after the 1936 
Civil War helped the regime take hold, as much as it helped the Church itself, 
attesting to the power of religion when used by the state . It was finally the Vatican, 
not the state, that pushed for recognition of religious freedom in Spain40 , 
commensurate with recognition of Church autonomy41. Today, Spain has struck a 
balance between secularity and establishment of the Catholic religion42.
Comparable developments in which states used their constitutions to neutralise the 
influence of the Catholic Church on the state occurred in Latin America. The Mexican 
Revolutions of 1910 and 1917 sought to oust religion from public life completely by a 
series of constitutional measures severely restricting all public manifestations of
37 Article 26, and see: Souto Paz, [2001] 684.
38 Article 27.
39 Souto Paz, [2001] 685; Martinez-Torron, [2001].
40 Souto Paz, [2001] 669.
41 The 1967 Law o f Religious Freedom.
42 Article 16(3) o f  the Spanish Constitution states: “No religion shall have a state character. The public 
powers shall take into account the religious beliefs o f Spanish society and maintain the appropriate 
relations o f  cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations”.
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religion43. What is remarkable is not so much the restriction on religious freedom for 
an ostensibly liberal regime, but that a principle of individual religious freedom44 was 
coupled with extreme displacement of religion from the public realm. The Mexican 
Constitutional amendment of 1992 rescinded many of the restrictions on the public 
aspects of religious life. Some restrictions remain: Religious ministers are not allowed 
to hold public office within several years of leaving the ministry45 and religious 
groups are not permitted to form political parties or associations with political goals. 
This is still an extreme privatization of religion, and exclusion of religion from 
political life46 47.
ii. Exclusion -  Turkey, which, with Senegal, is the only predominantly Muslim state 
described as secularist in its Constitution48, faces an ongoing struggle in which 
religion challenges the authority of the secular state49. In Turkey, the constitutional 
principle of secularism forbids the legal order of the State to be based on religious 
precepts50, effectively excluding religion from political public life, but generally not 
forbidding private or public manifestations of religion.
43 Articles 27 and 130 o f  the Constitution prohibited religious vows and monastic orders, prohibited 
religions from owning charitable organisations, restricted public worship outside churches, voided the 
legal effect o f  religious oaths, stated that Churches had no legal personality, regulated the number o f  
ministers, prohibited political voting o f  ministers, forbade ministers form criticising laws or authorities, 
prohibited religious publications from commenting on public matters and prohibited political meetings 
in churches.
44 The 1917 Constitution, Article 24.
45 Article 130.
46 See: Hernandez-Forcada, [2002] 301, 307.
47 Argentina had likewise progressed through tumultuous relations o f  the state with the Vatican, 
exercising severe state control during most o f  the 20th century up until an agreement o f  separation o f  
Church and state in 1966, followed by the constitutional provision (Article 2) stating that “The Federal 
Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion”. See: Floria, [2002].
48 The Turkish Constitution, Article 24, declares that:
’’Everyone shall have the right to freedom o f  conscience, faith and religious b e lie f . . . ”, and that 
“ ...N o  one may exploit or abuse religion, religious feelings or things held sacred by religion in any 
manner whatsoever with view to causing the social, economic, political or legal order o f  the State to be 
based on religious precepts, even if  only in part, or for the purpose o f  securing political or personal 
influence thereby”. See further: Oktem, [2002].
49 For a hermeneutic analysis o f  Turkish Secularism -  Laiklik -  see: Davison, [1998] Chapter Four.
50 The Constitution o f  Turkey, Article 24.
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However, Turkey’s constitutional principle of secularism entails a demand of loyalty
from public servants, such as the military51, to this principle. The European Court
accepted a state principle of secularism, in itself, as a sufficient reason for restricting
• » *religious freedom . It would seem, rather, that because this principle restricts 
religious freedom, it should be subjected to scrutiny under Article 9(2) of the 
European Convention. A law that demands loyalty of public servants to one attitude 
towards religion should be presumed to breach religious freedom, unless it can be 
shown why such a demand would be justified in a particular case.
The principle of secularity itself did come under scrutiny in European Court decisions 
in the case of Refah Partisi53. The European Court was called upon to examine the 
order of the Turkish Constitutional Court, which, in 1998, dissolved the Refah 
political party54, on the ground that it had become a “centre of activities contrary to 
the principle of secularism”. Upon application to the European Court, both the 
Chamber of the 3rd section and the Grand Chamber, to which the judgment was 
referred, did not find a breach of Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of 
association), and saw no further issues arising under Article 9. The underlying issue in 
the case was that of the legitimate place of religion in the public life of the state. The 
Turkish Government argued that the party in question, and political Islam, did not 
confine itself to the private sphere of relations between the individual and God but 
also asserted its right to organise the state and the community, posing a potential 
danger for Turkish democracy. The Court rejected the application, finding that the 
measures imposed by the state met a ’’pressing social need”. The Grand Chamber 
affirmed the decision, based on Refah’s intention of setting up a plurality of legal
51 Kalag v. Turkey [1997].
52 Ibid.
53 Refah P artisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [2002] Judgement o f  the 3rd section; [2004] Judgment 
o f  the Grand Chamber.
54 The Refah party rose to power in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1994 general election it won 19% o f  the 
popular vote. A coalition government was formed with Mrs. Ciller’s (secular) True Path Party. Some 
Turkish commentators championed the legitimacy o f  the party, which, although religious, chose to 
oppose secularism through participation in the democratic political process (Gole [1995]). (Since the 
ruling a more moderate Islamic party, AKP, which embraced democratic principles, was elected to 
power in Turkey in November 2002).
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systems and introducing Islamic law (shah ’a), and its ambiguous stance with regard 
to the use of force to gain power and retain it. The Court found that the State may 
forestall such a policy, which is incompatible with the Convention’s provisions, 
before concrete steps are taken to implement it that might prejudice civil peace and 
the country’s democratic regime55.
While not going so far as to legitimize banning a party which, if it implemented its 
goals, would breach human rights guaranteed in the Convention, the Grand Chamber 
nevertheless mentions Refah’s plans, which would breach religious freedoms, as 
legitimate reasons for curtailment of its rights56. This reasoning puts religious political 
parties in peril, insofar as a certain severity of breaches of human rights would be 
tantamount to undermining the democratic regime..
Hi. Neutrality: Neutral states are those espousing secularity which are neutral, rather 
than hostile, towards religion. As has been seen, even states that have an established 
religion may be neutral between religions and beliefs in other respects. But a secular 
state may, of course, claim to espouse a more consistent principle of neutrality. 
However, neutrality towards religion is manifested differently in different legal 
systems, for example in the attitude to state funding of religion, as will be seen in four 
examples from the range of different state interpretations of the principle of separation 
of religion and state.
France is defined in its constitution as a secular Republic57. However, because of the 
historical position of religion (Catholicism) in the state, its principle of laicete, 
secularity, which is ostensibly neutral, can work to the detriment of minority or newly 
introduced religions. French law prohibits government funding of religious bodies, 
but still allows public funds to maintain Roman Catholic churches built before 1905 
(which were transferred to the ownership of the state)58. Worshippers of religions
55 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [2002].
56 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [2004].
57 Article 2.
58 The Law Concerning the Separation o f  Church and State, o f  9 December 1905, D. 1906. 4. 6
96
mostly newer to France, such as Muslims, are prejudicially harmed by this law59, as 
mosques are not provided for. The choice of a state to become completely neutral is 
not necessarily egalitarian. A “hands-off’ approach to religion, coming after a 
historical association with one religion, gives an advantage to well-established 
religions, which have benefited from state endorsement in the past.
A second interpretation of neutrality and constitutional separation of religion from the 
state, with no such historical burden, is enshrined in the Constitution of United 
States60, in two clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution, the free exercise 
clause, which guarantees free exercise of religion61, and the establishment clause, 
which forbids establishment religion62. The tension between the two clauses has
63 • • •formed the backbone of religious freedom jurisprudence in the US . This tension is 
manifested in the long and tortuous line of Supreme Court cases regarding funding of 
religious bodies64. Under the US principle of separation of state and church, no 
funding of religious bodies is permitted. But under the free exercise clause, religious 
belief cannot be burdened more than non-religious belief. Thus, while it is clear that 
purely religious activities cannot be funded, much legal wrangling has defined the 
permissible line regarding funding of activities in parochial schools65, student 
newsletters66, and other activities that have a secular parallel.
59 Astier, [2003]. Nevertheless, the Government partially funded the establishment o f  the country's 
oldest Islamic house o f  worship, the Paris mosque, in 1926. (US Department o f  State International 
Religious Freedom Report 2002 -  France, http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13938.htmy
60 For a description o f  jurisprudence concerning the establishment clause o f  the 1st amendment to the 
US constitution see: Gunther, [1991] 1503-1537. Description o f  the ever-widening religious diversity 
in the US. See: Stein, [2000].
61 By barring Congress from making laws “prohibiting exercise” o f  religion.
62 By barring Congress from making laws “respecting an establishment o f  religion”.
63 This tension exists both at the federal level and at the level o f  the states. In Everson  v. B oard o f  
Education 330 US 1 (1947) the US Supreme Court applied the First Amendment Establishment Clause 
to the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment.(Discussion o f  the way the case led to acceptance o f  
the Establishment Clause’s application to the states, see: Lupu, [2001] 790).
64 See: Stone, [1991] 1467-1471, 1510-1534.
65 In such cases as: M uller v. Allen , 463 US 388 (1983); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 US 402 (1985).
66 Rosenberger v. University o f  Virginia, 515 US 819 (1995).
97
As will be seen in this chapter, the principle of separation of religion from the state 
has resulted not in an absence of a constitutional status of religion, but rather in a 
legal determination that both preserves group autonomy at the expense of individual 
rights and does not take enough account of the different positions of members of 
majority and minority religions.
In Japan, the constitutional text requiring separation of state and religion is derived 
from, and similar to, that of the United States. However, since the cultural setting is 
different, the involvement of religion in public life is also very different. The principle 
of separation of religion and state and the abolition of the established status of Shinto 
shrines were incorporated into the 1947 Japanese Constitution at the behest of the 
American Occupying force, who wished to end the identification of the Emperor as a 
god and the role of the Shinto religion as an ideology which underscores strong 
nationalism and statism67.
The Constitution prohibits any religious organization from receiving any privileges 
from the state68, prohibits the state from participating in any religious activity69, and 
mandates that the state budget remain strictly secular70. However, Japanese tradition 
has meant that the Shinto religion continues to play a role in the state71. The Supreme 
Court saw the separation of religion from state provision of article 20 as an indirect 
guarantee of religious freedom, rather than an independent principle. Therefore it was 
interpreted as unlawful, at least in petitions of individual persons, only if the activity 
directly infringes upon their religious freedom by imposing restriction on their 
exercise of religious freedom or by compelling them to attend religious activities . 
Thus, deification of a veteran by the veteran's association, despite his widow's




71 Under the 19th century Meiji Constitution, which recognised religious freedom for the first time, 
nonetheless the imperial Shinto religion was given an overarching position and was posited as non­
religious unifying force (Kawai, [1982]).
72 Case (O) No. 902 o f  1982; Minshu vol. 42, No. 5, p. 277.
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objection, was not considered a breach of religious freedom . The majority of the 
Japanese Supreme Court considered the absolute separation principle of Article 20 an 
ideal which is impossible to achieve in a real social context, leaving a margin of 
permitted state funding for social-cultural activities conducted by religious bodies74 
including certain religious ceremonies deemed to have a social rather than religious 
role75.
In Germany, in yet a further interpretation of neutrality, the Basic Law bars the
7Aestablishment of a State-Church . But a principle of coordination, rather than
77separation, is upheld . Religions can be aided by state funding, as long as this 
funding is equitable. However, only religions that are recognized in public law can
7ftbenefit from tax funding . While avoiding the pitfalls associated with the US 
principle of separation, this system itself jeopardizes state neutrality. It involves the 
state in deciding upon the definition of religions; it is discriminatory toward those 
religions, especially new religions, which have not yet been able to achieve 
recognition in public law; and it may involve the state in deciding which groups 
claiming to represent the same religion should be acknowledged, as will be seen in the
70discussion below .
While it may be initially thought that the secular state, which is not involved with 
religion or which relegates religion to the private sphere, could guarantee freedom of 
religion while evading the need to decide to whom these rights belong, whether 
individuals or communities, this is clearly not the case. Secular states, just as states in
73 Ibid.
74 Case (Gyo Tsu) No. 156 o f  1992.
75 Including a groundbreaking ceremony at a municipal gymnasium. Case (Gyo-Tsu) No. 69 o f  
1971; Minshu vol.31, N o.4, at 533.
76 Article 137 o f  the Weimar Constitution was incorporated into the Basic Law through Article. 140 o f  
the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Article 137(1) states that there will be no State-Church. Article 4 o f  the 
Basic Law guarantees freedom o f  religion and belief. (Further: Michalowski and Woods, [1999] 187).
77 Thus, prayers are allowed in state schools outside lessons, based on voluntary participation {School 
prayers Case 52 BverfGE 223 (1979)), but display o f crucifixes in classrooms in not permitted, as 
pupils have no similar possibility o f  avoiding it {Crucifix in Classrooms Case 93 BverfGE 1 (1995)).
78 Pursuant to the Weimar Constitution, Art. 137(5).
79 Section 3.2.
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which one or more religions are given a constitutional or legal status, need to make 
decisions about allocation of religious rights (religious freedom and religious
equality). Against this background, I argue that the interpretation of religious freedom 
must be as an individual right. Community rights may be derived from the individual 
right, but they may not override it.
Part B. Religious freedom should be an individual right in preference to a group 
right
Within the context of the various existing legal arrangements of religion in the state, I 
advance four main arguments as to why religious freedom should be interpreted as an
individual right, in preference to a group right:
1. Religions have a public character and so must accord individual rights 
in their public activities. This is so especially regarding state
established religions, but also, in a lesser measure, regarding all 
religions.
2. The right of members and workers of religious organizations to belong 
to the religious community and participate in its activities does not 
necessarily mean they must shed their rights at the door.
3. According rights to groups inevitably involves the state in defining 
religious groups, thus breaching state neutrality in matters of religion.
4. Jurisdiction cannot be accorded to a religious community that does not 
respect individual rights, as some members may not have a real choice 
whether to belong to it. Even where there is a choice, the state should 
not allow individuals to waive rights of religious freedom to their 
communities.
I then proceed to argue that:
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5. An individual conception of religious freedom should take into account 
the different positions of members of minorities and of majorities.
6. If religious freedom were to be recognized as a group right this would 
raise the further need to define group equality and to choose between 
individual equality and group equality.
7. States should not make value-judgments of the social worthiness of 
religions, as this breaches state neutrality.
I pursue the above arguments in the context of the different forms that state 
involvement (or non-involvement) with religion may take. These arguments are each 
relevant to different legal positions of religion in different states. I examine several 
cases from different jurisdictions, which exemplify these problems. Often, these 
problems did not arise in discussions of international human rights law. Some issues 
are best illustrated by jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, some 
arose in domestic cases in various jurisdictions, and some through examination of 
state constitutions, laws and agreements.
1. Religious institutions have a public or semi-public character and so cannot be 
granted rights that override individual rights
The public character of religious institutions provides a strong reason for demanding 
that they themselves respect individual rights, and do not benefit from a communal 
right to religious freedom that overrides individual rights. Where institutions belong 
to an established state religion, the status of the established religion and its affinity 
with the state make a particularly strong case for subjecting it to limitations based on 
individual rights of members and non-members. To a lesser extent, the argument of 
public character is true also for non-established religions.
As will be seen, under the European Convention, Churches have rights, but actions of 
State-Churches may also give rise to state obligations under the Convention. Some 
bodies of a State-Church may be victims of violations under the Convention, but this 
does not rule out state obligations concerning other bodies or actions of State- 
Churches. I argue that public aspects of religious disciplinary proceedings of a State-
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Church bear enough similarities to judicial proceedings to demand that they be subject 
to human rights guarantees. Internal judicial proceedings of other religions also share 
some of these characteristics in their implications for the individual subjected to them, 
but are left outside the scope of current human rights law.
Institutions of established religions, or at least some of them, can be subject to the 
international human rights obligations of the state, based on the claim that they are 
bodies of the state. Indeed, the obligation of states to ensure observance of the 
Convention by certain institutions of State-Churches has been recognized to some 
extent in judicial interpretation of the European Convention, based on the role such 
institutions play in the administration of the state, as will be discussed below. It is 
possible to suggest an evaluation of the applicability of the Convention to religious 
institutions according to two criteria: The first is the constitutional position of the 
Church and its institutions, whether it is on a par with state authorities, giving their 
actions towards members and non-members the imprimatur of the state. (For example, 
the legislation of Measures of the General Synod of the Church of England is primary 
state legislation in the UK.) The second is the performance of functions of the state, or 
functions usually associated with the state, such as registration of marriages, 
undertaking burials, education and welfare functions. There is also a third 
consideration in attaching responsibility of the state to acts of State-Churches, 
namely, that even when not directly fulfilling state functions, Churches offer a 
comprehensive guide for peoples’ lives, within an inclusive social and moral 
framework. This strengthens the case for including them within the state's human 
rights responsibilities, more than for comparable non-religious bodies that have a 
constitutional position or perform a state function. This third consideration, while not 
related to the status of the religious organization as a body of the state, is a further 
reason why the state should have to assure that Convention rights are respected, even 
within a religious organization.
In international law, there has not been recognition of a state obligation to ensure that 
religious organizations of non-established religions respect individual rights. 
However, there are reasons to favour such recognition. While the constitutional 
position of these religions is different from that of an established religion, non­
established religions do perform both formal and informal governmental functions,
102
such as marriage registration, burial, education and welfare care. Religious bodies to 
which legal state powers, such as marriage registration, are devolved, are exercising a 
government function and so the state should be held responsible for its compliance
O A
with the state's international human rights obligations .
When to attribute responsibility to the state in international law is a difficult problem.
Q 1
The Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts support 
the above interpretation. Conduct of any organ of legislative, judicial or executive 
branch is considered an act of state (Article 4). So, clearly, decisions of a religious 
tribunal operating under law are state acts. More ambiguous is the inclusion as acts of 
state, in Article 5, of acts of an entity that is not a state organ but is empowered by 
state law to exercise governmental authority. So, for example, it would seem that 
registration of marriages by non-governmental religious registrars is a state act. 
Article 9 is even further reaching, including in the scope of act of state conduct 
exercised by persons in the absence of official authorities exercising governmental 
authority in circumstances that call for these. These could possibly include acts of 
religious charities, which provide basic needs which are not provided by government. 
When any of these breach the state’s human rights obligations, the state could be 
responsible for contravening international law.
Other activities in which religious organizations perform functions primarily 
undertaken by the state, such as operating hospitals, or even schools, should also give 
rise to state responsibility. This was not the approach taken by the European
o
Commission in Rommelfanger , which viewed the Catholic hospital as a non­
governmental organization not liable to obligations of the European Convention. A 
modification of this approach is signalled in Costello-Roberts11, in which the 
European Court stated that even when the state privatizes state functions, such as 
education, the Convention obligations remain.
80 This will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
81 (Adopted by the International Law Commission 2001) UN Doc. A/56/10.
82 Rommelfanger v. Germ any [1989].
83 Costello-Roberts v. UK  [1995].
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However, it is possible to include non-state actors that perform such functions within 
the scope of human rights obligations, while allowing for an interpretation of the
* 84rights within a religious organization that is different from that of rights outside it .
The need to assure an observance of basic human rights at least within some 
institutions of religious organizations is bolstered by observing that regulation of 
members’ lives by non-established religions may be as influential and comprehensive, 
if not more so, than that of established religions. They may provide, in varying 
degrees, a personal moral and social framework and define a comprehensive 
community structure, which can encompass aspects from nurseries to pastoral care to 
the regulation of food sold to the community. Some of the examples discussed below 
illustrate this.
Indeed, some states have recognized religious organizations as public bodies, which 
need to respect individual rights just as other state bodies, even if the extent of such 
respect will be interpreted differently. In Germany, in which there is no State-Church, 
the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches are nevertheless public authorities subject 
to article 19(4) of the German Basic Law, under which recourse to the court is granted 
in case of violation of rights by these authorities.
1.1 Churches as bearers of rights and as bearers of obligations under the European 
Convention
The characterization of religious bodies as public or private has important 
consequences not just for their substantive rights, but also for their procedural ability 
to enforce these rights. The European Convention treats Churches both as rights 
bearers and, sometimes, as bodies with obligations under the Convention. Religious 
organizations are themselves able to use the European Convention to protect their 
religious freedom. They may have rights under the Convention as well as the 
competence to apply to the European Court to rectify such infringements.
84 See the German Constitutional Court's decision (o f 4 June 1985) in the Rommelfanger case, that 
within Catholic Church em ployee has only a core free speech right.
104
Churches and similar organizations have been recognized by the European 
Commission of Human Rights as being capable of lodging applications and claiming 
rights in their own name. Non-Governmental Organizations and other groups have 
locus standi under Article 3485 of the Convention, if their substantive Convention 
rights have been violated by a Party to the Convention. Because of the nature of this 
right, the question addressed by the Commission was whether organizations, rather 
than natural persons, could claim a right to freedom of religion, conscience or belief. 
The Commission decided that they could do so86. Among the rights included in 
organizations’ religious freedom, the European Court has acknowledged a right of
on
religious organizations to be recognized as legal entities .
It seems from the Commission’s language, that it recognized Article 9 rights of
00
organisations as aggregates of members’ rights, rather than as group rights , although 
neither the Commission nor the Court has yet had to decide on this question. While 
recognizing a right of a Church to organize its worship, the Commission was careful 
to note that the church was protected “through the rights granted to its members”89.
Evans believes that this difference is of no importance, because a Church cannot 
manifest its beliefs independently of the actions of its members90. However, as will be 
seen, the difference between according religious communities or institutions 
substantive group rights and recognizing their rights as just an aggregate of individual 
rights is of significant practical and theoretical importance.
85 Previously Article 25.
86 A" v. Sweden  [1979]. Also: Omkarananda v. Switzerland  [1979]; Iglesia Battisti v. Spain  [1992]. 
Previously, the Commission did not recognize that non-natural persons have rights under Article 9, in 
Church o /X v . UK  12 YB 306. The question confronting the Commission was whether NGOs could 
claim a right to freedom o f  religion, conscience or belief.
87 Lehnof, [2002].
88 Saying the Church possesses and exercises rights “in its own capacity as a representative o f  its 
members”. X  v. Sweden, [1979].
89 X  v. Denmark [1976],
90 Evans, M., [1997] p. 287, ftnt. 22.
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The European Commission distinguished religious organizations that can be ‘victims’ 
under the Conventions from those for whose actions the state bears responsibility 
under it. In Finska forsamlingen I  Stockholm and Hautaniemi v. Sweden91, the Church 
of Sweden and its parishes were deemed to have Non-Governmental Organization 
status, since they were not exercising governmental powers. Therefore, they could
09have locus standi as ‘victims’ (under Article 25 ) to lodge an application against the 
state . The Commission then decided that it follows that the State cannot be held 
responsible for a violation of parishioners’ freedom of religion as a result of the 
decision of the Church Assembly.
Possibly, this decision should be read as limited to non-governmental functions, such 
as, in this case, prescribing the liturgy. But there are governmental activities of some 
State-Churches 94 , and these will be subject to Convention obligations. The 
Commission, following Article 25, differentiates between Non-Governmental 
Organisations and those bodies for whose actions the state is liable under the 
Convention. It is a preferable interpretation, to differentiate according to function, and 
thus not to exclude bodies of the State-Church, from the ambit of the Convention, but 
to examine the body performing the act and the nature of the act performed. State- 
Churches conduct government functions as well as acts of merely internal 
significance.
Indeed, it should not be the conclusion from Finska that State-Churches are never 
deemed state organisations for which the state is responsible. That would be an 
undesirable interpretation, which would result in lack of redress under the European 
Convention for individuals whose human rights were breached by a Church that may 
possess state powers affecting individuals and whose actions may be perceived by the 
public as those of the state. The State-Church would benefit from both the autonomy
91 Finska forsam lingen 1 Stockholm and Hautaniemi v. Sweden  [1977].
92 Now  Article 34.
93 The applicant was one such parish that complained against the prescribed translation o f  liturgy into 
Finnish.
94 Not necessarily o f  the Church o f  Sweden, which under the Swedish 1992 Church Act (kyrkolag 
1992:300) has fairly limited characteristics o f  a State-Church.
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of a religious community and the power, status and resources of a state endorsed 
religion, with no effective guarantee of the rights of individuals and sub-groups within 
it.
A position of the Commission that the central institutions of State-Churches are 
subject to the obligations of the Convention is discernible elsewhere. By agreeing to 
examine the merit of applications of clergymen of State-Churches against the Church, 
such as in Williamson95, the Commission implicitly accepted that State-Churches can 
be subject to the substantive articles of the Convention.
A distinction can be made based on the role that the Church is playing and the legal 
authority or capacity it is exercising, to decide whether or not it is exercising a 
governmental function of the state.
A distinction based on the role of the body concerned within the Church was made in 
the Case o f  The Holy Monasteries96. Greece claimed that the applicant monasteries 
could not be ‘victims’ under former Article 25 of the European Convention, by 
pointing to their strong connection with the state. The European Court did not accept 
the argument, even though the monasteries were public law entities, because their role 
is spiritual, and they have no administrative role in the state. They thus qualify as 
Non-Governmental Organizations. It is left open in the Court’s decision what these 
governmental or administrative roles might be. In keeping with the Court’s decision, 
these could still be interpreted broadly, to include not just central government roles 
but also government in its role of serving the community so as to include functions 
such as education and welfare.
A distinction between different Church bodies as well as a distinction between 
different functions exercised by Church bodies has been made by the UK House of 
Lords. Because the European Convention has been incorporated into the UK Human 
Rights Act, the UK courts needed to define the status of the State-Church and its 
institutions for the purposes of the European Convention. The House of Lords decided
95 Williamson v. U K  [1995], as well as Karlsson  v. Sweden [1986]; Knudsen v. N orway [1985].
96 Holy M onastaries v. Greece [1994],
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on the applicability of the Convention’s provisions to a Parish Council of the Church
07of England . The Lords interpreted the UK Human Rights Act to match the 
interpretation of the European Court and Commission as to when the European 
Convention would apply to Church bodies. The Church of England itself is not a legal 
entity, but the parish councils are. According to the Human Rights Act, the 
Convention would apply if the Parish were a 'core' public authority, which fell under 
Section 6(1) of the Act, or a ‘hybrid’ authority, exercising a public function, falling 
under Section 6(3) of the Act. Section 6(1) refers to ‘public authority’, but does not
QO
define it. The Lords, in several separate opinions , characterized it by possession of 
powers, democratic accountability, public funding, and an obligation to act in the 
public interest. One of the tests used" was based on Holy Monastaries and Finska -  
whether the body was established to be part of the process of government. None of the 
Lords thought that the parish council is a ‘core’ public authority, therefore they had to 
decide whether the parish council was a hybrid authority exercising a public function. 
Parishes do exercise public functions, such as registration of marriages and burials, 
but in the particular case, which dealt with repairs to the chancel, all but one of the 
Lords also did not think the parish council was exercising public functions of a 
‘hybrid’ body, under section 6(3), and therefore, in this case, the Human Rights Act 
did not apply. Further to this analysis, it appears that the provisions of the Act, and 
therefore of the Convention, would apply to the exercise of other functions of a 
parish, and to all acts of the central bodies of the Church of England.
This is the analysis under UK law, according to which first the body concerned has to 
be analysed, and then, if it is a ‘hybrid’ case, its function in the particular case. The 
European Commission had only distinguished between bodies of the Church for the 
purposes of application of Article 9. It is suggested that the UK approach be adopted 
under the European Convention regarding ‘hybrid’ Church bodies, distinguishing 
between their governmental and non-governmental functions.
1.2 Church employees and internal proceedings
97 Parochial Church Council o f  the Parish o f  Aston Cantlow  v. Wallbank [2003].
98 See opinions o f  Lord Nichols, Lord Hope, Lord Scott.
99 By Lord Hope.
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One of the state-like activities conducted by religious organisations is having an 
internal legal and judicial system. It is of course only state-like: It applies only to 
members, and in this sense it is voluntary; generally, the 'judicial' determinations may 
only be recognised in law through private law arrangements. But, effectively, such 
'judicial' decisions of religious bodies may determine privileges, rights and 
responsibilities as recognized by the community, affecting members' lives as much as 
state judicial decisions. Thus, there is strong reason to suggest that internal 
proceedings in religious organizations follow basic safeguards of fair procedure. 
However, it is more questionable whether international human rights law can hold 
states responsible for enforcing fair procedure requirements in such cases.
I look at three types of internal proceedings by religious organisations: Disciplinary 
proceedings against clergy in a State-Church, disciplinary proceedings against clergy 
in a religious organisation with no constitutional status, and other proceedings in a 
religious organization that determine religious rights within the religious community. 
States may be responsible under international human rights law for guaranteeing fair 
procedure in the first case. In the second and third cases, there is a strong argument 
for the demand of such guarantees, but there is currently no basis to claim that these 
exist in international law.
A case of the first type was discussed in Tyler v. UK100. An Anglican minister argued 
that he should be guaranteed rights of fair procedure, according to Article 6 of the 
European Convention, in disciplinary proceedings against him in the ecclesiastical 
courts101. The UK government argued that his function was in a nature of a public 
service, rather than a private professional service, and so the proceedings were not a 
determination of his 'civil rights' within the meaning of Article 6(1). The Commission 
in Tyler did not rule on this argument, as it decided the ecclesiastical court did 
constitute an independent and impartial tribunal.
100 Tyler v. U K [  1994].
101 Art. 6(1): “In the determination o f  his civil rights and obligations or o f  any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law ”.
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The term ‘civil rights and obligations’ in Article 6(1) is ambiguous. Its interpretation, 
given in Strasbourg jurisprudence, purposely ignores state classification, examining 
instead the contents and effects of the right102, and includes some public law and 
administrative procedures, especially, but not exclusively, those in which the 
authority is not acting as sovereign103. Pertinent among these were the determinations 
that classified disciplinary proceedings resulting in suspension from medical 
practice104 and legal practice105 as a ‘civil right’ within the ambit of 6(1). Disciplinary 
procedures in a State-Church could similarly be said to determine ‘civil rights’ under 
this test. However, more relevant to disciplinary procedures in State-Churches, which 
concern state employees, is the test regarding employment disputes of civil servants 
given in Pellegrin106. It includes in Art 6(1) employment disputes regarding civil 
servants, excluding only disputes regarding activities of public servants who are 
acting as a depository of public authority. Under the rationale of this test, proceedings 
regarding clergy might be excluded from Article 6(1 )107.
It would be advisable if disciplinary procedures against clergy in State-Churches were 
included in the ambit of international human rights guarantees of fair procedure in 
determination of legal rights, such as Article 6(1 )108. The constitutional status of the 
ecclesiastical courts in the United Kingdom 109, should mean that Convention 
obligations must apply. Disciplinary proceedings in such a case are quasi-judicial
102 K onigv. Germany [1978].
103 See further: Van Dijk and van Hoof, [1998] 394-406.
104 Le Compte v. Belgium [1982].
105 H. v. Belgium  [1988].
106 Pellegrin  v. France [EctHR 1999].
107 Disciplinary proceedings are also probably not ‘criminal’ proceedings within the scope o f  Article 6, 
under Engel v. Netherlands [ECtHR 1979-80]. Proceedings that apply to small, close defined groups, 
with sanctions that do not include restriction o f  freedom, such as disciplinary proceedings in State- 
Churches, are categorized under this test as disciplinary rather than criminal proceedings, not falling 
within Article 6.
108 Compare the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(1).
109 The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (as amended by the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003) 
prescribes censures that may be pronounced when an ecclesiastical offence has been established. 
Decisions o f  ecclesiastical judges possess the status o f  law. However, whether review by civil court o f  
the censures pronounced is possible is unsettled (Doe, [1996] 217).
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proceedings, in which a legal mechanism associated with the state determines rights 
and privileges of individuals.
It is an inbuilt weakness of European Convention protection, because it creates 
obligations on states not private parties, that it would apply to disciplinary 
proceedings of a State-Church but not to proceedings of another religion. Proceedings 
in religious institutions of religions other than state religions would not be subject to 
Article 6(1). But this leaves an important facet of individual rights unprotected. These 
are procedures, that de facto determine significant aspects of the lives of members of 
the community or organization, including benefits, privileges, social standing or 
employment, as crucial to the lives of members as any official determination of rights. 
While the legal basis, if any, for such proceedings is rooted in private law, the 
determination may be more than a private matter, because of its severe ramifications 
in a cohesive community, and, at least in case of disciplinary procedures, the moral 
opprobrium of the individual concerned.
Such a case was a decision by the Chief Rabbi of the UK on a Rabbi’s fitness to hold 
rabbinical office, following an investigation of allegations against him, discussed in 
an application for judicial review in the Queen’s Bench Division110. The Court 
decided it would not exercise judicial review, because the decision to be reviewed was 
not a regulation of a field of public life, for which the government would have 
provided a statutory framework, if regulation did not exist. The test for judicial review 
in UK law is not the same as that for the application of the European Convention (by 
means of the Human Rights Act). The judicial review test is broader, as it does not 
apply only to acts of government but to acts that would have been undertaken by 
government. It could be suggested that this is a preferable test to determine which 
bodies should be subject to human rights obligations. The UK Court found that some 
acts of NGOs are to be treated like government acts because they regulate a field that 
government would have regulated. Governments do not regulate religions, but for the 
purposes of application of human rights guarantees possibly the criterion should be 
broadened to include acts similar to those which government regulates, which could 
includes proceedings which are a determination of a person’s reputation in the
U0R. v. C hief R abbi e x p  Wachmann [1992] 1 WLR 1036, QB.
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community. A further difficulty pointed out by the Court is that of disentangling 
procedural considerations of natural justice from Jewish law, which the Court must 
respect. This is a substantial difficulty, which should caution care, but should not 
prove an absolute bar to application of procedural guarantees.
Religions use internal proceedings that have a judicial character not only regarding 
employees. Proceedings of the London Beit Din, a tribunal appointed by the Chief 
Rabbi to decide on certificates of kashrut for food vendors, were examined by a UK 
court, which decided that there was no recourse to judicial review of the decision111. 
The Beth Din is a religious Jewish court. It is not a court of law of the state. Food 
vendors voluntarily decide if they wish to apply for its kashrut certificates, and thus 
submit to its decisions to revoke such certificates. It does not decide legal rights, but it 
decides, in fact, on the livelihood of a member of the community, with a de facto 
significance much like that of a business licence. It is arguable that the religious 
institution cannot act regardless of the procedural rights of its member in such 
proceedings. However, in this case the argument is weaker than that regarding 
disciplinary proceedings, because there is no moral blame implied by the proceedings.
The right to have internal judicial or quasi-judicial procedures is a group right par 
excellence. If such rights are to be recognized as part of religious freedom, they 
should be subject to the proviso that individual rights of basic fair procedure (such as 
the rules of natural justice) are respected. However, there is a danger not only of 
interference in institutional religious autonomy, but also in matters of religious 
doctrine. Thus, not full judicial procedures, but rather rudimentary elements of fair 
procedure must be observed.
1.3 Democratic governance
If religious institutions of a state-religion have legal status as public bodies, there is an 
argument that they must be subjected to requirements of democratic governance (as
111 R. v. London Beth Din ex p  Bloom  [1998] COD 131, QB.
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well as possibly other attributes of good governance, such as transparency and 
accountability). As will be seen, this is a requirement that has been raised both from 
within, by members of religious organizations themselves, and from without, by states 
in which they operate.
The requirement for democratic governance of religious institutions has not yet been
raised in international law, and seldom in domestic law. It is not presently clear that a
democratic governance requirement exists in international law regarding state
governance, but there is a strong claim for such a requirement, an issue of much recent 
112debate . However, this is not a basis for a possible demand for democratic 
governance of religious institutions in the state.
Nevertheless, it would be commensurate with the trend for strengthening democratic 
governance and human rights observance in civil society, if this requirement was 
demanded of civic organizations, including religious institutions, particularly 
institutions of state religions, concurrent with the implementation of human rights 
provisions.
This is not an easy argument. So far democratic governance in religious institutions 
has seldom been demanded even in democratic states. It has never been raised as an 
international demand of religious bodies in other states. Even in the processes of state 
building in which the international community participated (such as Afghanistan and 
Iraq) and raised demands for state democracy, religious organizations were left outside 
these demands.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to develop legal bases for enforcing at least some 
aspects of democratic governance on religious institutions, such as voting for the 
administrative bodies that oversee religious institutions, but not appointment of 
religious authorities. A religious institution, although rooted in a private law contract, 
does have a public aspect. Its members do have a claim, regardless of the private law 
instrument setting it up, as to the way it is run, and can legitimately demand that 
principles of democracy and accountability be upheld. Religious organizations 
influence members’ lives often as much as the state. They encompass in their actions
112 See : Franck, [1990]; Franck, [1992]; Marks, [2000],
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and teachings all aspects of life, and form an important social, cultural and religious 
framework for members. In religiously pluralistic societies in Europe and elsewhere, 
religious organizations of different religions organize important aspects of individual 
and social life. It is important for the state to foster a plurality of organizations in civil 
society, but participation in civic society through its organizations should also mean 
that participants be able to oversee the civic organizations, including religious ones, in 
which they take part.
The argument for a requirement of democratic governance may be extended to 
institutions of religions that are not state religions. Some states that extend a 
requirement of democratic governance to certain private associations, exempt religions 
not only from human rights requirements imposed on private civic organisations, but 
also from democratic requirements of other civic organizations. This is a way in which 
states favour religious group rights over those of individual members. The decisions of 
the institution, according to its own rules, will be recognized over the wishes of 
individual members, even if they are a majority. For example, in Hungary, civic 
associations are required to have a democratic structure, but religions are exempt from
1 i
the need to have a democratic structure in order to be registered . Clearly, this 
exemption was given so as not to interfere in doctrinal matters. But the same attributes 
that favour a democratic governance requirement in civic organisations, namely that 
they manage important aspects of peoples’ lives, perform social functions in the state 
and often receive funds from the state (directly or through tax exemptions), apply to 
religious institutions. Future debate is needed on how to reconcile democratic 
governance and doctrinal imperatives, possibly distinguishing between doctrinal 
decisions and administrative organization of the religious institution.
A requirement of democratic governance for religious organizations was debated in a 
US case in an indirect way. US courts are loath to intervene in Church decisions, based 
on a principle of non-intervention in Church affairs grounded in the First Amendment. 
However, in Jones v. W olf14, a problem arose of deciding which faction in a Church
113 Schanda, [2002] 425.
114 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
114
dispute should prevail. The Court majority decided on a rebuttable presumption that 
the Church body decides by majority decision. The dissent on the Court said there 
should be no presumption of a particular decision method, and the Court should look 
only to church doctrine as to who is the qualified decision-maker, otherwise the 
boundaries set by the First Amendment will be overstepped. While in practical terms, 
the difference is only one of evidentiary burden, there may be a more fundamental 
difference. The majority did not explicitly mention democratic ideals behind its 
presumption of majority vote. Nevertheless, in fact, the decision promotes principles of 
democratic governance, even if only in a weak (i.e. rebuttable) sense. This decision is 
an example, albeit a rare one, of imposition of principles of democratic governance on 
a religious organization by the state, the U.S., even if this was done only implicitly.
Why religious community members would favour a democratic governance 
requirement can be exemplified by a decision of the UK Court of Appeal. It ruled that 
the decisions of an Imam in compiling a list of members entitled to vote for mosque 
committee elections was not subject to judicial review, as his functions and decisions 
were not of a public nature115. The Imam’s actions were deemed binding on members 
by force of a private law contract. However, a mosque, as any religious institution, is 
not merely a product of a private law contract. It governs all aspects of adherents’ lives 
as much as state organs do, even when not taking over directly functions of the state, 
such as education. Requiring democratic participation in decision-making is part of 
assuring respect for human rights in carrying out these functions.
While currently there is no applicable legal requirement of democratic governance 
either in UK law or in international law, it could be an important development to 
participation in civil society if civic organization had a requirement of democratic 
governance that included at least the administrative functions of religious 
organizations. Of course, it may not be easy to delineate administrative functions from 
core religious functions. It is difficult presently to suggest how such a requirement 
could be introduced in future international legal instruments, but this should merit 
further consideration.
,15/?. v. Imam o f  Bury Park M osque ex p  Ali [1994] COD 142, CA
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Thus, religious organizations bear characteristics of public bodies having human rights 
obligations, as employers, as civic bodies, or as regulators of social life. As such, they 
are not purely private bodies, and should not be exempt from the obligation to observe 
human rights, including religious freedom of individuals.
2. Religious freedom includes the right to participate in religious communities 
without waiving one’s basic rights
In this section I expound the claim that individuals who participate in religious 
communities, whether as members or employees, do not let go of their rights at the 
door of the community. Their religious freedom encompasses the right to participate 
in religious community activities with basic rights such as freedom of expression, 
equality, and even freedom of religion itself. The normative claim regarding members 
is that the state must accord religious freedom equally, and so their right to religious 
freedom is infringed if they cannot benefit from equal protection of the law in 
institutions of their religion. Because religion is part of one’s identity, the individual 
should not be made to choose between participation in religious institutions and basic 
rights. It is the meaningful participation in religious life sought by members and 
workers as a manifestation of their religious freedom that calls for guarantees of rights 
by the state.
I show, that this is not just a normative claim. There are some indications of an 
existing basis in law for these claims, in European human rights law. Where such an 
argument is not accepted, particularly in the developed case-law of the US, I argue it 
is unjustified. The argument is strongest where a state-religion is involved, because 
individuals have a strong claim that a religion that has the imprimatur of the state 
must respect their rights. Nevertheless, the argument that religious freedom must not 
mean having to waive basic rights by joining religious activities is valid for other 
religions as well.
2.1 European human rights law
116
The problem of squaring the autonomy of religious institutions with individual human 
rights is evident in international as well as domestic legal context. The European 
Commission stated, that Article 9 does not oblige the High Contracting Parties to 
ensure that Churches within their jurisdiction grant religious freedom to their 
members and servants. In a State-Church, it reasoned, servants are employed for the 
application of a particular religious doctrine, and their religious freedom consists of 
their ability to leave the Church116. It saw the church as protected in its autonomy in 
these matters. This broad qualification of Article 9 can be criticised. Individuals 
always have a right to religious freedom, even when they undertake a position within 
a Clnrch. People enter employment or otherwise associate themselves with religious 
organisations for a variety of reasons and exigencies. They do not, thereby, forfeit any 
right to freedom of religion and belief. This right should, however, be interpreted 
differently according to the context of the position they undertake within the Church. 
The variable scope of individual religious freedom should depend on the position of 
the employee, his profession and the institution in which he serves. The applicants in 
Karlsson and Knudsen were clergymen, regarding whom it is most justified to view a 
Church demand of religious conformity as not infringing their religious freedom.
The European Commission, however, followed its earlier reasoning also in the case of 
a non-established Church, and viewed as legitimate a dismissal of a doctor in a
117Catholic hospital who expressed, in a private capacity, pro-abortion views , because 
it reasoned that by entering employment with the Church the doctor accepted a certain 
limitation of his freedom to criticise the Church. But when assessing the protection of 
employees’ human rights in religious institutions, not all employees should be treated 
alike. Differentiation should be made between ‘core’ religious employees such as 
clergy, for whom an imposition of doctrinal conformity would be easier to justify, and 
other employees who may have valid claims to a broader interpretation of religious 
freedom. This position regarding the Commission's qualification of Article 9 is 
especially strong when applied to State-Churches or dominant religions in the state.
116 Karlsson  v. Sweden  [1986]; Knudsen v. Norway [1985]; A"v. Denmark  [1976].
117 Rommelfanger v. Germany [1989]. The applicant claimed a breach o f  his freedom o f  expression 
(Article 10), but it seems that, equally, there was a breach o f  his religious freedom, as the reliance on 
Church doctrine prohibited him from expressing his ethical beliefs.
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However, even this qualification of Article 9 does not mean that, under the European 
Convention, states do not need to assure that Churches grant members and employees 
human rights other than religious freedom, as will be discussed below.
One of the main issues to cause concern for Churches, in any state, were they to be 
subjected to international human rights requirements, is the ordination of women 
clergy. The claim of women who wish to be ordained exemplifies well the argument 
of this section. It is precisely because of their wish to play a meaningful role within 
the religious community, that the law must intervene within the realm of church 
autonomy to guarantee their right to equality.
This issue has not been raised directly in international fora. Neither the European 
Court, nor, previously, the European Commission, have confronted the question 
whether State-Churches must ordain women as part of their human rights obligations. 
But a correlative issue was presented to the European Commission 118. The 
Commission decided that State-Churches that ordain women clergy have not breached 
the right to religious freedom of clergymen who objected to such ordination on 
theological grounds. In Williamson119, the applicant, a clergyman, tried unsuccessfully 
to challenge the legality of the Ordination of Women Measure120 as breaching his 
religious freedom. The Commission reiterated its established position that freedom of 
religion does not include the right of a clergyman, within the framework of a church 
in which he is working or to which he applies for a post, to practise a special religious 
conception121. However, the Commission, in dismissing his application, also noted 
that Article 14 of the European Convention prohibits discrimination in connection 
with Convention rights, a discrimination that the Measure sought to eliminate. But the 
Commission did not go (and did not need to go) so far as to say that the Church of 
England, whose Measures are parliamentary legislation, needed to allow for
1,8 Karlsson  v. Sweden [1986].
119 Williamson v. UK  [1985].
120 Priests (Ordination o f  Women) Measure 1993 (No. 2).
121 See: Karlsson  v. Sweden  [1986].
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ordination of women in order to abolish discrimination between men and women, so
100 •that the UK would be in compliance with the Convention . However, if Article 14 
applies to State-Churches, as applied by the Commission in this case, then not only is 
the Church allowed to appoint women, but it must do so. Indeed, under the 
Commission's reasoning the UK itself is in breach of Article 14 by the Anglican
10 TChurch’s failure to permit the ordination of women Bishops .
A similar question is likely to arise as to the ordination of homosexual clergy. The 
question of ordination of gay clergy has arisen in internal religious debate, for 
instance in the Anglican Church124. It has yet to be framed as a human rights 
requirement to which the Church of England, or any State-Church, must adhere. If 
such a claim would arise under the European Convention, the Court would have to 
examine whether refusal to appoint gay clergy breaches their right to equal enjoyment 
of religious freedom under Article 14 (in conjunction with Article 9) of the 
Convention. Sexual orientation is not one of the enumerated prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in Article 14, but it has been recognized by the European Court as one 
of the grounds of prohibited discrimination covered by the words “such as” in Article 
14125.
2.2 Domestic laws -  UK. Germany and the US
The unresolved conflict between church autonomy and individual freedom has been 
resolved differently in different states. The examples we turn to next, those of the UK, 
the US, and Germany, have each struck a different balance between Church autonomy 
and individual freedom. The US case-law leaves narrow the scope for protection of 
individual rights. German constitutional decisions have attempted a more balanced 
approach, but still give considerable protection to Church autonomy over individual
122 Indeed, it is not clear which Convention right the Commission was refering to, discrimination 
concerning which the Church was attempting to eliminate, possibly it is discrimination regarding the 
right to freedom o f  religion (Articles 14+9).
123 Priests (Ordination o f  Women) Measure 1993 (No. 2).
124 See: Bates [2003].
125 D a Silva M outa  v. Portugal [2001]; Frette v. France [2002].
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rights. In the UK the balance between institution and employees is yet to be 
determined in the interpretation of new legislation.
The UK Human Rights Act, which adopts the European Convention, does not state 
explicitly whether it upholds individual religious rights or religious group rights.
1 96However, Section 13 of the Act instructs the courts to have particular regard to the 
importance of the right to religious freedom, when its exercise by a religious 
organisation will be affected. The wording of the Section is vague. It does not say the 
court must prefer the right of the religious organisation to a conflicting right of 
religious freedom, for instance, that of a member. As the importance of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion which Section 13 stresses is also the right 
of individuals within religious organizations, it would be possible to interpret Section 
13 so as not to prefer a right of the religious organization over that of its members or 
employees.
In Germany, a constitutional guarantee of a right of self-government to religious
organisations127 was interpreted by the Constitutional Court so that it may override
constitutional rights of employees, including religious freedom. The workers to which
such decisions referred ranged from a minister (who was suspended by his church
nft
upon being elected to the Bundestag, contrary to constitutional protection of elected
190  •members ) to workers in non-religious roles that have a bearing on Church ethics
110  •(doctor in Catholic hospital who expressed pro-abortion views ), to workers in 
purely non-religious roles (a bookkeeper of a Catholic youth home who had left the 
Church131).
126 Section 13 (1): “ I f  a court's determination o f  any question arising under this Act might affect the 
exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) o f  the Convention right to 
freedom o f  thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the importance o f  that 
right”.
127 Article 137(3) o f  the Weimer Constitution, which is incorporated into the Basic Law through Article 
140.
128 In Article 48(2) o f  the Basic Law, which protects elected members from obstruction in accepting or 
exercising their office.
129 42 BverfGE 312 (1976).
130 70 BverfGE 138, 162-72 (1985)
131 70 BverfGE 138, 172 (1985).
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The range of workers whose rights were subject to the Church autonomy guarantee 
was overbroad. However, differently from the US doctrine of ‘ministerial exception’, 
which will be discussed below, the German Constitutional Court held that there were 
limits to the right of the Church to impose its views on its employees. Churches could 
not put unreasonable demands of loyalty on employees. Thus, the German Court does 
not see church autonomy as a blanket exemption of the church from compliance with 
protection of individual rights. However, the results reached by the Court show that it 
did not differentiate between workers according to their roles.
2.3 United States
A well-established doctrine regarding rights of workers within religious organizations 
exists in US case-law. However, under US religious freedom analysis, the rights of 
individuals in religious organizations are not adequately addressed. To see why, the 
principles of the law of religious freedom in the US should be recalled.
The US religious freedom jurisprudence is based on the two religion clauses of the 1st 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It contains two clauses regarding religion: the 
free exercise clause, which guarantees freedom of religion, and the establishment 
clause, which forbids Congress from establishing religion.
Free exercise of religion can be restricted by law, according to the Supreme Court test
i ‘X'yin Sherbert v. Verner , if such a law furthers a compelling state interest, and 
employs the least restrictive means in order to do so. The Court substantially modified 
this test in Employment Division v. Smith133, so that government can prohibit religious 
conduct without showing a compelling interest, as long as the law is neutral and 
generally applicable134. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act135, which the US
132 Sherbert v. V erner , 374 US 398 (1963).
133 Employment Division  v. Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
134 For a compelling history o f  Smith, the man and the case, see Epps [2001].
135 42 USC §2000bb  (1994).
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Congress enacted in 1993 to counter Smith and return the Sherbert test, was struck
13(5down by the Supreme Court decision City o f Boerne v. Flores . However, even 
under the now prevailing Smith doctrine, when a law is not neutral and generally 
applicable, government must still show a compelling reason for restricting exercise of 
religion137.
However, outside the line of free exercise cases, the establishment clause gave rise to 
a broad doctrine of Church autonomy. One of the important aspects in which church 
autonomy is elevated above individual human rights is the ‘ministerial exception’, 
defined thus: “When a church makes a personnel decision based on religious doctrine, 
...the courts will not intervene.”138 However, there need not be reliance on Church 
doctrine underlying each decision for the ministerial exception to apply. This means 
that churches and other religious organizations are exempt from a variety of 
employment laws 139, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that forbids 
discrimination in employment on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.
The lower Courts have asked whether the ministerial exception survives after the 
Smith decision. If government may burden individual religious practice by general 
neutral law even without a compelling state interest, may it also burden religious 
organizations by general neutral law, for instance, by employment equality 
legislation? All courts in which this question arose decided that the ministerial 
exception remains intact140. The reason given was that the ministerial exception 
addresses the rights of the church, while Smith refers only to the rights of 
individuals141. The ministerial exception is rooted in Supreme Court cases affirming
136 City o f  Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop o f  San Antonio 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)
137 Thus, a city ordinance specifically tailored to ban ritual slaughter o f  animals practiced by one 
religion, the Santria religion, did not survive the Supreme Court’s scrutiny (Church o f  the Lukumi 
BabaluA ye  v. City ofH ialeh  508 US 520 (1993)).
138 Bryce v. Episcopal Church o f  Colorado , 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002).
139 Generally on worker’s rights within Churches see: Laycock, [1981] 1397.
140 See: EEOC  v. Roman Catholic D iocese , 213 F.3d 795, (4th Cir. 2000);
Gellington v. Christian M ethodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. 
Central Tex. Annual Conference o f  the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, (5th Cir. 1999).
141 EEOC. v. Catholic University o f  America, 83 F.3d 455 at 462.
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the church autonomy doctrine, which protects the fundamental right of churches to 
decide for themselves matters of church government, faith, and doctrine. The result is 
that concurrently Smith and its progeny allow the state to burden individual 
manifestations of religious freedom by neutral law while the doctrine of church 
autonomy does not allow burdening of religious organizations by similarly neutral 
laws.
But church autonomy is in fact one type of manifestation of religious freedom. Thus, 
one manifestation of religious freedom, a group manifestation, is given more 
constitutional protection than other, individual manifestations of religious freedom.
The ministerial exception is far-reaching as it applies not only to clergy. The general 
rule is that "if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, 
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in 
religious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered clergy”142. This resulted 
in a range of cases in which individual workers were denied the opportunity to pursue 
discrimination claims against Churches. For example, the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission could not bring suit under title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
alleging sex discrimination against a Catholic Church for dismissing a female music 
director, even though she was replaced by a non-Catholic, as this was considered a 
doctrinal matter falling under the ministerial exception. Likewise a communications 
director for a church could not bring a claim under article VII for discrimination on 
grounds of ethnic origin143, because her role was to advance the message of the 
Church, and so fell under the ‘ministerial exception’, rather than any claim that the 
dispute itself had anything to do with religious doctrine144.
The US Supreme Court decided on the constitutionality of an exemption from the 
Civil Rights Act Title VII prohibition on discrimination based on religion for religious 
corporations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
142 EEOC  v. Roman Catholic D iocese , 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000).
143 Alicea-H em andez v. Catholic Bishop o f  Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003).
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perform work connected with ... its activities."145 The Court rebuked the claim that 
the exemption “offends equal protection principles by giving less protection to 
religious employers' employees than to secular employers' employees”, because the 
statute “does not discriminate among religions and, instead, is neutral on its face and 
motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the 
exercise of religion”. The exemption is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of 
“alleviating governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to 
define and carry out their religious missions.”146
The Court decided that the exemption applies even to employees of non-profit 
organisations operated by Churches who have no religious functions, such as workers 
of a church-owned gymnasium147. So, the freedom of churches to employ only 
members of their religion is even broader than the ministerial exception, as it applies 
to all workers.
Thus, in assessing whether the state breached principles of religious freedom the 
Court looked only at whether there was discrimination between religions. But here 
there is a different religious freedom concern. The autonomy of the religious 
organizations is furthered but the religious freedom of workers is left unprotected. As 
was seen, the European Court has decided that Member States do not have to 
guarantee religious freedom of workers in Churches. The US Court does not even 
address this as a problem of protection of individual religious freedom inside a 
Church.
The preference of institutional religious freedom to individual religious freedom in 
the US can also be seen regarding another exemption of Churches from laws that 
protect the rights of employees, an exemption from paying State unemployment 
contributions to religious bodies. A social worker of the Salvation Army who became 
unemployed was not eligible for state unemployment benefit, because the Salvation 
Army, like other religious organizations, was exempt by law from paying
145 Section 702, 42 U.S.C. Section 2 0 0 0 e - l.
146 Corporation o f  the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 US 327 (1987).
147 Ibid.
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unemployment contributions. The 1st Circuit decided that this law did not breach 1st 
amendment principles of religious freedom. “Establishment Clause concern is that of 
avoiding the effective promotion or advancement of particular religions or of religion 
in general by the government. Although favoritism toward any particular sect is not an 
issue raised by this appeal, it is not disputed that religious institutions as a whole 
benefit from the [...] tax exemptions. An incidental benefit to religion does not, 
however, render invalid a statutory scheme with a valid secular purpose. ... [w]hile 
religious employers may be benefited, the employees of exempted religious 
institutions, as the appellant has discovered, may be ineligible to enjoy the attendant 
benefits of the unemployment compensation scheme. Thus, the primary effect of the 
exemptions is not to force the general public to subsidize religion” surmised the 
Court148.
The constitutional concern of the Court was whether the state advances or inhibits 
religion. The Court concludes that the law doesn’t advance religion because the 
exemption is not at the expense of the public, but rather at the expense of the 
employees. In every religion whose employers benefit from the exemption, the 
employees lose their unemployment benefits. This means that institutions of the 
religion benefit at the expense of individuals of that religion. A worker who works for 
a religious institution because of a belief that furthers his participation in religious 
work is penalised for that religious choice. The purpose of the law is to protect 
religious freedom, by freeing religious institutions from government regulation. But it 
is protection of religious freedom of institutions at the expense of the religious 
freedom of their workers. Working at a religious institution is sometimes, though not 
always, a manifestation of a worker’s religious belief. The religious freedom of such 
employees in making employment choices according to their religious beliefs is 
harmed by a law that disqualifies them from receiving unemployment benefits 
because they chose to work at a religious rather than a secular institution.
Individual religious freedom and group religious freedom were developed by the US 
Supreme Court as two different strands of free exercise law. The D.C. Circuit Court in
148 Rojas v. Fitch, Docket No. 96-2328 (1st Cir., October 9, 1997).
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EEOC explained the distinction between them149: "government action may burden the 
free exercise of religion, in violation of the First Amendment, in two quite different 
ways: by interfering with a believer's ability to observe the commands or practices of 
his faith, . . . and by encroaching on the ability of a church to manage its internal 
affairs." Out of the two, the Court saw a reluctance of the Supreme Court to interfere 
with the second.
Ironically, considering the highly individualistic notion of human rights in the context 
of the United States Constitution, in the US the legal balance between Church rights 
and individual rights is currently weighted quite heavily to the side of the Church (or 
other religious organization). This is so in two ways: the first, in a conflict between 
the rights of a Church and the rights of its employee, the Church has the upper hand; 
the second, while individual religious freedom can be impinged upon by a general 
neutral law even absent a compelling state interest, Church autonomy and its right to 
religious freedom cannot be so impinged upon.
The meaningful religious freedom for many members of religious communities is thus 
the protection of their ability to be members of religious communities without having 
to sacrifice their basic rights. This is the religious freedom which international and 
domestic law should protect.
3. Religious group rights entail state determination of group membership, and 
therefore compromise state neutrality
Laws which accord legal status to religious groups are troubling, because for their 
implementation the state must accept one determination of the group and its 
representative leadership. This is often unacceptable to sub-groups, dissenting leaders 
or individuals within the group. Any determination between competing claims by the 
state means it will not remain neutral. While it is recognized in international law that 
states may have an established religion, with which they are historically associated 
and thus not remain neutral in this respect, nevertheless they do have an obligation of 
non-discrimination in their current actions towards religions. As examples in this
149 EEOC  v. Catholic U niversity , 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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chapter will show, group determination is not only misguided in principle, but is also 
problematic in application.
An inherent problem with according groups rights of religious freedom is that of 
defining the group. This was shown in Chapter Two to be a strong reason for 
according religious rights to individuals, rather than groups. The inevitability of the 
state being involved in such definition, as will be seen, reinforces this point.
One of the concerns over establishment of religion is the states’ exclusion or, 
conversely, legal regulation, of minority religions. Specifically, any official state 
determination of the legal status, rights and obligations of minority religions raises a 
concern that the object of granting them an official status is to keep them under 
government control. Moreover, the legal status of minority religions poses crucial 
conflicts between group rights and individual rights.
In certain cases the state cannot escape from legally defining religious groups and 
maintaining their rights according to these definitions. This is true even in states that 
maintain separation of religion from state, as even they cannot escape entanglement of 
the state with religion.
I analyse instances in which states accord religious status to communities in order to 
further the ability of religious communities to practice their religion, by according 
them legal powers, by exempting them from general laws and by allocating them 
funds. I then look at the regulation of legal status of religions by means of registration 
and state power to appoint clergy. In all these cases, the inherent problems in defining 
religious groups will be evident.
3.1 Legal powers
When the state derogates to religious communities the legal power to perform state 
functions, the state must necessarily decide who constitutes the religious group and 
who is its representative leadership. Thus, the empowerment of religious groups may 
mean an infringement of rights of sub-groups or alternative leaderships within the 
group. A particularly difficult situation facing the state is when a schism occurs within
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a recognized religion. Any position taken by the state, whether recognizing or 
refusing to recognize the splinter group, necessarily entails a judgement of the state on 
religious matters.
A refusal by the state to recognize a splinter group was sanctioned by the European 
Commission150 as not incompatible with religious freedom. The Marriage Board of 
the Pentecostal Movement, which was authorized by the state to grant its pastors 
license to register marriages, had revoked the licenses of the applicant pastors who 
were deemed by the Pentecostal Movement to belong to breakaway factions. The 
Commission affirmed the actions of Sweden which did not intervene in the decision 
of the Pentecostal board. The Commission decided that the state had no obligation to 
ensure that the Movement accepts those pastors, and the congregation they lead, as its 
members. Thus, it dismissed the application.
The Commission clearly favoured the religious autonomy of the Pentecostal 
congregation over the independent rights of its dissenting members. The Commission 
seems right in concluding that sometimes it is inevitable that the state decide which is 
the recognised leadership, and what are the decision-making procedures of the group. 
Celebration of marriage is a group function, so the legal right to celebrate marriages 
must be accorded to religious communities, rather than to individuals. These religions 
are entitled to decide who may act in their name. However, the right ultimately 
derives from that of individuals. If individuals leave a known religion and want equal 
legal recognition for their schismatic group, they are entitled to it, whatever the 
objections of the main group. Had the dissenting pastors asked for separate 
certification from the state, equal respect for the right of religious freedom would 
have meant that they have a right to receive it.
But does this mean that any breakaway group, no matter how small or novel, must be 
given recognition? It seems so. If the state recognizes religious groups for legal 
purposes, then it cannot make any decisions as to their religious or social worth. Any 
religious group must be given equal recognition. This can be qualified by technical
150 Spetz v. Sweden  [1992].
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difficulties, such as a group that is too small too maintain a marriage registration 
board, or unreasonable financial burdens involved151.
Indeed, an approach that does not let the state-recognized religious community 
override the choices of other religious groups of the same religion, and does not 
accept as permissible a state decision on competing demands within a minority 
religious group, was taken by the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. The case 
involved ritual Jewish dietary requirements 152 . The Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a New York state law which allowed food to be marked as ‘kosher’ 
only if approved according to standards maintained by an Orthodox Jewish board. 
The decision was based on first amendment constitutional principles of separation of 
Church and state. But the resulting decision also affects the position of religious 
minorities in that jurisdiction. As a result of the decision, government will no longer 
be able to give legal status to one leadership of a religious group, when part of the 
religious group claims an alternative leadership and religious interpretation.
Certification of marriage registrars involves a function that the state must perform, 
while certification of religious dietary requirements is a function that the state chose 
to perform, but the conclusion in both cases is the same. As in the case of state 
certification of religious marriage registrars, so too in state certification of religious 
dietary boards, if the state legally empowers any religious group, it must likewise 
legally empower all interested religious groups including dissenting groups.
A state decision on the definition of a religious group is needed not only in order to 
give groups legal power, but also in order to exempt them from general legal 
requirements. Such involvement of the state in deciding which are the bodies of the 
religious group to which it grants the exemption from general law is, likewise, 
problematic, as can be seen in the following example.
151 See below discussion o f  improper use o f minimum numbers o f  members for state registration of 
religions.
152 Commack self-serv v. Weiss Docket No. 00-9116, 00-9118 (2nd Cir., May 21, 2002).
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The European Court of Human Rights was confronted with the question of the 
legality of a state decision on leadership of religious communities in Cha ’arei shalom 
ve ’zedek153. The case illustrates the problem discussed in Chapter Two of recognition 
of group rights, that is, the determination of who has the power to define a religious 
group.
The applicant association wanted separate governmental certification as a religious 
organization, so that it could legally perform Jewish ritual slaughter (which was 
exempt from general animal slaughter regulations). The French government had 
already certified an association of the majority of the Jewish congregations, and 
refused to certify the Cha ’arei Shalom organisation, which had a stricter interpretation 
of the religious slaughter rules.
The majority of the Court decided that as long as the members of the community 
could obtain the stricter glatt-kosher slaughtered meat from another source, there was 
no breach of their religious freedom in not allowing them to obtain their own 
slaughter permit.
The Court seems to suggest that the individual’s right is only to receive kosher food, 
and there is no separate right to supply kosher food. The state decided, that one 
religious organisation stands for an entire religion. But performing ritual slaughter is 
part of the communal manifestation of religion. A minority group of the religion 
should have an equal right to state exemption154. The right to receive the religious 
slaughter exemption is given to community slaughter-houses, but the substantive right 
is that of individuals. They do not have to belong to the community that represents the 
majority of believers, and do not have to adhere to its religious interpretations.
Rights are given to religious groups as a practical matter. It would be impractical to 
give every Jewish person a slaughter certification, but these are still in principle 
individual rights. When the state accords such rights to a religious community,
153 Cha 'arei shalom ve ‘zedek  v. France [2000].
154 Cf. the dissenting opinion.
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individuals do not lose their claim to manifest this right in a different community of 
their choice.
3.2 Budget allocation
Allocation of state budget to religious organisations gives rise to a similar problem, 
even if it follows a principle of equality. The state must make a decision about who 
constitutes the religious groups. The budget is necessarily allocated to groups rather 
than individuals, even if the substantive right to the money belongs to individuals. 
However, if the right to state funding of religious activity is viewed as an individual, 
rather than a group right, then dissenting individuals within the religious groups have 
a right to demand allocation of funds to their sub-group. This should not be at the 
discretion of the state.
Germany allocates tax-funding to religious organisations. The Central Council of 
German Jews, a Jewish umbrella organisation, receives the proportion of State taxes 
ear-marked for the Jewish religious institutions. The Reform Jewish movement asked 
to receive a share of the funding from the state of Sachsen-Anhalt proportional to its 
membership in order to establish its own community centre155. As the Central Council 
decided that the Reform congregation did not follow Jewish tradition it did not agree 
that a proportion of the funding for the Jewish community would be allocated to them. 
The Reform community petitioned the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) against the state, regarding its religious funding156. The 
officially-recognized Jewish group saw the Jewish religious community as one, while 
the Reform sub-group saw itself as a religious community in its own right.
The Court ruled that there is not necessarily one single Jewish community. The 
Reform community may ask to be officially recognized as a separate Jewish 
community for funding purposes, if it can show that it has recognition by an 
international body of the movement of Reform Judaism. If so, in principle, any sub­
group of a funded religion may claim similar recognition and funding. Thus, the state
155 Sheleg, [2003].
156 BVerwG 7 C 7.01 (Judgement o f 28 in February 2002).u  
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is faced with the prospect of having to decide on the identity of religious groups, 
namely which is a separate religious group entitled to funding.
Thus, even in the distribution of state funds, which can only be allocated to groups, 
the ultimate bearer of the right to funding are individuals. Only individuals can define 
their religious group for funding purposes, and no religious group has a right to 
include individuals in its membership overriding individual or sub-group choice.
3.3 Registration
1^7 1SKIn some states, registration of minority religions (and in some, of all religions) is 
either compulsory or a prerequisite for exercising certain manifestations of religious 
freedom. In this context as well, a religious community should not have an overriding 
right to decide against separate recognition of a sub-group, because the right to 
register, although it can only be utilized by religious groups, is ultimately the right of 
the individuals who compose the group.
The requirement of registration can be seen, in itself, as a curtailment of freedom of 
religion and freedom of association. The danger is that this requirement will serve as a 
means to monitor or curtail the activities of minority or dissident religions. Even when 
not used for discriminatory purposes, this requirement may cause the state to have to 
decide between competing religious groups, an unwanted scenario for maintenance of 
religious freedom.
Granting legal status to religious minorities involves the state in the role of deciding 
what constitutes a recognisable religious minority group. Some states have set 
registration requirements quite obviously in order to avoid recognising new and small 
religions, by setting a minimum number of members and minimum time of operation 
in order to qualify for registration as a religion, such as the 1997 Russian Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. This practice discriminates
157 E.g. in Russia, the 1997 Law on Freedom o f  Conscience and Religious Associations
158 E.g. in China, see: Kolodner, [1994] 455.
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between religions and between members of different religions for no legitimate 
purpose.
This was the case in many former Soviet-bloc states159. But also other states have 
used registration laws to impede new religion. Austria’s 1997 Confessional 
Communities Law160 was clearly adopted with the intent of discriminating between 
existing and new religions. The law requires for registration of a religion, that it has 
been operation for a minimal number of years161 and has minimal membership162. It 
must also show its distinction from other existing religions and have a “positive 
attitude towards the society and state”, and must not create “an illegal disturbance of 
the relations of Churches and other religious communities” . These requirements 
serve no legitimate state interest and discriminate against new religions.
The European Court of Human Rights had an opportunity to examine the legality of a 
state demand for registration of religious communities in Metropolitan Church o f  
Bessarabia v. Moldava164. However, the Court ruled on the illegal application of the 
registration requirement and not on the legality of a registration requirement for 
religions in itself. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was denied registration by 
the government of Moldava, under the Moldavan Religious Denominations Act. 
Registration was needed to establish legal personality of a religion and was a 
prerequisite for marketing religious objects, and founding and distributing religious 
periodicals, among other things. The government denied registration because it 
considered the Church of Bessarabia as a schismatic group of the officially recognized
159 In Bulgaria -  The Denominations Act 2002; Georgia -  a draft Law on Religion; Turkmenistan -  
The 1996 Law on Religion; in Belarus - 2002 Law on Religion. For a critical discussion o f  these laws 
see: Problems o f  Religious Freedom and Tolerance in Selected OSCE States, (Report to the OSCE 
Supplementary Meeting on Freedom o f Religion or Belief, Vienna, July 17-18, 2003, www.ihf- 
hr.org/viewbinary/viewdocument.php?doc_id=4723).
160 Bundesgesetzblatt 19/1988.
161 At least 20 years, 10 o f  which as a confessional community within the meaning o f  the law.
162 At least 0.2% o f  the population.
163 The law further discriminates between religions by creating a category of'confessional 
communities', who do not share the rights o f  recognised religions, based on irrelevant criteria o f  
membership size and length o f  time o f  operation.
164 M etropolitan Church o f  Bessarabia  v. M oldava  [2002].
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Metropolitan Church of Moldava165. The Court accepted that refusal to recognize a 
religion that acts in a harmful way was a limitation in pursuit of a legitimate aim, 
under Article 9(2) of the European Convention, but the claim of harm was not proven 
in this case.
However, the Court did not use this opportunity to examine whether the demand for 
registration, in and of itself, as a prerequisite to conducting certain religious activities, 
is a breach of religious freedom. By refraining from doing so, the Court implied such 
a requirement is not. This seems an unadvisable conclusion. A registration 
requirement which makes vital religious activities, such as printing and distributing 
religious literature, producing liturgical objects, and engaging clergy166, a priori 
dependent upon registration of the religion by the government should be considered a 
breach of religious freedom. As the Court itself said, the state’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality is incompatible with any state power to assess the legitimacy of religious 
beliefs. From this assertion, it should follow that any power of the state to require 
registration as a prerequisite to conducting certain group religious activities should be 
considered illegal.
Even when registration is not a prerequisite for engaging in vital religious activities, it 
gives power to the state in allocating rights to groups. When a schism occurs, the state 
may be forced to decide between religious sub-groups. Even a non-biased government 
may find itself in an impossible position. Allocating group rights to one sub-group of 
a religion may be seen by the main institutions of the religion as impinging upon its 
religious community’s autonomy. This, again, points to the problem inherent in 
recognition of groups as subjects of religious rights. Recognition of groups and 
maintenance of group autonomy to conduct their internal affairs,may entail non­
recognition of schismatic sub-groups. However, from a perception of religious 
freedom as an individual right it would follow that no group can object to the 
recognition of another which it views as its sub-group. Registration requirements can 
serve to hinder this interpretation, and should be revoked.
165 Importantly, the government o f Moldava was aligned with Russia and o f  the Church o f  Bessarabia 
with Romania.
166 These were prohibited to non-registered religions by sections 35 and 44 o f  the Moldavan Religious 
Denominations Act (see paragraph 129 o f  the Court opinion).
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A breakaway subgroup is no less problematic in a state that eschews any kind of 
registration. Conflicts may involve private law rights such as use of churches, as 
happened in the US case Kedroff61. The Convention of the North American Churches 
of the Russian Orthodox Church broke away from the hierarchy of the Supreme 
Church Authority in Moscow. In a dispute concerning use of a New York church, the 
Court invalidated a New York state law168 which declared the autonomy of the 
American Church. The Court decided that it may only recognize decisions of the 
Church according to its hierarchy headed by the Moscow Church Authority, and not 
US government decisions which interfere with it. The Court recognized Church 
autonomy as a constitutional principle. Courts have held that Churches have 
autonomy in making decisions regarding their own internal affairs. The Church 
autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of internal Church disputes involving 
matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity.
The Court preferred the (foreign) Church even to the choices made by its (US) 
members. Even a state that has no registration requirements is thus faced with a need 
to determine whether it should recognize, for legal purposes, religious sub-groups 
despite opposition of the main religious group.
3.4 Claims of leadership
Legal powers of a state to appoint or change religious leadership may also involve the 
state in conflicting claims to leadership within the groups, highlighting, once again, 
the inherent problem of according rights of religious freedom to groups. Such powers 
can, of course, be misused by the state to breach religious freedom. Even if they are 
not deliberately misused, a decision about religious leadership by the state may 
involve it in making unwarranted decisions about claims concerning legitimacy of 
religious groups.
167 K edroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94 (1952).
168 The Religious Corporations Law o f  N ew  York.
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The European Court in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria169 decided that the rights of 
contenders to the leadership of the Muslim community to participation in the life of 
the community, protected by Article 9 of the Convention, as interpreted in the light of 
Article 11, had been breached when the state authorities were biased in exercising 
their power by law to decree the leadership of the Muslim community, rather than 
acting according to the election by-laws of the community. The Court made clear that 
state interference in the organisation of the religious community was a breach of 
Article 9 rights of every member of that community. However, the Court refrained 
from deciding whether state legal powers to change leadership of religious 
communities infringe Article 9, because, even if legal in principle, discretion was 
obviously misused by the state in this case.
This was a missed opportunity to examine whether legal powers of the state to change 
the leadership of religious communities are a breach of religious freedom. The 
decision leaves states considerable power over religious communities. As a result, 
misuse of this power will be remedied by the Court in each case, but the state powers 
to appoint religious leaders remain intact. Better protection of religious freedom 
would have been given to religious communities, had the court set a priori limitations 
on state powers to register religions and change their leadership. A power of the state 
to decide who are the clergy and leaders of a religious community is unwarranted 
even where the state is acting neutrally. The state must decide who constitute the 
leadership, and so must accept one determination of the group, necessarily ignoring 
other factions of the group that do not agree with the majority view. Freedom of 
religion for all is guaranteed if everyone can choose their own leaders. However, as 
will be seen next this may not be possible when community clergy also discharge 
state functions.
The status of religions, including the rights of communities and the appointment of 
their leaders, has in the past sometimes been determined in bi-lateral agreements 
between state and representatives of religions in the state or by international 
agreement of the state with a co-religionist state of the minority. This would suggest a
169 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria  [1996].
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way for religious communities to take part in defining their own rights, but this 
method is not free of the problems inherent in according legal rights to religious 
communities.
Unusually, the Muslim minority in Greece remains protected by provisions of an
* • 1 H(\international treaty between states regarding co-nationals , as was prevalent before 
the Second World War171. The Treaty of Athens172, which obliged Greece to allow the 
Muslim community of Thrace to elect its own religious leaders, who also have 
jurisdiction over matters of personal law, was examined by the European Court in 
S erif73. Greece appointed by legislative decree a different Mufti from that elected by 
the community. Serif, the community-elected leader, was convicted for usurping the 
function of a clergyman174, and he ultimately applied to the European Court.
The Court concluded that Greece acted in violation of Article 9 of the European 
Convention, by punishing a person for acting as a religious leader and by using the 
criminal law to prevent there being more than one leadership of a religious 
community. The Court did not examine the legality of the state powers to choose 
Muftis or any other religious officials bestowed with state legal powers, as such a 
determination was not necessary in this case. The Court did not ask whether Article 9 
includes a right for members of a community to choose their own leadership, both for 
religious functions and for judicial functions.
In this case, Serif was not exercising any judicial functions accorded to muftis by the 
state, but was only performing expressive-religious acts. While regarding purely 
religious leadership the state has no legitimate interest to interfere with community 
choice, regarding judicial-religious appointments, this is not a simple question. If 
community autonomy is recognised by the state, as it was in this case, state powers to
170 The Treaty o f  Lausanne from 1923, following the treaty o f  Athens o f  1913, whose provision were 
incorporated into Greek law in 1923 (See: Kriari-Catranis, [1994] 398).
171 See Chapter One.
172 In Article 11.
173 S erif  v. G reece [2001].
174 See also: A gga  v. G reece [EctHR 1999].
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appoint its officials undermine it. Nevertheless, the state has a legitimate interest in 
the appointment of judges in jurisdictions that are devolved to religious communities, 
as they exercise legal powers of the state.
However, if the state undertakes to appoint religious leaders to state functions, such as 
granting them legal jurisdiction, it is effectively involved in choosing community 
leadership. This leaves hollow the religious rights of individuals and sub-groups to 
choose their own religious leadership.
3.5 Conclusions
It is inevitable that states accord a legal status to religious groups. Religious groups 
exist, and the state, by recognizing or ignoring them, treating them favourably or 
unfavourably, gives them a certain legal status in the state. In some cases the legal 
status given is a means of restricting and controlling religions, such as registration 
requirements and involvement in appointment of clergy. Such state regulation, which 
has the capacity for misuse, is unwarranted, whether in fact it is misused or not. In 
other cases legal status is given for benign considerations, and may even be necessary 
in order to provide complete religious freedoms. Such is the case when recognizing 
groups in order to bestow them with powers to perform public legal functions, exempt 
them from general laws that contradict their religious doctrine, and allocate state 
budget. However, the need to decide who constitutes religious groups involves the 
state in an exercise which itself possibly breaches both state neutrality and rights of 
claimant individuals, groups or sub-groups which are not recognized. International 
human rights law has so far largely avoided these questions.
The implications for the thesis advanced in this work are complex: The problems of 
conflicting group claims support the argument for an individual right, but they also 
show that without recognition of groups as claimants, important aspects of religious 
freedom will be meaningless.
4. Jurisdiction cannot be accorded to a religious community to which individuals 
may not have chosen to belong. Even where there is a choice, the state cannot
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allow its citizens to waive their religious freedom by belonging to a religious 
group
Some states have granted legal jurisdiction to religious communities, typically in 
matters of personal law175. This arrangement persists in those states for historical and
1 «7/
political reasons related to internal conflicts about the role of religion in the state . 
Such a grant of group rights comes at the expense of individual rights, which cannot 
be squared with international human rights standards.
The right to have religious tribunals and be able to administer religious law has not 
been explicitly recognized in international human rights documents. It has been
1 77claimed that it should be seen as included within Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration . 
Even on this approach, because religious law can conflict with other human rights
1 7ftobligations, the extent of its application in such cases must be limited accordingly . 
However, a prior question is whether there is such a right to a religious legal system, 
or whether there is no such right because religious legal jurisdiction as such breaches 
individual rights. By a right to religious law and jurisdiction, in this discussion, I refer 
to a right to exercise legal powers over the members of the community (as distinct 
from internal tribunals exercising jurisdiction over clergy or purely doctrinal matters).
A right to a religious legal system (comprising both substantive religious law and 
jurisdiction of religious courts) cannot be claimed to be part of the right to religious 
freedom for two reasons: First, a legal system necessarily has an element of coercion.
175 See the examples o f  India, Israel, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka discussed in Chapter Four. The effects 
on human rights o f  women o f  religious personal laws will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
176 See also Sudan, where conflict over accommodation o f  religious pluralism has been a basis o f  
constitutional deadlock for the past 40 years. The 1985 Constitution states Islam to be the source o f  
law, while the 1995 Asmara accords are premised upon secularization. The Muslim community in the 
North is subject to sharia  personal and criminal law, while the South is subject to secular law. The 
sharia  system, however, affects both communities and both legal systems. The non-Muslim South is 
exempt from Islamic penal provisions, but this is a source o f  tension. For example, apostasy is a crime 
under Islamic law o f  the North, but the authorities o f  the South will be reluctant to extradite a Muslim  
apostate to the North (Kok, [1997]).
177 Sullivan, [1988] 514; Capotorti, [1986] 155-6. This claim might also apply to religious freedom
provisions in other international human rights instruments.
178 Sullivan, [1988] 514.
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Not every member of the religious community wants to be subject to religious law. 
Not every individual has consented to the imposition of religious law, but rather 
consent to the system of religious jurisdictions has been given by the representatives 
of the community. Even if a member of the community originally consented to its 
jurisdiction, for instance by entering a religious marriage, he or she may have entered 
a religious marriage for lack of choice, or may not have knowingly consented to 
different aspects of personal law that may be subject to such jurisdiction throughout 
his or her life.
Second, by relinquishing state power to the religious law, the state acknowledges an 
independent and equal source of law. State recognition cannot legitimize a source of 
law that does not emanate from the state. Religious law, even when recognized by the 
state, has a source external to the state. The demand for a right to a legal system is 
such a demand for state power. A right to religious freedom is a right against the state, 
but not a right to supercede the state179.
If a right to a religious legal system is recognized as part of the right of religious 
freedom, it applies not only to minority religions, but also to a majority religion. In 
the case of a sole dominant religion, the problem of the creation of an alternative 
source of law to that of the state, and its potential implications for human rights are 
underscored. This is so, as long as religious law remains unanswerable to international 
human rights standards. This danger exists, even where individuals have a choice not 
to be subject of this system.
The devolvement of legal power to the religious community cannot be predicated on 
members’ consent either. Individuals can make contractual arrangements in matters of 
private law. But personal law is also a matter of state interest. It should not be 
permitted to be left entirely to private arrangement. Even provisions in personal law 
which are jus dispositivus are still subject to the state legal system. This is different 
from recognition of an entire system of personal law on a contractual basis.
179 See Chapter Two fn. 12 and context.
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A state that has only religious legal systems without a secular alternative breaches the 
religious freedom of agnostics/atheists and of those who do not belong to a
1 OA
recognized religious system but are forced into one of the existing systems 
Moreover, it also breaches the religious freedom of those members of existing 
religious communities who do not want to be subject to religious laws.
A state that offers concurrent religious and secular jurisdiction still encounters the 
problems discussed above, both of legitimacy of the source of religious law in the 
state and of the consent to being subject to what is often a lifelong jurisdiction under 
one religious system. Individual members of the community may not have accepted, 
merely by belonging to the community, to be under religious jurisdiction, and cannot 
opt out of it without forsaking their religious, social and cultural connections, which 
compose their identity, and in some cases cannot opt out at all.
In India, the claim that different personal laws for Hindus and Muslims discriminate 
on the ground of religion, contrary to Article 15(2) of the Indian Constitution, and 
therefore are null181, was discussed and rejected by the Bombay High Court in State o f
1 OA
Bombay v. Narasu Appamali . The claim in the particular case related to a law 
making bigamy an offence for Hindus but not for Muslims183. The Indian Court 
reasoned that the communities were governed by different religious texts providing 
for totally different concepts of marriage acknowledged by the Indian Constitution.
Today, such discrimination contravenes Article 26 (as well as Article 18) of the 
ICCPR. The argument that different personal laws constitute discrimination on the 
grounds of religion could apply to any aspect of personal law, not only regarding 
criminal sanctions, that treats individuals of different religions differently because 
they belong to different religions. The only way for the individual not to be 
discriminated against is to convert to another religion, clearly not a viable choice.
180 Sullivan, [1988] 518.
181 Under Article 13(1) o f  the Constitution.
182 State o f  Bom bay  v. Narasu Appam ali AIR 1952 Bom 84. See further: Bharatiya, [1987].
183 The Bom bay Prevention o f  Hindu Bigamus [sic] Marriages Act, 1946.
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Thus, recognizing a right of communities to administer religious law both contravenes 
religious freedom of individuals and discriminates between individuals on the grounds 
of religion.
Other human rights besides religious freedom are infringed in community systems, 
including the right to equality on the basis of sex. These will be discussed in Chapters 
Four and Five.
Such jurisdictions of religious communities are typically instituted to protect the 
autonomy of illiberal religious communities within a secular state structure. The 
question of compatibility of such regimes with Article 9 is apparent in cases before 
the European Court. So, in Serif84, discussed above, the European Court stated that 
Article 9 does not require states to give legal effect to religious marriages and 
religious judicial decisions. This had already been decided by the Commission in a 
previous case 185. Religious freedom does not include a right to recognition of 
religious law as binding on the state. Indeed, as long as there is no prohibition on 
performing religious marriages, the religious freedom of those marrying is not 
infringed by the legal requirement of civil marriage. But it has to be acknowledged 
that this is a liberal view of religion, a view that displaces religion from the public 
sphere. From a religious point of view, especially that of a religious community, the 
constitutive power of religious acts is no less important than the ceremonial aspect.
Implicitly, the Court in Serif assumed that state-parties may give legal effect to 
religious marriages and religious judicial decisions. However, the legality of this is far 
from clear. This may impinge upon individual religious freedoms of people who 
might be under such jurisdiction involuntarily, including, for instance, minors.
The conflict of a religious legal system with the European Convention is evident in 
this same case. The Muftis of the Muslim community in Greece are public servants. 
They are judges with concurrent jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, alimony, 
execution of wills, custody and emancipation of minors of this minority
184 S erif  v. Greece [2001].
liS X v . Germany [1975].
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community186. Their judgements are given civil effect by civil courts, which only
examine whether the Muftis’ judgement conforms to the Greek Constitution and is
within its jurisdiction187. However, conformity to Greek law includes conformity to
188 •international law, which is paramount to domestic law in Greece . So, judgements of 
Muftis must conform to the European Convention, and thus must not be 
discriminatory, e.g., on grounds of gender189. Such a conflict has not yet occurred in a 
case before either the European court or domestic Greek courts. In the European 
Court, clearly the rights of the community would have to yield to individual rights 
protected by the European Convention. A Greek court would be faced with a decision 
whether to uphold the Muslim community rights protected by Greece’s international 
obligations under the Treaty of Athens, or the individual rights to which Greece is 
committed under the European Convention.
The potential conflict between legal jurisdiction of religious communities and the 
European Convention came to a head in the European Court discussion of Refah190. 
The European Court dealt specifically with the Refah Party's manifesto to set up in 
Turkey a plurality of legal systems of the different religious communities. Refah 
claimed that, under the existing (secular) system, religious freedom is curtailed, and 
the solution would be to let everyone choose the religious community and respective 
legal system to which they would belong. The Chamber (3rd section) of the European 
Court rejected this sort of community-based argument, a decision affirmed by the 
Grand Chamber to which the case was referred.
186 Pursuant to Law 1920/1921, Article 5, following the Treaty o f  Athens, 1913.
187 Law 1920/1921 Article 5 paragraphs 1 and 2. See Kriari-Catranis, [1994] 408.
188 Article 28.1 o f  the 1975 Greek Constitution mandates supremacy o f  international law (including the 
European Convention) over domestic laws.
,89 Article 14 in conjunctions with other Articles such as Article 8 o f  the Convention. See Chapter 
Four.
190 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [Judgement o f  the 3rd section, 2002], [Judgment o f  the 
Grand Chamber, 2004].
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However, the reasoning of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber differed from each 
other. The Chamber stressed “the State’s role as the guarantor of individual rights and 
freedoms”, and rejected, as incompatible with the Convention, the plan which “would 
oblige individuals to obey, not rules laid down by the State in the exercise of its 
above-mentioned functions, but static rules of law imposed by the religion 
concerned”191. It concluded that “the State has a positive obligation to ensure that 
everyone within its jurisdiction enjoys in full, and without being able to waive them, 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention”192.
The Grand Chamber was more reserved in its criticism of the idea of a plurality of 
legal systems. It expressly declined to form an opinion in the abstract on the 
advantages and disadvantages of a plurality of legal systems. In the case at hand it 
decided, that as Refah's policy was to apply some of shar 'ids private-law rules to a 
large part of the population in Turkey (namely Muslims), within the framework of a 
plurality of legal systems, it was not compatible with the Convention. The Grand 
Chamber surmised that such a policy went beyond the freedom of individuals to 
observe the precepts of their religion, for example by organising religious wedding 
ceremonies before or after a civil marriage (a common practice in Turkey) and 
according religious marriage the effect of a civil marriage193.
Thus, despite the same conclusion, the reasoning of the Chamber and that of the 
Grand Chamber reflect different philosophical outlooks. The lower court gave a 
strong individualistic interpretation to religious freedom. Specifically, it rejected the 
possibility of a political system in which individuals waive their religious freedom to 
their chosen religious community. It viewed the individual right as inalienable. It saw 
the state’s role as guaranteeing the continuous religious freedom of the individual, a 
role it does not fulfill if it allows individuals to choose religious systems that do not 
respect their Convention rights. The Grand Chamber did not reiterate the position that
191 Refah P artisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [2002].
192 Ibid. If  this reasoning will be accepted in interpretation o f  international human rights standards, it 
will mean that pluralist legal systems as exist in India or Israel will be seen to infringe religious 
freedom.
193 Refah P artisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [2004].
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a state that gives individuals the choice of a religious legal system that does not 
comply with the obligations of the Convention, breaches the Convention. The Grand 
Chamber implied that the system that Refah was proposing was not truly one of 
choice, it is only a system of choice in the sense that everyone can choose their 
religion, but once they choose a religion they are subject to its legal system. For most 
Turkish citizens, who are Muslims, conversion to another religion would not be a 
relevant choice, and they would be subject to Muslim law.
The Grand Chamber did not differentiate between two sorts of pluralities of legal 
systems: one in which there is a choice of an alternative secular system, and the other, 
as in this case, in which there is not. The Grand Chamber reasoned that because the 
shari’a would apply to a majority rather than a minority, the system should be 
prohibited. But the reason the system should be prohibited in any case, whether it 
applies to a majority or a minority, is because members of a religion cannot opt out of 
its legal system without converting to a different religion. Freedom of religion should 
mean that one can belong to a religion without being subject to its legal system.
More fundamentally, the reasoning of the Chamber offers a better protection of 
individual rights. According to the Chamber, it is not permissible that rights be 
waived by the individual to group determination, whether the choice he faces is 
genuine or not.
Other states outside Europe have pluralist legal systems in personal law. If a similar 
determination to that of the European Court were to be accepted in interpretation of 
international, not just European, human rights law, it would mean that pluralist 
religious legal systems of personal status law, such as exist in India194 or Israel195, will
194 Parashar, [1992], Article 44 o f  the Constitution states that Indian legislators shall aim to establish a 
uniform civil code throughout India. This has not been achieved. Religious communities are governed 
by their own personal laws (Muslims, Christians, Zoroastrians, Jews and Hindus (including, for legal 
purposes, Buddhists and Sikhs)). India was aware o f  possible infringement o f  international standards, 
as it entered upon its ratification o f  CEDAW a declaration regarding articles 5(a) and 16(1) that it will
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be seen to infringe it. (In fact, personal law in Israel is still governed by remnants of 
the Ottoman millet system, which the Grand Chamber criticised.)
5. A conception of individual rights does not necessarily prevent equal 
protection of members
An argument against the interpretation of religious freedom as an individual right, is 
that individual protection does not differentiate between religions of minorities and 
the religion of the majority. Because members of minority religions are a priori less 
well placed to protect their rights, a seemingly equal protection of individual 
religious freedom will have unequal results for members of majorities and minorities. 
Indeed, individual rights analysis often does not take this difference into account, but 
it is possible to offer an individual rights analysis of religious freedom, which takes 
into account the unequal starting positions of members of minorities and members of 
majorities.
One problem that raises such considerations is that of the official days of rest. The 
state must make one determination on its day of rest, which cannot suit all religious 
groups. This issue reached the European Commission in the case of Stedman196. 
Stedman, a Christian, refused to work on Sundays, resulting in termination of her 
work contract. Upon her application, the Commission decided that her right to 
religious freedom had not been breached, because she was free to resign from the
i q  n #
post. Konttinen (which is cited in Stedman) was similarly decided, but in this case 
the applicant was a worker who was a Seventh Day Adventist. Because of his 
religion, he refused to work on Saturday, and was dismissed from state employment. 
The Commission had applied in Konttinen the same reasoning that it later applied in 
the Stedman case. In both cases, the Commission found that Article 9 had not been
abide by these provisions "in conformity with its policy o f  non-interference in the personal affairs o f  
any Community without its initiative and consent." See further discussion in Chapter Four.
195 See Chapter Four.
196 Stedman  v. C/AT [1997].
197 Konttinen v. Finland  [1996].
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breached, as the worker could leave his or her job, and maintain his or her religious 
holy day. Article 14 (equality in enjoyment of rights) had not been breached either, 
according to the Commission, because no individual is guaranteed that their holy day 
will be regarded as a state day of rest.
The argument of voluntary exit, which has also been used on other occasions by the
• • 1QRCommission , is unsatisfactory, particularly in the case of employment. The worker 
may not have a choice. Economic and social considerations may preclude other 
employment. Allowing the worker a choice between losing his job and having to work 
on his holy day does restrict his religious freedom.
Such a restriction might be justified in some cases, but not in others. In Stedman’s 
case it is justified, because she observes the day of rest of the majority. While some 
jobs necessarily must include Sunday work, her day of rest conforms to the general 
day of rest, and Sunday work is the exception required only in specific employments. 
In the case of Konttinen, the worker belongs to a minority religion, with a different 
holy day than the majority. Society does not accommodate his religious needs, as his 
holy day is not the general rest day. He has a stronger claim to infringement of 
religious freedom. Being a member of a minority religion, he is at an a priori 
disadvantage compared to the general population. There is a difference between the 
two cases. The social context, in this case the position of the religious majority and 
minority groups, must be taken into account in the analysis.
The argument that the membership in a majority or a minority group must be taken 
into account in assessing claims of religious freedom in employment was already 
raised in Chapter Two. There it was seen that the need to regard social context does 
not mean that the right is a group right. It is an individual right of the employee. The 
Commission did not err in assessing the right as an individual right, but rather in 
ignoring the social context in which it is set.
198 Karaduman  v. Turkey [1990]; Bulut v. Turkey [1991] (religious students in a secular university), 
and by the European Court: Dahlab v. Switzerland  [1998] (religious teacher in a secular institution). 
These cases are discussed Chapter Five.
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The need to take into account the majority or minority placement of those seeking 
equality of religious freedom arises also in view of the latest developments in US 
religious freedom jurisprudence. Discrimination between mainstream and minority 
religions was not often explored in US Supreme Court cases. However, in the pre- 
Smith case, Larson199, the Court struck down a state law that exempted, from 
registration for the purposes of charitable solicitation, religious organizations that 
solicited less than fifty percent of their contributions from non-members, but not those 
that solicited above this share from non-members. “Free exercise thus can be 
guaranteed only when legislators -  and voters -  are required to accord to their own 
religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations”, 
noted the Court. However, this test was overlooked in later developments in US 
religious freedom jurisprudence.
Analysis of the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith200 shows how the test 
formulated by the Court, whether the law is neutral and generally applicable, gives 
little attention to whether the law impacts differently upon religious majorities and 
minorities. Laws that are generally applicable and neutral tend to consider the 
interests of majorities rather than minorities, not necessarily intentionally. The facts of 
Smith itself exemplify this assertion. The use of peyote was prohibited under the state 
drug laws, with no exemption for sacramental use. The prohibition on use of peyote, 
with no exemption for sacramental purposes, is general. But the lack of exemption is 
relevant only to a religious minority. But if the general category is framed as 
prohibition on use of intoxicating substances used for sacrament, inconsistently 
peyote is prohibited but wine is not. In the process of legislation, the majority is more 
likely to ban a substance used by a minority. The argument of minority protection was 
mentioned in passing in the concurring opinion and in the dissent in Smith.
The same problem is evident in a lower court's application of this test, regarding the
• 1 •Jewish eruv . A Municipal Ordinance prohibited placing any thing upon public
199 Larson  v. Valente, 456  US 228 (1982).
200 Employment Division  v. Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
201 Tenafly Eruv Association  v. The Borough O f  Tenafly 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
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poles. Religious Jews had placed wires to mark an eruv, a boundary that, under 
Jewish law, permits carrying or pushing outside the home objects (including 
wheelchairs and prams) in the Sabbath. The Court found merit in the eruv supporters’ 
free exercise claim because the law was only enforced against them and not others 
who contravened it. But had this not been the case, the analysis under the ‘generally 
applicable and neutral’ test would mean that the city could have taken down the eruv. 
Of course, the law is applicable to all religions, but it is only relevant to the practice 
of one religion. The only case in which a minority is given consideration under the 
post-Smith rationale is when it has been specifically targeted. In all other cases, in 
which some religious groups are placed at a relative disadvantage, the discriminatory 
result is disregarded.
It seems that an individualistic conception of religious freedom has led to unequal 
protection of religious freedom of members of minorities. But this need not and 
should not be the case. The majority or minority context should be taken into account 
when determining religious freedom, otherwise equality in according this right is 
impaired. This does not detract from the nature of the right as an individual right.
6. Apportioning equality between religious groups is inherently problematic
If religious freedom were to be recognized as a group right, it would entail two further 
problems. The first is concerned with equality between religious groups, and is raised 
next. The second, related problem is concerned with evaluation of the worthiness of 
groups and is discussed in section 7.
Recognition of religious freedom as a group right entails recognizing religious 
equality (one aspect of religious freedom) as a group right. This translates into two 
questions, namely, what does equality between religious groups entail (what are the 
criteria for equal allocation of religious freedom between groups) and whether 
religious equality of individuals takes precedence over religious equality between 
groups.
6.1 Equality in allocation of resources
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Some of the rights included in religious freedom can only be utilized by a group and 
not by an individual. But these rights still constitute an aggregate of individual rights. 
Such is the right to funding of religious institutions, in those states in which the 
constitutional system interprets religious freedom to include this right. Funding for 
communal religious activities can only be given to groups, not to individuals.
The state must not only accord religious freedom, but it must do so in a non- 
discriminatory manner . The provisions of international human rights law mandate 
non-discrimination between individuals . However, if states recognise religious 
communities as entities that are subject-holders of the religious freedom and religious 
equality, then it must be decided how equality should be assessed between religious 
groups. Relying on the principle that religious freedom is ultimately an individual 
right would seem to suggest that equal apportionment should be based on the number 
of members. Approaches that view groups, as well as individuals, as holding 
religious rights, could suggest other methods: A group that the state had persecuted in 
the past should be compensated in order to be treated equally204. Alternatively, on the 
assumption that religious plurality is inherently good for social discussion in society, 
each religious group deserves an equal share of public resource, or at least a critical 
minimal share of resources, which will allow it to function and propagate its ideas.
A clash between the different perceptions of equality in allocation of resources arose 
in Hungary. As in other post-Soviet states, the state set about restoring religious 
rights after decades of Communist rule. One of the tasks the state set itself was 
restoring to former owners confiscated Church property. However, a legal challenge 
to the constitutionality of this arrangement claimed that rather than an equal treatment 
of religions, compensating Churches according to the property they owned before 
confiscation, was an attempt to recreate a previous religious landscape. The
202 ICCPR, Article 2(1); In Europe: ECHR, Article 14.
203 ICCPR, Article 2(1); ICSECR 2(2).
204 Cf. CEDAW Article 4(1).
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Hungarian Constitutional Court rejected this claim, and viewed the arrangement as a
90Scorrect implementation of the right of religious freedom .
This is a restitutional perception of equal treatment of religious groups. Other, 
distributional perceptions of religious equality could have been suggested, such as 
starting with a ‘clean slate’ and providing all religions with public aid according to 
current membership. Whichever way the state decides to apportion this restitution, it 
would necessitate a decision on how to judge equality between religious groups.
In a different allocation of public resources in Hungary, public broadcast media 
allocates broadcast time to the eight major religious communities, taking into account 
the proportional membership of each out of the general population. Size of 
membership is indeed a relevant factor in allocating a public resource, such as 
broadcast time. But it must be recognized that this too is a value-judgement about 
what equality of religious freedom means. It could be argued that this helps maintain 
the supremacy of existing religions with large membership over new religions, which 
necessarily have a smaller membership to start with. According to this argument, 
equality of religious freedom means giving all religions an equal opportunity in the 
marketplace of ideas, i.e. all must receive an equal time slot to propagate their beliefs 
to the public.
This analysis shows the difficulties of applying equality of religious freedom to 
groups. State involvement in allocation of public goods to religious groups, whether 
funding, property, broadcast time or other public goods, necessarily requires the state 
to set criteria for equality, indirectly revealing a value-judgment of the state on the 
merits of the groups. The dilemma of equal allocation to groups is indicative of a 
more general problem, which is inherent in a conception of group rights. An 
individual rights approach would entail allocation according to membership.
205 On the restitution o f  church property, Decision 4/1993, (11.12) ABH. 48 (Constitutional Law Court), 
English translation in Solyom and Brunner [2000] 246. See further discussion o f  the decision: Schanda 
[2002], 412-413.
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However, as shown above, this may not be an adequate solution to the dilemma of 
group allocation.
6.2 Equality on the basis of religion between individuals or between eroups
Equality between religious groups, rather than individuals, has been attempted for the 
purpose of resolution of conflict between religious groups, through constitutional 
recognition of more than one religion on an equal basis. The result of laying down the 
rights and limitations of groups may involve infringing individual rights of group 
members. Equality on an individual basis is sacrificed for equality based on groups. 
For example, government positions are allocated according to group affiliation. A 
qualified member of one group may not have an opportunity to be a candidate for a 
government position, but overall equality between the groups will be maintained.
y^r\£.
The 1990 amendment of the Constitution of Lebanon exemplifies these principles. 
It divides parliamentary seats equally between Christians and Muslims, and
90*7proportionately between denominations within these . Top-level (although not
9flR 900other) positions are to be divided equally between Christians and Muslims
206 Following the National Reconciliation Charter (the ‘Taef Agreement’, further see UN Doc.
A/48/453 and E/C. 12/1993/SR. 14).
207 Article 24 states that:
1) The Chamber o f  Deputies is composed o f elected members; their number and the 
method o f  their election is determined by the electoral laws in effect. Until such time 
as the Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non-confessional basis, the 
distribution o f  seats is according to the following principles:
a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims.
b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each religious 
community.
c. Proportional representation among geographic regions.
208 Article G(a), the National Reconciliation Charter.
209 Lebanon's constitutional approach was not accepted by the Human Rights Committee. In its 
discussion o f  the Lebanese state report it expressed concern that every Lebanese citizen must belong to 
one o f  the religious denominations officially recognized by the Government, and that this is a 
requirement for eligibility to run for public office. It stated that this practice does not comply with the 
requirements o f  Article 25 o f  the Covenant (the right to vote and to be elected by universal suffrage) 
UN Doc. A /52/40 vol. I (1997) 53 at para. 353.
Lebanon not only adopted a group-equality approach in its own constitution, but was an early 
proponent o f  group rights during the negotiation on the drafting o f  the UDHR, when such an approach 
did not hold sway. (Morsink [1999] p. 274).
152
Similarly, in the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, Muslims are deemed members of 
Turkish community and they elect a Turkish Vice-President. Greek-Orthodox 
Christians are deemed members of the Greek community and they elect a Greek 
President . In the Cypriot case the complexity of the arrangement is compounded by 
the fact that the dichotomy between the two groups is both ethnic and religious.
Both the Lebanese Constitution and the existing Constitution of Cyprus curtail 
individual religious equality. A Muslim Turk cannot become president of Cyprus, and 
a Christian-Greek cannot be vice-president. A qualified Christian or Muslim Lebanese 
cannot obtain a top-level public position if the denominational quota has been filled. 
This manifests a conception of religious equality (or approximate equality) between
911groups, even at the expense of individual equality .
In Northern Ireland, while the general legal framework is one of equality on an
919individual basis , as a temporary measure the police force is legally permitted to 
recruit new officers according to an equal sectarian quota213. This arrangement is 
different, as it is a measure of limited duration in a system that is based on individual 
equality.
The strong argument for the preference of equality of religious groups above equality 
of individuals, is a pragmatic one, if arrangements based on equality between groups
210 Article 1 The State o f  Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic ... the President being 
Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities o f  Cyprus 
respectively . . . .
Article 2 For the purposes o f  this Constitution:
(1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens o f  the Republic who are o f  Greek origin and whose 
mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members o f  the Greek- 
Orthodox Church;
(2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens o f  the Republic who are o f  Turkish origin and whose 
mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems;
211 Compare: an implied international endorsement o f  a group equality approach (on an ethnic basis) in 
Bosnia, in the Dayton Agreement, Annex IV, 35 ILM 170 (1996).
212 See: Northern Ireland Act 1998.
213 Police (Northern Ireland ) Act 2000, Section 46.
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achieve the sought outcome of prevention of conflict, particularly in situations of 
conflict resolution. However, in practice this has not necessarily proved so.
7. States should not evaluate the social worth of religious groups as this breaches 
state neutrality
Sometimes, states have to make a value judgment about religious groups when they 
must perform distributive functions, as seen in the case of budget allocation. In cases 
in which no action of the state is required, it is unwarranted for the state to make such 
value judgments, as the state must remain neutral in matters of religion. But, if 
positive action of the state is required, it may have no choice but to make such value 
judgments.
One such case, in which the state is called upon to make a judgment as to the social 
worth of institutions is tax exemptions. In Walz214 the US Supreme Court decided that 
property tax exemptions awarded to organizations for properties used solely for 
religious worship do not infringe the First Amendment prohibition on establishment 
of religion. Justice Burger, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stressed that any 
position that the government adopt on taxation of religious institutions -  exemption 
from taxation, exemption only for social activities of religious institutions, or no 
exemption -  would inevitably result in some government entanglement with religion. 
Therefore, the government choice to exempt all religious institutions was a legitimate 
option. There is no need to evaluate the social good that the religious institution 
contributes to society (in the form of schools, kindergartens etc.) in order to justify the 
exemption. The extent of social involvement may differ between religions, and it is 
best that state authorities are not involved in evaluating the social worth of religions.
The scheme approved by Justice Burger, in which all religious activity may be tax 
exempt, amounts to permissible indirect government subsidy for all religions. It is 
based on the alluring, if paradoxical idea that a state is truly separate from religions if 
it supports all their activities rather than only their social, not directly religious
214 Walz v. Tax Commission , 397 US 664 (1970).
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activities. In order to maintain state neutrality, the ultimate criterion for choosing the 
methods of allocation of resources (or, conversely, fiscal exemptions) must be such 
that the state refrain from evaluating the worthiness of activities of religions.
91 SOther states in which religion is separate from the state, such as France , do engage 
in making such evaluations and permit state funding of institutions of a social (rather 
than religious) function that are operated by religious bodies. This aid, it can be 
claimed, does not further religion, as it benefits society as whole . But at the same 
time it works, of course, to enhance the influence in society of those religions 
receiving the funding and distributing aid.
The outcome of such evaluations as to whether the activity has a social purpose or is 
purely religious, is, in any case, culture-specific and religion-specific, and so best 
avoided. So, for example, the Japanese Supreme Court, in trying to distinguish social 
functions from religious functions, regarded certain Shinto religious ceremonies, 
deeply embedded in the national culture, as serving a social, rather than religious 
function, and thus being legitimately state-supported under Japan's principle of 
separation of religion from state217.
Evaluation of the worthiness of the religious principles themselves is certainly a 
breach of religious freedom, and its outcome will discriminate illegitimately between 
religions. The UK law of charitable trusts admits as charitable ‘for the advancement 
of religion’ those religious associations that ‘confer a benefit’ on society, such as the 
intangible benefits of edification218, which were deemed not to accrue, for example, if
910the worship is not conducted in public . This assessment involves the state in a value 
judgment of religious principles, and could today be challenged domestically under
215 1905 Law Concerning the Separation o f  Church and State.
216 This argument was relied upon by the Finnish government to justify the funding o f  State-Church 
parishes by Church tax (from which exemptions could be obtained) in its submission to the ECHR in 
Kustannus oy vapaa ajattelija ab  v. Finland [1996].
217 Including a groundbreaking ceremony at a municipal gymnasium. Case (Gyo-Tsu) No. 69 o f  
1971; Minshu V ol.31, No.4, at 533.
218 See Luxton [2001] p. 46-49; Gilmore v. Coates [1949] AC 426, HL.
219 Re Hetherington  [1990] C hi.
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the Human Rights Act, under Article 9 in conjunction with Article 14 of the European 
Convention, and ultimately in the European Court.
In the cases discussed so far, the state had to make decisions on allocations and 
exemptions to religious organizations, so a decision had to be made whether to 
differentiate between different religious organizations. Even this decision has to avoid 
judgments of value of religions. A fortiori, in cases in which government of its own 
initiative and not in a fulfillment of a prescribed function decides to take a stand on 
religious groups, such a value judgment is completely unwarranted. As will be seen, 
however, it is not always easy to differentiate between value-judgment by government 
of religions themselves, which breaches government neutrality, and value-judgment 
of religious organizations that is warranted by their social activities.
990In the Universelles Leben case , the applicant association complained about a 
government publication that referred to it as a ‘sect’, claiming the pejorative labeling 
infringed its religious freedom under Article 9. The European Commission decided 
the application inadmissible, citing the European Court's decision in Otto-Perminger- 
Institut221, that those who manifest religious belief must be prepared to face criticism 
of that belief. The Commission concluded that the state may convey criticism of 
religions, so long as it does not amount to indoctrination, and that in this case the 
publication had no adverse repercussions on the religious freedom of the association.
But criticism of religion by a state is not the same as criticism by individuals. A 
religion must accept criticism from individuals or other religions. However, the state 
has limitations, it must act neutrally towards all beliefs, and certainly not express 
opinions against any of them. Of course, if the religious organization conducts 
harmful activities, the state must warn against these specific harmful activities. In the 
absence of such specific proven activity, the state cannot legitimately pass a value 
judgment on religion.
220 Universelles Leben v. Germany [1996].
221 Otto-Prem inger-lnstitut v. Austria [1995].
156
In American Family Association222, a US Circuit Court made finer distinctions in 
adjudicating a similar matter of government criticism of religion. A city council 
issued a resolution condemning the stand of several organizations, including Christian 
organizations, on homosexuality and encouraging media outlets to ban their 
advertisements on the matter. The organizations argued that by this, government was 
veering from neutrality on matters of religion. The majority on the Court decided that 
the message was about a specific issue, not about the religion itself, and distinct from 
it. Thus, it was permissible. “Defendants' actions had a plausible secular purpose, did 
not have the primary effect of inhibiting religion and did not create excessive 
entanglement with religion”, opined the Court. The dissenting judge, however, read 
the resolution as attributing responsibility to the religious organizations for anti-gay 
hate crimes, and thus as a condemnation of their religious belief. In principle 
however, rather than in application, the judges positions are close and preferable to 
that of the European Commission. The state may, and sometimes must, take a stand 
on public issues that religions also take a stand on, such as health, education and 
discrimination. But the state should not take a stand against a religion as such . The 
dissent reminds us that this is a thin line, but, nonetheless, one that should be 
observed.
8. Conclusion
Whatever status states have granted to religion or religions, they have not been, and 
will not be able to avoid conflict between opposing demands of religious freedom. 
This is true whether they have an established state religion or not, whether they 
require religions to be registered or not. Particularly, these are conflicts between 
communities, between factions of communities or between communities and 
individuals within them.
A consistent and principled manner of addressing these conflicts requires recognizing 
the right of freedom of religion as an individual right. Communal rights are derived
222 American Family Association  v. City and County o f  San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
223 Except in such cases as the religion stands for one issue only, such as racism, to which the state is 
obliged to object.
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from them, and cannot supersede them. Some rights must be allocated to groups, but 
they still are individual rights. If group religious rights are given primary or equal 
recognition (in relation to individual rights), the state is faced with decisions in which 
it has to define the group and choose one among competing leaderships. Such 
decisions of the state are, in themselves, an intrusion of the state into religious affairs, 
which itself is an infringement of religious freedom.
Primacy of religious freedom as an individual right means, that individual self- 
determination is the decisive factor in allocation of group rights and privileges. So, 
although the state cannot avoid intruding in religious conflicts, in the sense that it 
must decide for one side or another, it should do so according to this principled 
approach. For international law to intervene in the constitutional structure of the state 
is controversial. Restriction on exercise of state sovereignty is inherent to 
international human rights law, but as seen in this chapter, regarding religious 
freedom the intervention goes to the heart of constitutional structure and state identity. 
Nevertheless, and perhaps precisely because of the political agenda behind states’ 
position towards religion, international law should mandate protection of this 
individual right.
CHAPTER FOUR : WOMEN AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The protection of women’s freedom of religion and belief is a paradigm test case of the 
conflict between religious freedom as a community right and the rights of individuals in that 
community. A core problem in the application of religious freedom is the inherent conflict 
between religious freedom, if it is given a group dimension, and women’s right to equality 
and individual religious freedom. No international human rights instrument has, to date, 
comprehensively addressed or solved this difficult problem. While women’s equality may be 
affected by claims of religious freedom in various contexts such as the workplace, this 
chapter will use examples mostly from the area of personal law, specifically marriage and 
divorce. The conflict in this area is not accidental. The doctrines of many religions have 
sought to regulate family life, deciding on the role of men and women within the family as 
one of the bases of the social structure that the religious doctrine sets up. Important 
inequalities in this area emanate from religion.
In this chapter I explain first why both the right to equality and the right to individual 
religious freedom of women should be seen as standing in conflict with community religious 
freedom (section 1.1). Then I examine the existing relative international legal protection of 
rights in this conflict. I show that there exists a legal determination that posits women’s 
individual rights above claims of group religious freedom (section 1.2). It will then be 
argued, that the determination that group religious freedom cannot override women’s 
individual rights should be upheld, but attention must be given to the complex problems this 
determination creates: Once a state acknowledges a right to religious freedom of communities 
and relegates legal powers to them, it is in practice more difficult for the state to implement 
rights of equality for women (section 2). The state may need to address discrimination of 
women in religious marriages even where there is no religious jurisdiction over personal law 
(section 3). However, not giving legal recognition to personal status systems of religious 
communities because they are discriminatory can result in further discrimination of women, 
which must be rectified (section 4). A clear, albeit far-reaching, consequence of recognizing 
the individual rights of women to equality and to freedom of religion and belief over any 
communal right of religious freedom is that religious institutions should not be able to curtail 
these rights of women even in their internal organisation (section 5). Finally, the 
compatibility of institutional participation of religion in the law-making process that
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determines the rights of women, both at the national and international level, with religious 
freedom is questioned (section 6).
1. Introduction : The problem and existing international law
1.1 The conflict between group religious freedom and the religious freedom of women
It is not only women’s right to equality which stands in conflict with a community right of 
religious freedom, but also women’s individual right of religious freedom. Human rights 
instruments, following a liberal approach, speak of a right to ‘manifest’ and ‘practice’ 
religion or belief. For women, however, one of the most important aspects of freedom of 
religion may be the right to manifest their religious belief by being an equal member of a 
religious community or organization. Equality in the religious community is a religious 
freedom concern for women who choose to become, or remain, members of religious 
communities1. While the effect on equality of women by religions to which they belong has 
not traditionally been seen as a religious freedom concern, it is an important one from 
women’s point of view2. The ability of women to belong to a faith of their choice, or, more 
often, a faith into which they were bom and comprises their social and cultural connections, 
without being discriminated against, is vital to realizing their religious freedom. Application 
of feminist analysis to international law may be helpful in justifying this interpretation . In 
the same way that McKinnon argued that legal -  and indeed human rights -  concepts should 
be defined and addressed in ways that matter to women4, the scope of rights protected within 
the idiom o f ‘religious freedom’ may thus have to be redefined.
' On the impact o f different religions on women’s human rights, see: Howland, [1999]; Rahman, [1990]; An- 
N a’im, [1987],
2 For a claim that international human rights law based on a liberal conception o f  freedom largely excludes 
women, see: Wright, [1993] 129.
3 For a discussion o f  the applicability o f  feminist theories to international law, see: Charlesworth and Chinkin, 
[2000]; Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, [1991].
4 MacKinnon, [1987].
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The liberal approach to religious freedom, which mandates that everyone be allowed to 
choose their religion, but does not intervene in the ‘private’ realm of religions themselves, 
must be rejected in this context. What happens within and by religious communities should 
be of concern to international and national law5. Religious freedom is not about “all or 
nothing” -  either you choose to take part in a religion and must accept its inequalities, or you 
must cease to belong to that religion. For women, realizing religious freedom is often about 
realizing their freedom within religion6. The argument of voluntary choice, which resonates 
of the liberal tradition, “you are free to leave the religion, therefore your liberty is not
n
restrained”, is flawed for various reasons which were discussed in this work . This is 
particularly so for women who often cannot leave, or do not want to leave their religious 
community. This is so not only for economic reasons, as the economic disparity between men 
and women makes it difficult for women to leave, but unequal treatment and social status of 
women and girls in many cultures and religions, including in education and assigned gender 
roles, mean that they are effectively less able than men to exercise independence and exit
o
their groups of origin . Moreover, these women often have little influence over the rules of 
the community they live in.
1.2 Guarantees of religious freedom of women in international documents
International covenants that guarantee freedom of religion and belief do not refer to specific 
rights of religion and belief of women. Nor does the 1981 UN Declaration on religion and 
belief. It is particularly surprising that this Declaration, proclaimed only two years after the 
adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women [CEDAW], has no mention of these concerns. Of course, most rights guaranteed in 
international documents are guaranteed to everyone, with no explicit mention of their 
applicability to women. But regarding religious freedom, because of the reasons highlighted
5 On how states can be accountable in international law for non-state infringements o f  women's rights see:
Cook, [1993]; Romany, [1994].
6 Feminists, among others, pointed out that the liberal conception o f  freedom was framed in negative terms, as 
absence o f  constraint, rather than in positive terms, as the opportunity for self-realization. Frazer and Lacey 
[1993] 60.
7 See discussion in Chapter Three.
8 See: Muller Okin, [1999], Shachar, [2001], Muller Okin, [2002].
162
above, there are particular causes for concern that, without specific mention, it would be 
interpreted in a way that would result in protection of the freedom of religion and belief of 
men but not of women.
CEDAW itself does not have any express provision dealing with discrimination of women on 
religious grounds, but it has several pertinent articles dealing with the elimination of practices
based on the inferiority of either of the sexes9, right to vote and hold public office10, access to
11 10 health care including family planning , equality before the law , and prohibition on
11discrimination in marriage . The compliance of states with all these articles may be affected 
by religious law, practice or tradition. Even a newer international document, the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women14, does not refer 
to any effect of religion on women or even to women’s rights in marriage.
As seen in Chapter One, the 1981 Declaration, as well as newer proposed international 
documents, signal some shift towards adoption of group protection of religious communities. 
Such a shift in perception of religious freedom in international law, although it has not yet 
matured into a recognition of religious group rights, could potentially jeopardize the human 
rights of women, both their right to equality and their right to individual freedom of 
conscience and religion, for instance by the recognition of a right to a communal legal system 
without sufficient protection against discriminatory laws. These documents should be 
interpreted so as to include a right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sex by 
religious laws, practices, customs or institutions. No binding international instrument 
currently guarantees any such protection.






14 Adopted 15 September 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 and A/CONF, 177/20/Add. 1.
15 CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.lO
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Riglhts Committee in 2000 as an updated General Comment on Article 3 (equality between 
mem and women). It addresses the human rights concerns of equality between the sexes, 
including those raised by the right to freedom of religion . The GC states that “Article 18 may 
not be relied upon to justify discrimination against women by reference to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion”. An important premise of the General Comment is gleaned 
from paragraph 5 which asks that "[sjtate parties should ensure that traditional, historical, 
religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women's right to equality 
before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant rights"16.
The General Comment also addresses directly the conflict between women's equal rights 
under the convention and rights of minority members (including those of religious minorities) 
under Article 27 of the ICCPR. It determines that rights under Article 27 do not permit 
infringement of women’s equality in enjoyment of rights17.
This approach can be supported by reference to Article 2 (non-discrimination) and Article 26 
of the ICCPR (protection against discrimination in any field regulated and protected by 
public authorities)18.
There exists a strong case for concluding that the prohibition of gender discrimination must
16 The relation between CEDAW and the ICCPR should also be a matter for concern. Coherence should be 
sought in the interpretation o f  UN human rights conventions. Such concerns would lead to question Saudi 
Arabia’s ratification o f  CEDAW in October 2000 subject to a reservation that “[i]n case o f  contradiction 
between any term o f  the Convention and the norms o f  Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to 
observe the contradictory terms o f  the Convention”. The reservation seems to go directly against GC 28 to the 
ICCPR to which Saudi Arabia is not a party. But GC 28 would reinforce the interpretation that the reservation 
is contrary to the object and purpose o f  CEDAW itself.
17 Paragraph 32 o f  the General Comment states that:
"[t]he rights which persons belonging to minorities enjoy under Article 27 o f  the Covenant in respect o f  their 
language, culture and religion do not authorize any State, group or person to violate the right to the equal 
enjoyment by women o f  any Covenant rights, including the right to equal protection o f  the law. States 
should report on any legislation or administrative practices related to membership in a minority community 
that might constitute an infringement o f  the equal rights o f  women under the Covenant (Comm. No.
24/1977, Lovelace  v. Canada , V iew s adopted July 1981) and on measures taken or envisaged to ensure the 
equal right o f  men and women to enjoy all civil and political rights in the Covenant. Likewise, States should 
report on measures taken to discharge their responsibilities in relation to cultural or religious practices within 
minority communities that affect the rights o f  women".
18 Also relevant is the ICSECR, Article 3, which guarantees equal enjoyment o f  economic, social and cultural 
rights.
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be regarded as a norm of customary international law19, at least if the discrimination is 
systematic and state endorsed. Prohibition of similar discrimination on the basis of religion 
may also be customary law20. So, both these norms would obligate states, even if they had not 
ratified the relevant conventions or had entered reservations to the conventions on these 
issues. There is, however, no determination of the outcome, if these rights conflict, that is if 
one person’s right to non-discrimination on the basis of gender is claimed to conflict with a 
right of a group to non-discrimination on the basis of religion (if such a right is recognized).
Prohibitions of discrimination on grounds of race are routinely recognized as jus cogens. 
Gender grounds of discrimination are less often argued to be norms of international law from 
which no derogation is permitted21. Neither is there evidence that discrimination on grounds
99of religion has attained such status .
1.3 Reservations to convention provisions affecting non-discrimination in enjoyment of the 
right to religious freedom
The HRC has defined what are valid reservations to the ICCPR, in General Comment 2423. 
The Committee noted that human rights treaties differ from treaties that are mere exchange of 
obligations between States, in which they can reserve application of rules of general 
international law. Covenant provisions in human rights treaties that represent customary 
international law may not be subject to reservations. The Committee lists among these
19 The Restatement [Third] o f  the Foreign Relations o f  the United States § 702 cmt. 1 (1987) states that freedom  
from gender discrimination as state policy, in many matters, may already be a principle o f  international law (702 
comment (I)). However, this is only if  discrimination is a matter o f  state policy, not if  these are acts o f  
individuals which are not condoned by state ; see also Chinkin, [1997] 83, who refers to the Opinion o f  Judge 
Ammoun in the International Court o f  Justice decision Legal Consequences fo r  States o f  the Continued 
Presence o f  South Africa in Nam ibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276  
[1970] ICJ Reports 4, for the argument that the right to equality, codified in the UDHR, is a pre-existing 
customary norm.
20 The Restatement [Third] o f  the Foreign Relations o f the United States § 702 cmt. 1 (1987) states that there 
exists a strong case that systematic discrimination on grounds o f  religion is violation o f  customary law (702  
comment (j)). See also Sullivan [1992] 798.
21 Charlesworth and Chinkin, [1993] 70.
22 The Restatement [Third] o f  the Foreign Relations o f the United States § 702 cmt. 1 (1987) does not list either 
religious discrimination or gender discrimination as ju s  cogens (comment (n)), although noting that 
international law in this area is developing and may already be more comprehensive than noted.
23 CCPR/C/21 /R ev.l/A dd.6.
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provisions, which represent customary law, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
In General Comment 3124 it clarifies that also Article 2 (non-discrimination) cannot be 
subject to reservation25. Thus, reservations to the ICCPR (on religious, or any other, grounds) 
cannot operate to deny these obligations. For the same reason the corresponding non­
discrimination obligations in CEDAW (Articles 2, 7, 15, 16), at least to the extent that they 
protect the same rights as the ICCPR, should not be subject to reservations.
There is also a different basis for arguing that non-discrimination in enjoyment of rights on 
the basis of sex is not subject to reservations to CEDAW or the ICCPR, namely that they are 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the covenant26, as learned, respectively, from 
Article 2(a) of CEDAW27 and from GC 28 to the ICCPR.
CEDAW General Comment to Article 16(2) notes with alarm the number of state parties that 
have entered reservations to articles 2 and 16 based, inter alia, on cultural and religious
*7 obeliefs and urges them to withdraw these reservations . This in itself is a telling sign of the 
impact of religion on recognized human rights of women and should warrant further 
attention.
So, there is no clear hierarchy in international law between freedom of religion and equality
9 0on the basis of sex. The interpretation offered by the HRC in General Comment 28 , that 
freedom of religion cannot justify the limitation of equality between men and women, should 
serve as a starting point, but as will be seen, this raises a multiplicity of problems.
24 CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13.
25 See also GC 18, on non-discrimination (1989).
26 CEDAW, Article 28. See also: The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 
19(c), and the ICJ decision in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention  [1951] ICJ Reports, 15.
27 A claim raised in the objections to the reservations based on religion o f  some state parties,entered by 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
28 CEDAW GC 21 (adopted 4 February 1994) UN Doc. A/47/38.
29 CCPR/C/21 /Rev. 1 /Add. 10.
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2. Application of discriminatory religious law through relegation to the religious 
communities
States give legal status to religious law by relegation of state authority to religious 
communities, usually in the area of family law. This legal structure directly pits the rights of 
religious communities against the rights of individuals, with specific implications for the 
rights of women in those instances in which the religious law is discriminatory to women. 
The clear direction of GC 28 is that a principle of religious freedom cannot override women’s 
individual rights; however states find it particularly difficult, for political reasons, to 
intervene to reverse such discrimination, especially in the law of minority communities, as 
will be seen. It seems easier for states to assuage political group aspirations by conceding to 
religious groups jurisdiction over the family, often compromising the rights of women, rather 
than risking a political confrontation and power struggle between sub-groups in the state. In 
this case state practice regrettably does not support the General Comment of the Human 
Rights Committee, which remains de lege ferenda.
2.1 Religious tribunals and the right of women to equality before the law
The claim has been made that in international law the right to manifest religion or belief 
includes the right to observe and apply religious law in a community, including the right to 
establish and maintain religious tribunals . As will be seen, this is cause for concern, as it 
potentially harms individual rights, and often among these the rights of women.
If such a community right is recognized, the question which follows is whether international 
human rights obligations apply to legal proceedings of religious courts, and specifically, in 
the context of this chapter, whether the right of women to equality before the law applies in 
those courts. Article 15 of CEDAW guarantees women equality before the law in civil
O 1
matters. It has been questioned whether the Article also applies to religious courts or to
30 Capotorti, [1979] implies that religious marriages should be recognized. He mentions that some states 
recognize entire systems o f  personal status, but he does not raise problem o f  gender discrimination. Capotorti 
claims that preservation o f  customs and legal traditions forms part o f protection o f  minorities, although notes 
that “some argue” that these must be subject to the state’s moral and social policy. See also: Sullivan [1992] 805 
ftnt. 29; Meron, [1989] 155-156.
31 Sullivan [1988] 516.
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religious law administered by secular courts. While it would be advisable if future human 
rights documents would refer specifically to equality before religious courts, I think it is clear 
that if the religious court or law is authorized by the state, Article 15 applies, because, as far 
as international law is concerned, it is the state law.
Personal law can be relegated, by law, to the religious communities in different ways. For 
example: In India, a secular state, the personal law is the law of the individual’s religious
'X'y »community , and it is applied in the secular courts. In Bangladesh, a Muslim state , personal 
law is the religious law of the individual’s religious community. As in India, it is applied in 
the secular court system, in the Family Courts34. In Israel35, personal law is mostly that of the 
individual’s religious community . Religious tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction in certain
* • ♦ 0 7instances and concurrent jurisdiction with secular courts in other instances . Appellate 
religious courts, are subject to limited judicial review by the (secular) Supreme Court of 
Israel. In Sri Lanka38, family law is communal, religious or customary39, but there is a 
separate jurisdiction only for the Muslim minority religious courts, which operate according
32 In India a complicated set o f  laws governs personal law o f  different religious denominations. A codification 
o f  the various personal laws began during colonial rule, and continued after independence. For instance, the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 codifies Hindu Law; the Constitution sanctioned the Shari’at Act, 1937, as the 
prevailing Muslim Personal law (January 26, 1950), with few reforming Acts such as the Dissolution o f  Muslim  
Marriages Act, 1939 giving the wife a right to dissolution o f  the marriage in certain cases. Christians are 
governed by Indian Divorce Act 1869 and Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872; Parsees are governed by the 
Parsee Marriage and Divorce Act, 1956.
33 According to Article 2A added in the 1988 amendment to the Constitution.
34 The Family Courts Act 1985.
35 Defined as a “Jewish and democratic state” in two o f its Basic Laws (Basic Law: Freedom o f  Vocation and 
Basic Law: Human Freedom and Dignity).
36 The Palestine Order in Council 1922-1947, (which remains in force from the pre-independence period) states 
in Section 47 that some matters o f  personal law are subject to religious law, whether civil or religious courts 
have jurisdiction. These matters are defined in Section 51, mainly matters o f  marriage, divorce and alimony and 
maintenance.
37 In Israel, the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, Art. 1, grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to Rabbinical (religious) Courts in matters o f  marriage and divorce o f  Jews. In other matters, such as 
spousal alimony, the Rabbinical court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts (Art. 4).The Druze Courts 
Law, 1962 Art. 4 grants exclusive jurisdiction to Druze religious courts in marriage and divorce o f  Druze. The 
Shari‘a Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over personal status matters: marriage and divorce, child custody and 
support, paternity, alimony and maintenance o f  Muslims (The Palestine Order in Council 1922-1947, The 
Procedure o f  the Muslim Courts Act, item 7). See also: Rosen-Zvi, [1995].
38 A state which, in Article 9 o f  the Constitution, accords Buddhism a foremost place.
39 See: Jayasuriya, [1982] 37-53.
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to Muslim law40, and in which sit religious judges, Quazis. Their judgements can be 
ultimately appealed to the (secular) Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. In these instances, the 
substantive law is the religious law, but the religious courts are subject to the general court 
system.
The CEDAW Committee saw an inherent conflict between religious law and jurisdiction on 
one hand and the equality provisions of CEDAW on the other hand. For instance, on Israel it 
noted that: "in order to guarantee the same rights in marriage and family relations in Israel 
and to comply fully with the Convention, the Government should complete the secularization 
of the relevant legislation, place it under the jurisdiction of the civil courts and withdraw its 
reservations to the Convention"41.
One of the dangers of adopting a principle of relegation, is that the state may choose not to 
rely directly on religion as a reason to diverge from the international human rights norm, but 
on the relegation of state authority to the religious community. This can be seen in the 
reservations to CEDAW that emanate from religious reasons. These are of two types: The 
first, reservations that rely directly and explicitly on religious grounds. These are the 
reservations submitted by religious Islamic states or Muslim majority states (Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Syria), subjecting some or all state 
obligations under the Convention to Shari’a law42. The second are the reservations entered by 
India and Israel. These rely, for their justification, on a domestic legal principle of autonomy 
of religious communities in the sphere of family law.
40 According to the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 1951.
41 Concluding Observations o f  the CEDAW Committee: Israel (adopted 12/08/97) UN Doc. A/52/3 8/Rev. lJPart 
II paras.132-183. Israel expressed its Reservation to Article 7(b) concerning appointment o f  women to serve as 
judges o f  religious courts where this is prohibited by the laws o f  any o f  the religious communities in Israel.
42 At the 1987 GA Third Committee discussion on reservations to CEDAW, Iraq and Egypt both justified their 
reservations on the sovereign right o f  States to choose their political, economic and social system without the 
interference o f  others. (Egypt, A/C.3/42/SR.26 par. 9; Iraq, A/C.3/42/SR.29 par. 29. See: Lijnzaad, [1995] 333).
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2.2 Competing religious and secular sources of legal authority and protection of the rights of 
women
In these last mentioned legal systems, in which religious and secular legal systems operate 
side by side, the religious legal systems develop as a competing legal system with that of the 
state. The secular state views itself as the ultimate source of law, from which both the secular 
and the religious legal systems draw their authority. However, religious legal systems do not 
view the state as their source of authority, but see themselves as deriving their authority from 
a divine source. This competition has direct implications for the ability of the state to uphold 
its international obligations to safeguard human rights of women. This is evident, for 
example, in India and in Israel.
The demand in international law that states guarantee equality raises a question of the 
relationship between religious and secular law within the domestic system. Even in states 
where constitutional protection from discriminatory laws exists, religious law may be 
excluded from its ambit. In India, an early post-independence case43 suggests the Bombay 
High Court viewed religious law as falling outside the ambit of “laws in force”44, which 
would be void45 if they are inconsistent with the constitutionally protected fundamental 
rights46.
However, in 1995 in Sarla M ugdat1 the Supreme Court of India ruled that personal laws 
operate by force of secular legislation, not religious authority. This determination was not 
made in order to test their constitutionality, but as a prerequisite to the Court’s determination
A G
that they can be superseded by a Uniform Civil Code . But, if religious personal law
43 Slate o f  Bombay v. Nasaru Appa M ali AIR 1952 Bom 84; ILR 1951 Bombay 77.
44 For a dictum to the same effect by the Indian Supreme Court see Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 
SC 707.
45 Under Article 13(1) o f  the Constitution.
46 Included in Part III o f  the Constitution.
47 Sarla M ugdal v. Union o f  India AIR 1995 SC 1531; 1995 SCC (3) 635.
48 The Court urged the government to conform to Article 44 o f the Constitution, which states that the State shall 
endeavour to secure a uniform civil code throughout the territory o f  India, and legislate the UCC. Indeed, the
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operates by force of secular law, this should open the way to argue that it also must be subject 
to constitutional review.
At the core of domestic conflicts between religious and secular legal systems, is a conflict of 
perception about the source and authority of law. The secular system views the formal source 
of religious law recognized by the state as state law. The religious system views its formal 
source as religion. Each of these two viewpoints, has implications as to which higher legal 
norms religious law has to conform to, including domestic human rights legal provisions, and 
international human rights norms49. Among these are provisions of equality of women.
Just such a conflict arose in Israel. A decision of the Supreme Court, based on the application 
of the Equal Rights of Women Law, 1951 to religious courts, directed the religious courts to 
follow the principle of community property which does not exist in Jewish law50 51. The 
rabbinical courts did not accept this ruling, and it has brought a head-on collision between the 
religious courts and the Supreme Court. The religious courts viewed their own legitimacy as 
deriving purely from religious law, and saw themselves as unable to deviate from it. Thus, the 
judgement of the Supreme Court of Israel was not followed by the Great (appellate) 
Rabbinical Court52. A conference of Rabbinical Court judges announced that they will 
continue to ignore the direction to rule according to the Supreme Court direction on 
community property, and will refer only to Jewish law53. Indeed, even in the Bavli case itself,
CEDAW Committee has criticised India's policy o f  non-intervention in religious personal law and thought India 
should solve the problem o f  relegation o f  religious law to religious communities, resulting in measures 
discriminatory to women, by enacting a Uniform Civil Code, which different ethnic and religious groups may 
adopt (CEDAW, A/55/38 part I (2000) 7 at paras. 60 and 61). This has not been done.
49 Compare Elon, who argues that in Israel, although Jewish law in matters o f  marriage, divorce and child 
support has been incorporated by blanket reference, its formal source in Israeli law must be considered the 
secular legislature which incorporated it and not a religious source. (Elon, [1994] p. 1757).
50 HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court 48 (2) PD 221.
51 A principle o f  equal ownership o f  property during marriage and at its dissolution is included in General 
Comment 21 para 30-33 to CEDAW, interpreting CEDAW Article 16(1 )(h). This principle is unrecognized not 
only in religious legal systems. Although existing in most European systems and US states, it is also not 
recognized in UK law. It was considered and rejected by the Law Commission in 1978 (see: Law Com N o 86 
(Third Report on Family Property)). The Matrimonial and Family Proceeding Act 1984 did not change from the 
existing legal regime o f  separation o f  assets.
52 As can be seen in HCJ 2222/99 G abbai v. Great Rabbinical Court 54 (5) PD 401.
53 Shava, [2001] 786.
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the local Rabbinical Court ignored the direction of the Supreme Court54. The only effective 
solution which would guarantee protection of gender equality as recognized by the Supreme 
Court would be the abolition at least of non-consensual jurisdiction of religious courts in 
matters of family law.
2.3 Religious autonomy and women in minority groups
The relegation of personal law to religious communities is often particularly detrimental to 
minority women. States may find it especially difficult to intervene with anti-discriminatory 
legislative reforms in the law of minority religions. As will be seen, this is so in states with 
various different combinations of minority and majority religions. A delicate political balance 
between majority and minority will mean that the minority will be “left alone” even when the 
state attempts to implement its obligations of equality in international law.
A legal system based on autonomy of religious communities might be even more reluctant to 
intervene in minority religious personal law that infringes women’s rights than some outright 
religious states. In India, polygamy is prohibited for those religions in which a subsequent 
marriage for someone already married is void, but not when such a marriage is valid 
according to the applicable religious personal law, i.e. for Muslims55. As the Supreme Court 
of India in Sarla Mugdal56 pointed out, even Muslim states (Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Iran and Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union) have banned or restricted 
polygamy, while India, a secular republic with personal laws of religious communities, has 
not.
Constitutional equality provisions can be used to protect women in minority communities, 
but not without difficulty. In the landmark Shah Bano case57 the Indian Supreme Court
54 Case (Tel A viv Local Rabbinical Court) 884/99 Bavli v. Bavli.
55 Section 494 o f  the Penal Code, as interpreted in Sarla M ugdal v. Union o f  India AIR 1995 SC 1531; 1995 
SCC (3) 635.
56 Sarla M ugdal v. Union o f  India AIR 1995 SC 1531; 1995 SCC (3) 635.
57 M.A.Khan, v. Shah Bano Begum  1985 SCC 556.
172
ordered post-divorce maintenance payments under the (secular) Code of Criminal Procedure, 
generally unrecognized under Muslim Law beyond a period of three months, while also
58 • •suggesting an interpretation of Muslim law allowing for the maintenance order . Political 
uproar from the Muslim community caused the Indian Parliament to reverse the law in the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 which denies Muslim women 
the option of exercising their rights under the provisions of secular legislation. Thus, the 
Court's attempt to intervene in religious law proved politically unacceptable and was reversed 
by the political system. The Indian Supreme Court was finally called upon to determine the 
constitutionality of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act59. It decided 
that unless interpreted in a way that would benefit divorced Muslim women as much as the 
general law (the Criminal Procedure Code) benefited women of other religions, the Act 
would be contrary to constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law and equality on 
the basis of religion60. Therefore it interpreted the Act expansively, so as to allow for 
maintenance payments to Muslim women61. The clash between two sources of law is clear. 
The state judicial system saw the religious law as part of state law, thus open to interpretation 
by judges. The religious authorities viewed interpretation of religious law as a matter of 
doctrine reserved for religious authorities. The clash is particularly strong when the religion is 
one of a minority community.
Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim state, found it easier to intervene in Muslim personal 
law and harder to intervene in discriminatory Hindu personal law of the minority. Personal 
law issues such as marriage, child custody and property are governed by religious laws. Some
58 Ruling that in case the woman is unable to maintain herself after the period o f  iddat, she is entitled to have 
recourse to Section 125 o f  the Code o f  Criminal Procedure.
59 In Writ Petition (civil) 868 /1986 Latifi v. Union o f  India (decided 28/09/2001). See: http://judis.nic.in.
60 Articles 14 and 15 o f  the Constitution. It could be argued that not only would Muslim women have been 
treated unequally on the basis o f  religion, had the maintenance provisions not applied to them, as the Indian 
court ruled, but on the basis o f  sex as well. In a society in which married women generally do not work outside 
their home and do not earn money, some form o f  financial compensation upon divorce is necessary to redress at 
least somewhat the inequality created between the former husband and wife. Absence o f  any post-divorce 
financial payment to the wife, in disregard o f her contribution to the marriage, would fall far below the standard 
set by Article 16(1 )(h) o f  CEDAW as interpreted in para. 32 o f  CEDAW General Comment 21, which demands 
that in distributing property upon dissolution o f  marriage, financial and non-financial contributions o f  the 
spouses should be accorded the same weight.
61 See further examples o f  the difference between reform o f Hindu personal law and the personal law o f  
minority religions, which Parashar attributes to political calculation, in: Parashar, [1992] Chapter Four.
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provisions discriminatory to women still exist62, as was highlighted by CEDAW in 
concluding observations on Bangladesh's state report63. Some provisions of Muslim Personal 
Law had been modified, but, claimed the state representative, it would not be easy to modify 
Hindu Personal Law because of the complex religious issues involved64. This is a mirror 
image of the situation in India, a predominantly Hindu state, where it has proved easier for 
the state to modify by legislation Hindu personal law than the personal law of the Muslim 
minority (as seen for instance in the Shah Bano case). Indeed, Engineer comments that: “The 
secular forces in that country [Bangladesh] have been demanding further changes in the 
Muslim personal law. It is, however, interesting to note that like the Muslim minority in India 
the Hindu minority in Bangladesh resists any change in its personal law. Thus, Hindu women 
in Bangladesh are still governed by age-old traditions and laws”65.
The case of Bangladesh (a Muslim majority/Hindu minority state), just as the case of India (a 
Hindu majority/Muslim minority state), shows that women in minority religions face a 
particular barrier from state intervention to protect their rights, no matter which is the state 
religion and which is the minority religion. The state plays a delicate political balance, it tries 
particularly to avoid conflict with minority groups which may see any intervention in the 
status quo of religious law as government encroachment. Thus, women’s rights fall victim to 
a political balancing act.
62 For Muslims, mainly the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961. It permits polygamy under certain conditions, 
but it is a restricted option. It recognizes unilateral divorce ( taleq) where it is revocable, and permits limited 
grounds for divorce by the wife. The Government o f  Bangladesh is considering a draft Uniform Family Code 
which offers further reforms to the Muslim Family Ordinance, for instances providing women with broad 
grounds for divorce. Hindu personal law allows polygamy by the husband (which is outlawed in India for 
Muslims). Hindu personal law does not recognise a woman’s right o f  inheritence. See: Human Rights in 
Bangladesh -  A Study o f  Standards and Practices [2001] 72.
63 Concluding Observations o f  the CEDAW Committee: Bangladesh (adopted 01/02/93) A/48/3 8, paras.248-326.
64 The legal situation as described by Lailufar Yasmin in “Law and Order Situation and Gender-based Violence:
Bangladeshi Perspective”, (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Policy Studies 16 Ch. 4. www.rscc.org), is 
that Hindu women are still governed by the ancient Shastric law. Laws o f  the colonial period too remain, as they 
were not revised after independence, specifically, the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act 1856, Hindu W omen’s 
Right to Property Act o f  1937 and the Hindu women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act o f  
1946. Hindu women in Bangladesh do not have a right to divorce but can have a right to live separately. Hindu 
law does not make marriage registrations compulsory. Hindu wom en’s inheritance o f  property is very restricted.
65 Engineer, [2001].
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A further example of the reluctance of states to intervene in the religious personal law of 
minority communities, is seen in Sri Lanka66. A dual standard exists in the provision of 
minimum age of marriage67. In Sri Lanka the minimum age has been set to 18, except for 
Muslims, because of Muslim personal law, which does not provide a minimum age of 
marriage68. Likewise, polygamy is permitted, in certain circumstances, for Muslims69. Thus, a 
state which prohibits polygamy70 and underage marriages in its general laws, allows a 
minority religious community to operate a different law on these matters. So, women in a 
minority community are particularly adversely impacted on by relegation of personal law to a 
religious community.
The difficulty of the state in according equal rights to women once jurisdiction is granted to 
religious communities, proves in Israel, as well, to be particularly great regarding minority 
communities71. The Family Court Law, 1995, was amended in 2001, by the addition of 
Article 3(bl), which grants concurrent jurisdiction in matters of family law (except marriage 
and divorce) of Muslims and Christians to (civil) family courts. Until this amendment, all 
such matters were exclusively under the jurisdiction of religious courts'. Among these are 
proceedings for spousal support. Jewish women have had the option since 1953 to initiate 
proceedings for spousal support in either religious or civil court . The award of spousal 
support is consistently higher in family courts than in all religious courts, and religious courts
66 Sri Lanka has a Buddhist majority, while there are also Hindu and Christian minorities. The problem 
discussed only exists regarding Muslim personal law.
67 CEDAW prohibits the betrothal and marriage o f  a ‘child’ (in Article 16(2)), but does not specify what age is 
considered a child. The UN Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum age for Marriage and 
Registration o f  Marriage (GA Res. 34/180 December 18,1979) refers to ‘no less than fifteen’ and makes an 
exception only where a ‘competent authority’ has decided it is in the interests o f  intended spouses (Compare: the 
minimum age, 18, in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights o f  
Women in Africa, Art. 6(b)).
68 See: Concluding Observations o f  the CEDAW Committee: Sri Lanka. 07/05/2002.A /57/38 (Part I), paras.256- 
302. In fact, the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 1951 has a minimum marriage age o f  12.
69 Under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 1951.
70 See Jayasuriya, [1982].
71 See a general examination o f  the treatment o f  the Arab minority (o f  which the Muslim community forms the 
major part) by the legal system in Israel: Kretchmer, [1990].
72 Rabbinical Courts Judgment Law (Marriage and Divorce), 1953, Article 4.
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do not follow a principle of community property73. Thus the outcome is less likely to be 
equitable to women in a religious court74. The women of minority religions were harmed by 
lack of political will to interfere in the religious autonomy of minority religious 
communities75. Even after the passage of the legislation, it remains to be seen whether 
women of minority religions will have the same accessibility to civil courts as those of the 
majority religion76. It also remains to be seen how the civil courts will interpret the religious 
law of minority religions, and whether they will be able, as outsiders to the religious 
community, to interpret it in a way compatible with women’s equality.
The state may try to rectify human rights violations by religious law through directly 
applicable secular legislation. This too raises distinct problems if it is perceived as 
interference in the autonomy of minority religions. In Israel, secular legislation was 
sometimes, but not always, perceived this way by the Muslim minority legal system. The 
Muslim Qadis have ignored the secular prohibition of underage marriage as grounds for 
divorce77. In other cases they accepted and even welcomed secular legislation, such as the 
introduction of legal principle of “the best interest of the child”78.
Thus, in these four examples drawn from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Israel, relegation 
of personal law to religious communities has meant greater difficulty for the state law to 
rectify discrimination in personal law of minority women than of women of the majority 
religion.
73 HCJ 9734/03 A. v. Great Rabbinical Court (decided 21.10.2004).
74 In societies in which, in marriages, w ives still provide more o f  the home work and husbands more o f  the paid 
employment, some redress o f  inequality between spouses upon divorce is achieved by ordering o f  support 
payments (or other financial compensation). So, realistic amounts o f  support payments may be considered a 
measure to redress inequality o f  women.
75 In other instances the Israeli legislation intervened, affecting Muslim minority religious law: Unilateral 
repudiation o f marriage against the wishes o f  the wife is an offence according to Art. 181 o f  the Penal Law, 
1977. Polygamy is prohibited (for members o f  all religions) by Article 176 o f  the Penal Law, 1977. Shougry- 
Badame, [2001] claims, however, that the law is ineffectively enforced despite a high incidence o f  polygamous 
marriages among the Beduin Muslim community.
76 Layish, [1995] notes, that even when Muslim women have a choice o f  secular jurisdiction more favourable to 
them, such as in matters o f  inheritance, they prefer litigation in the Shari’a Court due to social and religious 
pressures.
77 The Age o f  Marriage Act, 1950, Article 3.
78 Layish, [1995],
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These intractable problems would also point against recognition of a group right of religious 
freedom which includes exclusive, and possibly even concurrent, jurisdiction over personal 
law.
3. Discrimination in religious marriage not caused by the state
3.1 Registration of religious marriages by the state without religious jurisdiction over 
personal status
The last section dealt with states that accord some autonomous legal status to religious 
communities, and the implications thereof for women. There are adverse implications for 
women also where the state recognizes, although it does not aid, a religious discriminatory 
practice, in instances in which the state offers everyone a civil alternative to religious 
marriage79. If the state itself discriminates in marriage provisions, it is clearly breaching the 
provisions which mandate equality in marriage in international conventions to which it may 
be party, including the ICCPR (Article 23(4)), CEDAW (Article 16) and Protocol 7 of the 
European Convention (Article 5 of which mandates equality between spouses in marriage, in 
private law rights between them, in relation to their children, during marriage and in its 
dissolution)80. It is less clear whether a state that recognizes religious marriages that have 
extra-legal discriminatory implications, breaches its obligations, even though the civil legal 
provisions that rule the marriage are not discriminatory.
It seems that the above mentioned provisions should apply in such a case as well. By 
relegating the role of arranging marriages to religious bodies, the state cannot ‘privatise’ it. 
Rather, the state must ensure that the religious marriages which it recognizes do not cause 
breaches of human rights which it is internationally obligated to uphold. As the Home
79 The HRC has opined that, “the right to freedom o f  thought, conscience and religion implies that the 
legislation o f each State should provide for the possibility o f  both religious and civil marriages. In the 
Committee's view, however, for a State to require that a marriage, which is celebrated in accordance with 
religious rites, be conducted, affirmed or registered also under civil law is not incompatible with the Covenant" 
(General Comment 19 para. 4 to the ICCPR).
80 Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, ETS 117, (entered into force 1 November 1988). It has not been ratified by the UK.
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Secretary stated in the parliamentary debate on the UK Human Rights Act 199881, when 
conducting marriages the Church stands in place of the state and performs a function for civil 
society. Thus the Act would apply to Churches in this role. So, also, should international 
human rights obligations.
A further example of the reluctance of states to intervene in the religious personal law of
O'}
minority communities, is seen in Sri Lanka . A dual standard exists in the provision of 
minimum age of marriage . In Sri Lanka the minimum age has been set to 18, except for 
Muslims, because of Muslim personal law, which does not provide a minimum age of 
marriage84. Likewise, polygamy is permitted, in certain circumstances, for Muslims85. Thus, a 
state which prohibits polygamy and underage marriages in its general laws, allows a 
minority religious community to operate a different law on these matters. So, women in a 
minority community are particularly adversely impacted on by relegation of personal law to a 
religious community.
Of course, even if the state did not recognize the registration of the marriage, the spouses 
would still be allowed to marry religiously, but would need to marry by civil registry as well, 
and only the civil marriage would be recognized by the state (as is the case, for instance, for 
Muslim marriages). In such a case, the state would not be seen as sanctioning a 
discriminatory marriage. Nevertheless, the discriminatory marriage would still be permitted
8’ Hansard  HC vol. 312 Col 1017 (20 May 1998).
82 Sri Lanka has a Buddhist majority, while there are also Hindu and Christian minorities. The problem 
discussed only exists regarding Muslim personal law.
83 CEDAW prohibits the betrothal and marriage o f  a ‘child’ (in Article 16(2)), but does not specify what age is 
considered a child. The UN Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum age for Marriage and 
Registration o f  Marriage (GA Res. 34/180 December 18,1979) refers to ‘no less than fifteen’ and makes an 
exception only where a ‘competent authority’ has decided it is in the interests o f  intended spouses (Compare: the 
minimum age, 18, in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights o f  
Women in Africa, Art. 6(b)).
84 See: Concluding Observations o f  the CEDAW Committee: Sri Lanka. 07/05/2002. A/57/3 8 (Part I), paras.256- 
302. In fact, the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 1951 has a minimum marriage age o f  12.
85 Under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 1951.
86 See Jayasuriya, [1982].
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to take place, the human rights implications of which will be discussed in the following 
section.
3.2 State attempts to rectify discrimination in religious marriage may not be enough to 
preserve equality
Because of the ingrained position of religion in many societies, even a conscious decision of 
the state not to recognize any religious law may not be enough to prevent discrimination to 
women caused by the application of internal religious law in the religious communities.
The existence of a non-discriminatory state secular system of family law may not suffice to 
guarantee that women’s individual rights are not infringed by a religious system of law. If 
religious systems exist as unofficial systems of law, as part of the exercise of communal 
religious freedom, women’s rights may be infringed in ways which the state may or may not 
be able to rectify.
In both the UK and US, Jewish law is an unofficial system of law. In the UK, Jewish 
marriages are registered by the state87, in the US only civil marriages are registered. In both, 
divorces are granted by state courts. However a divorce ordered by a civil court will not 
suffice for the parties to be considered divorced according to Jewish law. Both parties must 
be consenting parties to religious divorce (get) 88. Usually it is the husband who may be able 
to withhold the get from the wife. While the civil court can grant legal divorce, lack of a 
religious divorce will mean that the wife will not be able to remarry under Jewish law.
The civil law cannot rectify this, but laws in certain states in the US as well as the UK 
remove the possibility of the husband obtaining a civil divorce but leaving his wife 
effectively unable to remarry, by withholding the religious divorce. The New York state “get
Q Q
law”, the most famous of these , denies civil divorce to a petitioner absent a showing that the 
petitioner has removed “all barriers to remarriage” of a spouse, including “religious or
87 The Marriage Act 1949 Section 26(l)(d ).
88 Elon [1994] 1754-1755 ftnt. 9.
89 New York Domestic Relations Law para. 253 amended in 1983. A similar Federal law was enacted in 
Canada: Act o f  June 12, 1990, Ch. 1 8 ,1 Statutes o f  Canada (1990). Similar legislation was proposed by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission, “Multiculturalism and the law”, ALRC Report N o 57, 1992.
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conscientious restraint”. Similarly, the UK Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 states 
that when a marriage is entered according to Jewish or other religious usages, in divorce 
proceedings “the court may order that a decree of divorce is not to be made absolute until a 
declaration made by both parties that they have taken such steps as are required to dissolve 
the marriage in accordance with those usages is produced to the court”.
In 1992, the New York law was further amended90 to allow the court to take into account 
refusal of one spouse to remove barriers to remarriage of the other spouse in the distribution 
of marital property and determination of maintenance. Stone91 shows that the first provision 
was supported by the Jewish community, as it is not in conflict with Jewish law. The second 
provision, however, was controversial among the Jewish community due to a possibility that 
the imposition of financial penalties on a recalcitrant spouse creates a compelled divorce (get 
m e’useh), which is invalid under Jewish law92, as there must be consent of both parties93. 
Currently there is no international legal requirement that states withhold granting civil 
divorce until all religious barriers to remarriage have been removed.
The unofficial system of law has implications for the lives of women within the religious 
community which the state cannot always correct. Thus, even a clear determination that a 
community right of freedom of conscience and religion cannot prevail over the individual 
rights of women will not always have a possible practicable implementation. Women choose 
to belong to communities, or have no real choice but to do so, and abide by their internal 
rules. Providing an equal secular alternative may not be enough, application of fundamental 
human rights provisions to consequences of religious marriages may be needed.
4. Non-recognition of discriminatory religious marriages may further the discrimination 
of women
90 By para. 236b.
91 Stone, [2000],
92 See: Elon [1994] 1754-1755 ftnt. 9.
93 Maidment Kershner, [2001] 720-721,730 examines the use of action for damages in tort by the wife from whom 
the get is withheld in the US, and the possibility o f such action in the UK.
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The decision to uphold individual rights over a community right of religious freedom is not 
straightforward to apply in practice even when the state decides not to relegate legal power to 
religions that discriminate on the basis of gender.
The decision of a state not to recognize a religious system of marriage, because it is 
incompatible with equality to women, can harm the individual rights of both women and men 
who, because of social and cultural preferences, use the unrecognized system. A preferable 
individual rights approach would consider, in each case, whether individual rights would be, 
on balance, furthered or harmed by the recognition of the marriage for the purpose under 
consideration.
Religious systems of law which are not part of the state legal system and whose legal acts are 
not recognized by the state’s legal system may nonetheless have vital importance for people’s 
lives, and indeed have legal consequences under state law. The existence of an unofficial 
religious legal system, and its impact on women, should thus be analysed as one of the effects 
of religion in the state which impact the lives of women.
4.1 Potentially polygamous marriages
Religious legal systems that have no official legal status, but have important legal 
consequences, which may be different for men and women, are evident, for instance, in 
regard to Muslim marriages in the UK94 and in South Africa. While according legal validity 
to religious arrangements such as marriage may constitute a breach of equality for women, 
sometimes non-recognition of such marriages may have a discriminatory effect. This can be 
illustrated by the case of Ryland v. Edros95 in the Supreme Court of South Africa. The Court 
decided that it can recognize a Muslim marriage, which is not a valid marriage under the 
South African Marriage Act96, as a valid contract. The Court considered a Muslim marriage 
as not per se contrary to public policy, even if potentially polygamous. In this case, the 
motivation for the ruling, it seems, was that the Court wanted to recognize the wife’s property
94 Bano, [2003].
95 [1997] 1997(2) SA 690.
96 The Marriage Act 1961.
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and financial rights after divorce. Not recognizing the marriage would have left her with 
nothing, upon the dissolution of what was, de facto, a marriage. Thus, in this case, 
recognizing the religious marriage, even as a private law contract, furthers the woman’s right 
in the particular instance97. This is so, although general validation of Muslim religious 
marriages, even as a civil contract, is potentially harmful for women (as it validates marriages 
which are potentially polygamous)98. We see, that non-recognition of a religious practice by 
the state has a legal effect, just as recognition has an effect. Non-recognition of 
discriminatory marriages by law in a society in which such marriages take place may still be 
discriminatory towards women99.
Another implication of non-recognition of Muslim religious marriages in South Africa arose 
in Fraser v. Children’s Court100. The issue raised was the rights of biological parents 
regarding their required consent to the adoption of their child. The Act required the 
permission of both mother and father, when they were married, for a court decision to allow 
the child’s adoption. But in the case of unmarried parents the mother’s permission alone 
sufficed. The Act saw customary African unions, which are not recognized as legal 
marriages, as an exception requiring permission of both parents. But, it did not make the 
same exception for Muslim marriages, which are also not recognized as legal marriages. The 
Court found the distinction between customary unions and Muslim marriages discriminatory 
and thus in breach of Article 8 of the Interim Constitution. Thus, the Court found a way to 
rectify the result of non-recognition of Muslim marriages, for the purposes of adoption.
97 Where third party interests are involved the situation is more complex. Indeed in A m odv. M ultilateral M otor 
Vehicle 1997 (12) BCLR 1716 (D) the Muslim marriage was held not to give the widow any rights as a ‘w ife’ o f  
the deceased against the insurer.
98 Indeed, prior to this decision, in Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) the Appellate Division rejected a 
claim for maintenance based on a Muslim marriage, ruling that such a marriage was potentially polygamous 
and could not enjoy a d  hoc recognition, being against public policy.
99 See further : Rautenbach, [2003], who cites South African statutes specifically including as beneficiaries
spouses in unofficial religious marriages including the Special Pensions act and the Demobilisation Act.
100 1997 (2) SA 218 (CC).
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In an important recent case, Daniels v. Nom , the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
recognized Muslim marriages for the purposes of intestate inheritance. But the reasoning of 
Judge Sachs and Judge Ngcobo were revealingly different.
Judge Sachs viewed the word “spouse” in the laws discussed in the case as including spouses
100  • * • •of a Muslim marriage. Judge Sachs was careful to stress that the decision “eliminates a
discriminatory application of particular statutes without implying a general recognition of the 
consequences of Muslim marriages for other purposes. ... [T]he recognition which it accords 
to the dignity and status of Muslim marriages for a particular statutory purpose does not have 
any implications for the wider question of what legislative processes must be followed before 
aspects of the shari 'a may be recognised as an enforceable source under South African law”.
1 (13Sachs mentions in his decision the constitutional principle of “non-sexism” . He stresses 
that in a patriarchal society men find it easier to acquire property, and the laws under question 
achieve substantial equality between men and women, from which women in Muslim 
marriages would not benefit if excluded from the laws’ ambit. This rationale seemingly 
leaves room for non-recognition of Muslim marriages for those purposes in which such 
recognition would harm women’s substantive equality with men.
Judge Ngcobo uses a seemingly broader base for his decision. He contrasts the new 
constitutional order against the old order under which cultures and laws of Blacks were not 
recognized, and thus their marriages were not recognized. He cites the constitutional 
provision which guarantees freedom of religion104, which also permits “marriages concluded 
under any tradition or a system of religion.. .”105.
By its clear wording, the South African Constitution106 permits recognition of religious 
marriages, but does not mandate such recognition. It is implied by Judge Ngcobo’s opinion
101 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC).
102 Para. 26.
103 Para 22, citing Section 1(b) o f  the Constitution.
104 Section 15.
105 Section 15(3)(a).
106 Section 15 (3)(a): “this Section does not prevent legislation recognising - (i) “marriages concluded under any 
tradition or a system o f  relig ion ...”
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that such recognition may be warranted by the principle of religious freedom and religious 
equality. But if so, it is not clear if such recognition would have to be accorded to Muslim (or
• • 107other religious) marriages even in instances where this would infringe women’s equality . 
Thus, both judges reach the same result, but while Judge Sachs approach relies on the 
principle of non-discrimination of women, Judge Ngcobo’s relies on a principle of religious 
freedom, which, without a qualification based on the individual right of non-discrimination 
between men and women, could lead to unwarranted results.
4.2 Polygamous marriages
A similar dilemma is raised in regard to polygamous marriages. The principle that communal 
religious freedom cannot override women’s right to equality would mandate prohibition of 
such marriages. But, if such marriages are ignored by the law, in some cases the rights of 
individuals, especially those of women will be harmed.
Polygamy is not directly forbidden by international treaties. However, the ICCPR, in Article 
23(4), mandates equality between spouses. In General Comment 28, the HRC stated that 
polygamy is incompatible with equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry, as 
guaranteed by the ICCPR108. The same conclusion should be reached from CEDAW, which 
in Article 15 guarantees equality before the law, and in Article 16 guarantees equality in 
marriage, as indeed the CEDAW committee decided in General Comment 21.
Formerly, the English courts refused to recognise polygamous unions. In Sow a v. Sow a109 the 
UK Court of Appeal decided that a potentially polygamous marriage did not entitle the wife 
to any remedies under matrimonial laws. The legal position was changed by the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973110, which permits the court to grant matrimonial relief (including orders 
regarding maintenance) in a polygamous marriage. As for the state’s obligations, the position
107Article 15(3), however, would mean that it could not, as such recognition would have to be consistent with 
the other provisions o f  the Constitution. (See also Van der Vyver, [1999] 659-664).
108 Para. 24.
109 [1961] P 70.
110 Section 47.
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is different. In 1998 the Court of Appeal decided111 that a polygamous wife is not entitled to a 
widow’s benefit under the Social Security Act 1975112. This ruling raises a problem: 
Validation of polygamous marriages is inimical to women’s equality. But women who lived 
in polygamous marriages are doubly harmed by non-recognition of their rights under law -  
once by the marriage itself, and a second time by the withholding of widows’ benefits. The 
result is particularly troublesome when the women concerned are in substantial need of 
economic assistance.
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa113 addresses this complexity. It states that “monogamy is encouraged as the 
preferred form of marriage, and that the rights of women in marriage and family, including in 
polygamous marital relationships are promoted and protected”114. Other national and 
international bodies would do well to adopt similar standards.
A similar approach may be needed regarding not just polygamous marriages, but other 
unrecognized religious marriages. The African Women's protocol obligates the State-Parties 
to legislate that marriages must be recorded and registered115, not be polygamous116, and must 
be based on informed consent of the parties117, who are both over 18 years old118. They are 
meant to ensure, as far as possible in a social context of gender disparity, that women are 
equal and autonomous partners in the marriage. However, if religious marriages continue to
111 Bibi v. C hief Adjudication Officer [1998] 1 FLR 375, [1998] 1 FCR 301. (See discussion o f  previous cases: 
Hamilton, [1995] 73).
112 But for income related benefits, there is an allowance for a second wife in a polygamous marriage. See: 
Secion 121 and 147(5) Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (as amended by the Private 
International Law (M iscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 Sch, para 4); Income Support (General) Regulations 
1987 reg 18; Family Credit (General) Regulations 1987 reg 46; Din  v National Assistance B oard  [1967] 2 QB 
213, [1967] 1 All ER 750. See further: Lowe and Douglas, [1998], 51.
113 Adopted by the African Union, July 11 - August 13, 2003.
114 Article 6(c).
115 Article 18(d).




take place in breach of these provisions, states may have to continue to recognize these as de- 
facto marriages in order to guarantee rights of spouses, usually women, both between the 
spouses and towards the state, as seen in the Daniels decision.
5. Discrimination of women in internal religious affairs by religious institutions
The most far-reaching but logical conclusion of the adoption of a principle of superiority of 
gender equality over communal religious freedom, such as that adopted in GC 28, is that this 
principle will have to be employed even in doctrinal areas of religions, including the 
appointment of clergy.
5.1 Clergy who hold public office
The right of religious organizations to run their internal organization is perhaps the right that 
is most justifiably reserved to the community, with which international law will find it hardest 
to interfere. However, even under existing international law, barring women from serving as 
clergy who hold public office should be impermissible.
Where religious clergy are given public office by the state, or they are appointed by the state 
to hold office in which they exercise legal powers within religious communities, 
discrimination against women in their appointments should be considered a discriminatory act 
by the state itself. As such, it may run afoul of provisions of both CEDAW119, which 
guarantees the right to hold public office on equal terms, and the ICCPR120, which guarantees 
equality in access to public service. All ICCPR rights are guaranteed by Article 3 to men and 
women on an equal basis. Although GC 28 does not refer specifically to the appointment of 
clergy or religious judges, its unambiguous language interpreting Article 3 leaves no room for 
exception, and means that even religious doctrine as to appointment of clergy cannot serve as 




An example of such appointments, in Israel, is the appointment by the state of two State 
Rabbis and City Rabbis121. In Israel, jurisdiction in matters of family law is given to state- 
appointed religious judges122. Women cannot fill the posts of either state-appointed Rabbis or 
religious judges123. The CEDAW committee has criticized Israel over the fact that women 
cannot become religious judges124.
This implies that the CEDAW committee holds the view that international human rigths 
treaty obligations of states should be implemented in the appointment of religious judges 
even if this intervenes in religious doctrine. Alternatively, the state could abolish altogether 
the legal capacities of religious judges.
It is not clear if the same would apply to clergy appointed or funded by the state who do not 
hold a judicial role. It is more questionable if theirs can be considered a ‘public office’. 
Judicial office is public office, as its holder executes a core function of the state. A clergyman 
who only performs religious service does not execute any such state function. However, if the 
clergy is appointed to office by the state, holds office in a State-Church, or is paid as a civil 
servant, there is a strong argument to see the position such a clergy holds as a public office as 
well.
5.2 Clergy who do not hold public office
Even concerning the appointment of clergy who are not holders of public office, the state may 
have an obligation to prohibit gender discrimination. Under CEDAW, the parties are obliged 
to take appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
121 Pursuant to the C hief Rabbinate Law, 1980 and the Jewish Religious Services Law, [combined version]1971.
122 See: Shari’a Courts (Verification o f  Appointments) Law, 1965 ; Druze Courts Law, 1962; Rabbinical Courts 
Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953 regarding, respectively, Muslim, Druze and Jewish Courts.
123 Israeli law exempts these posts from the general provision o f  equality in appointment to public posts (Equal 
Rights o f Women Law, 1953, Article 7(c)).
124 CEDAW Concluding Observations on Israel's State R eport: Israel, A /52/38/R ev.l part II (1997) 87. Israel 
has, in fact, submitted a reservation to Article 7(b) precisely on this point.
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women, with a view to achieving the elimination of practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women125. This is a fairly weakly worded -  although unique -  provision of an obligation on 
the state to attempt to effect change. Nevertheless, it means that the state must endeavour to 
eradicate culturally determined gender roles even in private religious organisations.
The argument for imposing a legal obligation of non-discrimination on private religious 
organizations becomes stronger the clearer the involvement of the state with the religious 
organization. If the religion is legally or financially established or supported by the state there 
will be a stronger reason for demanding that the state reverse the discriminatory practice. But 
there is a basis for arguing that the states must promote non-discrimination even in religious 
organizations in which it is not involved.
5.3 Discrimination in appointment to religious office as a concern for international law
There is further indication that discrimination against women within religions, even in areas 
which are at the core of religious doctrine, is an issue in which international law can 
legitimately intervene. The former UN Special Rapporteur, Elizabeth Odio Benito, suggested 
in her study to the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
• ♦ 10 f \Minorities that studies be undertaken about discrimination against women within Churches 
and within religions, including discrimination in ceremonies and worship, in becoming 
ministers of religion and in having a part in the hierarchal organisations of religions. She calls 
for immediate attention to this issue by the UN and recommends that the Sub-Commission 
undertake this study. Her suggestion implicitly includes a determination that discrimination 
of women by religions is within the ambit of international human rights law. No further 
action has been taken on this by the UN.
Application of constitutional non-discrimination principles to religious organizations is also 
absent in most states. A state constitution which takes an important step in this direction is
125 Article 5(a).
126 Odio Benito, [1989] p. 54.
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• 127that of South Africa. In South Africa the non-discrimination provision of the Constitution 
has application for private actors, which would include religious bodies. Legislation which 
must be enacted in order to prohibit such discrimination by religious organization would 
certainly be controversial, raising objections such as those voiced by Van der Vyver, that a 
scenario in which “the Roman Catholic Church might be constrained to justify its internal 
ruling before a secular tribunal smells of totalitarianism of the worst kind” .
The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with this issue only indirectly, as seen in 
Chapter Three. It ruled that where a State-Church decided to ordain women clergy, a 
clergyman who did not approve could not claim his right to freedom of religion was
190infringed . The question whether State-Churches were obligated to ordain women clergy 
did not arise130.
Sometimes, it is precisely the establishment, the granting of legal status by the state, which 
exempts the institutions of the religious community from general law of non-discrimination 
on the basis of sex. In the UK, the Church of Scotland was granted jurisdiction over “matters 
spiritual” in the Church of Scotland Act 1921131. In Percy132, an associate minister was 
demoted from her position by the Church following allegations of misconduct. She filed 
claim under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, claiming that she was treated differently from 
male ministers. The Scottish Court of Session accepted the claim of the Church that the 
Employment Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain any complaint by the appellant of sex
127 9(4): “No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms o f  subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.” (The 
grounds in subsection (3) include gender).
128 Van der Vyver, [1999] 668.
129 Williamson v. UK  [1995], See also: Karlsson  v. Sweden [1986]; Knudsen  v. Norway [1985].
130 For the position o f  the Catholic Church see the Congregation fo r  the D octrine o f  the Faith, D eclaration Inter 
Insigniores on the question o f  the Admission o f  Women to the M inisterial P riesthood  (October 15, 1976): AAS 
69 (1977), 98-116. which denies the possibilty o f  the ordination o f  women, a position repeated in the Ordinatio  
Sacerdotalis (22 May, 1994) o f John Paul II (see the Vatican website www.vatican.va)
131 Sections 1 and 3.
132 Percy v Employment A ppeal Tribunal Order and Judgment [2001] ScotCS 65
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133discrimination, since it was a question concerning an office in the Church and was 
accordingly a ‘matter spiritual’. It followed that the Church had the right, "subject to no civil 
authority," to adjudicate finally on the matter and the Employment Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction.
Here the autonomy of the religious community to govern its institutions was given a priori 
precedence over the general law of non-discrimination in employment. This is precisely the 
type of preference of community over women’s equality which GC 28 directs against. As 
argued in Chapter Three, the constitutional structure of religion in the state has direct 
implications for the relationship between individual and group rights. These may have 
particular implications for women, as exemplified in this case.
5.4 Discrimination of women by religions and tax-exempt status
State endorsement of discriminatory religious organizations occurs even where religious 
institutions are not directly funded by the state, but are indirectly subsidized by receiving tax- 
exempt status. It can be argued, that even such an indirect endorsement is impermissible: If 
these religious institutions discriminate against women, their tax-exempt status as charitable 
institutions should be removed134, for a similar reasoning to that used to deny tax-exempt 
status from private educational institutions which discriminate on the basis of race in the
us135.
It could, however, be argued, that there is a dividing line between impermissible direct state 
funding of discriminatory religious institutions, and permissible indirect funding via tax 
exemptions. Such an interpretation would recognize as legitimate a “sphere of private 
support”, arguing that since people are allowed to adhere to discriminatory religions, they 
should be allowed to donate to them.
,33 In terms o f  Article IV o f  the Declaratory Articles contained in the Schedule to the Church o f  Scotland Act 
1921.
134 Cook, [1993] 107.
135 Bob Jones University v. US, 461 US 574 (1983).
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Nevertheless, these last considerations justify a right of everyone to donate to a religion of 
their choice, but not a right to do so under tax-exempt conditions.
6. Secular legislation based on religious motives
The multiplicity of conflicts between women’s equality and religious doctrines is not 
coincidental. They stem from the all-encompassing nature of religions as normative systems 
that organize private, as well as public, aspects of life. Since these systems were formulated 
historically in patriarchal societies, they often reflect those values. Thus, it must be asked, not 
only whether in particular cases reliance on religion infringes the rights of women, but 
whether, in principle, reliance on religious reasons for legislation should be seen as infringing 
religious freedom, among others, of women.
Secular legislation that infringes recognized human rights of women is, in many cases, based 
on religious motivation. Often there will be reasons based on social or cultural norms that 
have their grounding in religion, even if religion is no longer seen as their justification. Laws 
which have particular significance for the rights of women, such as those regarding rights of 
marriage, reproduction, abortion or contraception, will often be based on such social norms. 
International human rights law has, so far, not addressed this problem.
An important question is, whether such legislation can be said to infringe illegitimately the 
religious freedom of men and women who do not subscribe to those religious beliefs. In other 
words, the question raised is whether religious freedom is breached by the fact that secular 
legislation is based on religious motives, apart from any infringement of other rights which 
the law or policy might cause. This question, in general terms, has already been discussed in 
Chapter Two. While this question is relevant to both men and women whom such legislation 
affects, this chapter addresses specifically laws which affect women. The reason for raising 
this issue in regard to women’s freedom of religion is that there may be different 
considerations regarding women. Even in democratic states, where women participate equally 
in the democratic process, their effective political power is often less than that of men, for 
various reasons (such as lack of influence and less than proportional representation within 
political parties), and so the product of the legislative process may not proportionately reflect
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their beliefs136. Also, even if both women and men choose, by majority vote, to institute law 
based on specific religious teaching, the law will reflect the underlying discriminatory 
attitude to women often embedded in religious norms.
6.1 Religious reasons for state legislation
The problem whether religious reasons for legislation are legitimate, especially where these 
are concerned with the private lives of men and women, is theoretically difficult, 
constitutionally fundamental, and politically loaded. Nowhere is this more so than in the case 
of regulation of abortion.
Because it is not yet clear whether there is a right of abortion in international law, it is 
important to examine the process by which domestic and international law and policy on this 
issue is made. Currently, a right over reproduction is not explicitly included in any of the 
main human rights instruments. CEDAW guarantees equal access to health care, including 
‘family planning’137, a term deliberately left vague. GC 24138 interprets that “it is 
discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide legally for the performance of certain 
reproductive health services for women. For instance, if health service providers refuse to 
perform such services based on conscientious objection, measures should be introduced to 
ensure that women are referred to alternative health providers”.
Access to contraception and abortion might be considered as included in Article 2 in 
conjunction with Article 1 of CEDAW (prohibition of discrimination), although this would 
entail a complex argument that lack of access to abortion constitutes “distinction, exclusion 
or restriction made on the basis of sex”, because lack of means of ensuring reproductive 
choice have vastly unequal consequences for men and women, thus perpetuating existing 
gender inequalities139.
136 See: CEDAW GC 23 “Women in political and public life” (adopted 1997) UN Doc. A/52/38; Cook and 
Dickens, [2003] 44.
137 Article 12(a).
138 (Adopted 1999), UN Doc. A/54/38/Rev. 1, chapter 1.
139 See: Cook, [1992] 680.
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Only the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa includes a specific obligation of state parties to protect reproductive rights 
of women, including authorizing abortion in cases of rape and when continued pregnancy 
endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus 
or is the result of incest140. This is not a full right to abortion based on a perception of 
women's’ bodily autonomy, but rather a truncated right, based on what are perceived by 
society as fruit of crimes committed and danger to health.
The International Conference on Population and Development (‘The Cairo Conference’)141 
did not recognize a right to abortion. This was directly due to religious involvement in the 
discussions. The Vatican was one of the most active participants in the Cairo Conference, 
objecting to all references to human rights of abortion and contraception142. The Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action143 suggests states not take punitive steps against women 
who have undergone abortions, but nowhere suggest that it is a right of women. The follow- 
up report144 also does not suggest such a right.
While the question of abortion is usually argued as one of substantive rights, the process of 
the determination of these rights should also be considered. If a state or international policy 
is deemed in breach of religious freedom because of institutional religious involvement in its 
formulation, this adds a different reason to argue that prohibitions on abortions are in breach 
of human rights.
In the context of the debate on the constitutionality of prohibition of abortions in U.S. law, 
Laurence Tribe has argued that whenever the views of organized religion play a dominant 
role in formulating an entire government policy, as is the case with abortion, it is an improper
140 Article 14(2)(c).
141 Paragraph 8.25, Program o f  Action o f  the Internationa] Conference on Population and Development, 13 
September 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF. 171/13.
142 See: Eriksson, [2000] 187.
143 Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 September 1995, A/CONF. 177/20 and A/CONF, 177/20/Add. 1 
Chapter IV paragraph 107 (k).
144 Report o f the ad hoc committee o f  the whole o f  the twenty-third special session o f  the General Assembly, 
2000 (UN Doc. A/S-23/10/Rev. 1).
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involvement of religion in the political process, violating the Establishment clause of the First 
Amendment145. Later, however, in a move which is testament to the difficulty of this 
question, he shifted his stand, acknowledging that, in fact, religion could not be disentangled 
from the public debate on the issue146.
The controversial influence of religion on the legislative process can be seen in the 
constitutional reform concerning abortion in Ireland147. In the referenda on the issue, religious 
arguments played a pivotal role in supporting one side of the debate148. This influence of the 
Church on law and policy was criticized by the CEDAW committee. The Committee 
noted149, that although Ireland is a secular state, the influence of the Church is strongly felt 
not only in attitudes and stereotypes but also in official state policy150. In particular, it noted, 
women's right to health, including reproductive health, is compromised by this influence. 
While criticizing church involvement in legislation in a specific case, it seems that the 
Committee viewed the involvement of the Church in formulating state policy in a secular 
state as an institutional problem of human rights 15 \
145 Tribe, [1973] 1 8 - 2 5 .
146 Tribe, [1988] 1349-1350.
147 For discussion see: D ooley [1998] 121.
148 Previously the Eighth Amendment o f  the Constitution Act, 1983 acknowledged ’’the right to life o f  the 
unborn, with due regard to the equal right to life o f the mother”. The Thirteenth Amendment (1992) provided 
that “Article 40.3.3 0 (the right to life o f  the unborn) would not limit freedom to travel between Ireland and 
another state”, and the Fourteenth Amendment (1992) provided that “Article 40.3.3° (the right to life o f  the 
unborn) would not limit freedom to obtain or make available information relating to services lawfully available 
in another state". The latest, 2002, constitutional referendum on abortion sought to amend Article 40 to limit the 
cases in which a woman could legally obtain an abortion, so that medically necessitated permitted abortions 
would exclude danger to the wom en’s life from suicidal intent. The amendment was rejected.See further the 
referendum committee website: www.refcom.ie.
Although the Fifth Amendment (1972) removed from the Constitution the special position o f  the Catholic 
Church, Church involvement in constitutional debates remained influential. On the religious institutional 
religious involvement backing the failed 2002 amendment see: Parkin, [2002]; “Ireland decides, the Pope 
supports Ahern on Abortion", The People (Ireland), 3 March 2002.
149 CEDAW Concluding Observations on the second and third periodic reports o f  Ireland 1999, A/54/3 8/Rev. 1, 
para. 180.
150 On Church involvement in lawmaking in Ireland see also: Whyte, [1998] 51.
151 No substantial determination as to the existence o f  a right o f  abortion has been made under the European 
Convention. Open D oor and Dublin Well Women v Ireland [EctHR 1992] raised the issue indirectly. It dealt 
with an injunction banning dissemination o f information in Ireland on abortion clinics outside Ireland. The 
Court decided the case on the issue o f  freedom o f  expression and made no determination as to whether a right 
o f access to abortion is included within Convention rights. In Tokarczyk v. Poland  [EctHR 1999], the Court
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However, religious involvement in referenda, as in Ireland, raises separate considerations. 
The use of religious arguments in a referendum is perhaps the most justifiable of all uses of 
religious arguments in policy-making. As shown in Chapter Two, the strongest argument 
against use of religious reasons exists when these are used by public servants; These 
arguments are weaker against religious reasons for voting by individual citizens, such as 
voters in a referendum. It is practically impossible to disallow the reliance of individual 
voters on religious reasons for their voting. Not only that, but the right of free speech includes 
the right of the voters to hear and consider any religious message before voting, as well as the 
right of the religious speakers to impart such a message. Thus, while institutional religious 
involvement in deciding the rights of women is problematic, it may not be easy to justify its 
prohibition.
There is, however, a strong, although not conclusive, case for claiming that women do have a 
right of access to abortion under international law152. If so, regardless of the legitimacy of 
using religious reasons for the decision to vote for or against abortions, a law which prohibits 
abortions could be attacked on substantive human rights grounds.
The argument that the right to freedom of religion and belief includes a right that the state
will not legislate secular laws based on religious norms was raised, but not examined, in a
1case of the European Court of Human Rights. In Johnston the European Court concluded 
that Article 12 of the European Convention (the right to marry) does not include a right to 
divorce, nor does Protocol 7 to the Convention, and that neither is such a right included in 
Article 8 (protection of family life)154. Johnston claimed as well that lack of a divorce 
provision breached his rights under Article 9, as the inability to live with his new partner as
decided that the conviction o f  the applicant for arranging abortions did not infringe his rights under Article 10. 
The question whether women had a right o f  access to abortions again remained unanswered. In H v . N orway 
[ECommHR 1992], the Commission, asked to rule on a potential father's right in connection with an abortion, 
left broad discretion to the state on this issue, avoiding again a clear statement on the existence and permissible 
limitations o f  a woman’s right.
152 See Section 5 above.
153 Johnston v. Ireland  [1986].
154 Neither does the ICCPR, which does mandate, however, in Article 23, paragraph 4, that States parties shall 
take appropriate steps to ensure equality o f rights and responsibilities o f  spouses as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution.
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married man and wife was against his conscience. The Court summarily dismissed this claim, 
saying Johnston’s freedom to have and manifest his convictions was not in issue. (The law in 
Ireland has changed since the ruling155. Malta is now the only state under the jurisdiction of 
the European Court which has no divorce provision and to which this case is directly 
applicable156).
However, the Court’s analysis of religious freedom is still relevant. It viewed freedom of 
conscience as limited to the right to manifest convictions. The European Court interpreted 
narrowly the concept of religious freedom. It did not raise the question whether the state, by 
mandating a system of marriage and divorce which conforms to one religious creed, impinges 
on the freedom of religion and conscience of those who do not subscribe to that belief.
Lack of divorce provisions impinges upon the liberties of both men and women, but its effect 
on women and men is different. In a social structure in which most marital unions are 
dominated by men, through unequal financial power and traditional gender roles, lack of 
divorce provisions constitutes a breach of equality for women, as well as a breach of freedom 
of conscience for both men and women.
155 The Irish Referendum on Divorce on 24 November 1995 had been carried. Consequent to the constitutional 
amendment, the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 came into force on 27 February 1997.
The Irish Constitution, Article 41(3) as amended the 1995, states that:
(1) The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution o f  Marriage, on which the 
Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.
(2) A cou rt... may grant a dissolution o f  marriage where... ( i) ... the spouses have lived apart 
from one another for ... at least four years during the five years, (ii) there is no reasonable 
prospect o f  a reconciliation ... (iii) such provision as the Court considers proper ... will be 
made for the spouses, any children o f  either or both o f  them and any other person prescribed 
by law, and (iv) any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with.
(3) No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law o f  any other State but is a 
subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction...
[=of Ireland] shall be capable o f  contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during 
the lifetime o f  the other party to the marriage so dissolved.
156 After legislation o f  a divorce law in Chile in March 2004, the Phillipines are the only other state with no 
divorce provisions. The Catholic Church was influential in all three states in opposition to divorce legislation. 
See: “Chilean divorce law passed” , CBC-Canada Radio, 11 March 2004, w w w.cbc.ca.
196
When a state shapes the lives of men and women, constricting them through laws based on 
religious doctrine, a question of religious freedom is raised. This is true, of course, not just 
regarding lack of divorce, but regarding any other legal arrangement which is based on 
religious doctrine.
As discussed in Chapter Two, a contrary argument can be made, that, in keeping with liberal 
conceptions, channeling religious motives into the political system through democratic 
participation is not only legitimate, but also has a positive public value. However, women 
have historically been, and mostly still are, excluded from the formulation of religious 
doctrine. So, the legitimation of religious motives for legislation discriminates against women 
in the legislative process, apart from any discrimination which may be manifested in the 
resulting legislation.
6.2 Religious reasons for international norms
A comparable situation to the use of religious reasons in legislation, arises when religious
reasons underpin a state’s international obligations, or when religious reasons or religious
institutional involvement influence the formulation of international documents. Because
religions typically espouse a comprehensive value system of gender differentiation, their
involvement will entail a systematic influence on the development of international law in
regard to the rights of women. The Catholic Church is in a legally unique position to
influence such developments157, because of its centralised structure and its status in 
1 ^ 6international law . Other religions may also exert influence through states.
An example of how religious obligations might influence the creation of international law is 
seen in the opposition by some of the delegates of proposals for the inclusion in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of equal rights of men and women to contract or dissolve a
157 For the position o f  the Catholic Church on many issues pertinent to the rights o f  women see the Report on the 
Holy See submitted by Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on Freedom o f  Religion and Belief, 
E/CN.4/2000/65 o f  15 February 2000.
158 The Holy See is a permanent subject o f general international law. It concludes international treaties on the 
basis o f  full equality on behalf o f  the State o f  the City o f the Vatican or on its own behalf. (Kunz, [1952]). The 
Vatican, through the Holy See on its behalf, carries out activities, which in international law are traditionally 
assigned to states. Besides Concordats, the Vatican is signatory to other international treaties, it has diplomatic 
relations with states, and has a UN permanent observer status (Bettwy, [1984] 236).
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marriage. These were delegates of states bound by laws based on Concordats with the 
Church, which created obligations in respect of religious marriage and divorce. These would 
not permit them to accept the proposed text159. The right was finally mentioned in Article 16, 
which states that men and women are “entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution”.160 The reliance on the Concordats in the negotiations, however, 
suggests that pre-existing international law treaties, which had already absorbed much of 
religious tenets (in this case -  of Catholic doctrine) had already shaped the constitutional 
structure of the rights of men and women in states.
An example of institutional religious involvement in the formulation of international 
documents relating to the rights of women occurred when the Vatican was one of the most 
active participants in the Cairo Conference, objecting to all references to human rights of 
abortion and contraception161. The Holy See stated in a reservation to the final document of 
the Cairo Conference that it understood that the document does not affirm a new international 
right to abortion162. The Vatican also participated in the 1995 UN Beijing Conference on 
Women163, but lobbied China to ban reformist Catholic groups, who support women’s 
equality, from participating in it164.
The influence of religious bodies on formulation of international law affecting women’s 
freedom of conscience and religion is evident also in the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court165. The statute includes several gender-specific offences. Important in its
159 See: AC.2/SR.6/ p.4 (M. Amado o f  Panama) quoted in Morsink, [1999] 122.
Subsequent Concordats loosened state obligations in this area considerably: for instacne the 1984 Concordat 
with Italy (see: Certoma, £1985] 123) and the 1979 Concordat with Spain (see: Martinez-Torron, [2001] 728- 
729).
160 Likewise, the ICCPR states in Article 23 (4) that “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take 
appropriate steps to ensure equality o f  rights and responsibilities o f  spouses as to marriage, during marriage and 
at its dissolution”.
161 See: Eriksson, [2000] 187.
162 UN Doc. A/CONF. 171/13 p. 147. The Holy See is party to some UN human rights treaties: CERD, CRC and 
CAT (the Convention against Torture, 1465 UNTS 85) but not CEDAW, ICCPR or the ICSECR.
163 See further: Howland, [1997] 296.
164 See: Preston, [1995].
165 Adopted 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9.
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implication of religious attitudes is the offense of forced pregnancy, in Article 7(2)(f): 
"‘Forced pregnancy’ means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other 
grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as 
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;...”. The wording was controversial, as the 
inclusion of the limitation that the woman was ‘forcibly made pregnant’ means that 
confinement of a woman who is pregnant by consensual sex will not be a crime under the 
statute. The limitation was included at the behest of the Vatican166.
Thus, institutional religious involvement in formulating international human rights 
documents (or documents which affect human rights) is problematic. The strongest argument 
against this involvement is in the case of direct involvement of religious organizations. A 
somewhat weaker argument exists where states rely on religious arguments. After all, it may 
be argued that every party to the drafting process brings with it some pre-conceived 
ideological notion, and a religious approach is no less legitimate than any other. However, the 
nature of institutional religious involvement is different where the rights of women are at 
issue, as religions have not just a pre-set conception on particular issues but a comprehensive 
and non-negotiable set of conception about gender roles.
6.3 Religious determinations and individual conscience -  no clear dividing line
In theory, it is possible to argue that a communal religious determination should never prevail 
over individual choice. However, it is not always easy to decide where an aggregate of 
individual rights ends and a communal policy mandating one religious belief begins. Rights 
of religious freedom are pitted against each other when doctors, nurses or hospitals refuse to 
perform abortions. The health service professional does not wish to perform an act against his 
or her religious beliefs, but the woman seeking abortion is being denied this medical service 
for religious reasons, which do not form any part of her belief. This becomes a critical 
problem where most doctors or hospitals in her area refuse to perform this procedure. The 
CEDAW committee viewed this as an infringement of women’s reproductive rights, stating 
that if health service providers refuse to perform such services based on conscientious
166 See: Cedant, [1999].
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objection, measures should be introduced to ensure that women are referred to alternative 
health providers167. The CEDAW committee thus expressed its concern at the refusal, by 
some hospitals in Croatia, to provide abortions on the basis of conscientious objection of 
doctors168.
An individual doctor relies on individual religious freedom in refusing to perform the 
abortion, a right typically recognized169. A central policy of the state based on the same 
reasons, even if democratically decided, would be an imposition of group values over 
individual rights. A confluence of doctors or hospital administrations all manifesting their 
religious beliefs to abstain from performing abortions falls somewhere between the two. 
Thus, some cases cannot be categorized neatly as either a clash of rights, or an imposition of 
a religious belief of a group on an individual. Here, there cannot be a principled 
determination but rather each case must be decided on an ad-hoc basis.
7. Conclusion
As has been argued in Chapters Two and Three, religious freedom should be viewed as an 
individual right, which a derivative right of the community cannot overcome. So, a claim of 
community religious freedom cannot override the individual freedom of religion or belief of 
women within religious communities. The same reasoning would lead to the conclusion that 
no right of community religious freedom can override the right of non-discrimination 
between the sexes. These conclusions match those of the UN HRC in GC 28. However, this 
chapter has raised some of the complexities that this determination creates: States delegate 
jurisdiction in matters of personal law to religious communities, and so their ability to 
intervene and uphold principles of equality is weakened, particularly within minority 
communities. Thus, women who are members of minorities are harmed twice. However, even 
if religious personal status is not accorded legal recognition, unofficial marriage and divorce 
still exist. Non-recognition of these might, again, lead to double discrimination of women
167 CEDAW GC 24 para. 11.
168 CEDAW Concluding Observations on Croatia, A /53/38/R ev.l part I (1998) 10 at para. 109; See also: 
CEDAW Concluding Observations on Italy, A /52/38/Rev.l part II (1997) 106 at para. 353.
159 Compare section 38(1) o f  the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 exempting any person 
objecting to the activities covered by the Act from any duty to participate in them.
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(and in some cases men), once within the religious marriage and a second time by non­
recognition of the marriage by the state. A suggested approach could be one of determination 
in every legal situation, whether individual rights would be harmed or furthered by 
recognition of the partnership as a marriage for the particular determination of a legal right. 
While such an approach lacks certainty and forseeability, as spouses will not know their 
rights until a judicial determination is made, it is better than either alternative of blanket 
recognition of discriminatory religious marriages or non-recognition. As has been seen, 
regarding Jewish law, there may be a limit as to the ability of the law to intervene in the 
discriminatory outcome of extra-legal religious marriages. A principle which views gender 
equality above communal religious freedom will have to address two further controversial 
questions: that of the legitimacy of institutional religious participation in the lawmaking 
process at the national and international level, and that of the discrimination of women in the 
internal practice of religious organizations.
CHAPTER FIVE: CHILDREN, EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
This chapter examines how children are affected by the conflict between individual and 
group perceptions of religious freedom, and how international law should address this matter.
I point out the problems, that arise in interpretation of existing international law on the matter, 
and to which international documents fail to provide solutions.
First, I set out the existing protection of the child’s religious freedom in international law. I 
then look at the child’s right to choose religion (section 1), and how this choice is made for 
the child when the family situation changes, in the instance of adoption (section 2). I then 
look at choice of education as manifestation of religious freedom (sections 3, 4 and 5). I ask 
whether states must permit community religious education, and if so, does it follow that they 
must establish it, and do they have obligations in funding it. I ask whether schools must 
respect individual religious freedom of students, and if there is a difference in this respect 
between private, public, and publicly-assisted schools. I then ask whether teachers must have 
the same right of individual religious freedom within schools (section 6). I ask how 
considerations of gender equality impact upon this questions (section 7). The controversy 
surrounding the wearing of headscarves by female Muslim students will then be used as a 
case study in which many of these considerations are brought into play (section 8). The 
chapter concludes that under the guise of a right of the child, various group and individual 
interests have been protected by international law, and the only principled way of protecting 
the child’s religious freedom is through careful separation of individual rights from other 
social interests.
The right of the child to religious freedom is unique. The right of the child-as-individual 
stands in potential conflict with interest in the child’s religious upbringing by several 
communities to which it belongs: the family, the state, and sometimes the child’s religious 
community.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child1 [CRC], Article 14, guarantees the child’s right to
* 9 • •freedom of religion . The conflict of claims surrounding religious freedom becomes evident
1 Convention on the Rights o f  the Child (adopted 20 November 1989) 1577 UNTS 3.
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when noting that most of the reservations to the CRC are of three types, connected to
♦ • 3religious perceptions of the child: Reservations to Article 14, the right of religious freedom , 
reservations to articles of the Convention regarding adoption or family planning4, and 
reservations to the entire Convention, based on reasons which emanate from the dominance 
of religion in the state5. Most of these are reservations by Islamic states, although the Holy 
See too has broad reservations based on religion6. It is questionable whether such broad 
reservations to the Convention are valid, as indeed some of the signatories to the Convention 
have declared7.
An overarching provision of the CRC, Article 5, establishes that all Convention rights, and 
freedom of religion is no exception, differ from the rights accorded to adults, in that the
parents, and sometimes members of the extended family or community8, retain the right and
duty to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate 
direction and guidance in the exercise by their children of their convention rights.
2 Similarly, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o f  the Child , OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), 
{entered into force  Nov. 29, 1999) Article 9, guarantees that:
1. Every child shall have the right to freedom o f  thought conscience and religion.
2. Parents, and where applicable, legal guardians shall have a duty to provide 
guidance and direction in the exercise o f  these rights having regard to the 
evolving capacities, and best interests o f  the child.
3. States Parties shall respect the duty o f  parents and where applicable, legal 
guardians to provide guidance and direction in the enjoyment o f  these rights 
subject to the national laws and policies.
3 Reservations to Article 14: Algeria, Bangladesh, Iraq, Jordan, Kiribati, Malaysia, Morocco, Poland (child’s 
rights to be exercised with respect for parental authority), Singapore (right to be exercised with respect for 
authority o f  parents, schools and those entrusted with care o f  the child).
4 Syria, UAE, Egypt (reservation to adoption provision); Holy See (reservation to ‘family planning’, parental 
rights (concerning Article 13, 14, 15, 16 and 28).
5 Broad reservation based on state religion: Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, Djibouti, Iran, Kuwait, Maldives, 
Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia.
6 The Holy See entered reservations to Article 24 (regarding ‘family planning’) and a reservation (regarding 
Articles 13, 14, 15, 16 and 28) interpreting the articles o f  the Convention in a way which safeguards the primary 
and inalienable rights o f  parents, in particular concerning education (Articles 13 and 28), religion (Article 14), 
association with others (Article 15) and privacy (Article 16).
7 See objections to reservations by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden.
8 When “provided for by local custom”.
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Freedom of religion of the child is, however, subjected to a further qualification. Article 14 
refers specifically to the obligation of the states to respect the rights and duties of parents to 
provide direction to the child. Parental rights are mentioned in regard to freedom of religion. 
They are not mentioned in articles regarding other rights of the child, such as rights of 
expression, assembly and privacy9. Why this difference? If the reason is the relative 
immaturity of the child to make his or her own decisions and exercise autonomous choice, 
this reason applies to many other rights. However, regarding religion the parents are seen as 
having a right to shape their child’s identity. In this, it is different from freedom of speech or 
freedom of assembly of the child. Religion has a long-term relational aspect, distinct from its 
individual-liberty aspect, which these liberty rights do not have. If religious freedom is about 
belonging to a group, then the child’s immediate group, the family, has a recognisable 
interest in maintaining group cohesion, at least while the child is still part of that group. 
Rights that have only an individualistic-liberty aspect but no identity aspect, such as freedom 
of expression or association, do not hold a similar protected interest for the parents, of 
fostering familial identity.
1. Choice of religion
The right to choose religion is a defining aspect of the individualistic view of religious 
freedom. The group-identity view of religious freedom, however, would seek to protect and 
foster existing religious cultures. Both views accept that individuals have a right to change 
their religion. However, liberals and communitarians would view differently the value of 
such change, and therefore the legitimate legal barriers upon exercise of this right. Whereas 
liberals see value in change itself, an exercise of personal choice; communitarians value the 
continuation of religious traditions, while not opposing the option of change. Therefore, 
communitarians would argue for barriers that foster the community by making such change 
more difficult. Children’s right to change religion would be limited by both perceptions for 
different reasons, and to a different extent. Liberals would limit it in accordance with the
9
Although Flekkoy and Kaufman [1997] 34 point out that the parents right is only “to provide direction” to the 
child, and not to determine the child’s religion.
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developing capabilities of exercise of personal autonomy. Communitarians would limit the 
exercise of this right by children, in order to enable a fostering of identity10.
The conflict between religious community and individual rights was evident during the 
drafting process of the CRC. There was a consensus among all State Parties on recognizing 
children’s religious freedom as a right during the negotiations. Article 14 was modeled on 
article 18 of the ICCPR. As with the inclusion of a general right to change religion in the 
Universal Declaration, so too in the CRC negotiations, some Islamic states objected to the 
inclusion of a right of the child to change his or her religion, because this conflicts with the 
laws of Islam11. This caused a problem, as the right to adopt a religion was already conferred 
without limit of age in the ICCPR, so its exclusion from the CRC may be seen as an
• * 12elimination of an existing right. In one of the submissions which raised this objection , the 
representative of Bangladesh reasoned that the right of child to change religion would 
conflict with what was to become article 18 of the CRC -  the principle that parents have 
primary responsibility for the upbringing of the child.
In the end, no mention was made of a child’s right to choose religion . This may be seen as a 
lacuna, leaving this question open to interpretation in light of Article 18 of the ICCPR, rather 
than a decision that such a right does not exist. International law does not establish a 
minimum age below which children are unable to adopt a religion of their choice. In 
international law there has not, apparently, been a direct legal challenge of a child against his
or her parents regarding the right to practice religion14.
Exclusion of the right to change religion undermines the core of religious freedom as an 
individual right. Freedom, of any sort, means a right to choose. Without choice, it is almost
10 The formation of identity is itself a right of the child protected by the CRC, Article 8.
n Detrick, [1992] 26.
12 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39 Annex IV p. 2.
13 Detrick, [1992] 26.
14 Coons [1996] 159. Van Bueren [1998] 158 points out that the Human Rights Committee asked Norway 
whether views o f  twelve year olds were considered when joining or resigning from the Church o f  Norway (UN  
Doc A/36/40), thus indicating, that in the Committee’s view this was an age in which children should have such 
choice.
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impossible to speak of religious freedom. The child is tied into an identity decided for it, thus 
significantly limiting its freedom. The only, minimal, meaning it retains is as a limitation on 
government from interfering in the identity the child acquired at birth.
2. The child's religion in situations of change of family
The religious identity, usually given at birth, is a product of social and legal mechanisms 
constituting group choice. The child’s religious identity is determined from, or even before, 
its birth. This determination is recognized and given legal protection in certain cases. A 
newborn child obviously does not choose its religion. So, it may be asked, what is being 
protected, whether a right of the child or an interest of the community it was bom into.
Generally, the child’s religious identity bestowed upon it by its parents is unquestioned. As 
long as the parents agree on the child’s religion, no question is asked as to whether the choice 
of religion is in the best interest of the child (as long it does not cause neglect). Only in cases 
of parental disagreement does the legal system ask if the religious choice of either parent 
stands in conflict with their children’s best interest. Indeed, when one parent converts, the 
state may be prone to side with the parent who holds the religion into which the child was 
bom15.
When prospective adoptive parents, are both of a different religion than the birth religion of 
the child, the question arises even more acutely. Should children be adopted or fostered by 
parents of a different religion16? Are those who oppose cross-religious adoptions protecting 
the child’s interest to remain in his/her religion, or the group interest to maintain its 
membership? With a child old enough to understand his or her religious affiliation, there is a 
consideration of the interest of the child not to add change of religion to the overwhelming
15 Such an Austrian law prohibiting a parent, without consent o f  the other parent, from bringing up the children 
in a faith different from that held by the parents at the time o f  the marriage, or from the religion in which the 
children had been brought up, was examined by the European Court o f  Human Rights in Hoffman v. Austria  
[1993] It decided this impermissibly subjected each o f  the parents to a different treatment on the basis on his or 
her religion, violating Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 o f the ECHR.
16 For example: The Israeli Adoption Law, 1981, Article 5 states that there is no adoption but by a parent o f  the 
same religion as the child. (However, this can be bypassed, as Article 13A(c) o f  the Legal Capacity and 
Guardianship Law, 1962 allows for the conversion o f the child to the religion o f  the adoptive parent).
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change of the adoption itself. But there is also an argument against inter-religious adoption of 
infants akin to that raised against inter-racial adoption. Generally, such arguments are voiced 
against adopting from a minority or disadvantaged racial or religious group. The argument 
could be seen as protecting an individual right -  protecting the child from being denied its 
heritage, but should perhaps be seen as protecting a group interest of self-preservation. Such 
an interest of the group might stand in direct conflict with the interest of the child in a speedy 
adoption.
US federal law firmly opposes racial matching in adoption by prohibiting reliance on race to 
delay or deny adoptive placement by federally funded agencies17. There is no similar 
prohibition on matching religious background in adoption.
Protection of religious identity is rarely protection of the exercise of individual choice. 
Religion is usually assigned at birth. It is determined more by heredity than by any process of 
conscious choice. What is protected is affiliation, determined usually not even by an active 
choice of parents but by their own membership in a religious group. This is generally true, 
but is seen most clearly when the retention of original religious identity is stretched to its 
limit -  in the case of adoption. In adoption, the child no longer belongs to a particular religion 
as part and parcel of belonging to the birth family. The social perception that values retaining 
the child’s religion in adoption protects neither choice nor family connections, but a 
predetermined identity.
3. Right to religious education : Protection of right of child or of community?
Religious identity is determined at birth but fostered through education. Education influences 
the way individual choice is made. Religious education has thus always been a subject of 
importance in international law.
Guarantee of education in conformity with the child’s religion is one of the first issues in 
which international law has dealt not only with domestic state policy, but also with the
17 The Multiethnic Placement Act 1994, amended 1996, 42 USCA 1996b. However, Bartholet, [1998] 2354, 
claims the permissible ‘cultural competence’ considerations are in fact used for racial matching.
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conduct of the family unit itself. It is worthwhile to inquire what considerations are implied 
by international instruments, especially whether these were considerations regarding the right 
of the child or the protection of community interests.
Initially state obligations regarding religious education were not based on children’s rights or 
even parents’ rights, but were intended for protection and preservation of the relevant 
minority. The particular interest in children’s education was a product of minority 
communities’ wish to guarantee the continued existence of their religious minority 
community into the next generation.
Protection of religious education in international law begins in instruments protecting groups, 
and predates the 1948 watershed of individual rights. The Minority Treaties18 included 
guarantee of religious education. For instance, the 1919 Minorities Treaty between the 
Principled Allied and Associated Forces and Poland19 committed Poland to equal funding for 
educational, religious and charitable causes of minorities. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice opined, that the prohibition of privately owned schools by the Albanian 
constitution was a breach of Albania’s obligations regarding religious and linguistic 
minorities.
A similar minority protection guarantee in the inter-war era, a provision regarding children’s 
religious education, was included in the Anglo-Irish treaties. The Articles of Agreement for a
9 1Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland establish that Ireland will not endow any religion 
or restrict free exercise or affect rights of children to attend publicly financed schools without
99receiving religious education . Article 44.2.4 of the 1937 Irish constitution guarantees the 
right of any child to attend school without receiving religious instruction. In this case too, the 
religious education provision in the treaty concluded between two states, was aimed at a
18 See discussion o f  the Minority Treaties in Chapter One.
19 Treaty Series, No. 8 (1919).Treaty reprinted in Robinson [1943] Appendix I.
20 Minority Schools in Albania  (advisory opinion) PCIJ Rep. (ser. A/B) No. 4 (1935).
21 6 December 1921. Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Vol. I, 1919-1922 NAI DE 2/304/1.
22 Article 16.
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protection of the Protestant minority rather than children’s rights, as other rights of children 
are not mentioned or protected by it.
Even in the post-1948 era of individual human rights, the right to choose religious or moral 
education was only gradually recognized as an individual right of the child. First it was only 
recognized as a right of the parents, and only later of the child itself:
Under the ICCPR23, states undertake to “have respect for the liberty of the parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians, to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions”. The same wording is used in Article 13(3) of the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Van Bueren24 believes the 
omission of the child’s own right to religious freedom was due to oversight.
More likely, however, this approach follows the Universal Declaration, which viewed the 
child’s religious education as a right of the parents rather than of the individual child. Indeed, 
such a right accorded to the child would be incompatible with that of the parent. Article 26(3) 
of the Universal Declaration states that “parents have a prior right to choose the kind of 
education that shall be given to their children”. While this article does not refer specifically to 
religious education, it is clearly one of the important choices protected by it . Its phrasing 
resulted from a conscious ideological choice of the drafters to offset state power over 
education by giving parents the pre-emptory choice over the kind of education their children 
receive. In this context, it is notable that, during the drafting negotiations, the proponents of 
this phrase, such as Dr. Malik of Lebanon, stressed the need to take control of education out 
of the hands of the states, where dictators could use it to teach against the principles 
enshrined in the Declaration, much as Hitler used the state education system to inculcate
<n/
pupils in Nazi principles . This rationale reflects the fear that the state will provide an 
education which will teach pupils not to respect human rights. It ignores the possibility that 
the parents will choose private education, including religious education, which will go against
23 Article 18 (4).
24 Van Bueren, [1998] 159.
25 Morsink, [1999] 267.
26 Morsink, [1999] 267.
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the human rights principles of the Declaration. Children are not mentioned as bearers of 
rights, but rather a power balance is sought between the state, which can and must provide 
compulsory education27, and the parents, who have a prior right of choice of education.
Similarly, the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief states the child’s right to access to education in 
accordance with the wishes of his parents or guardians, the best interests of the child being 
the guiding principle28. Thus, the parents are given the initial legal control over the child’s 
religion. The only limitations on the practices of the child’s religious upbringing are that they 
not be injurious to his health or development29. By giving the parents the right to organize the 
life of the family in accordance with their religion or belief , the 1981 Declaration 
recognizes the family as an autonomous religious group headed by the parents.
As in international documents, the right to choose religious education as a right of the 
parents, is also espoused in some national constitutions31.
Unequivocal recognition of the child’s own rights was finally given in the CRC, which 
includes the child’s rights to religious freedom and education .
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its jurisprudence bring into sharp relief the problems of assigning to parents the right to 






31 E.g., in Cyprus, Article 18 o f  the 1960 Constitution provides the right o f  parents to bring up their children 
according to their own convictions. However, the Constitution o f Malta, article 2, specifically decrees that 





“... the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions”. 34
Since no mention is made of children’s right regarding their education, it is not the right of 
the child that is encapsulated in Protocol 1(2), but the right of parents. Here, as with the 
similar provisions enshrining parental choice in religious education, it may be suggested that 
the right is accorded to parents because they are seen as agents of the religious community to 
which they belong. Although a Church or religious community cannot claim to be victim of
infringement of Protocol 1 (2)35, this does not exclude the possibility that parents who do so
1 £
will act as agents of their religious communities .
The Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union attempts to affect a balance 
between the parents’ right and the constraint of democratic principles37. Again, the voice of 
the child is not heard.
The right to choose education according to religious and philosophical convictions should be 
framed in legal documents as a right of the children themselves and not as a right of the 
parents. Normally, this right could be exercised by the parents on behalf of young children 
who are too young to make a rational choice by themselves. The exercise of this right will, of 
course, shift to the child in accordance with their evolving capacities. However, because it is
34 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o f  the Child makes the same point more vaguely, demanding 
in article 9(3), on religious freedom o f  the child that: “States Parties shall respect the duty o f  parents and where 
applicable, legal guardians to provide guidance and direction in the enjoyment o f  these rights subject to the 
national laws and policies”.
35 Scientology Kirche Deutschland  v. Germany [EcomHR 1997],
36 At least in one case this brought about a strange result. In K eller v. Germany [1998] the Commission ruled 
that Scientologist parents, who claimed their rights under o f  Protocol 1 (2) were violated by a government 
leaflet to schools targeting Scientology, were not victims under Article 25 o f  the Convention. This was because 
the leaflet was directed against the religion and not the individual parents. It seems that, between Scientology 
Kirche and Keller, parents, children and community whose religion is targeted by the government all remain 
without remedy. It follows from the conjunction o f  these two cases that children are not given any rights by 
Protocol 1(2). The religious community is not a right holder under Protocol 1(2), and parents cannot claim to be 
victims o f  a breach o f  Protocol 1(2) unless they are specifically targeted by the state (usually a hostile 
government policy will be directed at a religion and not individual parents). So there is no victim o f  a Protocol 
1 (2) violation by a state, when the state publishes literature against the education o f  one particular religion.
37 Article 11-14: “The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles 
and the right o f  parents to ensure the education and teaching o f their children in conformity with their religious, 
philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing 
the exercise o f  such freedom and right”.
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the right of the child, parents would not be allowed to exercise it on the child’s behalf in all 
cases, and the courts will have to prefer an option which ensures the child’s continuing 
religious freedom.
Why parents should not always be allowed to exercise this choice can be seen by an
n o # ,
examination of the U.S. Supreme Court decision Wisconsin v. Yoder . In this decision, the 
Supreme Court, by majority decision, affirmed the rights of members of the Amish religious 
community to refrain from sending their children to school after the age of fourteen, an age 
younger than that mandated by law for compulsory school attendance (which was sixteen)39. 
The decision was based on the petitioners’ right to religious freedom. The Court viewed the 
conflict as one between state and parents, ignoring a potential conflict of interest between 
parents and children. Under the right to religious freedom, the US Supreme Court allowed the 
community to maintain its future membership by making it harder for young people with less 
education to leave. The state itself has a social interest, distinct from that of the children and 
from that of the Amish community, in providing children with the sort of education that will 
allow them to become socially responsible citizens40. By choosing to protect the religious 
freedom of the parents, the Court fosters and protects the community at the expense of 
(individual) children’s liberty. The wishes of parents and community were furthered, at the 
cost of limiting the children’s choices of education later in life.
The right to choose education is given to parents, in fact, as they were seen as representatives 
of the religious groups to which they belong, likely to send their children to schools of the 
same group, thus maintaining group membership. In contrast, if children (at least older 
children) are given a right to choose, overriding the decision of the parents, they may be more 
likely to opt out of the group to which they were bom.
A broader conceptual problem is raised by this discussion. Human rights generally guarantee 
various aspects of the individual’s autonomy, choices and freedom of action. It is not clear 
then, how a human right can guarantee an individual’s right over someone else’s choices and
38 406 US 205(1972).
39 The right to choose religious education as an alternative to public schooling was recognized in US law in the 
earlier Supreme Court decision Pierce  v. Society o f  Sisters 268 US 510 (1925).
40 De Groot, [2000] 1310-1314.
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actions. A right to respect for family life, accorded in the Universal Declaration to the 
family41, comes close, as it has a relational aspect, but it is still not a right over another’s 
actions or choices. The ICCPR phrases this as an individual's right to family life42.
4. What sort of education is compatible with religious freedom?
What sort of education should the state provide? Assuming that the state is acting in the best 
interest of its citizens’ children, what education should the state choose to provide to 
children? Should it provide a choice between religious and secular education, or should it 
provide only secular education? International law, as we have seen, requires, as a minimum, 
that parents have a choice of private religious education for their children. However, in a 
liberal state, it might be argued, no religious education should be given to children, no matter 
what are their wishes or their parents’ wishes. Even if children choose freely their religious 
education, they will be unduly influenced in their choice by their parents. Therefore, non­
religious education is the only “clean slate” upon which they will grow up to become free- 
thinking citizens, who will make up their own minds as to their choice of religion in the 
future43.
However, making a neutral choice is also making a choice. There may be a difference, but 
not a great one, between non-religious education (education which is neither religious nor 
secular) and not-religious education (secular education)44. Children who study in a secular 
school, even one which is not anti-religious, are more likely to accept a secular outlook in the 
future.
The liberal neutrality approach may counter another obstacle. Students do not come to school 
as tabula rasa. Even when the school sets out to provide a neutral educational setting, the 
students may change it by exercising religious behaviour or expression. If the school tries to
41 Article 16(3).
42 Article 17. See also Article 8 o f  the European Convention.
43 In Comm. No. 40/1978 Hartikainen v. Finland, CCPR/C/OP/1/1984 at 74, the UN Human Rights Committee 
decided that state requirement that every school pupil will receive some instruction in religion or ethics, when 
the parents are given a choice to accept the school instruction or to opt for outside instruction o f  their choosing, 
does not breach Article 18 (4) o f  the ICCPR.
44 For an argument that secular education inevitably prejudices the child against religion see: Ahdar, [2002].
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restore the neutral setting by limiting students’ expression, it risks infringing the student’s 
religious freedom.
Liberals wish to provide children with a neutral education, but encounter a problem of 
defining neutrality in education. Can we choose neutrality in education as a meta-value, 
without choosing neutrality as a value in itself45? Can neutrality be imparted as a negative 
capability -  do not be prejudiced against any religious viewpoint, rather than a positive 
capability - be neutral in your religious and philosophical convictions46?
It can be argued that such a meta-value, or negative capability, can be taught, but not at a 
very young age. In order to grow up as full individuals, according to this argument, children 
should first be given an affiliation, whether national or religious. It is not advisable or even 
possible to raise a child with no sense of identity. Similarly, we can teach children not to 
accept stereotypical gender roles and to accept different sexual orientations, but it would 
seem impossible not to instil in a child some gender role, rather than a completely neutral 
gender identity.
The view that religion is constitutive of the person is central to a strong version of the 
communitarian critique of liberalism. A softer version of the communitarian argument against 
liberal neutral education can be summarized by Nagel’s47 claim, that liberal theory is non­
neutral, because it discounts conceptions that depend on inter-personal relations. These 
conceptions, it can be added, are ever present in the children’s environment.
This conclusion can also be reached through a different argument, that the family as a group 
has rights. O’Neill48 has commented on the tension between children’s rights and family 
rights. He sees the approach of liberal individualism as unsatisfactory when it comes to the 
intra-family relationship and suggests instead a mode of family covenant. Although he does 
not deal with the role of religion in the family covenant, it seems that religious cohesion
45 See Waldron’s analysis o f  the different meanings o f neutrality within liberal theory in: Waldron, [1993] 143— 
167.
46 Compare a discussion o f  first and second order neutrality in: De Marneffe, [1990] 253.
47 Nagel, [1975] 9.
48 O’Neill, [1994] 63.
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might play an important part in this covenant. Even strict liberals will be hard-pressed to 
accept that there is no importance in familial religious cohesion, although, from a liberal
standpoint, this may not have enough importance as to trump individual choices.
While the practical translation of a child’s rights will be different than those of an adult, and 
should be constrained within family boundaries, I see no compelling reason to reject in 
principle the liberal model of individual rights in regard to children. Neither do I see a reason
to reject it in regard to a child’s freedom of religion.
5. Community religious education and individual human rights
Do students have a right to religious freedom in a denominational school? Individual rights 
stand in potential conflict with an institution which is an exercise of community autonomy. It 
should be asked whether, in this case, group or individual right should prevail.
5.1 Schools as public entities
Due to the nature of education, educational establishments can never be considered simply as 
private law organisations. As schools provide a public service, they should be seen as 
institutions which are subject to at least some of the same human rights provision as state 
entities. Even private schools are entities of a public nature operating in the public sphere, 
and have to accord human rights to their students49.
Problems arise when the rights of students conflict with the claims of religious educational
institutions to religious autonomy, or their wish to exercise religious rights as a community.
The UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960 prohibits, in Article 1,
discrimination on the grounds of religion, among other grounds. However, in article 2(b) it
exempts from its definition of discrimination, among others:
“The establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic 
reasons, of separate educational systems or institutions offering an 
education which is in keeping with the wishes of the pupil’s 
parents or legal guardians, if participation in such systems or 
attendance at such institutions is optional and if the education
49 See: Costello-Roberts v. UK  [ECtHR 2001],
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provided conforms to such standards as may be laid down or 
approved by the competent authorities”.
The Privy Council has recently interpreted this Convention as leaving the decision up to the 
state. Religious schools can discriminate in admissions on religious grounds without breach 
of the Convention. But, commensurate with the Convention, a state may decide to prohibit 
such discrimination50 . In the case under discussion, Mauritius prohibited religious 
discrimination in the Constitution51. Therefore, the Privy Council decided that state-funded 
Catholic secondary schools could not allocate places so as to create a majority of Catholic 
students. Due to the restriction in the state Constitution, the schools’ intention to preserve 
their religious ethos was not a permissible justification for discrimination in admission.
The interpretation given by the Privy Council to international law, leaving to the state 
whether to permit discrimination in religious schools, would mean that UK law, which allows 
publicly funded religious schools to preserve their religious character through special 
admission arrangements52, does not fall afoul of international standards. Such recognition by 
the state of the legitimacy of attempts by schools to maintain their religious character, even at 
the expense of discrimination of individual pupils, is permitted under this interpretation of 
existing international law.
However, such an exemption of religious schools from non-discrimination is problematic, 
because allowing for community religious schools, if these accept only students of their own 
community, makes the state an accomplice in discrimination.
States must allow private religious education, but have no obligation under the ICCPR to 
fund religious schools. This is generally so, although the Human Rights Committee left open 
a possibilty that the ICCPR entails, in certain situations, an obligation to provide some public 
funding for private schools . (One may suppose that such a situation might be the case of a 
community which would cease to exist without state aid). However, if schools of one
50 Bishop o f  Roman Catholic D iocese o f  Port Louis v. Tengur (Mauritius) [2004] UKPC 9.
51 In Section 3.
52 The School Standards Act 1998, Section 91.
53 Comm. No. 191/1985 Blom v. Sweden CCPR/C/32/D/191/1985; Comm. Nos. 288, 299/1988 Lundgren and  
H jord  v. Sweden CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996.
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religious denomination are funded by the state, then, under the ICCPR, other religions too are 
entitled to funding54. A denial of funding in such circumstances would breach both Article 
18(4) and Article 26 (the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination).
In Re the School Education Bill o f 1995 (Gauteng) 55, the Supreme Court of South Africa 
rejected the argument that there is an affirmative obligation on the state to provide 
community schools (in this case based on common language, but similar reasoning would 
apply to religious schools56). The Court read the South African Constitution in conformity 
with international law as providing only a right for those so willing to set up such schools 
themselves, without state interference.
Judge Sachs’ in his concurring opinion enquired further as to how this constitutional 
interpretation could reconcile the right to have schools based on common culture with the 
constitutional and international law prohibition against discrimination: What is provided for, 
he says, “is not a duty on the state to support discrimination, but a right of people, acting 
apart from, but in practicable association with the State, to further their own distinctive 
interests"57.
But Judge Sach’s analysis shows that there is a problem: Setting up and funding community 
schools, whether religious or linguistic, which accept only students of their own community, 
can be considered tantamount to discrimination by the state. This argument can be taken a 
step further: If setting up and funding a discriminatory institution makes the state an 
accomplice in discrimination, so does according such institutions a right to exist. This 
problem has not been dealt with in international law, and has resulted in different solutions in 
national laws.
54 Comm. No. 694/1996 Waldman v. Canada, CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996. But See the Supreme Court o f Canada’s 
decision, which was the basis o f  this communication and ruled that there was no breach o f  religious freedom  
where only schools o f  one religion were funded, because o f  their special legal status in the state: Adler  v.
Ontario  [1996] 3 SCR 609; (1996) 140 DLR (4th) 3).
55 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC); [1996] 3 CHLRD 310.
56 Schools based on common race were made an exception to the right to establish community schools in the 
School Education Act. However, the inherent danger in the permitted categories is that common culture or 
religion could overlap with racial discrimination, and basing institutions on these grounds could be an indirect 
way to discriminate racially.
57 Per J. Sachs, para. 77.
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One solution for the problem of maintaining both principles of choice of religious schools 
and of non-discrimination is for states to require that all religious schools not discriminate in 
admission against students of other religions, and allow them to be absent from religious 
education. This solution was tried in Ireland, which demanded that publicly funded Church 
schools announce clearly the hours for religious education, so students could choose not to 
attend. But this arrangement failed in practice, and in reality it became impossible to attend a
r  o
publicly funded Church school without receiving religious education .
5.2 The argument of voluntary participation
Is there an argument that private religious schools should be exempt from anti-discrimination 
norms?
One often used argument in favour of exemption of private schools (and sometimes even 
public schools) from the obligation to respect religious freedom is that the student chose 
voluntarily to attend, and so must abide by the rules set by the institution. Two cases show 
how this argument was used, one regarding a student in private education, the other regarding 
a student in public education.
In the Wittman59 case in South Africa, a pupil had opted to attend a private denominational 
school. Therefore, a South African court reasoned, the religious school is not required to 
respect the student’s choice regarding manifestation of religion and belief. By choosing to 
attend the private school, reasoned the Court, the student voluntarily agreed to abide by its 
regulations, including mandatory attendance in religious instruction and prayers. The Court 
acknowledged the existence of a right not to attend religious activities in schools60, but 
concluded that the right does not apply when choosing to attend a private school, and was 
thus waived in this case.
58 Clarke [1998] 74.
59 Wittman vs. Deutscher Schulverein  1999 (2) BCLR 92 (T); 1998 (4) SA 423 (T).
60 Based on Section 14(2) o f  the Interim Constitution, currently Section 15 o f  the Constitution. See also: Van 
der Vyver, [1999] who claims that the school could have been seen as an organ o f  the state (At ftnt. 105).
218
The argument of voluntary participation has also been used in regard to public schools. The
US courts have produced a long line of cases trying to decide what permissible forms of
religious expression in public schools do not contravene the US constitutional principle of
/ 1
separation of church and state. In Lee v. Weisman the Supreme Court decided that school 
graduation ceremonies in which clergymen offered prayers breached the establishment clause 
of the First Amendment and therefore were unconstitutional. The argument that attendance at 
the ceremony was voluntary was rejected. Although the students could excuse themselves 
from attending, it is not voluntary in any meaningful sense, because not attending would 
deprive them of participation in an important occasion recognizing their educational 
achievement.
The argument of voluntary participation is more convincing in regard to private schools than 
in regard to public schools. The public provision of education for every child, without 
discrimination, is the obligation of the state. The public school must treat all equally. In 
contrast, in the case of private religious schools, there is some merit in the argument of 
voluntary participation. Private schools were founded to uphold a particular community 
heritage. But it must be further scrutinised in each case. The school’s right to maintain its 
religious tradition is not absolute. Two sorts of consideration can be advanced in support of 
the child’s right in a religious school:
The first, is that a child in an educational establishment, whether attending it by compulsion 
or voluntarily, contributes to the social and religious environment as much as he or she 
absorbs from it. This is both the description of the situation as it is and as it ought to be. 
Wanting to be part of a school does not mean leaving your beliefs at home. The right of the 
school to maintain the original religious outlook of its founders must be balanced against the 
students’ religious outlook and convictions. It is important to recognize that the school is a 
developing institution. The student body, and the changes in the culture and religion of the 
students over the years legitimately shape the school as much as its pre-set rules.
The second consideration is that of factors specific to each case: Whether the school serves a 
unique minority or a majority community, whether is it funded by the state and whether the 
student has other equivalent educational opportunities. When the students claiming a breach
61 Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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of religious freedom are part of a minority or when the Church school has benefited from 
preferential state funding, the right of the student should be paramount to the school’s 
autonomy. Where there is a majority faith or a faith that operates a predominant number of 
schools, it should be treated differently from a minority faith. Members of a minority or 
disadvantaged religious group need to have equal access to good educational institutions, 
which will generally, in such cases, belong to the faith of the majority. In such a case, equal 
access means access without impediments to their religious freedom, and the individual right 
should outweigh the interest of cultivating religious group identity (of the ‘strong’ religious 
group).
6. Religious freedom of teachers
An issue closely linked to children’s right of religious freedom in schools is that of teachers’ 
right of religious freedom in both denominational and non-denominational schools. If there is 
a right to have denominational schools, this has direct implications on discrimination of 
potential employees on a religious basis. Should the general principle of non-discrimination 
in employment apply to denominational schools?
In the UK, this is answered by the provisions of the Schools Standards and Frameworks Act 
1998. Section 60 allows in a foundation or voluntary school which has a religious character
f\*)(i.e. privately established but state supported religious schools ) preference in hiring teachers 
whose religious opinions are in accordance with the tenets of the religion of the school63 and 
permits termination of employment of a teacher whose conduct is incompatible with the 
precepts, or with the upholding of the tenets, of the religion64 65.
62 See definition in Section 20.
63 Section 60(5)(a)(i).
64 Section 60(5)(b).
65 In Ireland, see: Flynn v. Pow er  [1975] IR 648, in which termination o f  employment o f  a teacher in Catholic 
schools whose personal life the school saw as departing from the school values was held not to constitute unfair 
dismissal.
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This contrasts with the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 which 
apply in case of other workers who are not teachers, and provide much narrower exemption 
from the provisions of non-discrimination. The Regulations state that non-discrimination 
rules in hiring do not apply where there is a genuine occupational requirement for an 
employer holding a religious ethos66, or, for any other employer -  a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement67. Department of Trade and Industry guidelines68 suggest, for 
instance, that belonging to a certain religion may be a legal requirement for carers in a 
religious care-home, but not for maintenance workers.
Elsewhere, unnecessarily broad exemptions apply to schools and hospitals. The UN Human 
Rights Committee criticized Ireland's Employment Equality Act, which exempts hospitals 
and schools directed by religious organisations from the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds even, in certain cases, in employing persons whose functions are not religious. This, 
the Committee concluded, may result in discrimination contrary to article 26 of the ICCPR69.
The EU Council Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation70 allows, in Article 4(2), for states to exempt from its provision 
of non-discrimination those “occupational activities within churches and other public or 
private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of 
treatment based on a person's religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by 
reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a 
person's religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational 




58 See: “Religion or b elief in the workplace -  a guide for employers and employees”, www.acas.org.uk. p. 13.
69 Concluding Observations on Ireland's State Report: Ireland, ICCPR, A/55/40 vol. I (2000) 61 at para. 443.
70 2000/78/EC o f  27 November 2000.
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Clarcke71, speaking of Ireland, has argued that there should be no right to have schools that 
exclude teachers or students of other religions, nor a right to receive state funding for such 
schools. In Ireland such schools are conducted by the Catholic Church. Clarcke likens such a 
right to the establishment of publicly funded hospitals for Catholics only. He claims that this 
would obviously be repugnant even though there are other hospitals. This approach views 
schools as providing a public service, whatever their ownership, and argues that rules of 
public institutions should apply to them.
But there is a difference between a school and a hospital. A school can be said to have the 
formation of group identity as one of its legitimate objectives. The same cannot be said of a 
hospital. There is no recognized right to have a denominational hospital, but there is a right to 
attend a religious school. This factor may crucially provide a difference between regulation of 
employment in Church schools and employment in Church hospitals.
An approach which seeks to accommodate the conflicting rights of religious education and 
non-discrimination in employment would balance the rights of the teachers with the 
legitimate aim of the school in fostering identity and would not give carte blanche for 
exclusion. The determination whether it is legitimate for a denominational school to 
discriminate in hiring would depend on factors such as whether it is a school of a majority or 
minority community, whether there are other schools in the area, and whether the school is 
state-financed.
7. Community religious schools and equality of female children
Whether community schools are subject to obligations of religious freedom is controversial. 
It is even more controversial whether denominational schools must respect the principle of 
gender equality, even if it conflicts with their religious ethos. This is a crucial question to 
which international law gives no clear answer. A well-recognised principle regarding
* * • * • • H0)discrimination, is that separate education is inherently unequal . However, a prohibition on
71 Clarcke [1998] 70-71.
72 See, e.g. on grounds o f  race: Brown v. Board o f  Education, 347 US 483 (1954).
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gender segregation in religious education73 will have devastating implications on most 
organized religious education systems. In fact, one of the main reasons religious communities 
maintain their own schools, and a main reason that parents want to send their children to such 
schools, is in order to ensure sex-separate education.
The UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960 sets down binding 
international rules purporting to combat discrimination in education74. Rather than setting a 
coherent rule, these articles show the problematic standards of equality that are applied to 
religion and gender. Starting with a broad anti-discrimination statement which includes 
religion and gender, the Convention reverts immediately to a separate-but-equal standard for 
gender75. This standard, which would not be acceptable under the Convention for any other 
basis of segregation, is deemed acceptable by the Convention in regard to sex-segregation.
73 Such as that implied by the prohibition on gender discrimination in religious schools in the Shelton and Kiss 
[1996] Model Law.
74 The relevant articles read:
Article 1
1. for the purpose o f  this Convention, the term “discrimination” includes any distinction, exclusion, 
limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect o f  nullifying or 
impairing equality o f  treatment in education and in particular:
(a) O f depriving any person o f  or group o f  persons o f access to education o f  any type or at any level.
(b) O f limiting any person or group o f persons to education o f  an inferior standard.
(c) Subject to the provision o f  article 2 o f  this Convention, o f  establishing or maintaining separate 
educational systems or institutions for persons or groups o f  persons; or
(d) O f inflicting on any person or group o f  persons conditions which are incompatible with the dignity o f  
man.
2. ... the term education refers to al types and levels o f  education...
Article 2
When permitted in a State, the following situations shall not be deemed to constitute discrimination, within 
the meaning o f  Article 1 o f  this convention:
(a) The establishment or maintenance o f  separate educational systems or institutions for pupils o f  the two 
sexes, if  these systems or institutions offer equivalent access to education, provide a teaching staff with 
qualifications o f  the same standard as well as school premises and equipment o f  the same quality, and 
afford the opportunity to take the same or equivalent courses o f  study;
(b) The establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic reasons, o f  separate educational systems or 
institutions offering an education which is in keeping with the wishes o f  the pupil’s parents or legal 
guardians, if  participation in such systems or attendance at such institutions is optional and if  the education 
provided conforms to such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in 
particular for education o f  the same level;
(c) The establishment or maintenance o f  private educational institutions, if  the object o f  the institutions is 
not to secure the exclusion o f  any group but to provide educational facilities in addition to those provided 
by the public authorities, if  the institutions are conducted in accordance with that object, and if  education 
provided conforms with such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in 
particular for education o f  the same level.
75 Article 2(a).
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Separate educational systems based on linguistic or religious differentiation are also 
permitted, but only if participation in such schools is optional. As in other international 
human rights documents, the UNECSO convention makes this contingent on the wishes of 
the parents, not the children76. Sex-separate education is permitted even when no other option 
is offered by the state.
The final document of the International Consultative Conference on School Education in 
Relation with Freedom of Religion and Belief, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, convened
nn 9
by the UN Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance, Abdelfattah Amor , also prevaricated 
and gave no guideline on how educational equality (especially with regard to gender) should 
be weighed against parental wishes. It deemed that states should promote “the awareness of
no
gender aspects, with a view to promoting equal chances for men and women” , but also 
declared that: “the role of parents, ...is an essential factor in the education of children in the 
field of religion or belief; and that special attention should be paid to ... supporting parents to 
exercise their rights and fully play their role in education in the field of tolerance and non­
discrimination...”79. Thus, no clear guideline is given as to whether parental choice or gender 
equality should be paramount.
8. Wearing of headscarves: A conflict of group and individual values
A test case of the conflict between religious community, parental choices and gender equality 
in education, involving many of the issues discussed in this chapter, is that of the restrictions 
on wearing of headscarves by Muslim students and teachers, raising political as well as legal 
issues, whose determination will define the limits of religious freedom.
76 Article 2(b).
77 Madrid, 23-25 November 2001, http://www.unhchr.ch/htm]/menu2/7/b/cfedu-home.html.
78 Article 7 (d).
79 Article 9.
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8.1 Three states -  three cases
In order to understand the correlation between religious freedom, equality and the legal status 
of religion in the state in this issue, I compare decisions in three different constitutional 
settings: In France, a student who is a member of a Muslim minority in a public school of a 
secular state with a Christian majority; in Israel a student who is a member of a Muslim 
minority in a private Christian minority school in a Jewish-majority state; and in Turkey a
O A
Muslim student in higher education in a secular state with a Muslim majority.
In France, in 1989, citing the principle of laicity, a state school had prohibited the wearing of 
headscarves by female students and expelled them for refusing to abide by this rule. The 
Council of State advised the Minister for National Education, in an advisory opinion, that 
“[t]he wearing, by students, of tokens expressing their religious affiliation is not, by itself, 
incompatible with the principle of laicity. However, this liberty would not permit pupils to 
flaunt, in a conspicuous fashion, symbols of religious affiliation which, by their very nature, 
by the conditions under which they are worn... would constitute an act of pressure, 
proselytism or propaganda...”81. The decision then enumerates cases in which this would be 
forbidden, including circumstances in which such expression would infringe upon the dignity 
or the liberty of the pupils in the school.
Later rulings by the Council of State, which struck down complete bans by schools on 
wearing of headscarves, narrowed, by way of interpretation, the broad language of the
89decision, and clarified that a ban would be justified only in extreme cases .
80 The issue o f  wearing o f  headscarves by female students is contentious in other multi-religious societies. For 
instance, some Japanese public schools prevented the wearing o f  headscarves, relying on a rule that religious 
clothing is not allowed to be worn in public schools. See: Boyle and Sheen [1997] 214. In Singapore, Muslim  
girls who wore scarves (tudungs) were suspended from public schools. The government claimed its policy was 
aimed at maintaining racial harmony between the country’s ethnic Chinese majority and Muslim Malay 
minority. See: “Third schoolgirl suspended over scarf’, http://news.bbc.co.uk 11 February 2002. In Holland a 
ban on a student wearing a headscarf to school has recently been lifted only in the face o f  imminent legal action 
(Sparks, [2003]). In Spain, a state school in El Escorial refused to allow a student to wear a hijab. The school’s
decision was supported by the Education Minister, who argued that the hijab was not ‘a religious symbol but a
sign o f  discrimination against w om en’. Daly, [2002].
81 Advice o f 27 November 1989, cited in An-Na’im, [2000] 920.
82 Kherouaa [1993] Public Law 198, and see discussion: Poulter, [1997] 43.
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Q 1
After years of public turmoil regarding this issue, the Stasi committee , appointed by 
President Chirac, recommended that pupils not be allowed to wear ‘ostentatious’ religious or 
political symbols, citing specifically headscarves, large crosses and the kippa, while discrete
* * 84religious symbols should be allowed. The law subsequently enacted prohibits the wearing 
of “symbols by which pupils ostensibly manifest their religious affiliation” in public schools, 
high schools and colleges.
In Israel, Mona Jabarin, a Muslim girl, petitioned the Supreme Court after she was refused 
admittance to a Christian school upon her insistence on wearing a headscarf*5. In Israel the 
problem is even more complex than in France. A member of one religious minority (Muslim) 
wishes to attend a school of another religious minority (Christian) in a state with a Jewish 
majority. The school agrees to accept a student from outside its religious community, but asks 
that it abide by its dress rules. Should the state interfere? In this case it did not. The court 
rejected the student’s petition, relying on the autonomy of the denominational school.
The third case arose before the European Commission of Human Rights. In Karaduman v.
86Turkey a university student, not a child, was refused a university degree certificate, until she 
would submit a photograph of herself in which she was not wearing a headscarf, in 
conformity with the university’s disciplinary regulations. Her claim of breach of religious 
freedom (in contravention of Turkish and international law) was dismissed by the domestic 
court, and she applied to the European Commission, claiming a violation of her right to 
religious freedom, in contravention of Article 9 of the European Convention. The 
Commission declared the complaint inadmissible, accepting a state principle of secularism as 
justifying the ban. (A recent case in the European Court, §ahin87, was decided just before 
submission of this thesis. It will be referred to briefly below, but does not substantially alter 
the analysis in this section).
83 “Le rapport de la commission Stasi sur la lai'cite” ( “The report o f  the Stasi committee on secularity”) 
(Published in full in Le Monde, 12 December 2003).
84 Law no. 2004-228 o f  15 March 2004.
85 HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin  v. the Minister o f  Education PD 48 (5) 199.
86 Karaduman v. Turkey [1990]; a similar case is Bulut v. Turkey [EcomHR 1991].
87 §ahin v. Turkey [2004].
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In all three jurisdictions, the various courts and policy-makers did not uphold the religious 
freedom of the student above countervailing policy considerations. I proceed to inquire what
Q O
were the reasons for these decisions, and whether they can be justified .
8.2 Religious freedom as individual right
Three criticisms can be levelled at reasons used by the courts and decision-makers, from a 
liberal-individualistic view of religious freedom:
(1) Religious freedom includes free religious expression -  The freedom to express religious 
belief, as any freedom of expression, must include the freedom to express such belief in a 
conspicuous manner, even in a manner that may be seen as flaunting religious symbols. Both 
the decision in the French Council of State and the subsequent French legislation, which 
entail that students may wear religious symbols but not ostensibly manifest them, fall short of 
this requirement. In the context of a school, as opposed to the general public forum, it is 
reasonable that a more restrictive interpretation be given to freedom of speech. The right to 
proselytize, for instance, although included in the right to freedom of religion, may be 
legitimately subject to some restriction in the school context. A school is a compulsory 
educational institution. Children are sent to school by their parents on the understanding that 
they are there to study, not to be preached to and converted to a different religion or a 
different form or orthodoxy of their own religion. However, the wearing of religious costume, 
in itself and without proof of further harm, cannot be considered an act of proselytism or 
pressure which justifies its banning.
88 Legal determinations regarding international human rights law in this matter have also been made in other 
states. For instance, in Trinidad and Tobago, in Sumayyah M ohammed (a minor) v. Lucia M oraine [1196] 3 
LRC 475; 2 CHRLD 276 (High Court Decision o f  17 Jan 1995) a Muslim student was not allowed to wear hijab 
in a publicly-funded Catholic secondary school, contrary to the school uniform rules. The court found the 
school’s decision not discriminatory on the grounds o f  religion and not in violation o f  freedom o f  religion, as the 
relevant Education Act was deemed not to apply to manifestation o f  belief. Although an interpretation o f  
domestic law, this interpretation contradicts international legal norms, which clearly protect all aspects o f  
manifestation o f  religion. The Court ultimately accepted the student’s claim on reasons o f  administrative law, as 
it found the decision o f  the school an unreasonable exercise o f discretion.
In the UK, R (on the application o f  SB) v Headteacher and Governors o f  Denbigh High School [2005] EWCA 
Civ 199 dealt with a somewhat different matter o f a student wishing to wear a jilb a b  (full covering) to school. It 
instructed the school to balance the legitimate aims o f protecting other students from pressure with the student’s 
Article 9 rights, before deciding if  the prohibition is legal.
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In the Turkish case, the ban on headscarves is even less justified in this respect. The Turkish 
student was not a child. She was a young, educated, adult, making her own decisions, and 
studying among other young adult students. A prohibition on religious expression in a 
university, which relies on the effect or pressure it may have on other students, is less 
justified than a similar decision would be in a school setting.
(2) Voluntary participation in a public activity does not amount to a waiver o f rights -  A 
second justification for dismissing the scarf wearers’ claim, which is to be questioned, is the 
reliance by the European Commission in the Karaduman case on the voluntary choice of the 
student to attend the university. The Commission decided that, by choosing to study at a 
secular university, the student submits to the university’s rules. The reliance on the
QQ
‘voluntariness’ of enrollment begs two questions . The first is factual: Could the student 
have obtained her science degree at a non-secular institution of comparable level. The student 
may have had no comparable choice. The second question is normative: Must a student 
submit to secular rules just because she chose to study at a higher educational institution. The 
student’s claim in this case is especially strong, as she attended a public university. The 
student chose to take part in a public educational activity, training to be a scientist, a 
contributing, creative member of society. In weighing the student’s religious freedom against 
the university code, it would appear that the code should be changed so that she is given 
equal access to education, rather than her human right be impaired in order to uphold the 
university’s code90.
Of course, the right to religious freedom that the student has can be subject to legitimate 
limitations. It might be, that succumbing to students’ demand to wear religious dress will 
create a religious atmosphere in the university, which the other students may find 
pressurizing and may impair the open liberal atmosphere which the university seeks to 
provide to its students, but this is a separate justification which must be proven.
89 For a discussion o f  voluntariness in European Commission o f  Human Rights decisions see: Evans, C. [2001] 
130-131.
90 Minnow, [1990] 287, remarks on a correlative issue o f free speech, that: “legal arguments can be made both 
to restrict and to extend students’ First Amendment rights in light o f  the school’s mission to socialize young 
people... and to inculcate the habits o f  good citizenship. ... [S]peech may be restricted to guard against 
disorder. But we might ask can its restriction be justified to maintain a particular order.”
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(3) A principle o f secularly -  A third justification, which does not tally with religious 
freedom as an individual right, is that raised in Karaduman, the implied acceptance by the 
European Commission of a Turkish state principle of secularity, as justifying the demand for 
conformity with a secular dress-code. But the constitutional character of the state should not 
justify a breach of religious freedom if it is otherwise illegitimate. In cases before the 
European Court and Commission, Turkey has repeatedly argued it needs to protect a principle 
of secularity in order to maintain democracy91. The Commission, in Karaduman, noted that 
secular universities may ensure that fundamentalist religious movements do not disturb 
public order in universities, or pressure students who do not practice religion. That is, of 
course, a legitimate government concern, if proven, and should be distinguished from 
reliance on a principle of secularity as such.
The European Court, in a case regarding the ban on headscarves in Turkish universities
• • O'}decided just prior to submission of this thesis , re-affirmed the determination in Karaduman, 
that the ban is a legitimate restriction of religious freedom. However, it analysed the 
pressures exerted on other students to dress religiously, as well as the political and social 
context in which extremist political movements seek to impose religious precepts, as 
analysed in Refah Partisi, rather than simply affirming the principle of secularism. It viewed, 
in the political context, the steps taken under the principle of secularity as proportionately 
furthering the legitimate aims of gender equality and a secular way of life.
The Court relied on a principle encountered during its previous rulings on matters of state and 
religion: It viewed the relationship between state and religion as an issue on which national 
determination will be given particularly wide berth within the margin of appreciation. This is 
a group-conception interpretation of religious freedom, in this case, paradoxically upholding 
a secularist stance.
A principle of secularity may also offend the liberal principle of neutrality. Such a principle 
could be neutral on its face but discriminatory in practice. A law, such as that in France,
91 See: Kalac v. Turkey [1997]; Case o f  Refah Partisi v. Turkey [2002, 2004].
92 §ahin v. Turkey [2004].
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which bans wearing religious symbols and clothing, may ban a practice which is compulsory 
in one religion but not compulsory in another.
Prohibition of religious dress cannot be justified by the arguments that such dress is 
‘provocative’ speech, that the institution was voluntarily entered into or that the state is 
constitutionally secular, but it can be justified by proven harm to other students. So it is in 
public institutions, but is this different in a private denominational school?
8.3 Religious freedom of the student or religious autonomy of the community?
Where the student attends a school of a minority community, an argument can be made for 
the religious freedom of the community, which does not arise in state schools. There is clear 
social value in fostering cultural and educational institutions of religious communities, as 
highlighted by communitarians. The schools could lose their value as a meaningful 
expression and preservation of the community if they are not allowed to maintain their 
internal rules, as decided upon by the community.
The Israeli Court dismissed the petition because the school in question was a private 
denominational school, and not a state school. The court preferred the autonomy of the 
religious (Christian) community, to the religious freedom of the individual (Moslem) child. 
(Although one of the three judges on the panel commented, that he would have reached the 
same conclusion in a case of a state school ).
Should there be a difference between a state school and a private denominational school in 
the need to respect individual religious freedom? One is a public institution and the other a 
private institution. But at least basic human rights should apply to private institutions 
operating in the public sphere. The public/private divide is not clear-cut. For instance, in 
Israel, as in some other states, the denominational school was publicly funded.
It appears that an institution open to general public enrolment should be seen as a semi­
public institution, which must treat the participants in its activities with equal respect for their 
rights, unless this directly contradicts the religious principles of the institution. This is similar
93 HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin  v. M inister o f  Education  48(5) PD 199, 204, per J. Goldberg.
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to arguing that a religious hospital must treat all its patients with equal respect for their rights, 
although it might be exempt from providing abortions. Wearing a headscarf does not stand in 
such direct contradiction to principles of a Christian school.
It is a difficult case, as the justification for having denominational schools is precisely to 
allow them to depart from the general liberal norms. The communitarian approach would 
recognize the right of the religious community to set its own rules. However, there is strong 
reason to insist that all religious communities respect basic human rights (including freedom 
of religion), at least in all their public institutions which are not of an inherently religious 
character.
Institutions of religious communities can be separated into core religious institutions used 
solely for religious service, (such as mosques, synagogues, churches), a middle level of 
institutions (such as religious schools), which provide a social service and do not play a part 
in religious services but have a purpose of furthering a certain religious outlook, and a third 
rank of institutions (such as religious hospitals), which provide a public service, whose 
mission is motivated by religious imperatives, but do not themselves serve a religious 
purpose. Institutions of the first level are justified in demanding adherence to their dress code 
even in contravention of individual religious freedom, institutions of the third level are not. 
Institutions of the middle level would be justified in overriding individual choice of religious 
dress only when it directly contradicted their religious ethos.
8.4 Equality of female students
The justification of defending the custom of wearing a headscarf, especially by reliance on 
human rights, raises serious questions as to the obligation of states to positively promote non­
discrimination of women. The practice of wearing a headscarf for women, in both Jewish and 
Moslem society is repressive to women94. It instils unequal values of modesty in behaviour 
and dress for men and women. It educates to inequality between the sexes and marginalizes 
young women in society from a young age95. Wearing a scarf for religious reasons is,
94 See: Rafiq Khan, [1993] 59, arguing that veiling in a reminder to Muslim women that their place is in the 
home (relying on a quote from the Q u r’an (24:31).
95 See: Mernissi, [1991], in which the author argues that through misinterpretation o f  Mohamed’s teaching 
women have become veiled, secluded and marginalized objects rather than subjects. See also Mernissi, [1975].
231
therefore, different from other signs of religious affiliation, as a Sikh turban or Jewish kippah. 
Upholding a student’s right to wear a headscarf is really promoting the right of her family and 
society to instil values of inequality from childhood. This is an example of the problem 
discussed above, whereby acknowledging rights to religious behaviour in the education 
system legitimizes practices which reinforce discriminatory views, in contravention of human 
rights norms. International law mandates that states counter such customs, even when 
practiced in the private sphere96, and of course in state schools, which are public institutions.
However there is a strong counter-argument. It has been argued by cultural-feminists and 
others, that, in her society, a headscarf may help a woman preserve her freedom97. The actual 
outcome in the Israeli case was that, after her case was dismissed and she was not allowed to 
wear a headscarf, Mona attended an inferior school. Wearing a headscarf would have, in 
reality, permitted Mona to attend a top school and get a top education. In this case, a 
discriminative practice can lead to better educational choices, which will ultimately advance 
equality for the girl.
However, acknowledging such a practice as a protection for women serves to reinforce the 
discriminatory attitude which made it necessary in the first place. Hassan98 argues, that the 
purpose of the veil was to make it safe for women to go about their work without sexual 
molestation, but Muslim societies have used the pretext of protecting the chastity of Muslim 
women to put them behind veils and shrouds and locked doors.
The goal of law should be to eradicate discriminatory social attitudes. But, in the short run, 
ignoring the fact that prohibiting discriminatory practices may limit women’s access to 
education and work outside the home, will only harm women.
One solution is to consider ways to empower girls, both legally and socially, to make their 
individual religious choices, rather than accept the choices of the religious community. Such 
an attempt was the recommendation of the Stasi committee to make known to immigrant
96 CEDAW, Article 5.
97 Poulter, [1997] 69.
98 Hassan, [1996] 382.
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students (particularly to girls) that over the age of sixteen they can apply for French 
citizenship without parental consent, together with the recommendation that they be able to 
continue their studies without parental consent.
The social context cannot be ignored. In Turkey, a state that has opted for a secular regime, 
Islam is a majority religion, as it is in Tunisia, where there are also prohibitions on wearing 
headscarves in schools". In these cases the state is trying to prevent the advancement of 
fundamentalist attitudes of its own majority religion. In the case of a student from a minority 
religion (such as the cases in France) other considerations arise. The actions of a government 
curtailing manifestations of a minority religion should be subject to more rigorous scrutiny 
than the actions of a government curtailing the manifestation of a majority religion.
General principles which mandate a preference for individual rights, developed in discussion 
of other issues in this study, are applicable also to headscarf disputes. There is no justification 
to override individual religious rights even when confronting provocative speech, even where 
participation is voluntary, and even within state institutions of a constitutionally secular state. 
Only clear evidence of direct threat to the religious freedom of others should be enough to 
curtail the religious freedom of headscarf wearing students. It is harder to argue for religious 
dress freedom within community religious institutions, but even there, individual religious 
freedoms must be respected, unless there is an overriding justification. It is legitimate, even 
mandated by international human rights law, to protect gender equality, a right no less 
important than religious freedom. However, the benefits and harm of such a prohibition, for 
the promotion of gender equality must be assessed in each social context.
9. Teachers’ headscarves and religious freedom in employment
The wearing of headscarves to schools raises similar, but somewhat different, considerations 
when the wearers are teachers. The European Court has decided that prohibition on a teacher 
in a state elementary school from wearing a headscarf was a permissible limitation of 
religious freedom under Article 9(2) of the ECHR in the case of Dahlabm . The Court
99 This was criticised by the CRC committee. CRC/C/15/Add.l81 (2002) at paras. 29.
100 Dahlab  v. Switzerland  [1998].
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accepted that the wearing of a headscarf might have some proselytising effect, because, in the 
Court’s estimation, it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which the Court assumed 
is laid down in the Koran and is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. In the 
Court’s opinion, wearing of an Islamic headscarf was incommensurate with the tolerance, 
respect for others and equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic 
society must convey to their pupils.
This begs the question what cultural and religious differences the Court would find 
permissible. The Court based its decision on the impressionable age of the primary school 
pupils. Of course, attitudes are learned through observations at an early age. However, the 
teacher did not manifest lack of tolerance to other religions or attempt to proselytise. The 
Court accepted as given the liberal model of a school which presents a homogenous front to 
the pupils. It did not suggest the alternative model where toleration is learned through variety. 
The first model in effect further ghettoises minority communities and minority women, as 
they will simply refrain from teaching in the state primary schools.
The European Court had followed a much better approach in a case which dealt with political 
ideology rather than religion, in the matter of Vogt101. A teacher was dismissed from a state 
school because of her membership in the Communist party. The Court agreed that state 
policy of refusing positions in the civil service to employees who were members of a political 
party that pursued aims ‘incompatible with the democratic constitutional systems’ served a 
legitimate aim, but its application must be balanced with the right of freedom of expression of 
the teacher. Where the teacher had not expressed undemocratic views within or even outside 
the school, her membership of a party which held such views could not in itself justify the 
dismissal as necessary in a democratic society . In the Dahlab case, no such particularised 
attempt at balancing the employee’s right against the danger to her pupils was undertaken by 
the court.
101 Vogt v. Germany [1995].
102 But see also the earlier case Kosiek  v. Germany [1987].
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103The German Constitutional Court in the Case o f the headscarf o f the schoolteacher ruled, 
by a majority vote, that the ban of a Land on the wearing of headscarves by teachers in public 
schools was illegal. The ban restricted three rights guaranteed by the Basic Law: Equality in 
eligibility for public office104, eligibility to hold public office without regard to religious 
affiliation105, and religious freedom106. A restriction on rights guaranteed by the Basic Law 
cannot be imposed without a basis in legislation. There was no basis in law for the banning of 
headscarves, and therefore the ban was unconstitutional. However, the Court ruled that the 
Land could legislate such a ban, subject to constitutional limitations, which would be a 
permissible restriction of religious freedom, commensurate with Article 9 of the European 
Convention. For a ban to pass constitutional muster, the legislator would have to consider the 
religious makeup of the population, the tradition of the schools and the intensity of religious 
feelings in the area.
The three dissenting judges argued that a public servant voluntarily accepts a limited scope of 
basic rights, by aligning himself with the state. Thus, teachers have lesser protection of their 
rights than parents and students. This is justified because as public servants they are given 
power over the citizen. A corollary of this power bestowed by the state upon the public 
servant is the acceptance of a limitation of rights. So, the Land could ban this behaviour of 
the teacher even absent enabling legislation, as it is forbidden anyway by the Basic Law.
In France, such a prohibition, based on the identification of someone fulfilling a role on 
behalf of the state with the state itself, is extended beyond schools to public institutions. 
French Justice Minister Dominique Perben has barred a woman from a court jury for wearing 
a headscarf, arguing that the Muslim scarf worn by the juror at a trial was contrary to the 
principle of impartiality. He said he did not want open signs of religious commitment in
107French courts . The Stasi committee similarly noted that the Minister of Justice objected to 
a female lawyer appearing in court with a veil.





107 “French juror barred for headscarf’, www.bbc.co.uk. 25 November 2003.
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Barring the wearing of a headscarf for jury duty is, in some ways, a more serious breach of 
individual religious freedom than barring it for teachers. It is the ability to take part in the 
legal system whilst adhering to their religion that is being compromised. Not only that, but 
Muslim defendants and litigants have a right, as any other citizens, that members of their 
community be equally represented on the justice system which decides their legal fate.
The wearing of headscarves has been restricted not just in the public, but also in the private
I /JO
sphere. In the Case o f the headscarf o f a shop-worker the German Constitutional Court did
not accept the petition of a shop-worker, who claimed that her employer’s ban on her 
wearing a headscarf to work violated her religious freedom, guaranteed by Article 4(1) of the 
Basic Law, because her religion forbids her from appearing in public without the scarf. The 
Court relied on Article 12(1) of the Basic Law, which guarantees freedom of vocation to both 
the employer and the employee. Private persons (such as the employer) are not subject to 
obligations of the Basic Law, so the shop has no obligation to allow her to wear the scarf. 
Neither does the shop have an obligation to find an accommodation such as letting her work 
in a back room.
The French Stasi committee109 has likewise decided that the law ought to allow private 
enterprises to restrict shop-workers wearing headscarves from dealing with customers. This 
seems a particularly groundless limitation of personal freedom. While the wearing of 
headscarves by teachers could reasonably be argued to influence their pupils, entrusted by 
their parent to the education system, no similar influence can be said to be exerted by shop- 
workers. The intolerance of customers to minority workers dressed according to their 
religion is precisely the discrimination which international human rights law seeks to uproot.
The EU Council Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation110, which member states needed to implement by 2 December
108 BVerfG, 1 BvR 792/03, decided 30.7.2003, (German Constitutional Court Website: 
http://vmw.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20030730 Ibvr079203.htm0.
109 “La rapport de la commission Stasi sur la lai’cite” ( “The report o f  the Stasi committee on secularity”) 
Published in full in Le Monde, 12 December 2003.
1,0 2000/78/EC o f 27 November 2000 OJ 2000 L303/16.
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2003111, prohibits, among others, indirect discrimination, which includes use of apparently 
neutral provisions which would put a person of a particular religion or belief at a 
disadvantage unless it is justified by a legitimate aim achieved by appropriate and necessary
1 19means . This applied both in public and private employment. It is surprising that the Stasi 
committee ignored the existence of this directive, as at least arguably, it applies to such dress 
prohibitions. Although the aims it attempts to achieve are legitimate, whether the means are 
appropriate and necessary is doubtful.
It should be urged that further international instruments require states to guarantee religious 
freedom in the private sector in those areas that affect individuals most, such as employment. 
It is difficult to view this as an issue of contractual freedom. Clearly, workers need to accept 
the posts available to them, and should not be made to choose between such positions and
11 Ttheir religious freedom .
10. Conclusions
International law has, for a long time, protected religious freedom and religious choice as a 
right of the family, rather than a right of the child. It was a right of the parents, seen as agents 
of their religious community, which was upheld against the state. Even today, international 
law prevaricates between recognising a right of the child and protecting a right of the parents 
over the child’s religious education.
Religious freedom as a right of the child must be better protected also in the school. Children 
should be regarded as bearers of rights of religious freedom within the school, whether they 
(or their parents for them) have chosen to attend public or private schools. Such freedom may 
be restricted according to legitimate needs within the school, but cannot be infringed based 
merely on the fact that the student attends the school. Indeed, learning to exercise individual 
choice is an important lesson for schools to teach.
1,1 Article 18.
112 Article 2(a).
113 This, o f course, does not preclude limitations resulting from health and safety or similar concerns.
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Teachers, as well as students, must be seen as individuals with a right to freedom of religion 
and conscience, which they do not ‘check at the door’ as they enter the education system. 
However, their freedom can be legitimately restricted to a greater extent than that of students, 
in order to preserve the rights of others.
This chapter examined the duality of religious freedom at its inception. It showed that what is 
perceived as an exercise of individual choice and free will is in most cases determined at birth, 
fostered by education and seldom changed even when the child ceases to be a child. The 
formation of identity is thus largely attributable to the group. Largely, but not solely. It is the 
ability to maintain individualistic-critical facilities towards group religious identity, as well as 
identity of minority religions, which must be protected through the legal system.
CHAPTER SIX : RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS A RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH
Religious freedom was analysed in Chapter Two as a right that can be understood 
through two perceptions: as a right of expression or as a right of identity. This duality 
is co-related, though not identical, to that between an individual perception and a 
community perception of this right. The duality is evident in the legal regulation of 
this right. It is particularly evident in legal regulations of religious freedom that place 
limits on expression. In these cases, the perception of the right will determine the 
boundaries of the right of religious freedom.
This study argued that religious freedom should be construed first and foremost as an 
individual right. In Chapter Two, the individual right was related to the expressive- 
critical aspect of religious freedom, and the community right to its identity aspect. 
However, both aspects inform this right to a certain extent even in its construction as 
an individual right, and this Chapter explores some of the implications of this balance 
on the regulation of religious speech.
In this chapter, I argue that contrary to the view that religious speech should be 
subject to community choices, it must be viewed as a matter for individual choice just 
as any other speech. The degree of protection accorded to religious speech should not 
be any less than that accorded to other kinds of political speech. For the same reason, 
I argue that the right to religious freedom must include a right to receive religious 
speech. The right to religious speech should be accorded on a basis of equality 
between religions. I show that seemingly neutral procedural means can be used 
illegitimately to effect discrimination against unpopular religions.
The distinction between religion as expression and religion as identity is utilized in 
the present chapter to examine four types of regulation that limit religious speech, and 
enquire as to their justification: I first examine the offence of proselytism and the 
justifications offered for it, arguing that, under the guise of the protection of 
individual religious autonomy, this prohibition serves also as a measure for religious 
group self-preservation. Next, imposition of penalties by the religious group itself on 
members whose religious speech it views as unacceptable is examined. I argue that 
even such internal sanctions cannot be solely left to group autonomy and
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determination, but that the state and international law, must require religious groups 
themselves to respect a certain right of free speech of their members. I then turn to 
prohibition of religious speech by the state when such speech is considered 
blasphemous. I claim that this offence protects religion as identity at the expense of 
the protection of religion as expression, a price which is not an acceptable balance of 
rights. Lastly, I turn to a most important area of regulation of religious speech and 
speech concerning religion under current debate: prohibition of religious hate speech. 
I argue that an understanding of the dual nature of religious freedom as a right which 
protects both identity and expression would lead to a regulation of speech which 
should be unique and different from regulation of other types of hate speech.
1. Free speech and religion - preliminary issues
1.1 The degree of protection of religious speech -  a matter for community resolution?
Religious speech is speech, and therefore is protected by the right of free speech1 (in 
addition to the right of religious freedom). But does it merit higher, lower or equal 
protection relative to other speech because of its religious character?
The European Court of Human Rights in Wingrove stated that there is a wider margin 
of appreciation available to the state parties when regulating speech in the realm of 
morals and, especially, religion, than when restricting political speech or debating 
public interest .
This exemplifies a ‘hands-off treatment of international human rights law when 
confronting religious choices made by the state4. But speech relating to morals and
1 Recognized in all major human rights instruments, including: Article 19(2) ICCPR, Article 10,
ECHR.
2 Wingrove v. UK  [1996].
3 This approach led the Court, by majority vote, to accept censorship o f  a film bound to outrage some 
Christian believers, as it viewed the restriction o f  free speech (Article 10(2), ECHR) as a legitimate 
protection o f  the religious freedom o f  others.
4 Compare the discussion o f  the deference accorded to state policy in issues concerning religion in the 
Draft Charter o f  Fundamental Rights o f  the European Union in Chapter One.
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religion is political speech. It is speech that relates to society and its values, and 
shapes it. It is a factor in the market-place of ideas. Under the approach that leaves 
wider discretion regarding religious speech to the state, one kind of political speech is 
thus treated differently from others. The implications of this point beyond this case 
are discussed in this chapter.
1.2 Right to receive religious speech
The view of religion as speech has other implications too. The perception of religious 
freedom as an expressive-individualistic right, the purpose of which is to foster 
critical debate, implies a right to receive views about religion as well as to impart 
them. So, the religious freedom that is restricted by limitations on religious speech is 
both that of those who impart the speech and of those who wish to receive the speech. 
This is true, for instance, when speech is censored for religious reasons.
However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in The Last Temptation o f  
Christ Case5, analysed this aspect of religious freedom differently. The applicants 
claimed that their ability to receive information was impaired by a ban on the 
screening of the film ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’. The Court decided that their 
right to freedom of thought and expression, guaranteed by Article 13 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, was infringed, since the right includes freedom to 
receive information. It saw, however, no infringement of Article 12, the right to 
freedom of religion and belief, because, it reasoned, no one’s right to practice, change 
or disseminate their religion or belief was impaired by the ban6.
But freedom of religion is also, a right of the individual to be inquisitive and critical 
about religion. In fact, such a view of religious freedom was one of the original 
justifications of this right7. In this view, just as freedom of expression includes the
5 Judgment o f  February 5, 2001, Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights (Ser. C) No. 73 (2001).
6 The American Commission which brought the case to the Court thought that Article 12 had been 
breached.
7 See discussion in Chapter Two.
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freedom to receive information, so freedom of religion and belief includes the right to 
receive information relating to religion, both advocating religions and criticizing 
them. The Court regrettably followed a narrower interpretation, encompassing only 
the actions of practice, manifestation and change of religion without the freedoms that 
allow the individual to make rational choices about them.
1.3 Equality of protection of the right to religious speech
Protection of religious freedom of expression, as well as any religious freedom, must 
be accorded equally. However, how equality should be assessed is a matter for debate. 
The different perceptions of equality are brought into relief in the examination by the 
European Commission, in Choudury v. UK?, of the offence of blasphemy in the UK. 
Because this offence in the UK applies only to Christianity, the applicant’s requests to 
UK authorities to prosecute Salman Rushdie and the publishers of his The Satanic 
Verses for blasphemy were dismissed9. The applicant claimed that his rights under 
Article 9 of the European Convention were breached, since the UK authorities did not 
protect his religion from blasphemy. The European Commission decided that there 
was no interference with his freedom of religion, which does not include a right to any 
specific form of proceedings against those who offend the sensitivities of an 
individual or group. Because no right under Article 9 was breached, there was also no 
violation of Article 14, which only arises in connection with discrimination of 
Convention rights.
The Commission seems right in not viewing the lack of blasphemy proceedings as a 
breach of religious freedom. However, the interpretation of what constitutes 
discrimination in protection of religious freedom seems remiss. If a state decides to 
offer a certain means of protection of religious freedom, even such as are not 
mandated by Article 9, whether it discriminates against the applicant should be 
assessed according to the protection of religious freedom that the state in fact offers to 
other religions. The request for the application of the blasphemy prohibition to 
another religion should have been denied only because ordering such a prohibition
8 Choudury v. UK  [1990] 12 HRLJ 172.
9 R. v C hief M etropolitan Magistrate, ex p  Choudhary (1990) 140 NLJ 702.
242
would be incommensurate with the religious freedom of others (as will be argued later 
in this chapter).
There are wider implications of this interpretation of discrimination in religious 
freedom. It would follow from Choudury that only a limited ambit of protection is 
offered by Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9. The state is only required not to 
discriminate in according the minimal standard mandated by Article 9. Any further 
protection it offers to religious freedom on a discriminatory basis would not be a 
violation of the Convention. A preferable interpretation would accord equality not just 
in the minimum provision demanded by Article 9, but in the actual implementation of 
the rights by the state.
1.4 Discrimination in the right to religious speech by seemingly neutral procedural 
regulation
Not only substantive regulation, but procedural restrictions as well, can impede 
freedom of religion. More perniciously, seemingly neutral provisions applicable to all 
religions escape legal censure, but may in fact impact upon some religions more than 
others (whether intentionally or not) with a discriminatory result.
How such procedural restrictions escape legal censure can be seen in the European 
Court decision in Manoussakis]0. It concerned a Greek law requiring prior state 
authorisation for use of premises for religious worship. Such authorization was denied 
to Jehovah’s Witnesses. The European Court11 decided that the law was incompatible 
with Article 9 in so far as it allowed ministerial discretion for authorisation beyond 
the formal conditions laid down in the law. However, the ruling should have given a 
broader protection to religious freedom. Any law limiting where worship may take 
place (beyond health and safety regulations which apply to all public buildings) is an 
unjustified infringement of religious freedom. It is the state that must justify why a 
restriction should be permitted. Furthermore, formal conditions, even seemingly 
neutral ones, are likely to impact adversely upon minority religions and unpopular
10 Manoussakis v. Greece [1996].
11 Ibid, para. 47.
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religions. Indeed, in this case this was exemplified by the demand of the law that fifty 
families submit the request, a demand that is harder for smaller religions to comply 
with, as hinted at by Judge Martens (in a concurring opinion). An approach more 
critical of state regulation would have better served the protection of religious 
freedom.
The danger inherent in state authorities laying down seemingly neutral provisions that
impact adversely minority or unpopular religions is highlighted by a recent decision
1 0of the US Supreme Court . It held that an ordinance making it a misdemeanour to 
engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and 
receiving a permit, violates the First Amendment, as it applies to religious 
proselytising and to distribution of handbills. Thus, under US law even procedural 
regulation, with no discretion as to the substance of the speech, is not permitted. The 
American Court noted that the seemingly neutral technical provision in fact impacts 
disproportionately upon religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, which lack 
financial resources and so rely on door to door canvassing to proselytize.
While dealing with regulations impacting on religious freedom, two contrasting legal 
approaches applicable to cases of restrictions on religious freedom, including 
religious speech, are apparent. The first is content with the formal equality and 
general applicability of the regulation, while the second approach looks at whether the 
seemingly formal regulation has a disparate impact on small religions, which lack 
relevant resources. This second approach better protects religious freedom.
2. Proselytism as protection of community identity
The relation between competing perceptions of religious freedom as an 
individualistic-deliberative right and as a right that protects identity as part of the 
community (or even the cohesiveness of the community itself) is reflected in the legal
12 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society o f  New Yorkv. Village o f  Stratton 536 US — ; 122 S.Ct. 2080. 
(2002).
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regulation of proselytism. The right to change religion is internationally recognized as 
included in the right to religious freedom13. The right to convince others to change 
their religion is more controversial. In the international instruments, it is specifically 
mentioned only in the American Convention14, but it is generally recognized as part of 
religious freedom15. A study of its limitations is instructive regarding the 
understanding of this right.
To justify restrictions on proselytism, two arguments are used, which are compatible 
with a liberal point of view: prevention of coercion and prevention of undue 
influence. Prohibition of coercion to change religion is justified, as coercion negates 
free will. The argument of undue influence is more problematic. There is a fine line 
between effecting a change of religion that is devoid of free will (through coercion) 
and the legitimate right to convince others to change their religion within the free 
market-place of ideas. It seems that UN studies have not sufficiently acknowledged 
this distinction, but have, rather, permitted prohibition of both.
The former Special Rapporteur to the Sub-commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Elisabeth Odio Benito, recommended in 
her study16 that states adopt provisions against coercion to change religion. Prevention 
of coercion to change religion is legitimate and, indeed, warranted government policy. 
But Odio Benito did not consider the greater danger to religious freedom inherent in 
the potential use by governments of such legislation for persecution of unpopular 
minority religions which proselytise, even absent proof of use of coercion.
The earlier work of Special Rapporteur Arcot Krishnaswami in his study on religious 
rights commissioned by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities , included a proposal that “no one should be subjected to
13 E.g. ICCPR, Article 18 (right to adopt religion o f choice); The American Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 12(1) (prohibiting impairment o f the right to change religion).
14 Article 12(1) refers specifically to a right to disseminate religion or b elief.
15 Under the ECHR: Kok.kinak.is v. Greece , [EQHR1994].
16 Odio Benito, [1989] 26.
17 Krishnaswami, [I960].
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coercion or to improper inducements likely to impair his freedom to maintain or 
change his religion or belief’18. However, what are improper inducements is, of 
course, a matter of interpretation.
On a principled level it may be questioned whether such prohibitions in fact protect 
individual autonomy or rather maintain the cohesiveness of the community19. Four 
different examples of state prohibitions on proselytism exemplify this last point: In 
the Kokkinakis case20, the European Court found the Greek law against proselytism21, 
which prohibited exertion of influence upon religious belief either by moral or 
material support, or by appeal to someone of low experience or intellectual faculties, 
to be compatible with Article 922. In Germany, the Constitutional Court decided in the 
Tobacco Atheist case23, that the denial of parole to a prison inmate who tried to bribe 
other inmates with tobacco to forswear their religion, did not breach Article 4 of the 
Basic Law (which guarantees religious freedom). This, reasoned the Court, because 
the right to proselytize exists only when not exploiting a harsh situation of others, 
which is inconsistent with their dignity24. Based apparently on a similar justification
18 Rule 1(3) o f  his 16 proposed rules.
19 Several justifications o f  proselytism in particular instances have been offered which rely explicitly on 
the maintaining o f  community identity. Among these are Makau Wa Mutua’s approach that 
indigenous African religions are not equipped to deal with missionary religions, and so state action 
against external religions is justified (Wa Mutua, [1996]). Foldesi, [1996] argues that after years o f  
communism and state-sponsored secularism in Eastern Europe it is justified, to give some legal 
protection to the historical church by restrictions on proselytizing religions from the outside. Lerner 
argues for a right o f  the community against the right o f those who wish to proselytize based on a right 
to privacy, recognised in Article 17 o f  the ICCPR, although this would seem a right that can only be a 
right o f  individuals. (Lerner, [2000] 117). These justifications remain outside the present discussion, 
which deals with the ostensibly liberal individualistic justifications, which, as w ill be seen, are also an 
indirect protection o f  community cohesiveness.
20 Kokkinakis v. Greece [1994].
21 Law no. 1672/1939 (Section 2) makes it an offence to engage in 'proselytism', defined as:
“an attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs o f a person o f  a different religious persuasion 
(eterodoxos), with the aim o f  undermining those beliefs, either by any kind o f  inducement or promise 
o f  an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking 
advantage o f  his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety.”
22 Even though it found a breach o f  the Convention in its application in the particular case.
23 12 BverfGE 1 (1960).
24 See Currie, [1994] 253.
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of unfair inducement, Israel’s Penal Law includes offences of offering another person
or
monetary or material compensation to effect his religious conversion , accepting
9A •such compensation from another for a religious conversion , and causing the
j  7
religious conversion of a minor . In 2001, France passed a law “aimed at
no #
strengthening the prevention and the repression against cults and sects” , creating a 
criminal offence of abusing a state of ignorance or weakness, leading the person to an
90act or an abstention which are seriously harmful to him . This applies not only to 
minors or persons of diminished legal capacity (in which case the law is undoubtedly 
a justified restriction), but also to “persons in a state of psychological or physical 
subjection resulting from serious pressures exercised”, a less clear and more 
controversial category. Depending on its interpretation, this definition could mean 
different things. Under a broad interpretation this could even include pressures that 
are equivalent to high pressure sales techniques.
Seemingly, the restrictions on proselytism are justified, as even liberals exclude some 
classes of people from full autonomy. These restrictions are based on the objection to 
the use of manipulative techniques to cause someone to change their religion. 
However, use of the same manipulative techniques on people who are already 
members of the religion (or other ideological group), including children, in order to 
maintain their membership, is not considered illegal. Thus, welfare provisions 
accompanying a religious service for members of a church would not be illegal, but 
provision of the same services for outsiders would be. This shows that behind a 
fafade of individual-based reasoning, the prohibitions are predicated upon a view of 
religious freedom as a group-identity right. So, breaking this identity in a way 
incompatible with full autonomy is seen as harmful, but maintaining identity through 
similar means is not.
25 Section 174A, the Penal Law, 1977.
26 Section 174B, the Penal Law, 1977.
27 Section 368, the Penal Law, 1977.
28 Law No. 2001-504 o f  12 June 2001.
29 Article 20, amending Section 223-15-2, the French Criminal Code.
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Article 9 would not protect improper proselytism such as offering of material or social
30 31 • •advantage, stated the European Court in Larissis v. Greece . But religious 
institutions routinely offer material and social advantages to their own members in 
order to keep them as members. It is only when religions do so in conversion of others 
that states interfere. If the object is to protect individuals from undue influence, why 
do prohibitions exist in one case but not the other? Possibly, what is protected is more 
the group to which the individuals belong, than the individuals themselves.
There is yet another consideration: As we have seen, prohibitions on proselytising 
have been enacted regarding the use of material inducements, or exertion of influence 
on people whose capacities or circumstances make them vulnerable. All are forms of 
manipulation regarded as improper. But manipulation is a constant element in 
interactions between people in society. Such prohibitions apply almost only to 
conversion of religious beliefs. Manipulation of other ideas and beliefs in similar 
circumstances (ranging from political persuasion and election campaigning to the 
inducement to purchase products, by means including PR and advertising) generally 
remains legal, and even desirable in a society predicated on a free market-place of 
ideas. This distinction between change of religious beliefs and change of any other 
beliefs lacks any coherent justification. This further points to the conclusion that such 
prohibitions in fact are intended to protect and foster existing religious identities 
rather than individual autonomy.
This criticism applies to laws prohibiting proselytism of adults. Prohibition of 
inducing children to convert is justified, based on the widely shared perception that it 
is easier for adults to manipulate children’s beliefs. Indeed, calls for stricter regulation 
of commercial advertising to children follow the same approach. This differential 
treatment regarding adults, protecting them from manipulation of religious beliefs but 
not from manipulation of other categories of beliefs and ideas, hints that states which 
prohibit conversion for a pecuniary interest are protecting groups from the ‘poaching’
30 Larissis v. Greece [1999], para. 45.
31 The holding o f  the Court, however, which dealt with proselytizing without material inducement, 
seems right to differentiate between an army context, in which it did not view a Greek conviction for 
proselytising as an infringement o f  Article 9, and the civilian context, in which it viewed the ban as 
infringing Article 9.
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of members rather than the individual aspect of religious freedom. Thus, under an 
individual-based conception of religious freedom, many restrictions on proselytism 
are unjustifiable .
2.1 Restrictions on proselytism in the private sphere
Restrictions on religious speech, including proselytism, are not only those imposed by 
the state. Private bodies may impose restrictions that are not less onerous, especially 
against small and unpopular religions.
In a recent case in Israel33, a newspaper refused to carry an advertisement for a book 
advocating the religious beliefs of Messianic Jews, claiming that this advertisement 
would offend parts of its readership. While the majority on the District Court held that 
a private newspaper was under no legal obligation to enter into contract with potential 
advertisers, the dissenting judge argued that a newspaper may not discriminate on the 
grounds of religious belief in deciding which advertisements to publish.
Such an interpretation of the obligations of newspapers, private bodies, to respect 
human rights, especially in a small market with a limited number of newspapers, 
would preserve the freedom of religious speech of unpopular minorities. Absent such 
protection, dominant religious groups could curtail the right of minorities to propagate 
their religion through private action, as effectively as government can curtail it 
through legal restrictions.
This is yet another area where private actors can effectively harm religious freedom. 
Granted that any restriction on private actors would have to take into account the 
rights of these private actors, particularly when imposition on the freedom of the press 
is involved, the interpretation of the right of religious freedom in state law and
32 Criminalisation o f  the acceptance o f  material remuneration by the convert (Section 174B o f  the Israel 
Penal Law, 1977, as described above) may be an even clearer infringement o f  religious freedom. 
Everyone has a right to change religion. A prohibition on accepting remuneration for doing so is a 
limitation o f  this right. It may be justified as a paternalistic limitation, prohibiting people from 
becoming victims o f  exploitation, but in its broad scope it may be an impermissible protection o f  the 
group rather than a permissible protection o f  the individual.
33 Civ. App. (Jerusalem) 3060/02 Stern v. Palestine Post (decided 18.11.2003).
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international law should move beyond the traditional ambit of protection of religious 
freedom only in the public sphere.
3. Freedom of religious speech and sanctions within a religious group
Indisputably, everyone has a right in international law to leave a religious group34 and 
expound views different from its teachings. But an important question is what sort of 
sanctions may the religious group itself impose against those it considers heretics. 
Religious groups employ a variety of sanctions ranging from purely social sanctions 
through termination of employment (of employees), stripping of Church assets, 
initiation of applicable civil legal proceedings, to excommunication. If a group is 
allowed to maintain its religious identity, it must have some means to do so. However, 
the freedom of religious speech of members is curtailed if they know that sanctions 
may be imposed upon them for speaking their mind and expressing their beliefs. Such 
expression is also the way for religions to develop, conduct internal debate and 
discussions, and manifest the true beliefs of their members.
Apostasy and heresy present a conflict between the right of individuals to believe 
what they choose and the right of the religious group to promulgate its own religious 
doctrine. Sullivan35 believes this presents an open question in international law. She 
argues that if religious and secular authorities overlap and try to suppress the 
expression of belief by alleged heretics through stripping them of secular privileges or 
property rights, the right of the individual prevails. It is clear from this position, that 
she believes there is an “inner-religious” sphere in which the group should prevail, for 
example, permitting the group to impose religious sanctions on individuals, even 
excommunication of such members. There is a strong argument for non-involvement 
of the law in such internal doctrinal matters, allowing for a community right of 
religious freedom. However, individuals may have arguments for the recognition of 
their human rights within religious communities and institutions, as explained in
34 UDHR Article 18, (the right to change religion). This provision was omitted from the ICCPR,
ICESC, and in the 1981 Declaration, which, however, does not derogate from existing rights (see 
Chapter One). So, apostasy laws, which exist in some Islamic states, such as Sudan, forbidding 
Muslims from changing their religion, are clearly in contravention o f  international norms.
35 Sullivan [1988] 495.
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Chapter Three. Even religious sanctions against individual members may have to 
withstand a test of compliance with certain human rights provisions.
Forbidding individuals that a religion considers heretics from claiming that they 
belong to that religion is an infringement of their religious freedom, as guaranteed by 
Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration36. This interpretation favours the rights of the 
individual or splinter group over the dominant group. If this right is recognized
• 37against the group itself and not just as a right against state-imposed sanctions , then 
this will be a right against religious sanctions emanating from religious dogma, and 
not a right against the secular actions of the state. The decision, who is considered a 
member and what is regarded as heresy, is part of every religion’s doctrine, and thus 
is an issue in which legal intervention will most directly jeopardize religious freedom. 
However, the need to promote debate and discussion within religions, and protect the 
rights of those who engage in such debate, would favour this interpretation of 
religious freedom.
4. Prohibition of blasphemous speech derives from an identity perception of 
religious freedom
Up to now the legality of sanctions within a religion has been discussed. However, 
expression to which religious groups object is sometimes prohibited by the state itself. 
A state can protect a religious group’s view of its own religion, inhibiting individual 
religious expression, through an offence of blasphemy. As will be seen, the perception 
of religious freedom, as an expressive-critical right or as an identity right, will be 
determinative of the legitimacy of this prohibition. A critical-expressive approach will 
lead to an elimination of this offence. An identity approach will tend to support the 
legitimacy of this prohibition. The offence, originally based on identification of
36 Krishnaswami, [1960] 38 and Ribiero, [1987] 15, cited by Sullivan [1988].
37 Such as the Anti-Islamic Activities o f  the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition 
and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984, in Pakistan, which forbids members o f  the Ahmadia from calling 
themselves Muslims. In Zaheer-ud-din  v. The State 1993 SCMR 1718, the constitutional validity o f  the 
Ordinance was upheld by Pakistan’s Supreme Court (over a dissent which thought it breached religious 
freedom). The Court majority opinion was based on a rationale o f  a ‘religious trademark’, that a 
prohibition on the Ahmadi from calling themselves by a title which already belongs to others is not a 
breach o f  their religious freedom. For a criticism o f  the decision see: Lau, [1994].
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religion with the state, has found new identity-based justifications, such as protection 
of feelings of all believers and a particular justification based on the protection of 
minority religions. The conclusion should be that a balance must be effected between 
the critical and expressive perceptions, which would mandate against blasphemy 
offences but instead would permit certain hate speech prohibitions (discussed further 
below).
An examination of the offence of blasphemy in the UK highlights these 
considerations. While this offence is no longer commonly utilized in the UK or in 
other liberal democracies, its analysis is instructive. As will be seen, the identity 
perception of religious freedom has been given the weightier consideration, even in 
the discussion of the abolition of the offence.
4.1 Prohibition of blasphemy as protection of the state
Originally, the offence of blasphemy had as its object the protection of the state
• i nthrough the protection of the established religion, a symbol of the state. Historically 
the blasphemy law in the UK was closely related to the crime of sedition, since the 
Crown is both the head of state and of the Church. The prohibition of blasphemy 
protected the official faith, irrespective of whether affront to feelings was caused40. 
Blasphemy was originally related to sedition, since attacks on God and on the 
established religion were viewed as attacks on the social order41. As Sir Hale ruled in 
Taylor's Case: “For to say religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations 
whereby the civil societies are preserved, and the Christianity is parcel of the laws of 
England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak subversion of the 
law”42. The King’s Bench stated in Rex v. Woolstorf3 that “the Christian religion is
38 Blasphemy is an offence not only in the UK. An offence o f  blasphemy, or similar offences, exist in 
other states, including democratic states, such as Austria (Section 188, the Penal Code), Denmark 
(Section 266b, the Penal Code), Italy (Articles 402-406, the Penal Code) These are mostly not in use. 
The analysis o f  the English offence illustrates the principles involved.
39 History o f  the crime o f  blasphemy in Europe see: Cabantous, [ 2001].
40 Shelton and Kiss, [1996] 559.
41 Post, [1988] 306.
42 86 Eng. Rep. 189, 1 Vent. 293 (K.B. 1676).
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established in this Kingdom and therefor would not allow any books to be writ, which 
should tend to alter that establishment”44. So, it is not surprising that even Christian 
non-Anglican denominations were protected only to the extent that their beliefs were 
common to those of the established Church45. If the justification of the offence of 
blasphemy is like that of sedition, as an act which unravels the social order, then once 
an essential connection is no longer perceived between one religion and the basic 
order of society, the offence remains without justification.
This interpretation of the crime of blasphemy is echoed in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Ireland in Corway v. Independent Newspapers46, which rejected an 
appeal against judgment dismissing a plaintiffs motion to commence private criminal 
prosecution for blasphemous libel under the Defamation Act, 1961, against a 
newspaper that ran a cartoon portraying the Eucharist in an insulting light. The Court 
reasoned that the Irish blasphemy cases (the latest from 1855) based the crime on the 
principle that protection of Christianity, the established religion, was inseparable from 
protection of the state. Once Ireland disestablished its Church (in 1869) the offence 
could not survive47.
4.2 Protection of religious feelings
Today, the more common justification given, one that relies on the terms of liberal 
theory, is not the protection of religion itself but of the rights of others, namely the 
protection of religious feelings. Relying on such a justification, the majority on the
43 94 Eng. Rep. 112, 1 Barn. K. B. 162 (1729).
44 Ibid, 113.
45 The Law Commission Working Paper No. 79: Offences against religion and public worship 5-6
(1981).
46 [1996] IEHC 27 [1999] 4 IR 484 , discussed in Ranalow, [2000].
47 Similarly, in Italy, Articles 402-406 o f  the Penal Code prohibit offence to the state religion. The repeal 
of the law proclaiming Catholicism to be the official state religion in Italy apparently means that these 
provisions are no longer in force. A different provision, Article 724, prohibits insult to any religion.
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European Court of Human Rights in Otto-Preminger-Institut48, decided that a 
forfeiture of a film following criminal prosecution for “disparaging religious doctrine” 
defined as expression “likely to cause justified indignation” was not in violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention49. The majority argued that the right to 
freedom of religion, in Article 9, includes a right to respect for religious feelings of 
members of a religious group, which must be balanced against the right of the 
individual to criticize religion (protected by Article 10)50.
The majority on the Court relied on the identity aspect of religious freedom to include 
protection of religious feelings in Article 951. The majority opinion stated that while 
members of religious groups cannot expect to be exempt from criticism or even denial 
of their faith, some methods of opposing religious beliefs can be thought to inhibit 
those who hold such beliefs from exercising their religious freedom, and the state may 
take measures to protect them . Indeed, in this extreme situation, restricting freedom 
of religion for some would maximize freedom of religion for all. However, the Court 
moves from arguing that speech which inhibits believers from exercising their 
religious freedom can be legitimately prohibited, to acknowledging a broader general 
right to respect for religious feelings not dependent on the showing of any such 
inhibition, as was the case here. The Court says that gratuitously offensive remarks 
about the religious opinions of others “do not contribute to any form of public debate
48 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria [1995].
49 This followed similar reasoning by the European Commission in an earlier case, Lemon v. UK
[1982]. Leader, [1983] 340, argues that the Commission should not have recognised a right o f  citizens 
not to be offended in their religious beliefs, as only fundamental rights explicitly mentioned in the 
Convention are ‘rights o f  others’ which may justify limitation on free speech. In H andyside v. UK  
[1979-80], dealing with speech that did not address religion, the European Court offered a test o f  
balance o f  interests under the European Convention when offensive speech is involved.
50 The dissenting opinion (o f  Judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczyk) was that a right to protection o f  
religious feelings is not included in the Article 9 right to freedom o f  religion. The opinion states that it 
is legitimate for the state to curtail offensive anti-religious speech only when it is violent or abusive. 
The dissent argues that the applicants can rely on both Article 10 and Article 9, as freedom o f  religion 
and belief includes a right to express views critical o f the religious opinions o f  others.
51 Richards argues that such protection o f  group identity interests, as were recognised in this case, 
inevitably implicates the court in deciding who are the groups and what are the beliefs that are owed




capable of farthering progress in human affairs”53. But the Court failed to consider 
that while harm, strife and conflict were historically initiated by such remarks, 
equally, great intellectual debate has been achieved by precisely such offensive 
remarks.
4.3 Protection of minorities
A different argument for retention of the offence of blasphemy (and for its extension 
to the protection of all religions in the UK, where the offence protects only the 
majority religion) has been offered by Parekh54: A majority religion doesn’t need the 
protection of an offence of blasphemy, but minority religions do, because of their 
vulnerability in the face of the majority. This view can be criticized, especially in the 
context in which it was expressed, that of the Salman Rushdie case55. Rushdie is a 
member of a minority religious group in the UK. The protection which Parekh 
suggested for minority religions to protect them from the majority, would work in this 
case against Rushdie, a member of the minority itself. His right to criticize his own 
community would be curtailed. A protection of the community would override 
individual rights of members of the community. This is an unwarranted solution. The 
protection of religious minority members, rather than the dogma of the religion, which 
should be open to criticism, can be achieved by other means, such as prohibitions on 
hate speech, which will be discussed below.
4.4 The Select Committee Report
The offence of blasphemy, last used in the UK in a successful private prosecution in
e/L cn
1977 , has not been abolished , although the government has announced plans to
53 Para. 49.
54 Parekh, [ 1997] 145.
55 See description o f  some o f  the public discussion and consequences o f  the Rushdie affair in Able, 
[1998] 2 1 -43 .
56 R v. Lemon [1979] 1 All E.R. 898. This was the subject o f  a failed application to the European Court 
{Lemon v. U K [  1982]).
57 Even if  a criminal offence is rarely, or even never, used for prosecution by the state, its existence 
may have other legal implications, e.g. its use for a private prosecution. Another such use was as a
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abolish the offence . A recent report of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Religious Offences in England and Wales59 did not offer a conclusion regarding the 
law of blasphemy, but offered several options which will be discussed below60. The 
Law Commission in 198561 reached a conclusion that the offence should be repealed. 
This conclusion was also indicated by the UN Human Rights Committee62.
The Select Committee Report, in its approach to religious freedom, mostly 
encompasses the identity aspect of religious freedom rather than its expressive-critical 
aspect, as will be seen in what follows.
In its analysis of the law under the Human Rights Act 1998 , the Committee believes 
the current offence would contravene Article 10, and Article 14 in conjunction with 
Articles 9 and 10 (as the offence protects only one religion). However, the Report 
does not mention that the offence would also contravene Article 9 by itself. The 
Report sees in the prohibition a contravention of freedom of expression and of the 
obligation not to discriminate in the application of the right to religious freedom. It 
thus looks at the religious freedom of the members of groups which the blasphemy 
laws either do or do not protect. The Report does not consider religious freedom from 
its perception as a critical-expressive right, the religious freedom of the blasphemer, 
which is impaired.
basis for a request for an injunction against an exhibition in Australia, which was ultimately denied. 
{Pell v. Council o f  Trustees o f  the National Gallery o f  Victoria, [1998] 2 VR 392 (Supreme Court o f  
Victoria), see Casenote, 22 Melbourne University Law Review [1998] p. 217.
58 Morris, [2001],
59 (10 April 2003) Volume I (HL Paper 95-1).
60 The Report was initiated following the Religious Offences Bill, but ultimately dealt with a wider 
scope o f  subjects, including the question o f  the offence o f  blasphemy raised by the Law Commission’s 
“Offences against religion and public worship”, Law Com. 145, 1985 (HMSO, London) and by the 
“incitement” clause which was omitted from the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. (See 
further Idriss [2002]).
61 “Offences against religion and public worship”, Law Com. 145, 1985 (HMSO, London).
62Concluding observations on state report o f  UK, ICCPR, A /55/40 vol. I (2000) p. 47
63 In Annex 3.
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The Select Committee suggested three options for the offence of blasphemy, without
98choosing between them: leave as is, repeal, or replace with a broader offence . The 
reasonings it gave for each of the approaches reveal more of a community-identity 
approach than an expressive-critical approach to religious freedom.
Under reasons for the ‘leave as is’ option", the Committee stated claims that the 
blasphemy law is part of a legal fabric, which underscores the constitutional heritage 
and national identity, that should be tampered with only for weighty reasons. This is a 
viewpoint that sits squarely within the community perception of the right.
98 Ibid, p. 13-18.
99 Ibid, p. 13.
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Under the reasons for the ‘repeal’ option100, the Report stresses that the common law 
offence of blasphemy is discriminatory, as it protects only one religion. The Report 
also states that the most serious deficiency of this offence, is that UK courts have 
interpreted the offence as one of strict liability. The Report does not directly ask, 
however, whether any offence of blasphemy would be commensurate with respect for 
religious freedom, whether or not it were an intentional offence. An expressive- 
critical approach would raise this question and maintain that a blasphemy offence is 
incommensurate with the right.
Under the option of replacement of the offence with a broader, non-discriminatory
provision101, the Report suggests the use of the Indian Code provisions as a starting
point, particularly Article 295A:
“Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the 
religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either 
spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or 
otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or religious beliefs 
of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment...”.
The Indian Supreme Court viewed this Article as commensurate with the Indian
• I AA #
Constitution’s provisions of freedom of speech and freedom of religion . The Indian 
approach, as the Report itself notes, is based on an uppermost consideration of 
preventing religious strife, in a particular political context. The Report sees problems 
with such a law in its potential misuse for political prosecutions (which it sees as 
unlikely to occur in the UK) and in the difficulty of defining hurt to religious feelings.
Yet, the more basic objection, which should be raised, stems from a view of religious 
freedom that sees the value of this right in the freedom of criticism and debate of 
issues of religion and belief. Even deliberately insulting speech is not necessarily 
without merit. Some effective conveying of religious ideas for and against religions is 
deliberately provocative and insulting. Hence there is no justification for an offence of 
blasohemy. There is, however, speech which effectively silences, through propagation
100 Ibid, p. 14.
101 Ibid p .15. This option was suggested by Lord Scarman in R. v Lemon [1979] AC 617, 658.
102 Ramji Lai M ody v. U.P. State AIR 1957 SC 620.
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of hate or intimidation, members of a religious group from expressing their own voice 
and enjoying their rights as equal citizens. This speech should be more narrowly 
defined, and better addressed through prohibitions on hate speech, as will be 
discussed below.
5. Prohibition of religious hate speech as a balance between ildentity and 
expressive perceptions of religious freedom
The thesis advanced in this work, that a duality between protection of expression and 
protection of identity is inherent in religious freedom, is also a key to understanding 
and constructing an offence of religious hate speech. Because of this duality, religious 
hate speech has a unique character different from other hate speech. This will become 
apparent through analysis of international and domestic lawmaking and legal 
decisions regarding this offence. The analysis will also highlight what should be the 
considerations regarding the restriction of such speech, restrictions which are the 
subject of current legal controversy.
5.1 Existing international protection
The ICCPR, in Article 20(2) mandates that: “Any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
shall be prohibited by law”. This provision stands in conflict with rights enshrined in 
Articles 18 (freedom of religion) and 19 (freedom of speech), or, put another way, 
Article 20 carves out an ambit of speech and religion which shall not be protected by 
Articles 18 and 19. What restrictions are permitted (and, indeed, mandated) by Article 
20 on Article 18 and Article 19 rights is left unclear.
The decisions of the Human Rights Committee offer some, but not much, guidance, as 
they lack a principled approach. In some cases the solution to the balance of rights is 
clear-cut, as there is legitimate reason to curtail the expressive aspect of religious 
freedom. Ross v. Canada103 concerned a Canadian teacher, who lost his teaching
103 Comm. No. 736/1997 Ross v. Canada CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997.
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position for publishing anti-Semitic writings. The Human Rights Committee justified 
the restriction of Ross’s rights by the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
under Articles 18 and 19, including their right to have an education in the public 
school system free from bias, prejudice and intolerance. The reasoning in this case is 
understandable and justifiable. The case does not concern a regular exchange of 
speech between adults, but an adult, a teacher, in a position of authority towards 
children. The ambit of freedom of religious expression should be much narrower than 
it is in the adult market-place of ideas.
Regarding speech to adults the case is more complicated. In J.R.T.104, the HRC found 
that Canada did not breach the author’s Article 19 rights, because Canada complied 
with Article 20(2). In this case, indeed, the speech was inciting, especially set against 
the historical context of anti-Semitism, its subject was a religious group and not 
religious ideas, and was legitimately prohibited. But the HRC gave no guidance as to 
whether or how it attempted to balance Article 19 against Article 20(2)105.
The different UN human rights conventions themselves take different approaches to 
hate speech. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination applies to hate speech based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin, but not religion. It mandates a much broader prohibition than Article 20 
of the ICCPR. CERD, in Article 4(a), mandates that state-parties prohibit not just 
incitement to hatred and discrimination, but also the dissemination of ideas based on
104 Comm. No. 104/1981 J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada CCPR/C/18/D/l 04/1981. The applicant 
whose telephone services were curtailed by the Canadian authorities gave pre-recorded messages 
denouncing “the dangers... o f  international Jewry leading the world into wars, unemployment and 
inflation and the collapse o f  world values and principles”. (This communication concerned the 
Canadian Supreme Court Case: Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor [1990] 3 S.C. R. 892 
discussed in the next section).
105 Some further guidance can be gleaned from the decision o f  the HRC in Comm. No. 550/1993 
Faurisson v. France CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, which addresses Article 19, but whose reasoning is 
applicable also to Article 18. The assessment o f  incitement is made in regard to the historical context. 
Thus, Holocaust denial constitutes incitement against Jews, legitimately prohibited according to all 
Committee members. But a French law, the “Gayssot Act", which amends the Law on the Freedom o f  
the Press o f  1881, Section 24, was deemed overbroad by the concurring Committee members, as it 
would prohibit bona f id e  research connected with matters decided by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and thus 
would contravene Article 19.
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racial superiority. Regarding religion it would not be possible to proscribe theories of 
superiority without severely curtailing the expressive aspect of religious freedom, as 
the essence of many religions is a claim that they are the true religion, while other 
religions are false106.
The EU Draft Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia107
1 Oftdefines racism and xenophobia as: “the belief in race, colour, descent, religion or 
belief, national or ethnic origin as a factor determining aversion to individuals or 
groups”. It mandates that states criminalize intentional conduct of public incitement to 
violence or hatred for a racist or xenophobic purpose or to any other racist or 
xenophobic behaviour, which may cause substantial damage to individuals or groups 
concerned109, as well as public insults or threats towards individuals or groups for a 
racist or xenophobic purpose110.
The EU has so far failed to agree on a Framework Decision on Combating Racism 
and Xenophobia, mainly due to fears expressed that the Decision could be used to 
restrict political and expressive rights111. This is a danger regarding criminalisation of 
any speech which may be regarded as racist or xenophobic, but it is a particular 
danger regarding religious speech, which is often used to express political ideas that 
may be unduly classified as racist or xenophobic.
The lack of clear guidance in international law on religious hate speech, prompts a 
closer examination of how state decisions have encountered this issue.
106 As discussed in Chapter Two.
107 OJ 2002 C75E/269.





5.2 Religious hate speech should be treated differently from other hate speech
While laws against religious hatred and intolerance have a laudable purpose, such 
laws may impermissibly contravene both freedom of religion and freedom of
119expression. Special Rapporteur Odio Benito lists approvingly states which have 
laws penalising acts of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief and 
recommends that all states adopt similar laws. However, she does not attempt to 
distinguish between laws that legitimately prevent incitement and those laws that 
themselves contravene religious freedom and freedom of expression, by preventing
1 1 o
legitimate religious speech . A fine but crucial line must be drawn between the two. 
Where such a line must be drawn has been a subject of much controversy within state 
practice and juridical debate, as well as within the limited international case-law on 
the subject.
In the UK, a proposal to extend the offence of incitement to racial hatred, to include 
incitement to religious hatred was included in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill 2001, but was subsequently dropped. It was, however, included in the Religious 
Offences Bill 2002, and re-introduced in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill 
2004114. Incitement to racial hatred is a criminal offence under the Race Relations Act 
1965, Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. It is an offence to use threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour or display written material which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting and which is intended or is likely to stir up racial 
hatred115. The House of Lords Select Committee, in its report on the Religious 
Offences Bill116, did not reach a conclusion as to whether there needs to be any
112 Odio Benito, [1989] 25.
113 Indeed, fear o f  allowing overbroad restrictions apparently caused the omission o f  provisions 
regarding a duty to prohibit hate speech (religious among others), from the Constitution o f  the Republic 
o f  South Africa, 1993, after it was initially included in the ANC draft Bill o f  Rights issued in 1990 
(published 7 South African Journal on Human Rights (1991) p. 110.) See: Neisser, [1994].
114 Section 119.
115 Sections 18-19.
116 House o f  Lords Select Committee Report on Religious Offences in England and Wales (10 April 
2003) Volume I (HL Paper 95-1)).
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additional legal protection “either for believers as a class, or for the objects connected 
with their beliefs”. However, the same formulation regarding religion as regarding 
race would not sufficiently protect religious freedom.
The legitimacy of limitations on hate speech as restrictions of free speech has been
117  * •much debated . The debate has centred on hate speech targeting race. But religious 
hate speech differs from racial hate speech, a point which has not received much 
attention. When religious freedom is involved, its dual character must be taken into 
account. Religions consist of groups of people whose identity it helps to define. But 
religions also consist of ideas. There is potential social benefit in speech against 
Catholicism or anti-Catholicism but not against members of those groups. There is no 
similar differentiation regarding racial hate speech. There is simply no possible social 
benefit arising from speech against blacks as blacks, and there is no such thing as
1 1 O
speech against the idea of blackness .
The difference between two types of speech, that targeting ideas and that targeting 
groups, can be understood by comparison to other possible categories of hate speech. 
In the landmark case R. A. V v. City o f St. Paulug, the US Supreme Court ruled on 
the constitutionality of the St. Paul ordinance, which banned offensive speech on the 
basis of race, colour, creed, religion, or gender. It held the ordinance was invalid 
because it constituted content discrimination120, as it did not ban speech on other
117 For a few interesting positions in the vast theoretical literature on this issue see: Sunstein, £1993] 
Chapter Six; Post, [1994]; Fiss, [1996] especially 16-22.
118 In some states, such as Brazil, race hate speech laws have been interpreted to include religious 
groups ( See: Superior Tribunal de Justifa HC 15155/RS (decided, 18/12/2001)).
In the UK, the judicial interpretation in Mandla v. D owell Lee [1983] 1 All ER (which dealt with 
discrimination, not with hate speech) according to which the Race Relations Act 1976 would 
encompass some religious groups but not others, was one o f  the motivations for legislation broadening 
the prohibitions o f  the Race Relations Act to religious groups, as discussed in this chapter.
119 505 US 377 (1992).
120 In any case, the ordinance was deemed overbroad by all the Justices as it was not limited to a 
prohibition o f ‘fighting words’ , utterances that convey almost no exposition o f  ideas and whose value 
is clearly outweighed by their harm, so as to except them from First Amendment protection, (see: 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 US 250 (1952)).
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possible bases such as political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality. "The 
First Amendment does not permit [the city] to impose special prohibitions on those 
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects”, reasoned the Court. The law was 
deemed unconstitutional because the prohibition was based on the subject the speech 
addresses121.
I would argue that political affiliation and union membership are different from race, 
creed and gender. Speech against political affiliation and union membership targets 
views (which should be permissible), while speech against race, colour or gender 
targets groups or inherent characteristics (which should, under certain conditions, be 
impermissible). Religion can belong to both categories: Speech against religion can be 
either against a religious view or against a religious group of people, making it harder 
to distinguish between speech that should be permissible and speech that should not.
Interestingly, although the case dealt with race hate speech, the Court criticises the 
ordinance by using an example from discourse about religion. Under the ordinance, 
says Justice Scalia, for the majority:122: “One could hold up a sign saying, for 
example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, 
for that would insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’” Under the 
ordinance, the Court reasons, speech against a religion would be prohibited, but 
speech against those who oppose religion would not. Thus, it sees the ordinance as 
constituting not just content discrimination but impermissible unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination.
121 The conclusion from R.A. V. is that the only way a US State could legislate against hate speech is by 
prohibiting injurious speech based on any group affiliation, or any injurious speech (so as not to run
afoul o f  the Court’s prohibition on content-discrimination). Indeed, in Virgina v. Black  (538 U S ____
(2003)), a statute that prohibited one type o f  hate speech (cross burning) for whatever reason, was held 
constitutional by the US Supreme Court. It reasoned that as long as the prohibition does not 
discriminate as to the content o f  the speech, a State may choose to prohibit only those forms o f  
intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear o f bodily harm.
122 Justice Scalia , 505 US 377, 392.
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Indeed, one-sided prohibitions on speech concerning religion, which apply to some 
sides of the debate but not to others, are an unacceptable limitation of free speech and 
freedom of religion. But furthermore, any prohibition that stifles speech concerning 
whose religious beliefs are right or wrong, even in insulting terms, is an unwarranted 
limitation on the critical-expressive aspect of religious freedom, one of the key 
justifications of this right123. Legislation against religious hate speech should follow 
an approach that would distinguish between permissible offensive speech against 
ideas and impermissible offensive speech against people qua members of a religious 
group. (Some mention of such an approach can be seen in Justice Stevens’ concurring 
opinion, in which he argues that the St. Paul ordinance is not discriminatory, because 
it does not bar hurling fighting words based on conflicting ideas, but does bar anyone 
from hurling such words based on the recipient’s race, colour, creed, religion or 
gender)124.
Freedom to use offensive speech against religious beliefs may have a social benefit. In 
the discussion of a Canadian law prohibiting speech likely to expose a person to 
hatred or contempt because of his religion (among other grounds) , Greenawalt 
rightly points out that some religious views deserve hatred and contempt, such as
196religious racist views. This law was the subject of the Taylor case in the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The Court decided that the law was not a restriction of freedom of 
expression intolerable in a free and democratic society . However, the dissent 
argued that the scope of the prohibition was too broad and invasive, catching more
123 See discussion in Chapter Two.
124 In its international obligations the US is, as a party to the ICCPR, obliged to prohibit a much wider 
range o f  speech under Article 20: “[a]ny advocacy o f national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. So there is mismatch between its law and its 
international obligation. (As usual in US decisions, the international obligation is not mentioned in the 
decision).
125 The law prohibited “to communicate telephonically ... any matter that is likely to expose a person 
or persons to hatred or contempt by reason o f  the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable 
on the basis o f  a prohibited ground o f  discrimination”. The prohibited grounds o f  discrimination
include (though are not restricted to) race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion.
126 Canadian Supreme Court Case: Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor [1990] 3 S.C.R.
892.
127 Ibid, p. 939-940.
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expressive conduct than can be justified. The use of the words "hatred" and 
"contempt", argued the dissent, are vague, subjective and susceptible of a wide range 
of meanings, extending the scope of the law to cover expression presenting little 
threat of fostering hatred or discrimination and could even reach speech which is in 
fact anti-discriminatory128. There was no defence in the law under discussion 
regarding honest religious disagreement, and Greenawalt believes this should have 
been noted by the Court.
I would put the criticism more broadly: Religions consist on the one hand of views 
and on the other hand of people whose identity is defined by belonging to them. Any 
prohibition on religious hate speech should be approached with the differentiation 
between speech against ideas and speech against a group of people in mind, so as to 
prohibit the latter but not the former.
When speech is religiously-motivated, the decision as to what is permissible speech 
must consider not only freedom of expression, but also freedom of religion. 
Especially so, if the offending speech is claimed to be inherent to the practice of 
religion, such as reading or publishing sacred texts which contain the offending 
speech. In Alba v. The State o f Israel129, the Supreme Court of Israel denied an appeal
• 1 m  • • •against the appellant’s conviction for incitement to racism for publishing an article 
claiming that, under Jewish law, the killing of non-Jews was a lesser offence than the 
killing of Jews, presuming to rely on an interpretation of religious texts. Alba had
1 I
relied on the problematic statutory defence of quotation of religious scripture . The
128 Ibid, p. 955-961.
129 Crim. App. 2831/95 Alba  v. The State o f  Israel, 50 (5) PD 221.
130 Article 144B o f the Penal Law, 1977 creates an offence o f  publication with intent to incite to racism. 
The different treatment o f  religious hate speech is clear in Israeli law: in addition to the offence o f  
publication with intent to incite to racism there is an offence o f incitement to racism (Article 144A), for 
which no specific intent is required. However, this broader offence is limited to grounds o f  race, colour 
or ethnic-national origin, but not religion.
131 Article 144C(b) o f  the Penal Law, 1977 states that publication o f  quotations from scripture and
prayer books or practice o f  religious ceremony will not be considered as constituting the offence o f
incitement to racism, unless they were done with an intention to incite.
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majority judges did not accept the defence, as they found the publication a misleading 
presentation of Jewish scripture showing a clear intent to incite to racism.
But the defence itself is problematic: Why should speech which constitutes reiteration 
of existing religious doctrine be treated differently from other hate speech? Either all 
hate speech prohibitions should be subject to determination of intent, or they should 
not. Why should religious speech be acceptable where other speech would not be? 
Under the classification suggested in this chapter, which makes speech inciting 
against religious ideas permissible but speech inciting against people based on their 
religion impermissible, speech such as Alba’s would not be protected merely by 
virtue of its religious sources.
Yet, the difference between targeting ideas and targeting people may not always be 
easy to determine. In the UK, a street preacher was convicted under the Public Order 
Act 19 86133 for holding a large sign displaying the words “Stop Immorality”, “Stop 
Homosexuality” and “Stop Lesbianism” in a city centre, as the sign was considered 
threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person, likely to
1 <5Q
cause harassment, alarm or distress . The preacher had, in fact, provoked a hostile
133 Sections 5(1) and 5(6).
139 DPP  v. Hammond, (QBD, decided 13 January 2004, reported: The Times 28 January 2004).
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reaction from passers-by. The High Court affirmed the magistrate’s finding that 
equating homosexuality with immorality was insulting. It saw the restriction of the 
protestor’s Article 9 and Article 10 rights under the European Convention as 
consistent with the Convention, as it had the legitimate aim of preserving tolerance to 
others,
Nevertheless, if the preacher’s expression is barred, virtually no possibility is left for 
expression of the religious viewpoint that homosexuality is immoral. An assertion that 
homosexuality is immoral is part of a discussion of views on morality which must be 
permitted. However, even this analysis, which categorizes the expression as targeting 
views and not people, may be challenged. The statement may be seen as directed at 
homosexuals as people, because it is directed at an essential component of their 
identity. The classification of the speech as speech against ideas or speech against 
groups is itself a matter of interpretation, which may differ from the speaker to his 
audience.
A much broader prohibition of religious speech aimed at maintaining peaceful 
relations between communities is evident in the approach of the Supreme Court of 
India. In the Hindutvam  cases, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition on 
seeking votes using religious grounds141 falls under a legitimate public order 
exception to the constitutional free speech guarantee142, relying on India’s 
constitutionally determined secular character for the assertion that such expression is 
against decency and propriety in a secular society143. The consideration of toleration
140 Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo  v. Prabhar Kashinath Kunte (1996) 1 SCC 130; AIR 1996 SC 1113; 
[1996] 3 CHRLD 343.
141 Articles 123 (3) and (3A) o f  the Criminal Code.
142 Article 19(2) o f  the Constitution.
143 India is defined in the preamble to its Constitution as a secular state. Its secular character is 
reinforced in Article 28(1), which guarantees that: ”No religious instruction shall be provided in any 
educational institution wholly maintained out o f State funds”. This extreme position against the 
involvement o f  the state with institutionalised religion is evident only in states with marked Church- 
state separation, such as the US.
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between religious communities was seen as paramount to any consideration of free 
expression. The Court viewed the principle of a secular society, and indeed the 
attempt to maintain tolerance between religions, as justifying a displacement of 
religious speech from the public-political arena in its most crucial process -  
democratic elections. The complete prohibition on religious election speech goes 
beyond the legitimate aim of maintaining religious tolerance. Only speech actually 
provoking hatred and strife between religions should be prohibited.
6. Conclusions
It has been seen that viewing religious freedom as an expressive-individualistic right 
has important consequences for analyzing the permissible limitations of this right in 
cases of religious speech. It has been argued that, under an individualistic approach, 
the protection of religious speech would be equal to that of other political speech 
(while under a community approach more would be left to the determination of the 
state). Under the individualistic-expressive-critical view religious freedom protects 
not just the speaker but also the willing recipient of the speech.
An examination of proselytism has revealed that the limitations on it, though 
explained as protection of personal autonomy, in keeping with an individualistic 
perception of religious freedom, may be due more to a perception of this right that 
tries to maintain the identity of the proselytisee or even the identity and cohesiveness 
of the group itself. In weighing the balance between the free exchange of religious 
ideas and the preservation of existing religious identity, an individualistic-expressive 
perception of the right would see more value in the former, the community perception 
would see more value in the latter. An individualistic-expressive approach would thus 
limit restrictions on proselytism only to those that impair individual autonomy and 
negate free choice, similarly to regulation of other types of persuasive speech.
An individualistic-expressive approach would see value in speech considered 
blasphemous by a religious group. This would mean not only that the state could not 
restrict such speech, but might have to protect the individual even from sanctions by
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the religious community. The question of religious sanctions within the group directly 
confronts the religious freedom of the group with that of the individual. The group 
approach would favour allowing the group its own sanctions, including expulsion, 
against those it considers to veer from its doctrine. An expressive-individualistic 
approach would seek to implement human rights even regarding sanctions within the 
group. This would be an extreme implementation of the individualistic-expressive 
approach, as it would mean that the group does not have unlimited discretion even in 
the application of its own doctrine.
The view of religious freedom as a right that protects both expressions of ideas and 
equality of members of all religions in the public sphere, would lead to a treatment of 
hate speech regulation that would differentiate between speech about ideas and speech 
about members of religious groups.
C O N C LU SIO N
This study has developed an argument for the preference of religious freedom as an 
individual right over religious freedom as a group right. My first objective was to 
point out a crucial conflict between the two conceptions and delineate its many facets, 
some of them in areas in which the conflict may not have been initially anticipated. 
(This analysis is valid independently of whether or not one agrees with the stand I 
take about this conflict). My second objective was to persuade that, in this conflict, 
individual rights should prevail. Throughout the discussion, it has been seen that, 
although a preference of individual rights over group rights raises considerable 
problems, a preference of group rights raises problems, both theoretical and practical, 
which are even harder to surmount.
1. Theoretical conclusions
It has been shown that religious freedom can and should be interpreted as an 
individual right, and as a group right only if derived from individual rights and not 
overriding them. The main arguments in support of this conclusion were developed as 
follows:
A. Conceptual argument as to the existence of group rights
1. Group rights are incommensurate with the concept o f human rights - 1 have first 
argued, in Chapter Two, that the purpose of human rights is to protect men and 
women from the power of the collective, monopolized by the state. Therefore, to use 
the concept of human rights merely to transfer power from the state to groups within 
the state empties this concept of all meaning. So, there could not be a right of the 
group itself that overrides individual rights. Thus, there could only be a group right of 
religious freedom in the sense of an aggregate of individual rights.
Even when dealing with the most nuclear group, the family, I argued in Chapter Five, 
the right of the family group can not be substituted for a right of the individual child.
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B. Argument as to the dual character of the right of religious freedom
2. The dual character o f religious freedom and the right o f  the individual both to
belong to, and dissent from the group, must be upheld -  In the theoretical exposition 
(Chapter Two) it was argued, based, among other things, on the justifications given to 
religious freedom in liberal theory, that this right has two aspects. It is a right which 
protects the ability to express and criticize. It is also a right that protects identity and, 
therefore, equality. It is a right of doing and of being.
The evolving politics of identity, which center on nationality, race, ethnicity and 
religion have resulted in a shift to the protection of the identity aspect of religious 
freedom (Chapter One). But both aspects of this right need to be maintained and 
protected: the identity aspect, which is connected to belonging to a community, and 
the expressive-critical aspect, connected to individuality (especially individual stances 
against the community).
This duality, between right of identity and right of expression, was shown in Chapter 
Six to be a key to the analysis of religious speech and its legitimate boundaries. It was 
shown that individual religious speech, including speech which criticises the group 
the speaker belongs to, or a group the speaker does not belong to, can only be 
effectively protected through an individualisic perception of this right.
C. Argument as to why individual rights should supersede group rights, even if
group rights are recognised
3. Upon entering a religious group 'you do not leave your rights at the door ’ -
Because religion is part of one’s identity, individuals should not be made to choose 
between participation in religious activities, communities and institutions, and their 
basic rights, such as freedom of speech and non-discrimination. It is the meaningful 
participation in religious life sought by members and workers as a manifestation of 
their religious freedom that calls for guarantees of rights by the state. Therefore,
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religious communities and organizations should themselves be required to respect 
rights of individuals.
This argument was developed and nuanced in Chapter Three. If religious 
organizations are to exist, they clearly must be able to put certain demands on their 
members, under certain conditions. Human rights within the organization will be 
interpreted according to context, but this does not mean that members waive their 
rights when entering the religious organization.
4. The public character o f religions mandates respect fo r individual rights - 1 have 
argued that religions have a public, as well as private, character and so must accord 
individual rights in their public activities. This is true especially of state established 
religions, but also in a lesser measure of all religions. A religious organization cannot 
be said to be a wholly private affair. For example, religious schools, as providers of 
education, fulfill a role of the state. As argued in Chapter Four, educational 
institutions that belong to one religious denomination may have obligations to respect 
certain human rights of all students. As discussed in Chapter Three, institutions of 
religious communities are also employers. As such, they must have human rights 
obligations towards their employees. As seen in Chapters Three and Four, religions 
control important aspects of personal life through marriage, divorce and family status. 
This too is an exercise of authority relegated by the state. Even when personal law is 
exercised by the religious community without recognition of the state, it is exercising 
state-like authority as far as the members affected are concerned. Religions in this 
case cannot be considered purely private institutions. Even towards members who 
dissent from the group, as shown in Chapter Six, the religious group should not be 
considered to have unlimited discretion as to sanctions, in disregard of human rights.
Furthermore, as became clear throughout the discussion, particularly in Chapters 
Three and Four, the classical liberal distinction between the public realm and the 
private realm is particularly unhelpful in the realization of individual religious 
freedom. Religious freedom is often curtailed by actors and arrangements operating in 
the private sphere, not least by religious communities and religious organizations 
themselves, acting towards their own members or others. Traditionally, human rights 
law has addressed the public realm, the abuse of citizen’s rights by the state. To
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advance religious freedom, however, it must go beyond these boundaries and address 
abuse of individual rights by the group as sanctioned by the state.
5. There is no effective voluntary choice and so individual freedom must be 
respected both within and without groups -  Freedom of religion must be redefined to 
include both freedom to choose, manifest and practice religion, as stated in many 
existing international and national instruments, and freedom within religious 
organizations and communities. If individuals’ freedoms within religions are 
restricted, this impairs their right both to choose religions and to remain within their 
chosen religion. Religious freedom of both those who are unable effectively to leave a 
religion and those who may not wish to do so is breached. Especially harmed are 
socially weaker members within the religious communities (such as children, 
dissenters -  who may be considered blasphemers and apostates by their religion, and 
women in some societies).
However, religions, which are social constructs, are defined by their set of rules. 
Some imposition of rules within community institutions must be acceptable, as long 
as the ability to leave the religious group is granted.
Exclusive jurisdiction over matters of personal law should not be accorded to a 
religious community to which individuals may not have chosen to belong. As argued 
in Chapters Three and Four, even where there is a choice, the state cannot deem its 
citizens to have waived their religious freedom merely by the fact of belonging to a 
religious group.
6. Equal protection o f members o f minorities can and should be achieved through a 
conception o f individual rights -  A strong argument encountered for recognition of 
group rights was that, in order to accord meaningful, rather than formal, equal 
treatment, the relevant social context should be taken into account. Specifically, it 
should be recognized that the existing social and legal framework is geared towards 
the majority religion. I agreed with these assumptions, but argued that this can be 
taken into account within the individual conception, by according substantive rather
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than formal equality. This may entail differential treatment of minority and majority 
religions, in order to achieve substantive equality.
Furthermore, analysis of rights that takes social context (majority/minority status) into 
account would mean that sometimes individuals should even have a right of religious 
freedom against religious groups of which they are not members. The religious 
freedom of children of minority religions may be adversely impacted both within the 
state school system, and within the school system of another religious group. While it 
is legitimate for schools of both kinds to have regulations, religious freedom of 
students should be protected in schools of both kinds, taking into account factors such 
as majority/minority status of the pupil and the difference between private and public 
schools.
In fact, as seen mainly in Chapter Four, state principles of group autonomy, or simply 
majority/minority politics, may cause states to avoid intervening within minority 
religious communities in order to protect rights of individuals in those communities, 
even more than they avoid interference within the majority religious community. This 
has been exemplified in regard to rights of women in religious communities, in 
several states, each with a different religious composition.
It was shown that an important influence on religious freedom, the status of religions 
in the state, particularly established religions, has been largely ignored by 
international law. While arguing for an individual rights approach, this work has not 
ignored the importance of religion in forging ties which form social, communal and 
national identity. For this reason, an established state religion, in states in which there 
is one, while necessarily constituting some form of group preference, cannot be 
dismissed outright as illegitimate. However, the fact that there is a state religion 
should put on the state an onus of proving that no further discrimination is caused to 
members of minority religions, other than that inherent in the fact that one religion is 
considered a state religion and others are not.
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D. Argument as to further problems of religious freedom created by recognition of 
religious group rights in the state
7. According religious group rights involves the state in evaluation o f the social 
worth o f religious groups, thereby breaching state neutrality -  For the 
implementation of laws that accord group rights, often the state must accept one 
determination of the group and its representative leadership. This is frequently 
unacceptable to sub-groups, dissenting leaders or individuals within the group. Any 
determination by the state between competing claims means it will not remain neutral. 
Group determination is not only misguided in principle, but is also problematic in 
application. The definition of the group causes the state to breach its neutrality. Even 
when the state is neutral, it is called upon to make decisions which include value 
judgments on religions. According rights to groups adds further difficulties as it calls 
upon the state to make legal determinations predicated upon value-judgments between 
subgroups and regarding group leadership.
This argument is qualified. In some cases, it was shown in Chapter Three, it is simply 
not possible to accord the right to individuals. For example, the allocation of funding 
to religions. It would not be possible to let each member decide what should be done 
with the funding, and so some form of group determination is unavoidable.
The conclusion of this work must be qualified in other ways as well. In some cases 
there was shown to be a moral justification for putting achieve the peaceful relations 
within a mixed community, a group basis for equality could be used (proportional 
representation of the communities) rather than an individual basis (equal treatment 
regardless of a person’s religion).
However, while these, and other, more complex considerations must be taken into 
account, they do not detract from the conclusion of the course of argument of this 
thesis, namely that religious freedom must be understood as an individual right.
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2. Some practical implications
This work has set out to argue for a particular conception of the right of religious 
freedom, and, through such argument, better to understand the nature of rights. It has 
not set out to explore how practically to implement such rights. However, through the 
discussion, some practical recommendations have arisen, either for formulation of 
new legal norms, adoption of existing norms in further documents, or implementation 
of existing international provisions within state practice. It will remain for further 
work to suggest means of implementing these proposals.
The analysis suggested in this work has highlighted some of the important areas 
deficient in the protection of religious freedom. Two important areas of life have been 
left outside the scope of legal protection due to the classical liberal distinction 
between the public sphere, in which human rights are protected, and the private 
sphere, in which they are not. One of these is the workplace, another is the family.
In the workplace, human rights must be protected from private, as well as public, 
actors. This area has traditionally escaped the notice of human rights law, which has 
protected rights from the power of the state. However, here the distinction between 
the public and the private is not conducive to the protection of human rights. The 
place of work has become one of the important areas in which people spend much of 
their lives and so it exerts a strong influence on their lives, as much, if not more than 
the state. This status of the workplace as lying between the public and the private 
spheres was highlighted in Chapter Three (regarding the rights of employees in 
workplaces with various degrees of religious affiliation) and in Chapter Five (in the 
discussion of teachers and other public and private sector employees).
The ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. I l l )  forbids 
discrimination in the workplace on various grounds, including religion. As shown, 
however, the question what constitutes discrimination on grounds of religion is much 
more complicated than it is on other grounds such as race or colour, precisely because 
of the individual and group claims made on this right. More detailed instruments are 
important. One such instrument is the EU Council Directive Establishing a General
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Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation1. The Directive must 
be given effect in domestic legal decisions concerning claims of religious 
discrimination in the workplace. Other regional and international bodies should 
inquire into the adoption of similar detailed instruments protecting religious freedom 
and guaranteeing equal treatment in the workplace.
The other area explored in this study, in which religious freedom is harmed by the 
private/public distinction in the applicability of human rights law, is that of the family. 
Here too, traditionally, human rights law has not addressed infringements emanating 
from private actors, notably the family. As shown, the family and family law often 
implement religious perceptions. This shapes, to a large extent, the perception of 
women’s role in the family and the community.
Women’s religious freedom should be integrated into the mainstream of discourse on 
religious freedom and into any future legal instruments on religious freedom. The 
determinations of the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 28 should be 
implemented by states. The different UN human rights conventions, particularly the 
ICCPR, the ICSECR, and CEDAW should be interpreted according to the same 
principles as those elucidated in GC 28, so that equality of women guaranteed by 
these instruments could not be subject to restrictions or reservations based on religion.
Some more specific recommendations arose out of this discussion: The Human Rights 
Committee and the CEDAW committee should call upon signatory state parties in 
which personal law is religious law to legislate a secular non-discriminatory system of 
personal law.
International human rights law does not sufficiently protect rights of women within 
unofficial unions that are unrecognized by the state law (whether religious marriages, 
other unofficial marriages, or cohabitation). Such unions should be legally protected. 
This means ad hoc recognition of these unions as equal to marriages, in those 
instances in which rights of the spouses will be furthered and not harmed by the 
recognition.
1 2000/78/EC o f 27 November 2000, OJ 2000 L303/16.
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A critical analysis of the influence of religion on the legal interpretation of gender 
roles in the state should also lead to a re-evaluation of the law regarding sexual 
orientation and the recognition of the need for specific international legal standards in 
this area, a subject which was not explored in this work. Similarly to their role in 
defining gender roles, religions have played a role in defining morality and deviancy 
of sexual orientation. Both in the case of gender roles and in the case of sexual 
orientation, such definitions emanating from religious sources have been incorporated 
into the law. Although some work has been published on this issue , there is clearly 
scope for further research.
Investigation of the right of the child to religious freedom has revealed a disparity 
between the assertion that a right of the child to religious freedom is protected and the 
underlying assumptions reflected in legal reality, which protects choices of parents, 
communities and states. It should be recognized that existing formulations in 
international instruments of the rights of parents to choose the religious education of 
the child should be understood as a right derivative of that of the child, a right to 
exercise the right for the immature child, who is the ultimate bearer of his own right 
to religious freedom.
Future international instruments that guarantee religious choice in education should 
include protection of gender equality. This is particularly so, as religious education is 
often sex-segregated. While care must be taken not to deter parents from sending 
female children to schools, progress should be made, by education and by legal 
provisions, to elimination of sex disparity in education due to religious perceptions.
The analysis in this work of the oversight of the dual nature of the right of religious 
freedom has pointed to the unique way it should be protected in the market-place of 
ideas. Incitement to religious hatred should be prohibited, but only through legislation 
that carefully circumscribes the ambit of protection and guards freedom of religious 
speech. International instruments which deal with religious hatred should differentiate 
between religious and other bases of hate speech, tailoring the provisions of religious
2 See: Heinze, [1995].
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hate speech to allow for expression attacking religious views but not expressions 
attacking members of religious groups.
3. Some indications for future research
These conclusions also pave the way for further research:
One avenue of further inquiry indicated by this study is that of the applicability of 
international human rights law to religions or religious bodies. It is important to 
develop legal means to prevent religions and religious organizations from infringing 
human rights. A crucial question is whether religions can be subjects of international 
law. There are clearly great difficulties in according legal personality to religions in 
international law: They are non-state entities, they operate in the spiritual realm, and 
many do not have a clear institutional structure to which responsibility for violations 
can be imputed. However, the idea is not without basis. As has been seen, religions, 
through their representatives or through the actions of states, are already participants 
in the formation of international and national law, affecting human rights3.
Of course, religions vary greatly. It will be easier to make the theoretical argument, as 
well as to delineate the practical application with regard to large religions with well- 
recognized, state-like institutions, than with regard to small, diffuse religions. The 
Catholic Church is the paradigmatic case for application of these international legal 
norms. As was shown, it already takes part, directly and indirectly, in the formulation 
of international norms. These considerations will need to be taken into account in the 
investigation of the possibility for expansion of international human rights law.
One area which was explored within the discussion in Chapter Two was that of 
political participation of religious parties that espouse undemocratic principles. There 
it was shown that, in addition to all the considerations present regarding limitations on
3 This has been shown in Chapter Four in the context o f  women’s religious freedom, but is true also in 
other areas in which religions have an important influence on daily life.
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undemocratic parties that are not religious, religious freedom is a consideration which 
must be taken into account when limiting the political participation of such parties.
It is suggested that these considerations be investigated within the much broader 
debate on democratic liberalism in international law. Democratic liberalism argues 
that the individuals who constitute the state must give their consent to the government 
in order to legitimise its actions at the international level4, that only following a 
democratic process will validate a state’s exercise of power. International lawyers of 
this school have also argued for linkage of the legitimacy of governments to 
observance of human rights as well as to participatory democracy5. The argument for 
democratic liberalism has been criticised, on various grounds, among them the 
potential harm of dividing the world into Western and non-Western states6. States 
which are religious or in which religion plays a role in limiting democracy would 
raise a claim that democratic liberalism in international law accepts as legitimate only 
one view of religion and its place in the public sphere. The implications of the present 
thesis on this broader debate should be explored.
4. A few final words
Religions, which pre-date the state as a source of power, seemed to be on the wane 
with the emergence of modernity, but in today’s world the conflicts surrounding 
religion, state, human rights, individuals and collectives, and national and 
international law are as prominent as ever. In a recent analysis of ongoing armed 
conflicts worldwide, out of 29 major armed conflicts ongoing in 2000, about 10 were 
attributable, at least partially, to a religious cause7. Crucially, since 2001 the conflict 
with al-Qaeida could be added to this list.
4 Franck, £1990]; Franck, [1992].
5 See , for instance: Marks, [2000],
6 Carothers, [1992]; Further discussion Marks, [2000] 46.
’According to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [2001] table 1 A.3 
p. 57.
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The role of religion in the modem world has been largely overlooked by international 
lawyers. It has lately, however, become a focal point of attention for scholars of 
international relations. The study of law should explore the legal aspects of this 
debate. Huntington, in two influential articles8, argued that world politics are entering 
a new phase in which fundamental conflicts will not be between nation-states, or even 
ideological or political rivals, but between civilizations. These are differentiated from 
each other by their history, language, culture, tradition, and, most importantly, 
religion9.
This argument has caused considerable backlash. Among others, Ajami10 counters 
Huntington’s claims by arguing that modernity and secularism are on the rise even in 
non-Westem states, which, according to Huntington’s paradigm, should be on the 
opposite side of the culture-clash to the Western world. He cites India, Turkey and 
Algeria as examples in which middle classes held off religious-traditionalist turns. In 
this thesis it has been seen that this is a ‘glass is half full’ description of situations that 
could equally be described as ‘the glass is half empty’. In Algeria democratic election 
rights were suspended as a way for the secular state to fend off a religious challenge 
to the democratic system (see Chapter One). In Turkey too, religious freedom is 
restricted in order to maintain separation of religion and state (see Chapters Three, 
Five). In India, broad laws restricting religious speech have been recently used to curb 
fostering of religious strife (see Chapter Six). The conflict between religious and 
secular forces in these societies may have a price in civil liberties.
The study of religious freedom and human rights has particular importance for today’s 
international society. Only a principled international approach, applied without 
prejudice, can protect religious freedom worldwide.
8 Huntington, [1993]; Huntington, [1996].
9 While initially Huntington lists all these defining characteristics o f  civilization, his discussion refers 
almost exclusively to religions.
,0 Ajami, [1993]. This is one o f  a number o f responses to Huntington which were published in this 
issue o f Foreign Affairs.
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